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Introduction
Godehard Brüntrup SJ, Benedikt Paul Göcke, Ludwig Jaskolla
1. Panentheism and Panpsychism
Two great forms of unity metaphysics enjoy energetic discussion in the 
current debates of philosophy and theology. Firstly, panpsychism as a natural-
istic, non-reductive ontology of mind has gained ground in the analytic phi-
losophy of mind over the last 25 years.1 Additionally, and dating back to early 
20th century, panentheism has found use in theology and the analytic philoso-
phy of religion to describe the relationship between God and the world.2
This volume is the first attempt to create an anthology of the more recent 
history of philosophy and theology, and aims to bring these two research direc-
tions together in an interdisciplinary conversation.
Our aim is to examine the benefits which panpsychism and panentheism 
offer to one another; which problem-solving proposals are made possible by 
a synthesis of the two; and where the limitations of their interplay need to be 
demarcated.
One could of course wonder if the commonalities and potential connec-
tions between panpsychism and panentheism do not in fact end with the com-
mon prefix »Pan«. We would beg to differ: In the history of philosophy and 
theology, great thinkers have repeatedly combined panpsychism and panen-
theism in their systematic designs. The philosophical systems of Karl Christian 
Friedrich Krause3, Alfred North Whitehead4 and Charles Hartshorne5 all con-
tain panpsychistic and panentheistic motifs.
However, this is not primarily a historical anthology. Rather, we are con-
cerned with the systematic question of the explanatory potential which the 
combination of panpsychism and panentheism holds for current debates in 
philosophy and theology.
Although panpsychism and panentheism prima facie refer to different areas 
of subject matter, they exhibit astonishing structural similarities: Both pan-
psychistic and panentheistic approaches generally mediate between dualistic 
1   Brüntrup and Jaskolla 2017.
2   Cf. Peacocke 2004.
3   Cf. Göcke 2018.
4   Whitehead 1929/1978.
5   Hartshorne 1967.
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and monistic theories by avoiding a complete ontological separation of God 
and the world, or mind and matter. The rejection of reductionism and the 
legacy of unity metaphysics can also be seen as common ground. God and 
world, as well as mind and matter, are regarded as different but nevertheless 
intrinsically related to each other.
The present volume is divided into two major thematic areas: The first 
section focuses on articles that examine the relationship between panpsy-
chism and panentheism from a philosophical perspective. The second section 
focuses on articles that examine the relationship between panpsychism and 
panentheism from a theological perspective. Our aim in compiling the articles 
was to assemble a clearly interdisciplinary anthology, containing both philo-
sophical and theological approaches. Our objective is to encourage the debate 
with each other’s discipline in order to enable new insights beyond established 
boundaries.
We hope that we can make a contribution with this volume to a debate 
whose conceptual potential is not just far from exhausted, but rather just be-
ginning to establish itself as a promising approach in philosophical theology.
The editors would like to thank the following institutions and individuals 
for their contributions to the creation of this volume:
The research upon which this volume is based was carried out by the DFG 
Emmy Noether junior research group »A scientific theology? Naturalism and 
Philosophy of Science as Current Challenges of Catholic Theology (Grant 
ID 295845819)«, and was made possible by the project »Analytic Theology and 
the Nature of God« sponsored by the John Templeton Foundation.
Friedrich Sieben, Stephen Henderson, Max Brunner and Tobias Keweloh 
have made major contributions to the production of the printed version of 
this volume.
2. Summaries
In his essay Interdisciplinary Convergences with Biology and Ethics via Cell 
Biologist Ernest Everett Just and Astrobiologist Sir Fred Hoyle Theodore Walker 
tries to show that biology and ethics can supplement theology. According to 
cell biologist Ernest Everett Just (1883-1941) ethical behaviors »evolved« from 
our very most primitive origins in cells. Evolution includes evolving ethi-
cal behaviors. Hence, for a significant portion of the panpsychist spectrum, 
from cells to humans, ethical behavior is necessary for evolutionary advances. 
This insight contributes to solving the problem of relating ethics to nature. 
Ethical behavior is natural. Also, natural ethics and cell biology coupled with 
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human-mind-body-cell analogy can supplement ontological panentheism 
(all-in-God-ism) by adding a corresponding spatial metaphor (all-inside-
God-ism). God is the all-inclusive whole of reality, and we are parts of reality 
included inside the all-inclusive divine body, somewhat like cells inside our 
bodies. Furthermore, according to astrobiologist Sir Fred Hoyle (1915-2001), 
life-favoring providence (ethical behavior) extends far beyond planet Earth. 
Hoyle advanced theories of stellar evolution (we are evolved stardust) and cos-
mic evolution guided by all-inclusive divine intelligence.
In his Panpsychism and Panentheism Benedikt Göcke works out a plausible 
version of the panpsychist thesis before two arguments for panpsychism are 
examined for their soundness. In a next step, two arguments against the devel-
oped panpsychist thesis are discussed, which, prima facie, pose theoretically 
insurmountable aporia for it. In a final step, it is argued that panpsychism as 
 located in analytic philosophy can overcome these problems when it is includ-
ed in the wider theoretical framework of panentheism, as it is paradigmatical-
ly set out in the classical German philosophy of the panentheist Karl Christian 
Friedrich Krause and his pupil Arthur Schopenhauer.
In her Deploying Panpsychism for the Demarcation of Panentheism Joanna 
Leidenhag addresses the problem that if panentheism cannot be clearly de-
fined and demarcated from neighbouring theological positions, then it is in 
danger of becoming a vacuous term, devoid of any purpose or promise within 
theological discourse. Leidenhag helps panentheists avoid this dismal fate in 
two ways. First, she provides a model of the kind of definition and demarca-
tion necessary, by outlining the family of positions known as panpsychism in 
philosophy of mind. Second, she tests the correspondence of specific versions 
of panpsychism to panentheism’s two central claims: (a) that the world is the 
body of God, and (b) that the world is in God. She concludes that a cosmopsy-
chism that posits a non-constitutive relation between the one cosmic subject 
and the many individual subjects, may be a useful, even necessary, ontology 
for panentheists to adopt if they are to deliver on the promise of a middle path 
between classical theism and pantheism.
According to David Skrbina’s God as World-Mind: Some Theological Impli-
cations of Panpsychism, the two perhaps most important concepts in the his-
tory of philosophy are God and mind. Though there is a vast literature on each, 
their intersection is much less examined, and his work seeks to further this 
discussion in light of a broadly panpsychist metaphysics. Panpsychism in con-
junction with a monist ontology suggests that mind is present at all levels of 
physical systems, from the smallest subatomic particles up to the universe as 
a whole. Ultimately Skrbina postulates a sort of minimalist panentheism, one 
on which God is a cosmic mind. On this view, God’s relation to the universe 
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is parallel to that between our own mind and body—no more, no less. Accord-
ing to Skrbina, this theory offers a concrete and tractable model on which to 
conceive of God, and it leads to broader conclusions about the nature of both 
subjects and objects. He concludes that viewing God as a universal mind has 
clear religious and ethical implications, ones which are positive in their own 
right.
In his paper Universal Consciousness as the Ground of Logic Philip Goff first 
argues that mystics in many cultures throughout history claim to have experi-
ences in which it is apparent (to the mystic undergoing the experience) that 
there is a kind of non-dual ›universal consciousness‹ underlying all of reality. 
In a second step, Goff then presents an argument for something like the view 
of reality suggested by these experiences, based on its potential to account for 
the metaphysics and epistemology of logical truth.
In his paper Naïve Panentheism Karl Pfeifer attempts to present a coherent 
view of panentheism that eschews Pickwickian senses of »in« and aligns itself 
with, and builds upon, familiar diagrammed portrayals of panentheism. The 
account is accordingly spatial-locative and moreover accepts the proposal of 
R.T. Mullins that absolute space and time be regarded as attributes of God. In 
addition, however, it argues that a substantive parthood relation between the 
world and God is required. Pfeifer’s preferred version of panpsychism, viz. pan-
intentionalism, is thrown into the mix as an optional add-on. On this account, 
God is conceived of as a »spiritual field« whose nature can be made more in-
telligible by regarding »God« as having a mass-noun sense in some contexts. 
Pfeifer closes with the suggestion that we look to topology and mereology for 
further development of the position outlined in his paper.
In his paper What a Feeling? In Search of a Metaphysical Connection between 
Panpsychism and Panentheism Uwe Voigt raises the following question: Even if 
panpsychism and panentheism are logically independent from one another, 
could there be a metaphysical connection between them? As in the Kripkean 
parallel case of water and H2O, Voigt looks for the foundation for that even-
tual metaphysical connection in a certain kind of experience: the experience 
what it is like to be a microsubject. The disclosure of that experience starts 
from a closer look at the combination problem of panpsychism, whose core 
can be seen in the question how phenomenal bonding is possible. One prom-
ising possibility, according to Voigt, is to understand mental states, as New 
Phenomenology does it, as spatially extended ›atmospheres‹. From a panen-
theist point of view, God could then be conceived of as the mental inside of 
the space which encompasses the whole of a panpsychist universe, and herein 
panpsychists could see the reason why microsubjects are ›lured‹ to combine 
with one another in the first place.
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In his paper God or Space and Nature? Henry More’s Panentheism of Space 
and Panpsychism of Life and Nature Christian Hengstermann argues that 
Cambridge Platonist philosophy of religion as a whole left a decisive mark 
on the history of panentheism and panpsychism. As to panentheism, they 
have been credited with seeking to precipitate a »pantheism controversy« 
more than a century before the outbreak of the historic debate of that name 
in Enlightenment Germany. Theirs is a religious philosophy that may well be 
qualified as a »Spinozism of freedom«, i.e. a system of thought that views God 
as informing and suffusing all of reality, while also emphasizing man’s capacity 
for libertarian choice. Like the more well-known dispute between Friedrich 
Heinrich Jacobi and Moses Mendelssohn about the late Lessing’s Spinozist 
creed, the controversies about Cudworth’s account of Platonist, Patristic and 
Egyptian ancient theology pivoted around God as hen kai pan. As to panpsy-
chism, it is thanks to their staunch resistance both to Cartesian mechanism 
and Spinozist panpsychism that the Cambridge Platonists are accorded a piv-
otal role in the history of this contentious doctrine.
In his Varieties of Panpsychism Philip Clayton argues that, at first glance, the 
panpsychism debate appears to be a question of all or nothing, just as the thief 
either takes all of William’s money or he doesn’t. Clayton, however, suggests 
that we need to think our way beyond this way of approaching panpsychism. 
Particularly in the context of panentheism, panpsychism should be more com-
plex than the thesis that all levels of evolution can be summarized under the 
heading of pan-psyche or, following David Ray Griffin, pan-experience. Instead, 
Clayton argues, the discussion of God, evolution, and psyche needs to be ex-
panded to include the full variety of qualities, including awareness, intention, 
goal-directed behavior, mental representation, cognition, and consciousness. 
Clearly this shift has implications for understanding the nature and scope of 
metaphysics and theology, a topic to which Clayton returns at the end of the 
discussion.
Uwe Meixner’s essay Orthodox Panentheism: Sergius Bulgakov’s Sophiology 
explores the panentheistic ideas within a system of thought which is basical-
ly theologically orthodox, a system which is without impersonalistic tenden-
cies, upholding, instead, a personal god: the sophiological theology of Sergius 
Bulgakov (1871-1944), inspired by Platonism, Byzantine Christianity (in the 
guise of Russian Orthodoxy), and German Idealism. The essay also shows that 
Bulgakov’s orthodox panentheism is connected with an orthodox panpsychism.
In their chapter Panentheism and Panexperientialism for Open and Relational 
Theology Thomas Jay Oord and Wm. Andrew Schwartz argue that a particular 
form of theism—»open and relational theology«—has an affinity for panen-
theism and panpsychism. The open and relational theology Oord and Schwartz 
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recommend includes several attractive features. It affirms belief in a personal/
relational God, which offers a host of advantages to those who believe that God 
interacts with creation. According to Oord and Schwartz, their theology further-
more has the advantage of solving at least the theoretical aspect of the problem 
of evil. Oord and Schwartz finish by arguing that open and relational theologies 
that adopt panpsychism and panentheism can also overcome other theoretical 
problems in contemporary thought that alternative theologies cannot. 
In his essay A panpsychist panentheistic incarnational model of the Eucharist 
James Arcadi discusses the conception of the Eucharist as a special locus of the 
divine presence. In virtue of the consecrated elements’ status as the body and 
blood of Christ, and in virtue of Christ’s status as himself God, these objects 
are taken to be an instance of »God with us.« Arcadi’s essay attempts to make 
sense of the presence of Christ in the Eucharist within a panpsychist panen-
theism. Arcadi conjoins a causal explication of panentheism with a panpsy-
chism whereby God supplies the mental component of the cosmos to arrive at 
a conception of orthodox Christology that then funds an incarnational model 
of Christ’s presence in the Eucharist.
Ayon Maharaj’s chapter Panentheistic Cosmopsychism provides the first de-
tailed examination of the views on consciousness of Swami Vivekananda (1863-
1902), the famous nineteenth-century Indian monk who introduced Hinduism 
and Vedānta to the West. Maharaj first presents Vivekananda’s metaphysical 
framework of panentheistic cosmopsychism, according to which the sole real-
ity is Divine Consciousness, which manifests as everything in the universe. He 
then goes on to argue that Vivekananda’s panentheistic cosmopsychism com-
bines elements from the classical Indian philosophical traditions of Sāṃkhya 
and Advaita Vedānta as well as the teachings of his guru Sri Ramakrishna 
(1836-1886). Once this is done, Maharaj reconstructs Vivekananda’s sophisti-
cated arguments in favor of panentheistic cosmopsychism. Maharaj argues 
that Vivekananda’s panentheistic cosmopsychism, in light of its distinctive 
features and its potential philosophical advantages over rival theories of con-
sciousness, deserves to be taken seriously by contemporary philosophers of 
mind and religion.
3. References
Brüntrup, G. and L. Jaskolla (2017) »Introduction.« In: G. Brüntrup & L. Jaskolla (eds.) 
Panpsychism. Contemporary Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1-16.
Peacocke, A. (2004) »Introduction: ›In whom we live and move and have our being?‹« 
In: P. Clayton, A Peacocke (eds.) In Whome we Live and Move and Have our Being. 
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Publishing, xviii-xxii.
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Interdisciplinary Convergences with Biology and 
Ethics via Cell Biologist Ernest Everett Just and 
Astrobiologist Sir Fred Hoyle
Theodore Walker Jr.
Biology and ethics (general bioethics) can supplement panpsychism and 
panentheism. According to cell biologist Ernest Everett Just (1883-1941) ethi-
cal behaviors (observable indicators of decision-making, teleology, and psy-
chology) evolved from our very most primitive origins in cells. Hence, for an 
essential portion of the panpsychist spectrum, from cells to humans, ethical 
behavior is natural and necessary for evolutionary advances. Also, biology-
based mind-body-cell analogy (Hartshorne 1984) can illuminate panenthe-
ism. And, consistent with panpsychism, astrobiologist/cosmic biologist Sir Fred 
Hoyle (1915-2001) extends evolutionary biology and life-favoring teleology be-
yond planet Earth (another Copernican revolution) via theories of stellar evo-
lution, cometary panspermia, and cosmic evolution guided by (finely tuned 
by) providential cosmic intelligence, theories consistent with a panentheist 
natural theology that justifies ethical realism.
*   This deliberation is a significant reworking of »Advancing and Challenging Classical Theism 
with Biology and Bioethics: Astrobiology and Cosmic Biology consistent with Theology,« a 
10 August 2017 paper presented at the Templeton Foundation funded international confer-
ence on Analytic Theology and the Nature of God: Advancing and Challenging Classical 
Theism (7-12 August 2017) at Hochschule für Philosophie München [Munich School of 
Philosophy] at Fürstenried Palace, Exerzitienhaus Schloss Fürstenried, in Munich, DE—
Germany. Conference speakers included: John Bishop, University of Auckland, New Zealand; 
Joseph Bracken SJ, Xavier University Cincinnati; Godehard Brüntrup SJ, Munich School of 
Philosophy; Anna Case-Winters, McCormick Theological Seminary; Philip Clayton, Claremont 
School of Theology; Benedikt Göcke, Ruhr University Bochum; Johnathan D. Jacobs, 
St. Louis University; John Leslie, University of Guelph; Gesche Linde, University of Rostock; 
Klaus Müller, University of Münster; Ken Perszyk, University of Waikato; Andrew Pinsent, 
Oxford University; Thomas Schärtl-Trendel, University of Regensburg; Johannes Stoffers 
SJ, Munich School of Philosophy; Giovanni Ventimiglia, University of Lucerne; Theodore 
Walker Jr., Perkins School of Theology at Southern Methodist University; coordinated by 
Prof. Dr. Godehard Brüntrup SJ and Dr. Tobias Müller; with Niklas Ernst, Fredrich Sieben, 
and others.
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1. Biology and Ethics—From Cells to Humans—E. E. Just
1.1 Interdisciplinary Convergences with Biology
Obviously, deliberating about »panpsychism and panentheism« requires at-
tending to psychology and theology. And it may be that logic and argumenta-
tion can demonstrate that panpsychism is correct.
Nevertheless, Benedikt Paul Göcke finds that logically valid arguments 
showing »that panpsychism is correct« do not address »how it is possible 
that panpsychism is correct« (2018: 231). Also, logically valid arguments do 
not address empirical questions about actuality. Attempts at »empirical jus-
tification« are discouraged by various factors, including »the idea that pan-
psychism is useless speculation,« the »epistemic asymmetry between mental 
and physical properties,« the lack of »direct access« to other minds, and the 
seemingly »completely alien to us« nature of extreme low level phenomena 
or »proto-mentality« (Brüntrup and Jaskolla 2017: 4). Furthermore, empirical 
questions are not addressed because logical arguments from panentheist the-
ology, transcendental metaphysics, and transcendental phenomenology are 
indeed methods appropriate to demonstrating that panpsychism has positive 
truth-value.
Nevertheless, Göcke’s finding stands. Logically valid arguments do not ad-
dress how panpsychism is possible. And, for addressing how our psychism 
came to be actual, transcendental deductions need to be inferentially and syn-
thetically related to actual examples, including examples from our nonhuman 
relatives.
In metaphysics, exemplification does not prove, demonstrate, or justify. 
Nevertheless, examples can illustrate and illuminate metaphysical truths (logi-
cally necessary truths about existence as such). To be sure, actuality describes 
its part of possibility; and analysis, synthesis, extrapolation, and speculation 
can describe various other parts of possibility. And, any actual or any conceiv-
able counter-example would demonstrate that a putative metaphysical claim 
in not a genuine metaphysical claim, even if said claim described a factual/
contingent truth. Hence, in addition to studying logic, transcendental meta-
physics, theology, and transcendental phenomenology, for the sake of illus-
trating and illuminating panpsychism and panentheism, along with studying 
physics and psychology, we should study biology.1
1   We should study biology, including »general biology« (Just, April 1940) and »Theoretische 
Biologie« [theoretical biology] (Uexküll 1926; and 1934). Also, interdisciplinary conver-
gences with biology in the research university are treated in Undisciplining Knowledge: 
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And perhaps not obviously, studying broad-spectrum evolutionary biol-
ogy, ranging from humans to cells, brings us to yet another discipline: moral 
theory/ethics.
1.2 General Biology and Bioethics
In cell biology, Ernest Everett Just (1883-1941) was a pioneer. He was first to 
observe and describe the »wave of negativity« spreading around the surface 
of an egg cell from the entrance point of the fertilizing spermatozoon (there-
by repulsing other sperm) and first to describe »fast and slow blocks to poly-
spermy« (Byrnes 2010). In addition to authoring more than seventy articles, 
and co-authoring with Frank R. Lillie the chapter on »Fertilization« in General 
Cytology: A Textbook of Cellular Structure and Function for Students of Biology 
and Medicine (1924); Just authored The Biology of the Cell Surface (1939a), and 
Basic Methods for Experiments on Eggs of Marine Animals (1939b), plus numer-
ous unpublished deliberations on general biology and ethics.
E. E. Just advanced »basic methods« (1939b) rigorously attentive to the spe-
cific environment that is normal for living specimens. Prior to Just, marine 
biologists were habitually making uncritical use of specimens (often killed-
and-fixed) extracted from their normal-natural environments. Just criticized 
and corrected findings and concepts derived from such faulty methods. And he 
encouraged attention to development within normal-natural environments. 
Today, in ecological development biology (eco-dev biology), integrative sys-
tems biology, and embryo morphogenesis, Just’s contributions are described 
as pioneering.2
Interdisciplinarity in the Twentieth Century (2015) by Harvey J. Graff. And see »Biology, social 
science, and history: interdisciplinarity in three directions« (2016) by Chris Renwick.
2   Following Just’s pioneering lead, in biology, studying the »cell surface« became vitally im-
portant (Dover 1954, Grinnell 1975). And concerning Just’s pioneering contributions to 
environmental and ecological development biology, systems biology, and embryo morpho-
genesis, see: »Law of Environmental Dependence« (Just and Just 1941: 168, 157-165); »Ernest 
Everett Just, PhD: Pioneer in Ecological Development (Eco-Dev) Biology« (July 2013) by 
Katelyn M. Williams, Bryan A. Wilson, Wendi G. O’Connor, and Monte S. Willis in  Journal of 
the South Carolina Academy of Science, 11 (1): article 5; and see »Ernest Everett Just (1883-
1941)—An early ecological developmental biologist« (1 August 2006) by W. Malcolm Byrnes 
and William R. Eckberg in Developmental Biology, 296 (1): 1-11. In »Ernest Everett Just: 
Experimental Biologist Par Excellence« (February 2010) W. Malcolm Byrnes describes eco-
logical developmental biology as focusing »on development in its natural environmen-
tal context,« and he emphasizes Just’s challenge to established views, a challenge that has 
»much in common with what is known today as integrative systems biology, in which a 
top-down view is just as important as a [established-reductionist] bottom-up view for un-
derstanding the system« (Byrnes February 2010). Just’s early advocacy of a non-reductionist/
holistic approach is appreciated in »Just and Unjust: E. E. Just (1883-1941)« (August 2008) 
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In accordance with his pioneering basic methods, Just held that biology 
should distinguish without separating living organisms from their living envi-
ronment. Just says:
The living thing is part of the natural world, it grows and lives on the stuff of 
which it is made and whence it came. Then living thing and outside world con-
stitute one interdependent unity, as evolution teaches, as the development of an 
animal egg reveals. …
(Just 1939a: 366)
The interdependence between individual and outside world is a postulate which 
has its sanction not from any abstract philosophical principle, but is true be-
cause of the biological basis here set for. The best system of philosophy, then, 
is that which recognizes living thing and outside world as one interdependent 
continuum. Instead of building our philosophical theories of life on the behavior 
of electrons, it is safer to erect them on a biological basis. …
(Just 1939a: 366-67)
Just’s biology-based philosophy of nature produced a general theory of life, a 
»general biology« that identifies phenomena common to all life (April 1940). 
According to Just, living individuals are parts of the natural world, and »they 
form together one inter-acting system« (1939a: 356), »one interdependent con-
tinuum,« and »one interdependent unity« (1939a: 366-67). Obviously, Just’s 
general biology is consistent with panpsychism and panentheism.
In Biology of the Cell Surface (1939a), where Just was mainly concerned to 
offer an account of the living ectoplasm interacting with a living environment, 
he also offered briefly a biology-based theory of ethics, a general bioethics. 
Just’s general bioethics is distinct from special medical bioethics. Special bio-
ethics treats medical ethics among humans. Just’s general bioethics treats the 
evolution of ethical behavior, starting from cells.
The first book using the term »bioethics« was Bioethics: Bridge to the Future 
(1971) by Van Rensselaer Potter (born 1911, died 2001). Relative to contemporary 
medical meanings (medical ethics, nursing ethics, biomedical ethics), Potter’s 
original meaning of the term »bioethics« was literally biology converges with 
ethics. And given this wider scope (wider than medical ethics), bioethics in-
cluded relating study of land-and-forest to ethics. So Potter dedicated his book 
to the memory of land conservationist Aldo Leopold (born 1887, died 1948), 
»who anticipated the extension of ethics to Bioethics« (Potter 1971: v). The 
by James F. Crow in Genetics, 179: 1735-1740. Also, in embryo morphogenesis, Just strongly 
influenced essential concepts (concepts usually attributed to Holtfreter) according to 
»Ernest Everett Just, Johannes Holtfreter, and the Origin of Certain Concepts in Embryo 
Morphogenesis« (2009) by W. Malcolm Byrnes in Molecular Reproduction & Development, 
76: 912-921.
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wide scope of »bioethics« allowed adding »global« to Global Bioethics: Building 
on the Leopold Legacy (1988) by Van Rensselaer Potter.3 Here Potter identified 
Leopold as »unquestionably the first bioethicist« because Leopold was »first 
to envision a new ethical basis for human conduct« and »first to develop an 
ecological ethic (which he called the land ethic) …« (Potter 1988: xiii). Hence, 
bioethicists should appreciate the »pioneering efforts« (Potter 1988: xiv) ad-
vanced in »The Land Ethic« in A Sand County Almanac (1949) by Aldo Leopold.
Another pioneering approach to general bioethics, an approach that was 
pioneering for ecological development biology, was advanced in Biology 
of the Cell Surface (1939a [also 1933; 1940]) by Ernest Everett Just. In his brief 
account of biology converging with ethics, Just supplemented a Darwinian 
emphasis (upon struggle against the surrounding environment) by adding 
a Kropotkinian [Peter Kropotkin] emphasis upon »mutual aid« and »co-
operation« with the surroundings. Just said:
Life is not only a struggle against the surroundings from which life came; it is also 
a co-operation with them. The Kropotkin theory of mutual aid and co-operation 
may be a better explanation of the cause of evolution than the prevailing popu-
lar conception of Darwin’s idea of the struggle for existence. [And with cells, 
T.W.] The means of co-operation and adjustment is the ectoplasm [the cell sur-
face, T.W.]. …
(Just 1939a: 367)
Just agreed with Kropotkin. Natural selection alone cannot explain evolution-
ary advances. »Mutual aid« and »co-operation« with the surroundings (ethical 
behaviors) are essential to explaining evolution.
And in Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution (1902) Peter Kropotkin had pre-
dicted that future research would reveal »mutual aid« among microbes.
With many large divisions of the animal kingdom mutual aid is the rule. Mutual 
aid is met with even amidst the lowest animals, and we must be prepared to 
learn some day, from the students of microscopical pond-life, facts of uncon-
scious mutual support, even from the life of micro-organisms.
(Kropotkin 1902: 14)
3   According to H. Tristram Englehardt Jr. of the Center for Ethics, Medicine, and Public Issues, 
the term »bioethics« now serves »to identify the disciplined analysis of the moral and con-
ceptual assumptions of medicine, the biomedical sciences, and the allied health professions« 
(Englehardt’s foreword to Potter’s 1988 book: p. x). In contrast to such medical definitions of 
bioethics, Englehardt observes that, as used by Potter in 1971, the term »bioethics« had a 
more general meaning. Similarly, »bioethics« had a more general meaning in »Bioethics: A 
Review of the Ethical Relationships of Humans to Animals and Plants« (1927) by Fritz Jahr 
(Hans-Martin Sass 2007).
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Just’s study of microscopic life fulfilled Kropotkin’s prediction. Just recognized 
that in order for multicellular organisms to evolve from single cell organisms, 
or grow from individual egg cells, »co-operation« and »mutual aid« are neces-
sary; and he observed examples of this bioethical principle at microbial levels.
1.3 Mind-Body-Cell Analogy
Biology can serve panpsychism and panentheism by supplying an exception-
ally illuminating analogy.4 Contrary to Krause’s explicit argument against un-
derstanding panentheism in any spatial way (Göcke 2018: 178-179), a human 
mind-body-cell analogy adds a spatial metaphor (inside, outside) for panen-
theism understood as all-inside-God-ism. Biology shows that we are composed 
of living cells; and experience reveals that a living person is more than the sum 
of her/his cellular parts. According to Charles Hartshorne’s biology-instructed 
»person-to-cell analogy« for God, all creatures are like cells in the »cosmic 
body« of the all-inclusive Creator, »outside« of whom »there is nothing« (1984: 
59; also 1975 [c1937]: 197).
This biology-based analogy illuminates the panentheist idea that God is the 
one all-inclusive living individual »in whom we live and move and have our 
being« (Clayton and Peacocke 2004), the »one all-inclusive whole of reality« 
(Ogden 1984: 21; also Hartshorne 1973 [1967]: 7, 12, 16; 1975 [c1937]: 25, 72, 163, 
208).5 Nevertheless, in agreement with Krause, the spatial inside-outside as-
pect of mind-body-cell analogy fails to show there can be no »outside« of the 
all-inclusive whole of reality.
1.4 Partialist Fallacy
The idea of one all-inclusive-living-loving-creative whole of reality is a panen-
theistic conception of »the Creator« (in whom we creatures live and move). 
4   Biology-based analogy can also serve ethics. For instance, the egg cell’s »wave of negativ-
ity« repulsing all but one spermatozoon (described by E. E. Just) can serve as an appropri-
ate analogue for marital fidelity (coffee platform conversation with Andrew Pinsent on 
10 August 2017 and lunch conversation with Joseph Bracken on 11 August 2017 at internation-
al conference on Analytic Theology and the Nature of God).
5   Concerning Hartshorne’s panentheism: In the Preface to the 1975 reprint of his 1937 book 
Beyond Humanism: Essays in the Philosophy of Nature (1975 [c1937]) Charles Hartshorne of-
fers two important »retractions« from his 1937 terminology. He retracts labeling his »neo-
classical« metaphysics and theology with the classical term »pantheism« [pan-theism] in 
favor of labeling it »my panentheism« [pan-en-theism] (italics added); and he retracts label-
ing it »naturalism« (which implies contingent existence and contingent actuality, instead of 
necessary existence and contingent actuality) in favor of labeling it »supernaturalism« (1975 
[c1937]: viii-ix). As indicated in this Preface, after 1937, Hartshorne’s consistent typological 
label—for his (and Whitehead’s) organic cosmology and theology—became »panentheism.«
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Here theology (all-inclusive Creator) is rightly entangled with biology (in-
cluded creatures and creations). Obviously, from this panentheistic-Creator-
affirming perspective, failure to conceive of one all-inclusive living whole of 
reality (conceiving only of parts) is a fallacy in theology and biology.
And perhaps not obviously, conceiving only of parts is also a fallacy in eth-
ics. To be sure, this »partialist fallacy« was explicitly named in two books on 
moral theory (Gamwell 1984; Gamwell 1996 [c1990]).
In Franklin I. Gamwell’s The Divine Good: Modern Moral Theory and the 
Necessity of God (1996 [c1990]), »partialist fallacy« labels a failure to refer to 
the all-inclusive whole of reality that includes »the divine good« which is »the 
comprehensive variable that identifies the good as such« (1996 [c1990]: 149n.15, 
178). Similarly, the logical necessity of reference to divine goodness in ethics is 
developed in chapter 4 »God and Righteousness« in Man’s Vision of God and 
the Logic of Theism (1941) by Charles Hartshorne. According to Hartshorne, the-
ology serves theory of value by providing »explicit recognition« of »the whole 
of which all lesser values are parts« (Hartshorne 1975 [c1937]: 25). Following 
Hartshorne, Gamwell finds that the »partialist fallacy« (failure to refer to the 
divine whole) has been characteristic of modern moral theory since Immanuel 
Kant. And because reference to God (whose necessary existence is demon-
strated by valid metaphysical arguments) and the divine good is a necessity for 
adequate moral theory, modern moral theory is necessarily inadequate.
1.5 Partialist Fallacy in Cosmology
In addition to recognizing the partialist fallacy in biologically-psychologically 
entangled theology, and in moral theory, we should also recognize the partial-
ist fallacy in cosmology. Though the very word »cosmos« implies a cosmic 
whole, many cosmological theories refer only to parts of reality. Referencing 
only parts of reality (even all parts of reality [for example, in one form of pan-
theism God is the sum of all parts of reality]) can yield only inadequate ac-
counts of cosmic reality.
The term »big bang« (a term coined by »steady state« advocate Fred Hoyle) 
encourages committing the partialist fallacy by suggesting analogy to an ex-
ploding bomb or grenade. With a bang, a grenade explodes into many frag-
ments, obliterating the whole grenade. For the sake of correcting our tendency 
to conceive only of parts, we should notice that unexploded whole grenades 
are parts of the whole of reality, and that exploded grenade fragments are 
also parts of the whole of reality. Unlike parts of reality, the whole of reality 
is eternally all-inclusive. Cosmology should include recognizing that whether 
exploding/expanding or collapsing, or in some relatively steady state, all parts 
of reality are parts of the cosmic whole of reality.
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To conceive only of parts (as though there could be parts of no whole of re-
ality) is to commit the partialist fallacy. Where the partialist fallacy is avoided, 
cosmology converges with theology and moral theory.
1.6 Ethical Behavior Rooted in Biology
In moral theory, when going beyond the logically necessary metaphysics of 
morals, in addition to avoiding the partialist fallacy by referring to the necessary 
whole of reality (the divine good), an adequate moral theory must also refer to 
unnecessary/contingent factual examples. And according to Just, moral theory 
should have roots in biology. »Here«—among non-reductionist theories of life 
instructed by observations from biology, including cell biology—»we may seek 
the roots of man’s ethical behavior« (Just 1939a: 367). In the final footnote in 
Biology of the Cell Surface, Just said he would »deal with this point at greater 
length« in a »forthcoming« work (1939a: 367).
Tragically, before he could persuade a publisher to print said forthcom-
ing work on the biological roots of human ethical behavior, Just died in 
1941. Thankfully, manuscript pages are preserved at the Howard University 
Moorland-Spingarn Research Center.
1.7 Biological Origins of Ethical Behavior
»The Origin of Man’s Ethical Behavior« (1941, unpublished  manuscript6) 
was co-authored by Ernest Everett Just and his research associate Hedwig A. 
Schnetzler Just. In the opening chapter »The Problem Stated,« after rejecting 
the idea that moral theory should be restricted to religion and philosophy, Just 
and Just say: »… we intend to treat ethics as a problem in biology … It is within 
the field of biology, then, that we locate human ethics, or better to say, man’s 
ethical behavior« (Just and Just 1941: 2-3 [also 4, 91, 146]).
6   »The Origin of Man’s Ethical Behavior« (October 1941, unpublished manuscript) was pre-
viously called »Ethics and the Struggle for Existence« in a 15 April 1941 letter from Just to 
J. W. Buchanan (Kenneth R. Manning 1984: 327, 385 note 12); and referenced as »some 400 
typed pages« (including annotated bibliography) in a 15 October 1940 letter from Just to 
W. C. Allee; and referenced as »a forthcoming essay« in Just’s 1939 book—The Biology of the 
Cell Surface (1939a: 367). Handwritten drafts »are preserved in the Howard collection [of 
E. E. Just papers at the Howard University Moorland-Spingarn Research Center]: EEJ(H), 
box 125-21, folder 396« (Manning 1984: 385 note 12). Also, adding recently (25 May 2018) dis-
covered, by Theodore Walker Jr. and Lillie R. Jenkins, typed pages (from box 125-9, folder 162; 
and from box 125-19, folder 382 [mostly from folder 382]) yields 251 pages, now transcribed 
and edited by T. Walker, L. R. Jenkins, and W. Malcolm Byrnes, in consultation with Stuart 
Newman, and now called »The Biological Origins and Evolution of Ethical Behavior: From 
Cells to Humans« (2019 [1941]).
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The »origin of man’s corporeal being« (»his material being«) is described in 
terms of evolutionary biology. Similarly, according to Just and Just, the »origin 
of man’s ethical behavior« (»Man as spiritual being …«) should be described in 
terms of evolutionary biology. (Just and Just 1941: 6-8).
Darwin, Huxley, Kropotkin, and others had in various ways related ethics 
to evolutionary influences from sub-human relatives, such as apes and other 
mammals with brains and central nervous systems and herd instincts.7 To this, 
Just and Just added a more distant reach. They reached further down the bio-
logical spectrum, and further back in the history of life on Earth, than contem-
porary or previous others. They argued that ethical behavior (mutual aid and 
cooperation with others and with the surrounding environment) »evolved« 
from our »very most primitive fore-runner« (Just and Just 1941: 12 [also 17]): 
from cells.
The Just and Just emphasis upon observing »mutual aid« (Kropotkin) and 
»co-operation« (»ethical behavior«) throughout nature (from the most primi-
tive cells to humans) witnessed against the prevailing overemphasis upon 
competitive ›struggle for existence,‹ an overemphasis advanced more by fol-
lowers of Darwin than by Darwin who was speaking in metaphor (Just and Just 
1941: 108, 110, 119 [also p. 240]). This overemphasis produced a crisis for moral 
theory/ethics conceived as part of natural philosophy. Contrary to generic 
natural law, this overemphasis made ethical behavior seem unnatural, even 
contrary to nature. In the postscript »Mutual Aid and Ethics« (1941: 211-243) 
Just addressed this crisis and its aftermath in the opening paragraph, saying:
The promulgation of the theory of natural selection, emphasizing as it did the 
struggle for existence, dates a crisis in ethics. Over-emphasized by Darwin’s fol-
lowers, the struggle for existence came soon to be a credo not only in biology 
but also outside of it. It gave birth to a philosophy that founded a new politi-
cal school of thought which, in my judgment, came to be more pernicious than 
the Machiavellian idea which, save for sporadic recrudescenses, was in modern 
times outmoded. Thus translated, it gave western civilization a new fire, all the 
more injurious because an invention alleged to be nature’s creation. It came to 
be spiritually a burning of all books about airy dreams wherein Utopias and 
7   Evolution and ethics were related in The Descent of Man, and Section in Relation to Sex (1871) 
by Charles Darwin, in Evolution and Ethics (1894) by Thomas Huxley, in Mutual Aid: A Factor 
of Evolution (1902) by Peter Kropotkin, and in Ethics: Origin and Development (1924) by 
Peter Kropotkin. Recent efforts include: Evolution and Ethics: Human Morality in Biological 
and Religious Perspectives (2004) edited by Philip Clayton and Jeffrey Schloss, and Darwin: 
A Richer Account of Evolution (2008) edited by John B. Cobb Jr. Also, see »A Sociobiological 
Expansion of Evolution and Ethics« (1989) by George C. Williams, the preface to the 1989 
Princeton edition of Huxley’s Evolution and Ethics (1894).
20 Theodore Walker Jr.
sequestered isles of peace were chartered. It left only hell burning, made earth a 
hell of struggle; in the smoke, paradise vanished and with it peace on earth and 
good will to men.
(Just and Just 1941: 211 [postscript page »a«], italics added)
Similarly, panpsychist-panentheist logician-philosopher Charles Hartshorne 
had seen that it was important to correct the Darwinian idea that ethical be-
havior is not natural. In Beyond Humanism: Essays in the Philosophy of Nature 
(1975 [c1937]) Hartshorne said:
The Darwinian conception of animal life as primarily a ruthless struggle certainly 
did contaminate ethics extensively. Those who wished to resist this contamina-
tion did two things: they emphasized the distinctiveness of man (Huxley), and 
they pointed out that cooperation is as genuine an aspect of all animal life as 
conflict, even if the scope of the cooperation is usually very narrow (Kropotkin). 
This insistence that human love is not an utter stranger in the world was logically 
[29|30] and psychologically imperative. We must somehow see the world as 
one, even in respect to ethical problems …
(Hartshorne 1975 [c1937]: 29-30)
Over-emphasis upon competitive struggle in nature contaminated eth-
ics (Hartshorne 1975 [c1937]: 29) and dated »a crisis in ethics« (Just and Just 
1941: 211 [a]). This crisis-inducing over-emphasis was corrected by recognizing 
the importance of mutual aid and co-operation (ethical behavior) through-
out nature, even among cells. Thereby, cell biologist Ernest Everett Just and 
Hedwig A. Schnetzler Just made an important contribution to moral theory/
ethics.
Now, with the 2018 discovery of this unpublished manuscript, their contribu-
tion can be more widely received. In addition to appreciating Just’s pioneering 
contributions to cell biology, now we can better appreciate his contributions to 
biology-based moral theory. Furthermore, appreciating Just’s general biology 
and bioethics may help with achieving new advances in psychology, anthro-
pology, and social ethics.
1.8 Psychology, Anthropology, Social Ethics—Traveling a Path Pioneered 
by Just
In psychology and anthropology, some theorists are traveling a path converg-
ing with biology and ethics, a path pioneered by Just from the 1930s to 1941. 
Among preeminent examples, evolutionary influences upon ethical behavior 
are described by Robert Wright (1994), William F. Allman (1994), Jeremy Rifkin 
(2009), and Frans de Waal (2009).
21Interdisciplinary Convergences with Biology and Ethics
Robert Wright in The Moral Animal: The New Science of Evolutionary 
Psychology (1994) quotes Charles Darwin predicting that »through study of 
evolution, ›light will be thrown on the origin of man and his history,’« and »›in 
the distant future‹ the study of psychology ›will be based on a new founda-
tion’« (Wright 1994: 3 [Origin of Species, p. 458 (Wright endnote 1)]). Wright 
emphasizes »distant future« by observing that in 1960, 100 years after Origin 
of Species (1859), historian John C. Greene observed that Darwin would have 
been disappointed because in 1960 anthropological studies included little 
study of evolutionary influences [See Darwin and the Modern World View (1961) 
by John C. Greene]; but, »a revolution started« between 1963 and 1974 when 
four biologists (William Hamilton; George C. Williams; Robert Trivers; John 
Maynard Smith) wrote about evolutionary influences upon the social behav-
ior of nonhuman animals (Wright 1994: 4). Then, in 1975, a transdisciplinary 
synthesis (of social behavior studies in animals and evolutionary biology) pro-
duced »sociobiology« in Edward O. Wilson’s Sociobiology: The New Synthesis 
(1975). And since the mid-1970s, increasingly, evolutionary biology has been 
applied to human behavior. This revolutionary paradigm shift is leading to 
a »new science of evolutionary psychology« (Robert Wright 1994). Similarly, 
rooting modern psychology and modern behavior in stone age humanity 
yields evolutionary psychology in William F. Allman’s The Stone Age Present: 
How Evolution Has Shaped Modern Life: From Sex, Violence, and Language to 
Emotions, Morals, and Communities (1994).
More recently, in Empathic Civilization: The Race to Global Consciousness in a 
World in Crisis (2009) Jeremy Rifkin offers »a new interpretation of the history 
of civilization« (p. 1). This new interpretation is based upon a »radical new 
view of human nature« that is now »emerging in the biological and cognitive 
sciences« (p. 1). Rifkin says this new interpretation is »forcing us to rethink 
the long-held belief that human beings are, by nature, aggressive, materialistic, 
utilitarian, and self-interested« (p. 1). We are being forced to rethink human 
nature because scientists are now discovering that nature generally is not ade-
quately described by the still prevailing view that evolution is about ›survival of 
the fittest‹ where ›the fittest‹ are the most aggressively self-interested. Instead, 
new research indicates ›fitness for survival‹ includes capacity for empathy and 
cooperative pursuit of mutual wellbeing. Rifkin argues that a realistic hope for 
overcoming our present global ecological crisis can derive from this new dis-
covery of empathy in nature. Similarly, in The Age of Empathy: Nature’s Lessons 
for a Kinder Society (2009) Frans de Waal argues that new research revealing 
altruism and fairness among animals can inspire a biology-based pursuit of »a 
kinder society.«
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And most recently, contemporary researchers are starting to see what 
E. E. Just reported during the 1930s, cooperative behavior among cells. For in-
stance, see »Team Players: Long thought mostly to compete with one another, 
microbes turn out to form partnerships that rule the planet« (November 2018) 
by Jeffrey Marlow and Rogier Braakman.
Natural law is not about »only the Angelicall and human Nature« (Matthew 
Hale 2015 [1693]: 13). According to cell biologist Ernest Everett Just (1883-1941), 
from cells to humans, ethical behavior is natural and necessary for evolution-
ary advances.
In Part II, we will see how astrobiologist/cosmic biologist Sir Fred Hoyle 
(1915-2001) extends evolutionary biology and life-favoring teleology beyond 
planet Earth via theories of stellar evolution, cometary panspermia, and cos-
mic evolution guided by (finely tuned by) providential cosmic intelligence.8 
And we will see that these theories are consistent with a panentheist »natural 
theology« that justifies ethical realism.9
2. Biology and Ethics—Beyond Earth Science—Fred Hoyle
2.1 Another Scientific Revolution
Consider the popular idea of two scientific revolutions: a Copernican revolu-
tion followed by a Darwinian revolution. This idea is addressed by biologist 
Francisco J. Ayala in »From Paley to Darwin: Design to Natural Selection« (2008) 
in Back to Darwin: A Richer Account of Evolution, edited by John B. Cobb Jr. In 
8   Biology has been extended beyond planet Earth via theories of stellar evolution, cometary 
panspermia, and finely tuned cosmic evolution (Hoyle, Wickramasinghe). Psychology has 
been extended to ultimate extremes (all the way down to observing quantum decisions and 
nonlocal entanglements, and all the way up to cosmic relations) via quantum physics at the 
down end and quantum cosmology at the up end. The call for a new »science of conscious-
ness«—advocated in Shadows of the Mind: A Search for the Missing Science of Consciousness 
(1994) by Roger Penrose—nourished the emergence of quantum cosmology, such as found 
in a collection of essays in Consciousness and the Universe: Quantum Physics, Evolution, Brain 
and Mind (2011) edited by Sir Roger Penrose, Stuart Hameroff, and Subhash Kak.
9   Here the term »natural theology« indicates logical study of logos about theos within univer-
sity research compliant »natural philosophy« or »philosophy of nature«—recently called 
»science«—and featuring six characteristic commitments distinguished by Erkki Vesa Rope 
Kojonen: commitment to (1) »realism,« (2) »participatory ontology« such that study of crea-
tures and creations can reveal something about the Creator, (3) a positive view of reason, 
(4) formulating logical arguments or proofs, (5), valuing rational factual evidence, and (6) the 
conviction that natural theology has a »positive value for religious life« (Kojonen Summer 
2017: 4-5 in online preprint). For the sake of moral theory within natural philosophy (natural 
law/natural ethics), commitment to realism, especially ethical realism, is essential.
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a chapter section—titled »Darwin’s Revolution«—Ayala argues persuasively 
that a »priggish version« of this idea is true, yet inadequate.
I have proposed that this version of the two revolutions is inadequate: what it 
says is true, but it misses what is most important about these two intellectual 
revolutions, namely, that they ushered in the beginning of science in the modern 
sense of the word. These two revolutions may jointly be seen as the one scien-
tific revolution, with two stages, the Copernican and the Darwinian. … Origin of 
Species is important because it completed the Copernican revolution, initiated 
three centuries earlier, and thereby radically changed our conception of the uni-
verse and the place of mankind in it.
(Ayala 2008: 68)
Ayala holds that Copernicus and Darwin achieved »one scientific revolution 
with two stages« (2008: 68).
Stage one of this scientific revolution [Copernicus] »consisted in displac-
ing the earth from its previously accepted locus as the center of the universe, 
moving it to a subordinate place as one more planet revolving around the sun« 
(Ayala 2008: 67, italics added).
Stage two of this same scientific revolution [Darwin] »consisted in displac-
ing humans from their position as the center of life on Earth, with all other 
species created for the purpose of humankind, and placing humans instead 
as one species among many in the living world, so that humans are related to 
chimpanzees, gorillas, and other species by shared common ancestry« (Ayala 
2008: 67-68, italics added). The Darwinian second stage »… completed the 
Copernican revolution …« (Ayala 2008: 68, 69).
Accordingly, scientific revolution stage one (in astronomy) was displacing 
the Earth from the spatial center of the universe, and placing the Earth in revo-
lution around a star. Then, stage two (in biology) was displacing humans from 
un-relatedness to other evolving life on Earth. And now, another scientific rev-
olution (in astrobiology and cosmic biology) is displacing the Earth again. Now 
Earth is no longer conceived to be the biological center of the universe.10
10   With regard to displacing humans from the biological center; in Beyond Humanism: 
Essays in the Philosophy of Nature (1975 [c1937]) Charles Hartshorne says, »the notion that 
man is the center of the universe« is »not yet completely shattered by astronomy, since 
we still do not know that we are not the highest of the creatures; but it certainly has no 
positive support from reason—to say the least,« and Hartshorne conceives of the pos-
sibility of creatures »more intelligent or more richly sensitive than we« (1975 [c1937]: 88). 
Hartshorne also conceived of »intermediate individualities« possibly »interposed be-
tween« the universal individual (God) and human individuals (1975 [c1937]: 310). In other 
words: individuals less inclusive than God, and more inclusive than humans. A similar 
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The idea that all life originated in some »warm little pond« (Darwin to 
Joseph Hooker in 1871) on planet Earth is being replaced with the idea of a 
vastly larger pond: our Milky Way galaxy (with our solar system embedded in 
a spiral arm revolving around a galactic center). Moreover, the Milky Way is 
one among many billions of galactic ponds. Contrary to the astronomically 
improbable belief that microbial life originated exclusively in our little pond; 
Fred Hoyle advanced the vastly more probable idea that microbial life as such 
»did not begin on the Earth« (1980: 21), that »life is not confined to a particu-
lar galaxy,« and that »Life can spread itself through the Universe« (1980: 23). 
Rather than being restricted to Earth, life is »a cosmic phenomenon« (Hoyle 
and Wickramasinghe 7 August 1986).
2.2 B2FH and Stellar Evolution
Historically, the revolutionary practice of connecting evolutionary biology to 
astronomy and cosmology was greatly advanced when Fred Hoyle and oth-
ers produced evidence indicating the heavy elements (elements heavier than 
hydrogen and helium, including especially carbon) were synthesized from hy-
drogen in stars (Hoyle 1946; Hoyle 1947; B2FH 1957).11
B2FH is »known to all astronomers« (Martin Rees 1997: 16) as referring to 
the last name initials of the four authors of »Synthesis of the Elements in 
Stars« (1957): E. Margaret Burbidge, Geoffrey R. Burbidge, William A. Fowler, 
and Fred Hoyle. The work signified by B2FH is so widely known because it was 
»a turning point in our knowledge of how the universe works« (Neil de Grasse 
Tyson and Donald Goldsmith 2004: 165).
This revolutionary turning point connected biology to stellar evolution. We 
are made of heavy elements synthesized in previous generations of stars. We 
are evolved stardust.
Though Fred Hoyle and others did science and mathematics showing that 
we are stardust; many of us first learned to conceive of ourselves as stardust 
from musician-poets Crosby, Stills, Nash & Young singing: »We are stardust. 
We are golden. We are ten billion year old carbon. And we got to get ourselves 
back to the garden« (1969 at Woodstock). Since then (Hoyle 1946; Hoyle 1947; 
B2FH 1957; Woodstock 1969), evolutionary astrobiology (along with advancing 
idea was expressed in Fred Hoyle’s sci-fi novel The Black Cloud (1957) about an interstellar 
cloud of organic molecules endowed with a metabolism and intelligence.
11   See »The Synthesis of the Elements from Hydrogen« (1946) and »On the Formation of 
Heavy Elements in Stars« (1947) by Fred Hoyle; and see »Synthesis of the Elements in 
Stars« (1957) by E. Margaret Burbidge, Geoffrey R. Burbidge, William A. Fowler, and Fred 
Hoyle /B2FH.
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theories of »cosmic evolution« and »cosmic biology«) has been displacing the 
idea that biology is exclusively Earth science.12
2.3 Panspermia, Astrobiology, and Cosmic Biology
Turning—from Earth-only biology to astrobiology and cosmic biology—
was indicated in Fred Hoyle’s The Relation of Biology to Astronomy (1980). 
Here, drawing upon work with Chandra Wickramasinghe, Hoyle argued 
that interstellar clouds include granular particles of bacteria. Hoyle and 
Wickramasinghe advanced a theory of water, organic materials, and microbial 
life being circulated by comets called »cometary panspermia« (1981a; 1982; 
1983; 1 December 1984). And they advanced »the Case for Life as a Cosmic 
Phenomenon« (7 August 1986 [also Wickramasinghe and Tokoro January 2014; 
Wickramasinghe, K. Wickramasinghe, and Tokoro 2019]).
Hoyle predicted that the idea of interstellar and cosmic microbiological 
processes will become obvious to future generations. Hoyle said:
I suspect that the cosmic quality of microbiology will seem as obvious to future 
generations as the Sun being the centre of our solar system seems obvious to the 
present generation.
(Hoyle 1980: 24-25)
Hoyle’s 1980 prediction is coming true. The cosmic quality of microbiology is 
becoming more and more obvious. And the once »maverick science of astrobi-
ology« (Darling 2001) is now becoming less and less maverick.13
12   Concerning »cosmic evolution« and »cosmic biology,« see: Origins: Fourteen Billion Years 
of Cosmic Evolution (2004) by Neil de Grasse Tyson and Donald Goldsmith; »Imperatives 
of Cosmic Biology« (2 March 2010) by Chandra Wickramasinghe and Carl H. Gibson; 
Cosmic Biology: How Life Could Evolve on Other Worlds (c2011) by Louis N. Irwin and Dirk 
Schulze-Makuch; and Vindication of Cosmic Biology: Tribute to Sir Fred Hoyle (1915-2001) 
(2015) edited by Chandra Wickramasinghe. Concerning relations between astronomy and 
biology: In 1937 in Beyond Humanism: Essays in the Philosophy of Nature (1975 [c1937]) 
Charles Hartshorne was saying »astronomy is not as yet of much help in determining the 
prevalence in space-time of conditions favoring animal organism« (58). Since then, espe-
cially since B2FH (1957), astronomers have learned to be of much help to biology; and in 
so doing, they created the new convergent disciplines of astrobiology and cosmic biology.
13   In Life Everywhere: The Maverick Science of Astrobiology (2001) David Darling says, with re-
gard to panspermia theories advanced by Hoyle and Wickramasinghe, »Today … pansper-
mia is at least tolerated« and »the idea of microbes being able to hop from world to world 
has very much entered the scientific mainstream« (47). Also, see The Living Universe: 
NASA and the Development of Astrobiology (2005 [c2004]) by Steven J. Dick (chief NASA 
historian) and James E. Strick. Also see: (Hoyle and Wickramasinghe 30 March 1979), 
(Hoyle and Wickramasinghe 6 November 1979), and (Hoyle and Wickramasinghe 1981; 
1982; September 1983; December 1983; 1984).
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The previous scientific revolution (in astronomy and biology) displaced 
Earth from the spatial center of the universe (Copernicus 1543) and displaced 
humans from un-relatedness to other evolving life on Earth (Darwin 1859). 
The current scientific revolution (in astrobiology and cosmic biology) is dis-
placing Earth from the biological center of the universe, and theory of evolu-
tion on Earth is displaced from un-relatedness to stellar, galactic, and cosmic 
evolution (B2FH 1957). Furthermore, this Copernicus-like revolution is pro-
ducing a cosmic biology (Hoyle and Wickramasinghe 1979; 1980; 1981a; 1982; 
8 September 1983; 1 December 1983; 1984; 7 August 1986) that is consistent with 
natural theology (Hoyle 1984 [c1983]; Hoyle and Wickramasinghe 1981b; 1988).
2.4 Consistent with Natural Theology
Hoyle and Wickramasinghe argue that precisely tuned life-favoring cosmic cir-
cumstances are required to make life possible. The »coupling constants« of 
physics must be chosen with enormous precision (Hoyle and Wickramasinghe 
1981b: 141-43; also Hoyle 1984 [c1983]: 218-19). Creating and sustaining such 
enormously precise cosmic circumstances (today called »cosmic fine tun-
ing«) requires deliberate acts of a »super intelligence,« an interacting and »all-
embracing intelligence« (Hoyle 1984 [c1983]: 215). The numerical calculations 
put the need for cosmic intelligence—exercising cosmic influences—beyond 
question.
A commonsense interpretation of the facts suggests that a superintellect has 
monkeyed with physics, as well as with chemistry and biology, and that there 
are no blind forces worth speaking about in nature. The numbers one calculates 
from the facts seem to me to be so overwhelming as to put this conclusion be-
yond question.
(Hoyle 1981b:12)
Furthermore, given the extreme complexity of even the smallest living mi-
crobe, mathematical calculations witness against the still prevailing theory of 
life emerging from non-life by random/chance assembly.
The chance that life forms might have emerged in this way [by way of random 
assembly, T.W.] is comparable with the chance that a tornado sweeping through 
a junk-yard might assemble a Boeing 747 from material therein.
(Hoyle 1981a: 105)
A commonsense interpretation of the facts forced Hoyle to conclude (against 
his previous atheism) that a cosmic intelligence must be exerting cosmic 
influences favoring the evolution of life. This implicitly pro-theological 
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conclusion is rendered explicit in chapter 9 »Convergence to God« in 
Evolution from Space: A Theory of Cosmic Creationism (1981b) by Fred Hoyle 
and N. Chandra Wickramasinghe.14
This revolutionary practice—of connecting evolutionary biology to cre-
ationist cosmology and natural theology—was anticipated and advanced by 
natural philosophers thinking deeply about science and biology. For instance, 
in Science and the Modern World (1925) Alfred North Whitehead conceived that 
science was becoming »the study of organisms« (103), with physicists studying 
the smaller organisms, and biologists studying the larger organisms. And, with 
emphasis upon universal creativity, Whitehead connected his biology-oriented 
»philosophy of organism« to cosmology and theology in Process and Reality: 
An Essay in Cosmology (1927-28). Similarly, biology was connected to ontology, 
evolutionary cosmology, and natural theology in Beyond Humanism: Essays in 
the Philosophy of Nature (1975 [c1937]) by Charles Hartshorne. Here Hartshorne 
held that »the structure of reality« is »one of organisms within organisms« 
(91), that »the philosophical argument for cosmic evolutionism stands on its 
own feet« (140; italics added), and we are »cells in the body of God« (197).
Revolutionary advances in astrobiology and cosmic biology are catching up 
to philosophical anticipations, and connecting agreeably with »a quiet revolu-
tion« in theology identified in M. W. Brierley’s »Naming a Quiet Revolution: 
The Panentheistic Turn in Modern Theology« (2004). At »the panentheistic 
turn,« theology converges with cosmic biology,15 and with ethics.
14   Concerning God, biology, evolution, creation, and cosmic creationism: See »Hoyle 
on Evolution« (12 November 1981) by Fred Hoyle in Nature; chapter 1—»Chance and 
the Universe«—in The Intelligent Universe: A New View of Creation and Evolution (1984 
[c1983]) by Fred Hoyle; and chapter 10—»The Concept of a Creator«—in Cosmic 
Life-Force (1990) by Fred Hoyle and N. Chandra Wickramasinghe. And, from among theo-
logians at the Perkins School of Theology, see Sisters of Dust, Sisters of Spirit: Womanist 
Wordings on God and Creation (1998) by Karen Baker-Fletcher, and The Big Bang and 
God: An Astro-Theology … (2015) by Theodore Walker Jr. and Chandra Wickramasinghe 
[where »Astro-Theology« indicates a constructive postmodern revision of early modern 
Astro-Theology: Or, A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, from a Survey of the 
Heavens (1715) by William Derham]; and note that in a chapter titled »It’s Only Natural« 
Craig C. Hill [a New Testament scholar attentive to biology] says, »… perhaps our biology 
is meant to drive us to God« (Hill 2016: 21).
15   Concerning panentheism and evolution, see: A Natural Theology for Our Time (1967) 
by Charles Hartshorne; Analytic Theism, Hartshorne, and the Concept of God (1996) and 
Whitehead’s Religious Thought: From Mechanism to Organism, from Force to Persuasion 
(January 2017) by Daniel A. Dombrowski; »Panentheism: A Field-Oriented Approach« 
(2004) and »Actual Entities and Societies, Gene Mutations and Cell Development: 
Implications for a New World View« (Spring/Sumer 2013) by Joseph Bracken; »Evolution 
28 Theodore Walker Jr.
2.5 Panentheism and Ethical Realism
Panentheism helps with discerning that the biblical imperatives—to love our 
neighbors and our enemies as we love ourselves (Matthew 5:43-48; 22:34-40)—
are imperatives founded upon realism, not mere idealism. Every experience 
confirms (by exemplifying) what no experience can deny: we really are partly 
inclusive parts among variously inclusive parts of reality. And logical/mereo-
logical analysis shows that all parts of reality are parts of the whole of reality, 
parts of »the one all-inclusive [divine, T.W.] whole of realty« (Ogden 1984: 21; 
also Hartshorne 1973 [1967]). Hence, conformity to reality (living righteously, 
not missing the mark [not sinning]) requires valuing neighbors, enemies, and 
selves as they/we really are: as parts among parts of the divine whole. This ethi-
cal realism is justified by panentheism.
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Panpsychism and Panentheism
Benedikt Paul Göcke
In what follows, a plausible version of the panpsychist thesis is worked out 
before two arguments for panpsychism are examined for their soundness. In 
a next step, two arguments against the developed panpsychist thesis are dis-
cussed, which, prima facie, pose theoretically insurmountable aporia for it. In 
a final step, it is argued that panpsychism as located in analytic philosophy can 
overcome these problems when it is included in the wider theoretical frame-
work of panentheism, as it is paradigmatically set out in the classical German 
philosophy of the panentheist Karl Christian Friedrich Krause and his pupil 
Arthur Schopenhauer.
1. Panpsychism in Analytic Philosophy of Mind
Panpsychism is a metaphysical theory about the fundamental structure of re-
ality and the ontological categories which constitute it. It rests on the assump-
tion that we dispose of epistemologically reliable access to the fundamental 
structures and qualities of reality that may be grounded both through our 
natural scientific and through our transcendental relationship to reality. As 
a first approximation, the intuition lying behind panpsychism admits of the 
following formulation: Both physical and mental properties are fundamental 
characteristics of reality. Because this formulation does not specify the central 
concepts, the panpsychist intuition must be explicated in several ways in order 
to develop a clear thesis of panpsychism.
1.1 The Fundamental Ubiquity of Physical and Mental Properties
That physical and mental properties are fundamental characteristics of re-
ality means that mental properties cannot be reduced either semantically 
or ontologically to non-mental properties nor can physical properties be re-
duced either semantically or ontologically to non-physical properties. In pan-
psychism, both mental and physical properties, respectively, are fundamental 
properties.1
1   See Chalmers 1996: 126 and Blamauer 2011: 9. See the collections edited by Göcke 2012, and 
Koons/Bealer 2010 for critical analyses of physicalism, and Kim 2007 for an argument against 
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By the assumption that physical properties are fundamental, panpsychism 
is distinguished from idealism from which it follows that physical properties 
can be reduced to mental properties. The demarcation of panpsychism from 
classical property dualism is more difficult. The latter is consistent with the 
panpsychist intuition that mental and physical properties are fundamental 
properties. However, while classical property dualism implies that mental 
properties are only properties of higher creatures and humans, who have a 
complex nervous system, and that some physical things possess only physical 
properties, the panpsychist generally assumes that the class of those entities 
that possess mental qualities is far wider than the class of higher creatures and 
humans.
However, within the panpsychist debate, there is no unanimity about how 
exactly this class is to be determined. As a minimum consensus, and line de-
marcating panpsychism from classical property dualism, the different mani-
festations of panpsychism have in common only the assumption that in 
addition to humans and higher creatures, the fundamental physical entities 
constituting empirical reality, that is, the smallest building blocks of the physi-
cal universe, possess mental and physical properties. The panpsychist assumes 
that between the exemplification of mental and physical properties at the 
fundamental ontological level of reality there obtains a factual equivalence, 
which, on the ground of the opposed semantic and ontological irreducibility 
of mental to physical properties, can only be known a posteriori, not a priori. It 
therefore follows from panpsychism that mentality is, at the fundamental level 
of reality, one ubiquitous and underlying property of reality.
The question of which conditions must be fulfilled for other entities to be 
spoken of as exemplifying mental and physical properties is variously answered 
by panpsychists. Some panpsychists assume that a necessary and sufficient 
condition for the exemplification of mental properties lies in the structure of 
complex physical objects. They argue that, although organisms at every stage 
of development exemplify mental properties, pure aggregates of physical enti-
ties such as tables or stones must be excluded. For in those, the physical build-
ing blocks do not form a well-ordered whole in which each part is connected 
with every other part, and with the whole in a whole constituting interaction.2
non-reductive physicalism. See Göcke 2012a for an argument that phenomenal experience 
belongs ontologically to the fundamental level of reality.
2   See, for this kind of panpsychism Clarke 2004: 5. See also Brüntrup/Jaskolla 2016a: 2: »Most 
forms of panpsychism, however, distinguish between mere conglomerates like a rock forma-
tion and genuine individuals like animals and possibly elementary particles. Mental proper-
ties can only be attributed directly to genuine individuals.«
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To overcome the explanatory difficulty that in every version of panpsychism, 
mentality is ascribed to the fundamental, and so simple, building blocks of 
reality, even though these are not necessarily part of any complex physical 
structure, other panpsychists argue, rather, for the thesis that every entity, on 
every level of complexity, exemplifies both physical and mental properties. 
The difficulty here consists in the fact that it is not clear how exactly physical 
entities, which are not fundamental building blocks of reality, may be ontologi-
cally individuated.3
In what follows, I at first bracket these difficulties and proceed from the min-
imal formulation of the panpsychist thesis, which ascribes mental and physi-
cal properties only to the fundamental building blocks of reality and higher 
living beings and humans, since this thesis sufficiently specifies, and places 
under discussion, the essential elements of panpsychist thinking. We hold to 
the following specification of the minimal panpsychist thesis: Both mental and 
physical properties are ontologically fundamental and, in their exemplification, 
factually equivalent properties of both the fundamental entities constituting real-
ity and the higher creatures and human beings.
1.2 The Fundamental Ubiquity of Physical Structures and  
Subjective Experience
The minimal panpsychist thesis remains unclear until the concepts of physi-
cal and mental properties are specified. In the following I therefore ignore ab-
stract properties and assume that mental and physical properties are the only 
metaphysically relevant property types.
Based on this premise, in a first step, mental properties can be classi-
fied as those properties which logically imply the existence of a subject of 
experience.4 The concept of a subject of experience is thereby minimally 
interpreted ontologically, and implies only that, on logico-conceptual grounds, 
3   For this variant of panpsychism see Blamauer 2011b: 338: »Panpsychism is commonly under-
stood as a doctrine that states that everything that occurs in the world has, in itself, a form 
of consciousness. That is, consciousness is not just a particular human property, but one 
that may be found on all levels of our universe. Mental properties (conscious experience, 
subjectivity, etc.) and physical properties (mass, charge, spin, etc.) are both fundamental and 
universal.« See also Buck 2011: 60.
4   See Foster 1991: 205: »If P is a pain-sensation occurring at a certain time t […] we should 
ultimately represent the occurrence of P as the event of a certain subject’s being in pain at 
t. And if D is a decision occurring at t, […] we should ultimately represent the occurrence 
of D as the event of a certain subject’s taking a decision at t. Quite generally, […] we must 
represent each episode of mentality as the event of a subject’s being in a certain mental 
state at a certain time, or performing a certain act at a certain time, or engaging in a certain 
mental activity over a certain period of time.« See also Shoemaker 1986: 10: »[It is] an obvious 
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we can think no mental property of which the exemplification does not imply 
the existence of a subject which is the ontological bearer of this property.
Mental properties can be further specified as intentional und qualitative 
properties: Every mental property implies both elements of relatedness to an 
intentional object and elements of phenomenal givenness. Mental properties 
are therefore exactly those properties which imply the existence of a minimal-
ly ontologically understood subject of experience that is intentionally related 
to an object, which appears to it in a certain phenomenal manner, and brings 
with it a what-it-is-likeness for the subject of experience of this state. Mental 
properties are thereby intrinsic properties of a subject of experience.5
Based on this understanding of mental properties, physical properties may, 
as a first step, be defined ex negativo: Physical properties are exactly those prop-
erties which are not mental properties. That is, the exemplification of physical 
properties does not conceptually imply the existence of a subject of experi-
ence, which is phenomenally directed towards some intentional content. 
There are two possibilities for arriving at a positive concept of physical prop-
erties, complementary to this aspect: the theory-based and the object-based 
account. The object-based approach to the concept of physical properties rests 
on the assumption that physical properties are exactly those which are exem-
plified by paradigmatic physical objects, or locally supervene on these. The 
theory-based approach rests on the assumption that exactly those properties 
are physical which are part of the ontological inventory of a physical theory, or 
supervene locally on these properties.6
conceptual truth that an experiencing is necessarily an experiencing by a subject of experi-
ence, and involves that subject as intimately as a branch-bending involves a branch«
5   See Strawson 2006: 189: »Experience necessarily involves experiential ›what-it-is-likeness‹, 
and experiential what-it-is-likeness is necessarily what-it-is-likeness for someone-or-
something. Whatever the correct account of the substantial nature of this experiencing 
something, its existence cannot be denied.« See also Blamauer 2011: 103. On the difficulty of 
determining the concept of intrinsic properties, see Seager 2006: 129-30: »The philosophical 
literature on the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties (or relational proper-
ties) is vexed and very far from settled. The core intuition would seem to be the idea that the 
intrinsic properties of x are the properties that all duplicates of x would have […] That is, the 
intrinsics are the properties x has ›all by itself‹ or ›of its own nature‹.«
6   See Stoljar 2002: 313: »A physical property is a property which either is the sort of proper-
ty required by a complete account of the intrinsic nature of paradigmatic physical objects 
and their constituents or else is a property which metaphysically or logically supervenes on 
the sort of property required by a complete account of the intrinsic nature of paradigmatic 
physical objects and their constituents« See also Stoljar 2002: 313: »A physical property is a 
property which either is the sort of property that physical theory tells us about or else is a 
property which metaphysically (logically) supervenes on the sort of property that physical 
theory tells us about.«
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Both approaches are confronted with difficulties. The difficulty of the object-
based approach is that, on the one hand, it is not clear what exactly a paradig-
matic physical object is, and how agreement about this could be achieved, and, 
on the other hand, it is not excluded that paradigmatic physical objects exem-
plify mental properties. If, then, all the properties of a paradigmatic physical 
object were classified as physical properties, then it could happen that the con-
ceptual dichotomy between mental and physical properties itself collapses.
The difficulty of the theory-based approach is, on the one hand, that it is not 
clear which properties a complete and true physical theory implies, because 
current physical theories frequently change and turn out to be false. Based on 
pessimistic meta-induction, it is to be expected that our present best physi-
cal theories will also be overturned, and new physical theories will be devel-
oped that incorporate new or other physical properties into their ontological 
inventory. Similarly to the object-based approach, the fact that genuine mental 
properties can be included in the theoretical framework of physics can also be 
applied to the theory-based approach.7
Nevertheless, the theory-based approach seems to be the more promising 
approach. However, in order to arrive at a positive determination of physical 
properties, it must, in one respect, be made specific and, in another, qualified. 
To avoid the case where mental properties are classified as physical properties 
if they were included in a possible future widening of the ground of physi-
cal theories, the theory-based approach must be restricted in such a way that 
physical properties are exactly the properties assumed in a complete and ad-
equate physical theory; as long as we are not dealing with any ontologically 
surprising extension of the currently known physical theories. Although not 
excluded, it would be particularly ontologically surprising if physical theories 
were to incorporate mental properties as mental properties into their ontologi-
cal inventory.
Based on this restriction, the specification of the theory-based approach as-
sumes that a decisive feature of properties found in physical theories, both 
in the past and in the present as well as in any non-ontologically surprising 
physical theory, consists in the fact that they are dispositional and thus struc-
tural properties: Any fundamental physical property is defined by its relation 
to other physical properties and thus by its dispositional behaviour in certain 
situations.8 This is faintly surprising, because the approach of an empirically 
7   See Melnyk 1997: 623/24. See Crook/Gillet 2001: 349.
8   See Blackburn 1990: 63-64: »Just as the molecular theory gives us only things with disposi-
tions, so any conceivable improvement in science will give us only a better pattern of disposi-
tions and powers. That’s the way physics works.« See also Brüntrup 2011: 17.
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serviceable physics, aside from its epistemological preconditions which may 
also contain a priori elements, is essentially based on experiments and trials. 
The structure of the experimental approach to reality is based on dispositions 
and structures: In the experiment, the researcher interrogates empirical reality 
to find out how it behaves under certain conditions. That is, the experiment, 
as the fundamental scientific relation to the world is, by its very nature, direct-
ed to dispositions. It is thereby in the excellent position of being exclusively 
structural, that is, of exploring extrinsic properties of the building blocks of 
reality empirically.9
The thesis of physical structuralism emerges eo ipso on the basis of this 
determination of physical properties. This means that the image of the fun-
damental structure of empirical reality, drawn by physics, is a picture of struc-
tural connections which provides information about the extrinsic relations 
of a causally closed system, and describes in mathematical and logical terms 
how physical entities in particular situations within this structure behave, 
dispositionally.10
Therefore, in contrast to mental properties, which are intrinsic properties, 
physical properties are extrinsic-relational and thus dispositionally determined.
1.3 A Minimal Analytical Panpsychist Thesis
Based on the assumption that mental properties represent an intentional 
object phenomenally to a subject of experience, and are therefore intrinsic 
properties of this subject of experience, and given that physical properties are 
extrinsic properties of reality-constituting entities, the minimal panpsychist 
thesis admits of being specified as follows: Both mental and physical properties 
are ontologically foundational, not reducible to one another but factually equiva-
lent in their exemplification by both the fundamental reality-constituting entities, 
and higher living creatures and human beings, in such a way that all fundamen-
tal entities, and higher living beings and human beings, are genuine subjects of 
experience, who have a phenomenal inner life, and are involved dispositionally in 
structures described by physics, due to their extrinsic properties.11
9    See Russell 1927: 254: »It would seem that wherever we infer from perceptions it is only 
structure that we can validly infer; and structure is what can be expressed by mathemati-
cal logic.«
10   On the causal closure of the structure of the physical universe, see Clayton 2008: 135.
11   Thomas Nagel says panpsychism is the thesis that »the basic physical constituents of the 
universe have mental properties, whether or not they are part of living organism« (Nagel 
1979: 181). See also Blamauer 2011a: 102: »Panpsychism is—in short—typically understood 
to be the view that consciousness experience is a fundamental as well as ubiquitous char-
acteristic of our universe, equal to physical properties like mass, charge, and spin.«. See 
43Panpsychism and Panentheism
Just as it is somehow phenomenal to be Benedikt Göcke, and to write this 
paper, there is also, somehow, something it consists in to be a photon and fly 
through the universe. However, even if the panpsychist is willingly to be im-
puted this, he is not obliged to accept that the basic building blocks of reality 
have a conscious life comparable to the one of human beings.12 The developed 
thesis of panpsychism merely states that there is, in each case, a phenomenal 
inner life of the fundamental building blocks of reality, which implies the exis-
tence of an ontologically minimally understood subject of experience, and, in 
this sense only, is similar to us. The developed thesis of panpsychism is thereby 
consistent with the fact that the phenomenal experience of the basic building 
blocks of reality can vary greatly from our experience of reality, and is sensu 
stricto epistemologically closed to us, as is the subjective experience of other 
people and higher living beings.13
2. Arguments for Panpsychism
The panpsychistic thesis, because of its prima facie absurdity, often evokes 
adverse reactions, since the natural attitude in life does not usually assume 
that the physical foundations of reality are subjects of experience with a phe-
nomenal inner perspective. For the English philosopher Colin McGinn, for 
example, panpsychism is reminiscent of the 1968 movement, and is desig-
nated by him as little more than a »comfortable piece of utter balderdash.«14 
However, because philosophy requires separating the genesis and the validity 
also Seager/Allen-Hermanson 2010: »Panpsychism is the doctrine that mind is a funda-
mental feature of the world which exists throughout the universe.«
12   For this objection, see McGinn 2006: 95: »Is it really to be supposed that a particle can 
enjoy these kinds of [human] experiences—say feeling depressed at its monotonous life 
of orbiting a nucleus but occasionally cheered up by its experience of musical notes?« See 
also Lycan 2006: 70. For a contrary argument see Pfeifer 2016: 45.
13   See Brüntrup/Jaskolla 2016: 4: »But similarity is not a transitive relation. Mental proper-
ties at the fundamental level might well be wildly dissimilar from those found in living 
organisms. The highly speculative and abstract character of panpsychism has thus always 
to be kept in mind. Panpsychism is a possible move in the logical space of metaphys-
ics, not a crude animalistic view of matter.« To distinguish human phenomenal expe-
rience from the phenomenal experience of the basic building blocks of reality, some 
panpsychists introduce the concept of proto-mentality. See Rugel 2011: 115-16 and Jaskolla 
2011a: 70.
14   See McGinn 2006: 93: »Any reflective person must feel the pull of panpsychism once 
in a while. It’s almost as good as pantheism! The trouble is that it’s a complete myth, a 
comfortable piece of utter balderdash […] and isn’t there something vaguely hippish, i.e. 
stoned, about the doctrine?«
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of a theory from one another, it must be soberly asked which arguments speak 
for panpsychism.
2.1 The Argument from the Homogeneity of Cosmic Evolution
The argument from the homogeneity of cosmic evolution is based on the as-
sumption that evolutionary processes, whose similarity is characterized by 
the development of complex entities and structures from simple entities and 
structures, play out on both the cosmic and the biological level. Against this 
background, the argument of the homogeneity of cosmic evolution assumes 
that the only plausible explanatory model consistent with the natural sciences 
for the factual existence of complex phenomenal life presupposes that every 
basic physical entity possesses mental properties. It may be formulated as 
follows:
(1)  Cosmic evolution has led to the development of physical creatures, 
which call a complex, phenomenal-intrinsic inner life their own.
(2)  Cosmic evolution can only lead to the development of physical be-
ings that call a complex phenomenal-intrinsic inner life their own 
when mental properties are either (a) bound by divine intervention 
to the exemplification of physical properties, or (b) by supervenience, 
or, (c) mental properties emerge from complex physical properties, 
or (d) each basic physical entity has mental properties.
(3)  Mental properties are not bound to physical properties by divine 
intervention.
(4)  Supervenience is no explanation of the existence of mental 
properties.
(5)  Mental properties do not emerge from physical properties.
  Therefore:
(6) Each basic physical entity has mental properties.
  Therefore:
(7)  Each basic physical entity has mental properties, and some complex 
physical beings have mental properties.
The argument is valid: If the premises are true, then it is not possible that the 
conclusion is false. The decisive question, therefore, is the soundness of the 
argument, so is about the truth of the premises. The first premise seems to 
be true: That cosmic evolution has led to the development of living creatures 
that have a complex, phenomenal inner life can be confirmed by oneself. The 
second premise is also true because it covers all relevant explanatory types of 
the emergence and existence of complex phenomenal life. 
The decisive premises are therefore (3) to (5). The third premise, that is, 
the assumption that mental properties have been brought into the world by a 
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decision of divine will at a certain time of cosmic evolution, to correlate with 
certain physical properties, is rarely treated: On the one hand, one is aware 
that, although a theological necessity for the possibility of God’s significant ac-
tion in the world obtains, the recourse to divine action is difficult to justify in 
detail. And one runs the danger of integrating God into the striven for ultimate 
foundation only as an explanatory gap filler. On the other hand, a theological 
explanation of the existence of complex phenomenal life points directly to the 
other explanatory models mentioned in the argument. For it would have to 
specify through which metaphysical means, or natural laws, the existence of 
mental states and their correlation with physical states is assured by divine 
action.15
The fourth premise, that is, the assumption that mental properties super-
vene on physical properties, may be excluded as an explanation of the exis-
tence of mental properties. Supervenience does not denote the causal, but the 
logical relation between properties of different property classes. It generally 
states that there can be no difference on the supervenient level without differ-
ence on the subvenient level but there may be a difference on the subvenient 
level without any difference on the supervenient level. That mental properties 
supervene on physical properties may well be the case accidentally. However, 
the supervening relationship does not explain how mental properties have 
come into the world but already presupposes their existence.
The fifth premise entails that there is a causal relationship between the 
existence of physical properties and the existence of mental properties. The 
concept of weak emergence entails that F is a weakly emergent property of a 
physical system S, with a specific microstructure (p1, …, pn), if and only if the 
natural laws logically imply that every physical system S with microstructure 
(p1, …, pn) exemplifies property F, but F cannot be reduced to the properties 
of the microstructural entities. The concept of strong emergence assumes that 
F is a strongly emergent property of a physical system (p1, …, pn) if and only if 
each system S with microstructure (p1, …, pn) exemplifies property F, but this 
exemplification of F does not logically follow from the natural laws, but is a 
factum brutum.16
Based on this understanding of emergence, a weak emergence of mental 
properties can be excluded. While, for example, liquidity is a weakly emergent 
property of accumulations of H2O molecules that can be explained by natural 
laws, this is not the case with mental properties, because it does not follow 
15   See, however, Hasker 2001 und Swinburne 1997 for an analysis of the explanatory rele-
vance of divine action for the existence of mental states.
16   See Brüntrup 2012: 68.
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logically from the natural laws that systems that have a certain physical micro-
structure have a certain mental characteristic.17
If mental properties emerge from physical properties, then they must be 
strongly emergent properties of physical systems. This possibility, however, is 
excluded because of the essential differences between physical and mental 
properties. For it is absurd to assume that a purely extrinsically determined 
structure, which has no intrinsic-phenomenal properties, is in a position to 
bring about the existence of intrinsic-mental properties. This would be as ab-
surd the assumption that a space-time universe is constituted by a structure of 
abstract mathematical entities.18
Because neither divine intervention nor supervenience and strong emer-
gence can explain the existence of complex phenomenal life, following the 
argument from the homogeneity of cosmic evolution, the last remaining possi-
bility for explaining the existence of complex phenomenal experience, is this: 
Mentality is not a new phenomenon of the universe, but one of its own es-
sential features: Even the smallest building blocks of reality have phenomenal 
properties that belong to the same ontological category as human phenom-
enal experience. Mental properties therefore belong to the ontological basis 
of reality.19
2.2 The Argument from Intrinsic Natures
The argument from intrinsic natures supports the genetic argument by analys-
ing the ontological carrier of the dispositional structures investigated by the 
physical sciences. It argues that mental qualities are the only plausible candi-
date to fulfill this crucial role of metaphysical explanation of the existence of 
17   See Strawson 2006a: 13: »Liquidity is often proposed as a translucent example of an emer-
gent phenomenon, and the facts seem straightforward. Liquidity is not a characteristic of 
individual H2O molecules. Nor is it a characteristic of the ultimates of which H2O mol-
ecules are composed. Yet when you put many H2O molecules together they constitute a 
liquid (at certain temperatures, at least), they constitute something liquid. So liquidity is a 
truly emergent property of certain groups of H2O molecules. It is not there at the bottom 
of things, and then it is there.«
18   See Strawson 2006a: 15. See McGinn 2000 for an argument that we are simply too limited 
to understand how mental properties emerge from physical properties.
19   See James 1950: 149: »And Consciousness, however small, is an illegitimate birth in any 
philosophy that starts without it, and yet professes to explain all fact by continuous evolu-
tion. If evolution is to work smoothly, consciousness in some shape must have been present 
at the very origin of things. Accordingly we find that the more clear-sighted evolutionary 
philosophers are beginning to post it there. Each atom of the nebula, they suppose, must 
have had an aboriginal atom of consciousness linked with it.«
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empirical reality. The following is an argument with three assumptions and the 
panpsychist conclusion outlined:
(1)  If there is an intrinsic nature of fundamental physical entities, the 
physical sciences can not give us any information about this.
(2)  There is an intrinsic nature of fundamental physical entities.
(3)  If there is an intrinsic nature of fundamental physical entities, the 
only plausible candidate for this intrinsic nature of fundamental 
physical entities is phenomenal consciousness.
 Therefore:
(4)  Fundamental physical entities have phenomenal consciousness.
 Therefore:
(5)  Fundamental physical entities have phenomenal consciousness, and 
some complex physical beings have mental properties.
The argument is logically valid, so the crucial question is the question of the 
plausibility of the premises. The first premise is true: We have already seen that 
the physical sciences examine only the dispositional behaviour of physical en-
tities, and this approach leads to physical structuralism, which does not imply 
any ontological statements about the intrinsic properties of physical entities 
whose dispositions are examined.20
All the theoretical terms of the physical description of the fundamental 
structures of the universe, such as the terms »electron«, »spin«, or »photon«, 
can therefore be removed by the method of Ramseyfication, which replaces 
each of these terms with an existential bound variable, without the result that 
the physically obtained state of knowledge is changed. There remains the as-
sertion that there are things which fulfil a certain dispositional function and, 
because of this, are part of a larger mathematically describable structure.21
The second premise is also true and may be justified by a reductio ad ab-
surdum. If one assumes that there is no intrinsic nature of the basic physical 
entities, it is assumed that the investigated dispositional properties may exist 
in themselves.22
20   See Williams 2011: 74: »Physical theory describes the fundamental physical entities exclu-
sively in dispositional terms.« See Russell 1948: 240: »The physical world is only known 
as regards certain abstract features of its space-time structure—features which, because 
of their abstractness, do not suffice to show whether the world is, or is not, different in 
intrinsic character from the world of mind.«
21   See Brüntrup 2011: 16.
22   See Seager 2006: 138: »Why should matter have any intrinsic properties at all? An alter-
native view is that all there is to matter is the set of inter-relationships which science 
reveals.« See also Brüntrup 2011: 25.
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This results in two problems: Firstly, in property theory, it is assumed that 
it is precisely the intrinsic properties of things that explain their dispositional 
behaviour, from a metaphysical viewpoint; by the fact that an entity x, in situa-
tion S, behaves the way Z in virtue of its intrinsic (or: categorial) properties M.23 
Without a categorial basis, that is, without the intrinsic properties of the basic 
physical entities, it would be metaphysically incomprehensible how their spe-
cific dispositional behaviour is possible at all.24 Secondly, the assumption that 
there is no intrinsic-categorial nature to the basic physical entities either leads 
to the conclusion that we live in an abstract mathematical structure, or to the 
assumption that empirical reality, as concrete empirical reality, is a strongly 
emergent property of an abstract mathematical structure. On the one hand, 
the denial of the existence of an intrinsic nature to the basic physical entities 
implies that the mathematical structures described in physics are ultimate re-
ality: All that exists are structures. For physics can not say anything about the 
intrinsic nature of reality.25 To avoid this absurd conclusion, on the other hand, 
it could only be assumed that empirical reality is a strongly emergent property 
of a special mathematical structure, and thus also an absurd factum brutum.26
Without intrinsic properties, therefore, it is not possible for the structure 
discovered by physics, and described in mathematical terms, to have any con-
crete reality at all. This means that physical entities have intrinsic natures and 
thus the second premise is justified.27
23   See Williams 2011: 71-72: »Categoricalism (sometimes known as ›Categorical Realism‹) is 
the thesis that all dispositions must ultimately have categorical properties that ground 
them; it is this thesis that the dispositional essentialist denies when she claims that some 
or all dispositions can be baseless.«
24   See Seager 2006: 141: »Dispositions require a categorical base. A good number, perhaps 
most or conceivably even all of the relational properties which science discovers about 
matter are causal dispositions. If dispositions require (metaphysically) a base of intrinsic 
properties which determines their powers then we have an argument from the relations 
structures revealed by science to the need for some intrinsic nature which subvenes these 
powers.« See Williams 2011: 72: »Categorical properties lack essential causal and modal 
features, so something must be added for a categorical property to properly ground a 
disposition. Nevertheless, as categoricalism concerns what is necessary for grounding dis-
positions, questions of what that additional something might be can be set aside.«
25   See Brüntrup 2011: 30: »But if there are no carriers, then the formal, mathematical struc-
ture is the ultimate reality.«
26   See Brüntrup 2011: 30: »How the concrete physical world as we know it emerges from this 
mathematical structure is a case of mysterious inter-attribute emergence, in this case the 
emergence of concrete physical objects from abstract mathematical structures.«
27   See Brüntrup 2016b: 55: »We need ultimate intrinsic properties that carry the entire exist-
ing set of functional-relational properties.«
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The third premise is decisive for the soundness of the argument. It is justi-
fied, in a first step, by the fact that the only case in which we can have epis-
temologically unproblematic, direct, certain, access to intrinsic properties 
of a physical entity is the case of one’s own phenomenal experience. For our 
mental qualities are such that they may be distinguished from the proper-
ties of physics by their phenomenal nature.28 Based on the assumption that 
it is epistemologically legitimate to extrapolate from the immediately certain 
knowledge of one’s own intrinsic essence to the intrinsic nature of all physical 
entities, it follows, in a final argumentative step, that we recognize mentality as 
the ontological carrier of the structures discovered in physics.
3. Arguments Against Panpsychism
Although there are two good arguments for panpsychism, at least two good 
arguments may be formulated against it, each of which can be understood as 
the complement of one of the arguments which speak for it.
3.1 The Problem of the Absurd Multiplication of Subjects of Experience
The argument from the absurd multiplication of subjects of experience con-
centrates on the minimal panpsychist thesis that all basic physical entities, 
and only some complex physical entities, have mental properties. It attempts 
to show that there is no objective concept of physical complexity to determine 
which physical structures are sufficient and necessary for the development of 
complex phenomenal life. On the argument, therefore, panpsychism implies 
that every physical structure correlates with the existence of a subject of ex-
perience, and thus leads to an absurd multiplication of the number of existing 
subjects of experience. The argument may be formulated as follows:
(1)  The limitation of the minimal panpsychist thesis, with respect to the 
number of existing subjects of experience, is plausible when there 
are objectively necessary and sufficient conditions for when a physi-
cal structure leads to the development of complex phenomenal life, 
and thus to the existence of a corresponding subject of experience.
28   See Seager 2006: 136: »Matter must have an intrinsic nature to ground the relational or 
structural features revealed to us by physical science. We are aware of but one intrinsic 
property of things, and that is consciousness. […] We are physical beings and our con-
sciousness is a feature of certain physical structures.« See also Brüntrup 2011a: 44. See 
Eddington 1920: 200 and Russell 1927: 402. See also Russell 1927a: 300.
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(2)  There are no objectively necessary and sufficient conditions for 
when a physical structure leads to the development of complex phe-
nomenal life, and thus to the existence of a corresponding subject of 
experience.
(3)  The limitation of the minimal panpsychist thesis regarding the num-
ber of existing subjects of experience is not plausible.
(4)  If the limitation of the minimal panpsychist thesis is not plausible 
with regard to the number of existing subjects of experience, then it 
should be abolished.
(5)  If the restrictions are lifted, panpsychism implies that each physical 
structure correlates with the existence of a subject of experience.
(6)  It is absurd that any physical structure correlates with the existence 
of a subject of experience.
 Therefore:
(7) Panpsychism is false.
Because the argument is logically valid, it is necessary to ask how the prem-
ises are justified. The first assumption is true: The minimal panpsychist the-
sis assumes that, in addition to the basic physical building blocks, only a few 
complex physical structures such as humans and higher living beings possess 
mental properties and constitute independent experiential substructures. This 
presupposes that there are objectively necessary and sufficient conditions for 
when a physical structure leads to the development of complex phenomenal 
life and thus to the existence of a corresponding subject of experience.
The second premise states that there are no such objective criteria, since 
the assumption that there are persisting complex physical objects cannot be 
justified against the background of physical structuralism. The reason is that 
structuralism implies that, in a sense, there is only one physical structure, and 
the relations it specifies between the physically fundamental entities, and it 
therefore leads to nominalism about macroscopic objects. What is addressed 
semantically as a complex persistent physical object is thus based on linguistic 
convention. Furthermore, because of the causal closure of physical reality, for 
any two basic entities, they are in a causal context which makes it possible to 
speak of them as a complex structure.29 Any setting of necessary and sufficient 
29   See Mathews 2011: 144: »The individuation of objects, at the macro-level, at any rate, is 
not consistently objectively determined […]. Matter is not really, in any ontological sense, 
parceled up into convenient units or packages, despite the plethora of discrete artefacts 
in our own daily life that suggest that it is. Indeed, many of our individuations—of rocks 
and mountains, for instance—have basically nominal status.« See also Skrbina 2011: 
126-127.
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conditions for the development of a rich phenomenal life is therefore an arbi-
trary semantic stipulation.
However, as the third premise of the argument implies, without necessary 
and sufficient criteria for the physical complexity necessary for a rich phenom-
enal experience, the restrictions of the number of experiential phenomena of 
complex phenomenal life, defined in the minimal panpsychist thesis, must be 
abandoned. For it is not clear why basic physical entities, and only a few other 
physical structures should be thought of as correlated with genuine subjects 
of experience.
To save panpsychism prima facie, on the fourth premise of the argument, it 
must be assumed that, in fact, any physical structure is correlated with the ex-
istence of a genuine subject of experience.30 As this consequence implies that 
tables, and planetary systems, and forests, and the sum of the table and the 
chairs in this room (let us call them »tairs«), should be classified as genuine 
experiential subjects, the panpsychist thesis secunda facie should be rejected, 
due to an absurd multiplication of subjects of experience.
3.2 The Combination Problem of Panpsychism
The fact that panpsychism leads to a prima facie absurd multiplication of exist-
ing subjects of experience seems to be a strong argument against its plausibil-
ity as a metaphysical theory. But it does not really show the inconsistency but 
only the epistemic significance of panpsychism, against the background of our 
general assumptions about the existence of subjects of experience. The argu-
ment is therefore flanked by a further argument that shows that, in the context 
of a panpsychist ontology, it is not clear how new subjects of experience may 
emerge from the mental properties of the basic physical entities, regardless of 
the structures that they constitute:
(1)  All basic physical entities are subjects of experience, and there is at 
least one subject of experience S that is not a basic physical entity 
but a complex physical entity.
(2)  If all basic physical entities are subjects of experience, and there is 
at least one subject of experience S that is not a basic physical entity 
but a complex physical entity, panpsychism must be able to explain 
the existence of S, by recourse to the physical complexity of S.
30   Skrbina 2011: 121-22 takes exactly this route: »[T]he body indeed has innumerable lesser 
selves: organs, cells, macromolecules, proteins, atoms, and so on. All of these (except the 
atomic ultimates) are themselves composed of lesser selves, and all participate in higher-
order minds.«
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(3)  Panpsychism cannot explain the existence of S by recourse to the 
physical complexity of S.
 Therefore:
(4)  Panpsychism is false.
The truth of the premises is decisive for the soundness of the argument. The 
first premise is true by definition, because it expresses the minimal panpsy-
chist thesis. The second premise is also true: We know from the argument from 
the homogeneity of cosmic evolution that the panpsychist assumes that the 
basic physical building blocks of the universe are conscious and, in the course 
of cosmic evolution, through the formation of complex structures, higher lev-
els of experience are constituted, by the mentality of the basic building blocks. 
If this constitution of higher-level subjects is not to be postulated simply by 
implication, the panpsychist must explain how it is possible that new subjects, 
different from the fundamental experiential subjects, can exist.
The starting point of the combination problem is to take up this explanatory 
requirement and put it to the panpsychist, in the third premise of the argu-
ment, that he can not fulfil this task which is necessary for him. For it would 
only be possible with reference to strong emergence, setting the origin and 
existence of a subject of experience’s complex phenomenal life in relation to 
the existence of basic subjects of experience.
The assumption that the existence of complex subjects of experience can 
only be explained by reference to strong emergence may be justified as follows: 
If m is the set of basic physical subjects of experience which, ex hypothesi, are 
responsible for the constitution of a complex subject of experience S that is 
not contained in m, then no facts about the elements of this set or m itself, nei-
ther the physical nor the intrinsic facts about the relations between the basic 
experiential subjects and their inner constitution, can explain the existence of 
S. Contrary to, for example, the vector analysis of a physical force, it is not ap-
parent how, out of many basic subjects of experience and their mental states, 
a further and genuine subject of experience could be generated at all.31
31   See also James 1950: 160: »Where the elemental units are supposed to be feelings, the case 
is in no wise altered. Take a hundred of them, shuffle them and pack them as close togeth-
er as you can (whatever that may mean); still each remains the same feeling it always was 
shut in its own skin, windowless, ignorant of what the other feelings are and mean. There 
would be a hundred-and-first feeling there, if, when a group or series of such feelings were 
set up, a consciousness belonging to the group as such should emerge. And this 101st feel-
ing would be a totally new fact, the 100 original feelings might, by a curious physical law, 
be a signal for its creation, when they came together; but they would have no substantial 
identity with it, nor it with them, and one could never deduce the one from the others, or 
(in any intelligible sense) say that they evolved it.« See also Goff 2006: 58 and Göcke 2012a.
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The only way to explain the existence of higher-level subjects of experience 
is, therefore, by recourse to the concept of emergent relations. But since weak 
emergence can be excluded, a theory of strong emergence is the only alterna-
tive. Some panpsychists argue, accordingly, that the existence of subjects of 
experience of complex phenomenal life emerges strongly from basic subjects 
of experience, even if no metaphysical or scientific principles can be stated 
that explain this relation.32
Because, however, the strong emergence of complex experiential entities 
is as obscure as the strong emergence of intrinsic from extrinsic properties, 
the panpsychist cannot appeal to strong emergence without undermining the 
justification for his own position, which has only led to the recognition of the 
phenomenal life of the basic building blocks of reality.33 Panpsychism should 
therefore be rejected.
4. Panpsychism and Panentheism
There are good arguments both for and against panpsychism. In what fol-
lows, it is argued that the apparent antinomy of panpsychist thinking can be 
resolved when panpsychism, as discussed in analytic philosophy of mind, is 
integrated into the metaphysical paradigm of panentheism, as discussed in 
continental transcendental philosophy. To illustrate this, exemplary recourse 
to the panentheistic thinking of Karl Christian Friedrich Krause and his pupil 
Arthur Schopenhauer is appropriate, because the philosophical systems devel-
oped by both thinkers are closely interwoven.
4.1 Krause, Schopenhauer, and Analytical Philosophy of Mind
Recourse to the monistic thinkers Krause and Schopenhauer, as luminaries of 
the wild years of classical German philosophy, in the course of the analysis of 
analytic panpsychism, is systematically obvious. Although, to my knowledge, 
Krause is not at all in this discussion and Schopenhauer is often only men-
tioned in a historical marginal note as a panpsychist.34 This is astonishing, for 
a glance at the writings of Krause and Schopenhauer shows quickly that a large 
32   See Goff 2011: 135-36: »[The argument] has no concerns about the intelligibility of pan-
psychist emergentism, the view that facts about the existence and nature of high-level 
conscious subjects, as a matter of brute fact or natural law, arise from facts about the 
existence and nature of micro-physcial conscious subjects.«
33   See Chalmers 2016a for an analysis of the combination problem, Goff 2016, Skrbina 2011 
und Brüntrup 2016b for various attempted solutions.
34   See, however, Skrbina 2007 for an analysis of panpsychism according to Schopenhauer.
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part of the topoi, which are presently discussed in the analytic panpsychism 
debate by recourse to Eddington, Russell, and James, are nearly verbatim, but 
at least, according to the case, to be found in Krause and Schopenhauer.
Firstly, both Krause and Schopenhauer hold the thesis of physical structur-
alism. They start from the causal closeness of the physical world, which for 
them is the world described by science. As transcendental philosophers, they 
assume that the knowledge discovered by physics is established by the princi-
ple of sufficient reason. The principle of sufficient reason, however, exclusively 
leads to the scientific discovery of the dispositional structure of empirical re-
ality. In this way, Krause and Schopenhauer place themselves directly on the 
ground of the panpsychism debate.35
Secondly, both agree that physical structuralism does not facilitate complete 
knowledge of the system of sciences, because it only explores the structure 
between different entities in empirical reality, and their dispositional proper-
ties, not their intrinsic nature. According to Krause and Schopenhauer, the in-
trinsic categorial nature of the thing as such (Ding an sich) cannot be attained 
by a methodology based on the principle of sufficient reason, since it is only 
the relations between things that are analysed. In this respect too, Krause and 
Schopen hauer agree with the current debate, which is based on the insight 
that decisive elements of a complete metaphysical explanation of the world 
cannot be grasped by structuralism.36
Third, both agree with the panpsychist debate that there must be an intrinsic 
nature behind the structured phenomena whose denial, as Schopenhauer says, 
35   According to Krause 1869: 4, science is a system of true findings, differentiated within 
itself, in which all parts »exist in relation to each other, not merely as a whole, in which 
parts are next to one other, collected in a mere aggregate, but as a whole in which the 
parts are all in, with and through one other (in, mit und durch einander), are all only in, 
with and through, the whole thing. Everything is essentially joined to form a whole which 
contains parts, each of which, although something specific, and exists for itself, neverthe-
less exists only for itself, by, and as long, as it is in a certain connectedness, and interac-
tion, with all other members of that structure, which also account for the organism«. 
Schopenhauer 1889: 4 fully agrees on the adequacy of such a concept of science: »For 
by science we understand a system of notions [Erkenntnisse], i.e. a totality of connected, 
as opposed to a mere aggregate of disconnected, notions [Erkenntnisse]. But what is it 
that binds together the members of a system, if not the principle of sufficient reason? 
That which distinguishes every science from a mere aggregate is precisely, that its notions 
[Erkenntnisse] are derived one from another as their reasons.«
36   See Schopenhauer 1969: 28: »That all science in the real sense, by which I understand 
systematic knowledge under the guidance of the principle of sufficient reason, can never 
reach a final goal or give an entirely satisfactory explanation. It never aims at the inmost 
nature of the world; it can never get beyond the representation; on the contrary, it really 
tells us nothing more than the relation of one representation to another.«
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is a good recommendation for a place in the madhouse.37 For both, this insight 
into the intrinsic nature of reality cannot be forced as the conclusion of a chain 
of proof, but must be carried out by every subject of knowledge himself, in the 
form of immediate intuition. When this is done, it can be used as an element 
of a final foundation that turns physical structuralism into an all-embracing 
metaphysical theory.38
Fourth, just as in the analytic debate, it is assumed that our immediate 
perception of our own phenomenal experience serves as an epistemically le-
gitimate justification for the existence of an ontological carrier of the disposi-
tional properties of physical reality. So Krause and Schopenhauer assume that 
a direct, certain intuition of one’s own intrinsic nature is possible, and that 
knowledge of the intrinsic nature of empirical reality can be deduced from 
this direct, certain, knowledge. Without this perception of our own intrinsic 
nature, physical structuralism would remain only a metaphysical patchwork.39
4.2 Panentheism as the Solution to the Panpsychist Aporia
Although Krause and Schopenhauer are in harmony with the central insights 
of contemporary analytic philosophy of mind, they spell out the panpsychist 
insights under panentheistic premises, transcendentally. While panpsychism 
is generally understood as a position mediating between physicalism and dual-
ism, since it determines both the physical and the mental as inseparable and 
fundamental features of reality, panentheism generally strives for a higher 
37   See Schopenhauer 2015: 163.
38   See Krause 1886: 9: »If, therefore, there is knowledge of something which in an unlim-
ited way is all that there is, this insight entails that this something is without a ground 
(ohne Grund). Consequently, the insight into the nature and existence of this something 
is without a ground as well, it is unprovable and not in need of a proof. […] If there is such 
an insight, it must be immediate and not mediated through any other insight or item of 
knowledge. And although not everyone will be able to obtain it without instruction, it 
must be possible to instruct every spirit to obtain this insight for themselves.«
39   Krause 1886: 66 argues that »we can only become aware of other things in so as far as 
these things are ourselves, and we are in these things ourselves.« Furthermore, »we can 
make an inference to the beings outside us, under the form: as true as I am myself, as I 
observe myself, there is also this or that being« Krause 1886: 75. Krause, in other words, 
argues that, through self-observation, we can use what is discovered as the true nature 
of the I to account for the ultimate ground of empirical reality. Schopenhauer, in turn, 
expresses this idea in a similar way: »What is directly known to us must give us the expla-
nation of what is only indirectly known, not conversely.« (Schopenhauer 1966:196) That 
is, as Schopenhauer 1889: 246 says, »if we stood in the same inward relation towards every 
natural phenomenon as towards our own organism, the explanation of every natural 
phenomenon, as well as of all the properties of every body, would likewise ultimately be 
reduced to [that which is discovered as the nature of the I in self-observation].«
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reconciliation of an atheistic pantheism, on which the universe itself is causa 
sui, and the ontological dualism of necessarily existing creator and contingent 
creation. To achieve the synthesis of pantheism and classical theism, panen-
theism interprets the being of the finite universe, in the monistic tradition, 
as an intrinsic constitutive part of the all-unity, which is conceived as abso-
lutely infinite, and transposes the fundamental difference between the ground 
of being and the effect of being into the Absolute itself. Thus, the world as a 
constituent part of the inner structure of the Absolute is distinguished from 
the Absolute in itself, just as hydrogen and oxygen are also constitutive of the 
whole in the H2O molecule, and yet may be determined and distinguished 
from it.
Transcendental panentheism, as presented by Krause and Schopenhauer, 
attempts to justify the relation between empirical reality and the Absolute, 
epistemologically, as a metaphysical theory, by analysis of the immediately 
certain conditions of the possibility of any subjectivity. The esssential idea is 
as follows: In and through the recognition of the intrinsic nature of one’s own 
self, which is directly examined in intuition, the subject ascends to the recog-
nition of the intrinsic determination of the Absolute, and then descends back 
to the intrinsic determination of the whole of extrinsic empirical reality which 
sustains physical structuralism.
Krause calls the Absolute simply »Essence« and Schopenhauer, as he him-
self admits inadequately »Will«. For both, the Absolute is the one principle 
of being and knowledge of empirical reality that unites all transcendent and 
transcendental determinations in the unity of its essence. He who recognizes 
himself recognizes this idea that, in his being and knowing, he is always bound 
in the one being and the recognition of the Absolute. Hence, Krause locates 
the world logically expressis verbis »in« the Absolute. Schopenhauer speaks, in 
a conceptually equivalent way, of the existence of empirical reality as a man-
ifestation of the Will.40 For both, therefore, the being of reality is not to be 
40   Empirical reality, in Krause’s words, has to be understood panentheistically as being in 
the ultimate ground, while, in Schopenhauer’s words, it has to be understood as a mani-
festation of the ultimate ground. Although different in name, both doctrines arguably 
express the same concept: That B is in A means that, according to its true nature and 
existence, B is completely and inseparably determined by the true nature and existence 
of A. As Krause 1869: 307-08 states: »Following present linguistic usage, I use ›in‹ here 
[…] of finite essences and essentialities, and mean by it that this finite thing is the higher 
whole [that is, Essence] as part of it. So this finite thing, as a part of the same, is, however, 
bounded by the whole of pure Essentiality. So indeed, the limit of the finite is in com-
mon with that of its whole, but this boundary does not limit or circumscribe (begrenzt 
oder umgrenzt) the whole as a whole.« That B is a manifestation of A means the same. 
What Schopenhauer says about the relation between the ultimate ground of empirical 
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understood in the mode of a creation, but as the intrinsic determination of the 
Absolute itself. In the knowledge of our own self, one knows through meta-
physical intuition the Absolute only in one of its manifold determinations.41
And precisely in this lies the key to solving the panpsychist aporias. Both 
arguments for panpsychism show that conscious experience is a necessary 
condition for the existence of reality. The argument from the homogeneity of 
cosmic evolution shows that conscious experience, as an intrinsic bearer of 
dispositional structures of being, must exist at every moment of the existence 
of the universe. The argument from intrinsic natures yields the conclusion 
that the dispositional structure, studied by physics, without conscious experi-
ence of microphysical reality, could have no concrete reality. Both arguments 
against panpsychism show that panpsychism, despite the necessity of phe-
nomenal experience for any metaphysical foundation of physical structural-
ism, has serious problems with the concept of the subject of experience: The 
argument from the absurd multiplication of subjects of experience has shown 
that, under any panpsychistic premises, any arbitrary physical structure im-
plies the existence of a corresponding subject of experience. While the com-
bination problem has shown that the panpsychist can consistently assume a 
certain number of basic subjects of experience, but does not have the explana-
tory resources to explain the existence of subjects of complex phenomenal ex-
perience. Although, in panpsychism, on the one hand, conscious experience 
is necessary for the existence of reality, it cannot, on the other hand, explain 
how subjects of experience can be individuated, and go beyond the number of 
fundamental subjects of experience.
The solution to this antinomy suggested by transcendental panentheism is 
to maintain the fundamental validity of the arguments for panpsychism, but to 
re-read it, and to abandon the assumption that there are numerically distinct 
reality, and empirical reality itself, therefore fits well with Krause’s panentheistic defi-
nition of the world’s being in its ultimate ground: »Now this is all very well, yet to me, 
when I consider the vastness of the world, the most important thing is that the essence 
in itself […] is present whole and undivided in everything in nature, in every living being. 
[… T]rue wisdom […] is acquired by thoroughly investigating any individual thing, 
in that we try thus to know and understand perfectly its true and peculiar nature.« 
(Schopenhauer 1969: 129).
41   See Krause 1903: 362: »My chief principle is that all science rests upon the intuition of 
an infinite substance, which intuition can not be proved according to the principle of 
sufficient reason, but can only be proved as present in the human mind (Geist).« See 
also Schopenhauer 1889: 216: »The kernel and chief point of my doctrine, its Metaphysic 
proper, [is] that this thing in itself, this substratum of all phenomena, and therefore of 
the whole of Nature, is nothing but what we know directly and intimately and find within 
ourselves as the will.«
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metaphysical subjects of experience. Within present analytic philosophy of 
mind, the epistemological reference to the intrinsic nature of one’s own exis-
tence constitutive of panpsychism is interpreted as meaning that it can only 
show the inner nature of each individual existence. Instead, it should be as-
sumed panentheistically as showing truth beyond the inner nature of one’s 
own existence, and, as a matter of fact, as a self-display of the intrinsic nature 
of the Absolute: The inner vision of the self shows more than the inner nature 
of one’s own existence. It shows the inner nature of the Absolute.
If the analytic panpsychist follows this argumentation, he leaves the two 
arguments against him at the expense of his abolition in transcendentally 
motivated panentheism. For he then abandons the assumption that there is 
metaphysically more than one subject of experience: All the different mental 
qualities, following the panentheistic interpretation of panpsychism, would be 
characteristics of the only existing subject of experience: the Absolute.42
This conclusion might evoke prima facie similar amused reactions as pan-
psychism. But secunda facie it is quite an attractive theoretical option, because 
the physical sciences show us the image of a causally closed universe, and be-
cause the panpsychist may explain the reality of the individual relations of 
any dispositional structure, but not why they together constitute a coherent 
and harmonious reality. The panentheist can explain this by analogy to our 
pre-critical experience of diachronic identity as follows: Just like the assump-
tion that there is a bearer of my conscious life enables me to see a unity and 
identity in my life, so empirical reality requires the existence of a single bearer 
to explain its own ontological unity.43
42   Cf. Brüntrup 2011a: 39-40. As Wollgast 1990: 22 summarizes Krause’s insight: »Human self-
knowledge, and therefore all knowledge, presupposes an absolute principle, ›Essence‹, 
which first makes the unity of thought and being (Sein) possible. The subject, searching 
for indubitable knowledge, and so reflecting on itself, presupposes the Absolute, knows 
that it always already finds itself within the Absolute, that it can know itself and the 
Absolute only through the Absolute.«
43   A central argument that seems to speak against the developed thesis is based on the 
premise that our phenomenal experience is a single stream of consciousness, and that 
we cannot have an epistemological approach to phenomenal experience that is not our 
own phenomenal experience. In other words, we always have only phenomenal access to 
our own consciousness, and no phenomenal evidence that this consciousness is part of a 
higher consciousness. This argument is a purely epistemological argument, and does not 
lead to a metaphysical conclusion that shows that it is not the case that our phenomenal 
experience is, at the same time part of a broader, phenomenal life. See Sprigge 2006: 485-
86. See also Jaskolla/Buck 2012, Göcke 2014, and Zagzebski 2013 for analyses of holism and 
the concept of omni-subjectivity.
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The recent literature on panentheism often starts with two claims. First, one 
is reminded of the recent popularity of the term ›panentheism‹ across phi-
losophy of religion, systematic theology, the comparative study of world re-
ligions, science and religion, and naturalistic spirituality.1 Through numbers, 
if not through arguments, »the panentheistic turn« is presented as »a doctri-
nal revolution«, which cannot be ignored by either critics or sympathisers.2 
Second, one is presented with a problem; namely, that no one knows exactly 
what panentheism means or how it can be demarcated from similar views—
even demarcated from the very view panentheism is commonly pitted against, 
namely classical theism.
The central claims of panentheism, which are often used to define the posi-
tion, are that ›the world is the body of God‹ and ›the world is in God‹. In order 
to avoid predetermining whether these phrases should be taken literally or 
metaphorically, I refer to these claims throughout this paper as ›the panenthe-
istic slogans‹. These slogans are evocative but cannot illuminate panentheism’s 
distinctive claims regarding God’s relationship to the world without further 
analysis. As a result, there is a growing collection of secondary literature seek-
ing to interpret these slogans in a way that clearly demarcates panentheism 
from neighbouring theological positions.3 This paper contributes to this sec-
ondary literature.
However, there are also scholars who criticise the search for a clear demar-
cation for missing the point of panentheism entirely.4 As Thomas C. Owen 
notes, some panentheists seem to view the fluidity or vagueness of their posi-
tion as part of its attraction.5 The implication is that the gathering together of 
1   See, Clayton and Peacocke 2004; Biernacki and Clayton 2014.
2   Clayton 1999; Brierley 2004: 4.
3   Mullins 2016; Göcke 2013; Gasser 2019 Brierly 2008: 636-41; Peterson 2001; Stenmark 2019; 
Gregerson 2004; Towne 2005; Hutchings 2010.
4   Lataster 2014; Lataster & Bilimoria 2018.
5   Thomas C. Owen justly critiques Philip Clayton for glossing such ambiguity as ›richness‹. 
Owen 2008: 653-53; cf. Clayton 2004: 254, 256.
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various warring parties in religious discourse under the panentheist’s banner 
of relationality, naturalness, scientific credibility, and embodied spirituality, is 
a good to which clear definitions should be willingly sacrificed.6 For such a 
purpose, emphasising »family resemblances« between even the most dispa-
rate positions is enough.7 However, this paper rejects this all-inclusive framing 
of either the content or purpose of panentheism. In the marketplace of aca-
demia, a clear demarcation between one’s own theory or the family in which 
a theory is found and one’s competitors is an essential part of any sales pitch, 
elst the various members of the family might be adopted into other dynasties.
For all its celebration of unity, panentheism remains a polemical position 
and is presented as either »the other God of the philosophers«, the reasonable 
»middle path between two extremes« (dualistic classical theism and atheistic 
pantheism), or the »higher synthesis« between supernaturalism and atheistic 
naturalism.8 If we cannot demarcate panentheism from these neighbouring 
positions, then not only does panentheism lose its competitive edge and much 
of its explanatory power, but the gathering of ambiguously related theories 
under the umbrella of panentheism becomes superfluous; panentheism would 
amount to »a somewhat suspect ›fudge‹ word.«9 Process panentheist David 
Ray Griffin warns that »increased popularity brings a danger that ›panenthe-
ism‹ will be appropriated for doctrines devoid of [its] promise.«10 If panenthe-
ism amounts to the popularity of an ambiguous slogan, rather than a genuinely 
shared understanding of the relationship between God and the world, then the 
panentheist umbrella seems unlikely to weather any future storms.
Yet there might be a way to avoid this dreary forecast. As Thomas writes, one 
»major exception to this vagueness in the concept of panentheism« is found 
in the work of Process philosophy.11 Whilst few can deny the historical impor-
tance of Process theology within the panentheist family (particularly in the 
West where the name, but perhaps not the original idea, was coined), Process 
panentheism is often treated as the grandparent whose leadership of the fam-
ily has been surpassed by younger generations. Thankfully, this paper has no 
6    One might point to the value-based and political arguments for panentheism in Jantzen 
1984 and McFague 1993.
7    Clayton 2004: 249. Indeed, Philip Clayton describes both the classical theism of John 
Cooper and the atheistic pantheism of Robert Corrington as versions of panentheism, 
such that one is forced to asked what the term ›panentheism‹ excludes? See, Clayton 2017.
8    Cooper 2007; Brierley 2004: 3; Hartshorne & Reese 1953: 5.
9    Roe 198: 94. Patrick Hutching simply states that, to commit myself to panentheism is dis-
ingenuous since »I am—as I see it—committing myself to nothing.« Hutching 2010: 299.
10   Griffin 2005: 35.
11   Brierly 2004: 3.
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interest in defending Process theology, nor holding Process panentheism up as 
the exemplary for panentheists more widely. Instead, this paper investigates 
if a particular theory of mind, one that Process philosophy shares with many 
other historical figures, can provide the resources to demarcate panentheism 
from neighbouring theological positions. The theory of mind in question is 
panpsychism.
This raises an immediate methodological question; quite simply, what’s 
mind got to do with it? Although often taken for granted, it is not immedi-
ately transparent what a position in philosophy of mind has to do with the 
God-world relationship, nor how strong the relationship between mentality 
and divinity should be. On the one hand, it has been asserted that »on any pos-
sible reading of the panpsychic system« the world must be »internal parts of 
God and not external creations«.12 On the other hand, the historical preference 
for panpsychism by panentheists may be little more than coincidence, since 
there seems no good reason why the God of classical theism could not have 
chosen to create a panpsychist universe quite apart from Godself.13 It seems 
safest to conclude that adopting a panpsychist theory of mind cannot deter-
mine one’s theology. Moreover, if God is the source of all being, then perhaps 
philosophy of mind should play second fiddle to philosophy of religion. If this 
is correct then panpsychism cannot and should not, determine one’s theology.14
This brief methodological excursus allows me to be clear about the scope 
and ambition of this paper’s analysis. It is precisely because panentheists 
have certain primary theological commitments regarding the God-world re-
lationship that this paper explores whether panpsychism can facilitate and 
clarify those commitments. Within this paper, philosophy of mind is serving 
12   James, 1947: 318; cf. Cooper 2007: 141.
13   Taliaferro 2017. This preference is noted in Cooper 2007: 193. However, classical theist 
Gottfried von Leibniz and pantheist Bauarch Spinoza, provide clear counter examples of 
how panpsychism can support various theological positions. Skrbina 2005: 87-91, 95-99.
14   R.T. Mullins raises something like this objection against demarcations where, »[a]ll the 
demarcating work is being done on the side of creation«, since »panentheism is supposed 
to be making a unique claim about the nature of God.« Mullins 2016: 342. But this seems 
to mischaracterize panentheism. Panentheism is primarily a statement about God’s rela-
tionship with the world, not about God’s nature in abstraction or considered apart from 
the world. Indeed, to many panentheists the idea of making a unique claim about the 
nature of God apart from the world would be to miss the point entirely (see, Henrikson, 
2017: 1083; Gregersen 2004: 20; Meister 2017: 8; Peters 2007: 285). A God-world relation-
ship may, of course, have strong implications for the attributes of God etc., such as seen 
in the panentheists tendency to accept divine passibility, mutability and deny creatio ex 
nihilo, but as Mullins shows these ideas alone fail to demarcate panentheism. On the in-
sufficiency of these demarcations see, Stenmark 2019; Mullins 2016: 344-336; Göcke, 2013: 
71-72; Lataster & Bilimoria 2018: 59-60.
68 Joanna Leidenhag
as handmaiden to philosophy of religion. Panpsychism neither gives rise to, 
nor determines the beliefs of panentheism, and there is no argument here 
that panentheists are panpsychists by default (nor vice versa). Indeed, I do 
not think panpsychists should adopt panentheism as the theological expan-
sion of their commitments.15 Instead, the central question of this paper is only 
whether panpsychism provides a useful framework for interpreting the two 
panentheistic slogans, such that panentheists may use panpsychism to demar-
cate themselves from their neighbours and rivals.
To achieve this, the section below will define panpsychism by providing four 
core theses that demarcate panpsychism from neighbouring theories of mind 
and provide the boundaries for identifying one’s theory as panpsychist. I then 
provide seven auxiliary theses that specify versions of panpsychism currently 
offered within this boundary. Not only is this necessary, since two ambiguities 
do not equal a clarity, but may serve as something of a model for the kind of 
demarcation we are hoping for with regard to panentheism. Whilst there may 
be a general correspondence between the aims of panentheism and panpsy-
chism, vague gestures towards a correspondence between these theories is a 
relatively unhelpful exercise, particularly if the goal is to clarify panentheism’s 
distinct claims. As such, the specific variants (seven auxiliary theses) within 
the panpsychist theory of consciousness are essential for the second task of 
this paper; to test whether particular versions of panpsychism can illuminate 
the two panentheistic slogans. The demarcation is in the details.
2. Panpsychism
The word ›panpsychism‹ can be translated to the general claim that all (pan) 
is mental (psyche), yet this should not be confused with animism, vitalism, 
or idealism. Popular definitions amongst contemporary panpsychists are that 
»mentality is fundamental and ubiquitous in the natural world«, »the view 
that the basic physical constituents of the universe have mental properties«, 
»physical nature is composed of individuals, each of which is to some degree 
sentient … [has] experience, or in a broad sense, consciousness«, or more 
colloquially that »everything has a soul … or a rudiment of a soul.«16 While 
these definitions provide a general idea of what panpsychism is about, a more 
15   I should acknowledge that I do not subscribe to panentheism or Process theology, but do 
consider panpsychism the most plausible position in philosophy of mind.
16   Goff, Seager & Allen-Hermanson 2017; Nagel 1979: 181; Sprigge 1998; Popper & Eccles 
1977: 15.
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precise list of Panpsychism’s Core Theses (PCT) are required to show that pan-
psychism is a coherent and demarcated position within philosophy of mind.
 Panpsychism’s Core Theses
The first core thesis is:
PCT1: At least some physical organisms are phenomenally conscious. (Mental 
Realism)
Phenomenal consciousness refers to the qualitative, subjective, experience or 
feeling of ›what it is to be like‹ an organism.17 The felt quality of an experi-
ence is said to be the phenomenal character of that experience; for example, 
the reddish quality of seeing the colour red. According to panpsychists, phe-
nomenality is a real and irreducible feature of this world. The first core thesis 
demarcates panpsychism from reductive physicalism in its various forms (e.g. 
eliminativism, behaviourism, functionalism).
The second core thesis is:
PCT2: Phenomenal consciousness is fundamental, and thus can neither arise 
out of, nor be reduced to anything wholly lacking in phenomenal consciousness. 
(Non-Emergence and Irreducibility)
A panpsychist does not merely believe that phenomenal consciousness ex-
ists but argues that phenomenality is a really hard fact to account for in a 
fundamentally physical world.18 If organic consciousness (phenomenal con-
sciousness of material organisms) is real and neither reducible nor strongly 
emergent, then »there must be some secret properties of matter with a direct 
connection to consciousness«.19 Weak and Strong Emergentists, however, will 
disagree with these claims and so PCT2 demarcates panpsychism from emer-
gence theory.
Since a traditional substance dualist or hylomorphist can hold to PCT1 and 
PCT2, a further core thesis is required to demarcate panpsychism from these 
two alternative positions. I propose that a third core thesis of panpsychism 
should be,
PCT3: Whatever is fundamental for materiality is also fundamental for mental-
ity, since there is only one fundamental level of reality. (Fundamental Monism)
17   Sprigge 1971: 166-68; Nagel 1974; Chalmers 1995.
18   Galen Strawson 2008: 60-67; Brogaard, 2017: 131-137.
19   Coleman 2018a: 185.
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For panpsychists then, unlike traditional substance dualists or hylomorphists, 
the individual phenomenal consciousness experienced by human beings is 
not itself fundamental, but it can be accounted for by positing a single, funda-
mental, psychophysical ground to reality.
This fundamental monism underpins a large portion of the general cor-
respondences between panpsychism and panentheism. First, just as panen-
theism seeks the path between monistic pantheism and theological dualism, 
panpsychism proposes a route between reductive physicalism and substance 
dualism. Second, just as panentheism wishes to talk of God and the world as 
a ›qualified non-dualism‹ (Vishishtadvaita) where two realities form a single 
unity, so do many panpsychists speak of mind and matter as the two proper-
ties of a shared neutral substance or as the intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of 
any one entity.20 Third, for panentheists, infinity is a monistic category that 
includes all finite realities, and for the panpsychist fundamentality is a mo-
nistic category that grounds all beings and includes both material and mental 
properties. Fourth, just as a panpsychist seeks to naturalise the mind, so too do 
many panentheists seek a naturalistic version of theism.
Finally, one should state a fourth core thesis for panpsychism:
PCT4: Fundamental consciousness is necessary for explaining organic 
consciousness.
Panpsychism posits consciousness at the fundamental level of reality because 
it provides an explanation for organic consciousness. If fundamental con-
sciousness does not and will never aid (in any way) in explaining organic con-
sciousness, then panpsychists should abandon their position.21 As such, how 
best to specify PCT4 is a major conundrum for panpsychists, better known as 
›the combination problem‹.22 Phrased as a question, the combination problem 
asks: what is the relationship between fundamental consciousness and human 
subjects, just that the former aids in explaining the existence of the latter? The 
hard-nut of this question is, more specifically, how does the adding together of 
many single perspectives result in a composite but unified conscious whole? 
20   Meister 2017: 3. See, Stubenberg 2017; Chalmers 2015.
21   There are versions of panpsychism that are not so reliant on providing an explanation of 
organic consciousness, and instead seek to provide explanations to one of the other peri-
neal mysteries of philosophy; such as causation. However, within philosophy of mind, I 
take it that all theories raison d’etre is to provide an explanation of organic consciousness.
22   This is a very old problem discussed by Lucretius, Leibniz, and William James, but the 
conundrum was given its modern name in Seager 1995. For a thorough discussion see, 
Chalmers 2017b: 179-214.
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Whilst the combination problem has yet to be expressed as a defeater against 
panpsychism, it remains an open question that requires (and is currently re-
ceiving) further research.23 As panpsychists debate between themselves how 
to specify PCT4, this conundrum holds the competing mind-body ontologies 
in a stalemate; the combination problem is comparable to the interaction 
problem for substance dualists, or the question of how mind emerges from 
mindless matter for the emergentist. It may simply be a matter of which mys-
tery one is happy to live with.
With these core theses we have successfully defined panpsychism and de-
marcated it from the other major positions in philosophy of mind. A specific 
version of panpsychism will require auxiliary theses, upon which panpsychists 
may disagree whilst still identifying their position with the panpsychist camp. 
As mentioned above, these auxiliary theses will be important for interpreting 
the panentheistic slogans of divine embodiment and interiority.
 Panpsychism’s Auxiliary Theses
The seven auxiliary theses stated below are organised into three semi-
independent categories. First, whilst panpsychists all agree that mentality is 
found at the fundamental level they differ on how to specify the nature of this 
primitive mentality (Aux1-3). No living panpsychists I know of posit rational, 
volitional, self-conscious, emotional, imaginative, etc. minds as fundamental—
but prefer to use phrases such as »thin subjects« or »raw feels«.24 The kind of 
mental life enjoyed by human beings is taken to be the result of the complexity 
and evolutionary development of these basic subjects. On panpsychism, you 
can’t get something from nothing (pace strong emergence) and there really is 
something there (pace reductive physicalism), but we may be able to get more 
mental life from less—the question is ›how much less?‹. Currently a panpsy-
chist has a choice between three auxiliary theses on this matter:
Aux1:  Basic subjects, which have simple momentary experiences, exist at the 
fundamental level. (Subject Panpsychism)
The panpsychists who reject Aux1 do so either because it is too counterintui-
tive or because it bares the full force of the combination problem; it demands 
23   Sam Coleman describes the combination problem »represents a major theoretical ›I owe 
you‹ of the panexperientialist/panpsychist. But that there is work to be done does not 
imply the falsity of a view, and there are avenues to be explored.« Coleman 2006: 51.
24   ›Thin subjects‹ or »SESMETs« are what Galen Strawson uses to refer to subjects that per-
sist only for the briefest period of time, Strawson 2009. ›Raw feels‹ is a phrase taken from 
Toleman 1932 to refer to features of our mental life that science cannot capture.
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an account of how subjects combine to form larger subjects. To avoid these 
issues some panpsychists prefer:
Aux2:  Proto-phenomenal properties, but not phenomenal experience or sub-
jects, are found at the fundamental level. (Panprotopsychism)
Whilst panprotopsychism does not demand an account of subject combina-
tion, it does still require an account of how phenomenal experiences arise 
from proto-phenomenal properties without violating PTC2. Moreover, whilst 
some panprotopsychists name specific properties, such as qualities or in-
tentions, we cannot really know what proto-phenomenal properties are. 
Panprotopsychism, therefore, seems threaten by noumenalism.25 If Aux1 is too 
counterintuitive, and Aux2 appears too mysterious, then the third option is:
Aux3:  There are experiences, but no subjects to experience them, at the funda-
mental level. (Panexperientialism)
This is the option preferred, almost exclusively, by Process theologians since it 
requires an event-based, and not substance-based, ontology to make sense of 
experiences floating free of subjects.
The second disagreement between panpsychists is in how to specify what is 
fundamental, or perhaps more clearly, where the fundamental level of reality 
is (Aux4-5). As argued above, the panpsychist needs to hold to fundamental 
monism (PTC3) and this leaves panpsychists with only two choices. The first 
option is,
Aux4:  The cosmos is made up from a plurality of fundamental psychophysical 
micro-entities. (Micropsychism).
Simply put, the fundamental level of reality is where the building-blocks for 
all that exists are found (e.g. quarks and photons, or whatever is described by 
a completed physics). It is largely due to the success of reductionistic explana-
tions in the natural sciences that the majority of Western panpsychists retain 
the spirit of reductionism by holding to micropsychism alongside microphysi-
calism (that physical things are explained in virtue of their physical parts). In 
order to satisfy PTC4, micropsychists typically seek models of mental combi-
nation. However, Eastern forms of panpsychism, Absolute idealism, and the 
rise of environmental holism has also meant that some panpsychists, instead, 
favour:
25   See, panqualityism in Coleman 2018b and panintentionalism in Pfeifer 2016.
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Aux5:   The cosmos as a single psychophysical whole is fundamental. 
(Cosmopsychism).
More recently, some analytic philosophers of mind have come to prefer Aux5 
over Aux4, due to the perception that PCT4 will be easier to maintain.26 That 
is, it is hoped that a theory of subject individuation will be easier than a theory 
of subject combination. This view is influenced by Jonathan Schaffer’s account 
of priority monism, where the one and only fundamental entity is the cosmos.27
The third set of auxiliary theses outline two types of relation between fun-
damental subjects and human or organic subjects; namely, constitutive and 
non-constitutive relations. The literature on the combination problem is too 
large to survey fully here but I will give four example solutions from: constitu-
tive combination, non-constitutive combination, constitutive individuation, 
and non-constitutive individuation. It is these examples that are most relevant 
for the present discussion since they specify how different panpsychists under-
stand the mind-body relation and what it means for a mind to be ›in‹ another 
mind.
The first type of relation is a constitutive relation, where all the true state-
ments about human consciousness are (wholly or partially) grounded in 
true statements about fundamental consciousness.28 To use a (controversial) 
metaphor from ecclesiology, if individual members of a church are seen to be 
prior to the church itself, then the existence of the church might be said to be 
grounded in the existence of its members. In this case, the church just is the 
sum of its members. However, if the church (perhaps as a spiritual reality) is 
logically prior to it having any members, then being a member of the church 
is a state of affairs about an individual that is grounded in the existence of 
church (itself, probably grounded in something else, like the will of God). In 
both cases, the grounding entities are prior to and more fundamental than the 
grounded entities. That is, truths about human consciousness are true in vir-
tue of the fact that they are also, perhaps primarily, true about fundamental 
consciousness.
Aux6:  All true facts about organic consciousness are true in virtue of facts about 
fundamental mentality. (Constitutive Panpsychism)
26   Goff 2017b; Nagasawa & Weger 2017; Jaskolla & Buck 2012.
27   Schaffer 2010. Schaffer’s account is different to cosmopsychism primarily because Schaffer 
identifies as a materialist.
28   Chalmers, 2017b, 181; Cf. Fine 2012; Scheaffer 2009.
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On this view, the organic subject is the sum of its fundamental parts (if com-
bined with Aux4) or a part of a larger subject (with Aux5). All the organic 
subject’s properties and causal powers are metaphysically necessitated by 
the properties and powers found at the fundamental level. This is sometimes 
phrased as an ›ontological free lunch‹, since the organic subject is nothing 
›over-and-above‹ fundamental mentality.29
For many panpsychists, the advantage of Aux6 is that it retains a bottom-up, 
scientific (even quasi-reductionist) account of consciousness, parallel to ma-
terial sciences. The materialist will hold to a constitutive relation like this be-
tween fundamental physical facts and organic material/mental facts, whereas 
a constitutive panpsychist will hold to a constitutive relation between funda-
mental mental facts and organic mental facts (facts about the mental life of 
organisms). The main advantage is that constitutive relations seem best suited 
for accounting for mental causation in a bottom-up fashion alongside physical 
causation.30
A proposed constitutive combinatorial solution (Aux4 + Aux6) to the com-
bination problem is Philip Goff ’s idea of Phenomenal Bonding. Goff has pro-
posed that, just as fundamental entities have intrinsic phenomenal properties 
(subjectivity, experience) and extrinsic material properties (mass, spin, loca-
tion), so too might relations between such entities have intrinsic phenomenal 
relational properties which facilitate subject combination.31 Similarly, Gregg 
Rosenberg’s ›carrier hypothesis‹ has proposed that causation is a fundamental 
relation that has a phenomenal interiority to it, as part of his argument for pan-
psychism from causation.32 The biggest challenge for Phenomenal Bonding is 
to give a more positive account of what these ›bonds‹ are, where they are, and 
how they structure the mental aspect of the world such that some things, like 
organisms, are conscious as single collective wholes, and other things (like 
tables and slippers) are not.
Philip Goff has more recently argued that constitutive panpsychists should, 
instead, adopt Cosmopsychism (Aux5). Whilst this provides some relief from 
providing a positive account of combinatorial relations, it still requires an 
29   Goff 2017b: 226-27.
30   Chalmers 2017b: 193.
31   Philip Goff abandons his own idea in favour of a constitutive cosmopsychism. Others are 
more hopeful that ›phenomenal bonds‹ might yet provide the best way forward; Miller 
2017; Chalmers 2017b.
32   Goff 2009, Goff 2017a. As such, Rosenberg argues that panpsychism not only offers a so-
lution to the mind-body problem, but also to what intrinsic or categorical natures carry 
the structures of causality in our world. Rosenberg 2004. See also, Mørch 2014; Mørch 
forthcoming.
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account of constitutive individuation. Goff refers to this as Grounding by 
Subsumption; all true facts about organic subjects are true in virtue of being 
true of the cosmic subject. In this way, Goff argues, organic subjects are sub-
sumed within the cosmic subject as a partial aspect of a given unity.33 On this 
view, the fundamental entity (the cosmos) is not a »homogenous blob« but is 
»structured« by its different aspects.34 These aspects may be considered (epis-
temologically) in isolation, but (ontologically) depend upon the existence of 
the whole.
If one has never been enamoured by materialism and reductive explana-
tions, then constitutive solutions to the combination problem may seem 
unnecessarily strange or sterile. Instead, a panpsychist, perhaps who has previ-
ously been associated with dualism or emergence theory, may prefer to search 
for a non-constitutive solution to the combination problem.
Aux7:  There are true facts about organic consciousness that are not true in virtue 
of facts about fundamental mentality. (Non-Constitutive Panpsychism)
A non-constitutive relation allows for new properties to arise within the com-
bined organic subject that are not present in the fundamental subject. The or-
ganic subject can be said to be caused by the fundamental subject(s), but to 
exist over-and-above the fundamental subject(s).
The most important micropsychist version of the non-constitutive relation 
(Aux4 + Aux7) is Emergent Panpsychism.35 As with emergence theory more 
widely, an emergent panpsychist can say that the body is the emergent base of 
the mind, and that the body gives rise to the mind due to some contingent laws 
of nature. But, importantly, as a panpsychist body this emergent base is a soci-
ety of micropsychist subjects who merge or infuse to create a single collective 
mind. The main advantage of this position is that no further theory of combi-
nation is required, instead the emergent mind is fundamental in the same way 
that a substance dualist affirms.36
33   Goff 2017b: 221-233. The terms ›aspect‹ and ›unity‹ are treated as primitive concepts 
that do not admit fundamental analysis. Goff uses examples to clarify these terms: one’s 
unified experience is often made up of different auditory, visual, and emotional aspects; 
a specific colour is a unity of different aspects of hue, saturation and lightness; states of 
affairs (electrons-having-negative-charge) are fundamental unities of which the object 
(electron) and the property (negative charge) are aspects.
34   Goff 2017b: 225-26.
35   Seager 2012; Seager 2010; Brüntrup 2017; Mørch 2014.
36   And thus, David J. Chalmers argues that emergent panpsychism suffers from the same 
difficultly as substances dualists in accounting for mental causation; Chalmers, 2017b, 
193-94.
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As long as Aux7 is not combined with Aux2 (panprotopsychism), then 
emergent panpsychism is not in danger of retreating into a (super)strong 
emergence theory, as is ruled out by PCT2. As a realist position regarding 
mentality (PCT1) and often realist concerning downward causation, emergent 
panpsychism cannot be confused with Weak Emergence either.37 That said, 
given that the rejection of emergence is a core thesis for panpsychism, many 
panpsychists are not willing to sail so close to the wind of emergence theory.
Finally, one might propose a non-constitutive model of individuation 
(Aux5 + Aux7). Such solutions are popular amongst cosmopsychists, but highly 
speculative and often phrased metaphorically. For example, Itay Shani em-
ploys aquatic metaphors where the universe is a »vast ocean of consciousness« 
or »oceanic plenum« and human subjects are »local disturbances coursing 
the ocean as currents, waves, streams, eddies, bubbles, ripples, and the like«.38 
Freya Mathews and Joseph Bracken, who both endorse panentheism, employ 
the language of systems theory; a self is a »system with a very special kind 
of goal, namely its own maintenance and self-perpetuation.«39 For Bracken, 
Ultimate Reality is a comprehensive system, in this technical sense, and is 
identified as the divine-life system, which includes the world and all creatures 
»as a sub-system within the higher-order system of the divine life«.40
This brings us to the theological implications of these variants of panpsy-
chism and so to the main investigative question of this paper: can panpsy-
chism aid panentheists in interpreting their two core metaphors in a way 
that demarcates their position from neighbouring theories of the God-world 
relationship? Although the two panentheistic slogans should ideally be held 
together they are treated somewhat separately in the two remaining sections 
of this paper. First, I focus on how micropsychist theories of combination 
(Aux4 + Aux6/Aux7) illuminate how the world might be God’s body, and sec-
ond I examine how cosmopsychist theories of individuation (Aux5 + Aux6/
Aux7) may elucidate how one subject may be said to be ›in‹ another subject, 
perhaps as the world is ›in‹ God.
37   Brüntrup 2017.
38   Shani 2015: 389-437, 411-412.
39   Mathews 2003:48. Mathews 2010.
40   Bracken 2015: 219. Bracken is clear that the aim of its systems-orientated approach is 
to »eliminate any kind of dualism, even dualism between God and the world of creation« 
p. 224.
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3. The World as God’s Panpsychist Body
The first panentheistic slogan draws explicitly on philosophy of mind in claim-
ing that ›the world is the body of God‹. There are as many ways to interpret this 
metaphor as there are positions in philosophy of mind. If God is an immaterial 
mind, and the world is a ›mindless‹ mechanical body over which God has di-
rect and total control, then a classical theist could easily employ this metaphor 
to depict the ontological separation between God and the world, as well as 
God’s total determination of all events.41 Yet, panentheists typically critique 
exactly this depiction of the mind-body, God-world relationships.42 The suc-
cess for this metaphor hinges almost entirely upon whether the panentheist 
can specify a mind-body relationship capable of performing the interpretative 
heavy-lifting necessary to demarcate panentheism from neighbouring theo-
logical positions.43
Western versions of panentheism have more recently turned to emergence 
theory to elucidate the metaphor of divine embodiment.44 Emergence theory 
states that consciousness emerges from the complex arrangements of the 
physical body, such that consciousness supervenes upon (is determined by, or 
is at least ontologically dependent upon) the body. Probably the most well-
known statement of »emergentist panentheism« is Philip Clayton’s »panen­
theistic analogy«, which suggests that God acts in the world in a way analogous 
to how the emergent mind (whole) acts through the body (parts) as its physical 
substrate.45
There have been, however, a number of critiques against employing emer-
gence theory to interpret the panentheist’s use of this metaphor. Niels Henrik 
Gregersen argues that, whilst the world as God’s body may have been an attrac-
tive metaphor in antiquity, the rise of emergence theory in philosophy of mind 
makes this metaphor unsuitable since, »God would appear as an emergent 
reality arising out of natural processes rather than the other way around.«46 
Emily Thomas compares the emergentist panentheism of Clayton, Peacocke 
and Morowtiz, unfavourably, with Samuel Alexander’s emergentist theology 
by arguing that emergence theory is quite simply incompatible with the claim 
that the universe is ›in‹ God. If God is the emergent whole or resultant then it 
41   T.J. Mawson even argues that »Classical Theism is committed to seeing the universe as 
God’s body.« Mawson 2006: 171.
42   McFague 1993: 144-145, 154-155.
43   Ward 2004, 62-68; Barua 2010.
44   Leidenhag 2013, 978.
45   Clayton 1997: 258-59.
46   Gregersen 2004: 20.
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can only be true to say that »deity is strictly contained ›in‹ the universe« and 
not the other way around.47 In summary, as I have argued elsewhere, the use of 
emergence theory entails the prioritization of the material and the subordina-
tion of the immaterial, which is in tension with much philosophy of religion 
and forms of theism, including panentheism.48 The unsuitability of emergence 
theory, in addition to a longstanding historical precedent, gives us good reason 
to turn to panpsychism instead.
Subject Panpsychism and Micropsychism (Aux1 + Aux4) give an account of 
the body as a society of subjects. If the world is a body in this sense, then the 
universe is a cosmic community, united by a shared relation to the whole/God. 
This seems congruent with panentheistic motivations towards a sacramental, 
ecological, and value-laden picture of the physical universe, and the rejec-
tion of inert, mechanistic views of materiality. An example of this approach is 
Hartshorne’s statement that »The world consists of individuals, but the totality 
of individuals as a physical or spatial whole is God’s body, the Soul of which is 
God.«49 Yet, what relation the bodily community of subjects will bear to God 
on this panpsychist interpretation of panentheism will depend upon the type 
of combinatorial relation that is adopted, Aux6 or Aux7.
3.1 Constitutive Micropsychism and God’s Body
If the micropsychist, subject panpsychist also adopts a constitutive relation 
(Aux1+ Aux4 + Aux6), then God will be the sum of the universe; all facts about 
God will be true in virtue of being true of some feature of the world. As such, 
God is constantly affected by the experiences and events in the world between 
creatures as a metaphysical necessity. Indeed, whilst ›God‹ would properly 
refer to the joint experience of the whole cosmic community, it would not be 
incorrect to refer to each subject as God in a derivative sense of participating 
in, even constituting, the divine body. This resonates with Lataster’s celebra-
tion of panentheism for lacking »an authoritarian deity dictating commands 
from on high. Only the divine can tell us what to do, but we are the divine!«50 
47   Thomas 2016.
48   Leidenhag 2016.
49   Hartshorne 1984: 94.
50   Lataster & Bilimoria 2018: 52. Similarly, Gregersen ties Christian panentheism to degree 
Christology, where Christological revelation is not unique to the person Jesus of Nazareth. 
Freya Mathews goes so far as to suggest that on panentheism/panpsychism,  »God with 
angels and burning bushes, the gods and goddess of Olympus and small hearth gods of 
Asia to Daoist immortals, fox faries, vision lakes, tertons, dragons, and rainbow serpants« 
are all »different emanations of the same material substratum«, that is »imbued with 
possibilities of inspiritment.« Mathews 2010: 234-35.
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The problem for panentheism here is that a constitutive relation may be too 
strong, and so fail to demarcate panentheism from pantheism.51 Not only do 
God and the world share a single substance, but there are no facts about God 
that are not also true of the world as a whole.52
3.2 Non-constitutive Micropsychism and God’s Body
If the panentheist adopts Micropsychism, Subject Panpsychism, and Non- 
constitutive Panpsychism (Aux1 + Aux4 + Aux7), then the picture changes 
substantially. The world is still the body of God as a combined plurality of sub-
jects or cosmic community, but God is not reducible to the sum of this plurality 
of subjects. As such, God may have properties, intentionality, experiences, or 
actions that are not true of individual organic subjects, nor true of the cos-
mic community as a whole. As such, the panentheists could now demarcate 
their position from pantheism and classical theism by claiming that, whilst 
God depends upon the world (contra classical theism), God also transcends 
the world (contra pantheism); there are true facts about God that are not true 
of the world, but all true facts about the world affect, and perhaps even effect, 
the very essence of God.
However, if the non-constitutive relation employed is the causal relation 
of emergence then on this model God again appears secondary and depen-
dent upon the universe, but the universe does not appear dependent upon 
God. Panentheism would then become a version of emergent theism. This 
conclusion may not be exclusive to emergent panpsychism but may be a ten-
dency within all varieties of micropyschism and (as argued above) traditional 
emergence, where the parts are taken as more fundamental than the whole. 
Therefore, a panentheist committed to divine creation/creativity of the world, 
to God’s logical priority over the world, or even God’s logically equality with 
the world, is more likely to find aid from cosmopsychism (Aux5) than micro-
psychism (Aux4).
51   Lataster stresses that many versions of panentheism hold that God and the world are 
the same substance, and in doing so classifies panentheism as a version of pantheism. 
Lataster 2014: 390-91, 392.
52   For more on pantheism and constitutive panpsychism, see Leidenhag 2018.
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4. Panpsychism ›in‹ God
The second panentheist slogan, »that the world exists within the Divine, although 
God is also more than the world«, is captured in the very name ›pan-en-theism‹.53 
Whilst a panentheist could abandon all notion of divine embodiment, she can-
not abandon the claim that ›all is in God‹ and still claim to be a pan-en-theist. 
Yet, as Gregersen writes, »the concept of panentheism is not stable in itself. 
The little word ›in‹ is the hinge of it all.«54 It is widely recognised that this 
small word ›in‹, »must bear the brunt of the interpretative burden« since it 
alone »holds the position together and distinguishes it from its rivals.«55 To 
achieve this, what is meant by ›the world being in God‹ must exclude, first, 
whatever it means for the world to be ›outside of God‹ (Classical Theism) and, 
second, ›identical to God‹ (pantheism).56 Third, to say that ›the world is in 
God‹ should not be identical to the claim that ›God is in the world‹; the tradi-
tional doctrine of divine omnipresence or indwelling.57 Whilst more contro-
versial, this third constraint is nothing more than the logical consequence of 
the first two. For if what it means for the world to be in God is identical to tradi-
tional notions of omnipresence then the defining statement of panentheism is 
no different from a statement adhered to by most classical theists. Similarly, if 
›God‹ and ›world‹ can dance around the word ›in‹ interchangeably then there 
is a risk of implying that these are synonymous concepts, as in many versions 
of pantheism.
In his constructive proposal to demarcate panentheism from neighbouring 
positions, R.T. Mullins suggests that panentheists should interpret the ›in‹ lit-
erally and not metaphorically. To do this, Mullins recommends that panenthe-
ists make metaphysical space and metaphysical time attributes of God—in 
Gregersen’s words, God has »roominess«.58 When this roomy God creates the 
universe, physical space and time are created within the divine metaphysical 
space and time. In this way, the universe and all its objects are literally ›in‹ 
God. This proposal, as Mullins intends, says something unique about God 
and so might be the beginnings of a successfully demarcated panentheism.59 
53   Clayton 2017: 1045
54   Gregersen 2004: 19.
55   Clayton 2004: 252; Peterson 2001: 396.
56   Göcke 2013: 63.
57   For example, Krishna’s teaching in the Bhagavad Gita is often labelled as panentheistic 
and not pantheistic because he teaches that whilst »everyone abides in him, he does not 
abide in them.« Lataster & Bilimoria 2018: 52. This is contrary to Clayton 2010: 184.
58   Mullins 2016: 342-344; Gregersen 2004: 20.
59   Mullins 2016: 243.
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However, it says nothing about God’s relationship to the world and very lit-
tle about the ontology of the world. As a result, Mullins’ proposal abandons 
most of panentheism’s motivators to be a more credibly scientific, relational, 
dynamic, view of God that can account for both the problem of evil and the 
reality of religious experience.60 A clear demarcation that fails to motivate the 
position is only marginally helpful to the panentheist. The question is, can 
panpsychism provide an equally clear demarcation of panentheism as Mullins’ 
proposal without sacrificing the motivating reasons to adopt panentheism in 
the first place?
Since, cosmopsychism (Aux5) starts with a single whole, which all finite or-
ganic subjects are contained within, it seems that the second panentheistic 
metaphor is a theological parallel to cosmopsychism. This retains both the lit-
eral reading of ›in‹ that Mullins argues for, but in both a mentalistic and spa-
tial sense, since on panpsychism subjectivity and extension are fundamentally 
united (PCT3). As Uwe Meixner comments,
It seems natural to identify the transcendental subject with God. The immediate 
consequence of this idea is that everything is in God (qua being in His total expe-
rience, which, at the same time, is the totality of all experiences), whether as an 
experience, as a subject of experience, or as an object of experience.61
Meixner identifies this version of cosmopsychism (Husserlian idealism) with 
a panentheism that provides »a real sense of the inner, the utterly intimate 
omnipresence of God.«62 As such, this cosmopsychist notion of how the world 
is ›in‹ God, such that the minds of the world exist by virtue of being part of 
God’s experience, also retains at least some of the main motivators of panen-
theism. It seems a promising start for the panentheist, therefore, to adopt 
PTC1-4 with Aux5. However, the panentheist will still need to adopt a theory 
of individuation and apply either a constitutive or non-constitutive relation to 
her understanding of the God-world relationship.
4.1 Constitutive Cosmopsychism
If applied to panentheism, Philip Goff ’s grounding by subsumption would 
mean that organic subjects are constitutive aspects of the divine. This already 
60   Panentheists need not be concerned with all these motivators, nor does their proposal 
need to be successful in achieving all these claims. But, I take it that a panentheists should 
be concerned with at least one of these in order to motivate her metaphysical claims in 
competition to competing models of God.
61   Meixner 2017: 399.
62   Ibid.
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invokes the mereological language that literal interpretations of panentheism 
prefer. It also captures the idea that discrete, individual subjects and objects 
are both dependent upon God and manifestations of the divine being, not as 
symbolic representations as a classical theism may hold, but in a more direct 
and ontological fashion.63 In a way similar to how Goff says that aspects of 
the cosmic consciousness can be distinguished epistemologically without 
ontological separation, Göcke describes panentheism as holding to a distinc-
tion between reality and ultimate reality »that is epistemologically needed for 
ultimate explanation, [but] cannot be a substantial ontological distinction 
between them for a variety of reasons.«64
Goff argues that his grounding by subsumption model only applies to sub-
ject cosmopsychism (Aux1+Aux5), since aspects of unities (unlike parts of 
composites) cannot have any properties, which are not had by the whole with-
in which they are subsumed; if aspects of the cosmos are subjects, then the 
cosmos must also be a subject. This may suit the personal view of God adopted 
by many (but not all) panentheists, demarcating it from, at least, impersonal 
versions of pantheism. He also suggests, however, that fundamental reality will 
not be a pure subject, but an impure subject with both experiential and non-
experiential aspects (consciousness+).65 Although Goff cannot tell us what 
exactly consciousness+ consists in, grounding by subsumption may yet tell us 
some things about the cosmic-subject/God. For example, the cosmic subject 
must be aware of all the experiences and first-person perspectives that are con-
tained within it as partial aspects, otherwise these partial aspects would have 
properties not had by the cosmic subject. To be clear, the cosmic subject does 
not know about the experiences of finite subjects in a third- or second-person 
kind of knowledge, as is the case in some definitions of omniscience and om-
nipresence in classical theism, but the cosmic subject experiences them as its 
own, in an unmediated first-person way. Indeed, my experiences just are the 
experiences of God in the partial aspect of God that is ›me‹. Since my experi-
ences are grounded in God’s experiences, there can be no separation between 
how I feel and how God feels.
We might compare this constitutive cosmopsychism to Linda Zagzebski’s 
proposal to add ›omnisubjectivity‹ as a divine attribute within classical theism. 
She argues that perfect knowledge of subjects and their first-person experienc-
es, such that God is present with creatures in their experiences, is a direct im-
plication of the classical theists’ commitment to omnipresence, omniscience 
63   Clayton 2010: 187-190.
64   Göcke 2017: 6.
65   Goff 2017b: 230.
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and omnipotence.66 Zagzebski proposes that an omnisubjective God maximal-
ly empathizes with all the conscious first-person states of creaturely subjects. 
She contrasts her proposal with a constitutive relation between the divine 
consciousness and human subjects for three reasons. Her first reason is that 
if the »One conscious self (God) has another conscious self (you) as a part.« 
Then, »[t]he self you thought you were is not a distinct self.«67 This alone may 
not concern panentheists or panpsychists, who could argue that we must de-
flate our notions of selfhood away from autonomous or fundamental unities. 
Second, Zagzebski points out the repercussions for relationality, since »if I am 
simply a part of God, I lose much of the point of addressing God as a distinct 
person«.68 There can be no second-personal I-Thou relationship in a whole-
part constitutive relation; this seems to me a serious problem for panentheists 
who claim to have a highly relational view of God. Third, Zagzebski defends 
her own view from The Moral Objection, which worries that if God empathizes 
with humanity then immoral dispositions and intentions are included into the 
life of God. Although Zagzebski applauds Charles Hartshorne sensitivity to 
the importance of divine empathy, she cites his understanding of the world as 
the body of God as incurring the full force of The Moral Objection, and thus 
departing from the tradition on the issue of absolute divine goodness and holi-
ness.69 This is a clear example of how the type of relation between God and the 
world has concrete implications for religious practice and ideas of who God is.
As an asymmetrical relation, grounding by subsumption may appear to de-
marcate this version of cosmopsychist panentheism from pantheism; since the 
world would be grounded in God (by subsumption), but God would not be 
grounded in the world and thus it seems that God and the world cannot be 
strictly identical. However, this demarcation fails. For whilst it is true that God 
bears an asymmetrical relation to organic or finite subjects (such as human 
beings), God does not bear such an asymmetrical relation to the world (uni-
verse or multiverse) as a whole. Indeed, a constitutive relation means that the 
cosmic subject is not more than the world, but is just the sum of its parts; the 
total consciousness+ in the world when it is not individuated.70 The world as 
a whole is not a partial aspect of God, but simply is God. Goff considers this a 
problem for theological appropriations of his theory of mind. He comments,
66   Zagzebski 2013: 10-25.
67   Zagzebski 2013: 24.
68   Ibid.
69   Ward 2004: 70.
70   Leidenhag 2018.
84 Joanna Leidenhag
Cosmopsychism does not entail pantheism. We need not think of the universe 
as a supremely intelligent rational agent…. It is more plausible to think that the 
consciousness of the universe is simply a mess.71
Many pantheists will, justly, complain that Goff ’s depiction of their deity as 
»a supremely intelligent rational agent« is a mischaracterisation. However, 
Goff ’s assumption that his position is closest to some form of pantheism and 
his warning that any cosmic deity resulting from his philosophy of mind will 
lack mental (rational, emotional, experiential, violation) coherence or clarity 
should be of concern to panentheists.
4.2 Panentheism and Non-constitutive Cosmopsychism
The problem of a ›messy‹ God is avoided by a cosmopsychist panentheism 
that adopts the non-constitutive model of individuation (Aux7). The most 
common example of a non-constitutive relation is the contingent and causal 
relation described in emergence theory. When combined with cosmopsychism 
this becomes something like a reverse emergence theory, where the whole sys-
tem (›the ocean‹) logically precedes and causes the parts (sub-systems or ›ed-
dies‹) to endure semi-independently for a time. Unlike emergent panentheism 
or emergent panpsychism, the adoption of cosmopsychism buttresses this ver-
sion of panpsychism from the previous criticisms. If the panentheist were to 
adopt a non-constitutive cosmopsychism (Aux5 + Aux7) they would still be 
able to claim that God is logically prior to and the causal ground of all other 
subjects, whilst also being of one substance with all finite beings. The world is 
a contingent, rather than a necessary, aspect of God.
The non-constitutive relation means that the cosmic consciousness is more 
than the sum of its partial aspects. Therefore, the cosmic substrate, the divine 
ocean of consciousness, need not experience all (morally problematic) finite 
intentions, thoughts, emotions as its own. Indeed, the fundamental level of 
mentality need not be personal or a subject at all. That is, a non-constitutive 
relation (Aux7) is compatible with subject panpsychism (Aux1), panexperi-
entialism (Aux2) or panprotopsychism (Aux 3), in a way grounding by sub-
sumption was not. Therefore, a non-constitutive cosmopsychism allows the 
panentheist to adopt either a personal, impersonal or more-than-personal 
view of God. The demarcation between pantheism and panentheism is upheld 
by the contingent causal relation between God and the subjects/objects we call 
›the world‹. In terms of holding together agency at both the cosmic-divine level 
and the organic level, this position gives no immediate relief to the problems 
71   Goff 2017b: 246.
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of epiphenomenalism and overdetermination that challenge ontologies with 
fundamental agents existing on multiple levels, but this is not a unique or de-
feating problem for non-constitutive cosmopsychism/panentheism.72
This non-constitutive relation between God and the world means that 
there is a logically possible state of affairs where God, as the cosmic conscious-
ness, was the only consciousness in existence and none of the finite objects 
and subjects of the world were yet to individuate themselves from the divine 
substance or consciousness. What we may have in a non-constitutive cosmo-
psychist interpretation of panentheism is an origin of finite subjects/objects 
through emanation from the divine substance; creation ex deo, not creation 
ex nihilo. Contrary to classical theism, this emanation not only takes place 
within the substance of God, rather than from absolute nothingness, but indi-
viduation results from a kind of contingent law or principle of the divine being 
itself, rather than an act of the divine will. This corresponds with a number of 
statements from panentheists that emanation implies that God is »bodying 
[the world] forth, generating all life from her being« and that creation is »a 
self-transformation of the divine being«.73
5. Conclusion
This paper has explored whether panpsychism can illuminate the two panen-
theistic slogans in such a way that panentheism can be clearly demarcated 
from neighbouring positions. Whilst panpsychism may be combined with 
any model of God, panpsychism’s account of the mind-body relation and 
fundamental-organic consciousness relation do seem to provide a framework 
for interpreting the panentheists metaphors in a distinctive manner. This is a 
promising start, but further work will be needed to develop this into a more 
thorough demarcation and version of panentheism. Since evocatively power-
ful ambiguities have plagued panentheism in the past, I have employed pan-
psychism’s auxiliary theses in addition to the core panpsychist theses to try 
and make this discussion as specific and concrete as possible. It is clear from 
the resulting analysis that these auxiliaries make a great deal of difference to 
the interpretation of panentheism’s core metaphors. Future scholars should 
keep these particularities in mind when exploring or asserting any correspon-
dence between panpsychism and panentheism. In the end, a cosmopsychism 
that posits a non-constitutive relation between the cosmic consciousness and 
72   Chalmers 2017b: 194.
73   McFague 1993: 152; Göcke 2017: 7.
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organic subjects seems to mirror the kind of relationship between God and the 
world posited by panentheists most faithfully. However, there is much more to 
be done on this and panpsychists themselves are at no agreement concerning 
the possibility of such individuation; panentheists will need to pay attention 
to this ongoing debate. For now, it seems that there may be a way of employing 
panpsychism for the demarcation of panentheism, but as to whether panen-
theism is a plausible or desirable theology is a separate question and one I will 
leave panentheists to argue for.
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God as World-Mind: Some Theological Implications 
of Panpsychism
David Skrbina
Perhaps the two most important concepts in the history of philosophy are 
God and mind. Unsurprisingly, both are notoriously vague, which is a large 
part of the reason why there has been such a diversity of views on these top-
ics. Needless to say, the literature on each is vast. Less examined, though, is the 
intersection of these two concepts. ›God as mind‹; ›mind as God‹—what can 
these mean? What do they imply? How can such hybrid concepts be articu-
lated and integrated into the current stream of philosophic thought? These are 
the questions that I will explore in the present essay. Ultimately I will argue 
that the most reasonable conception of God is that of a world-mind—the 
mind of the cosmos—in a sense that is completely analogous to the mind of a 
human being.
These questions will be examined in light of two other over-arching con-
cepts: panpsychism and panentheism. Rather than analyzing these in terms of 
their various and subtle forms, I will address each in a relatively broad and 
loose conception. Panpsychism I take to be the view that all objects, or systems 
of objects, have, or contain, aspects of mind. Panentheism I take to be the view 
that God resides ›in‹ the universe as its spirit or soul. Both of these require 
some discussion before moving on to the primary subject at hand.
First, panpsychism: This is an ancient and respected metaphysical view, 
dating to the earliest days of Western philosophy. It almost certainly derives 
from even older pre-rational animistic traditions, which became formalized 
in the language and concepts of true philosophy. Primitive peoples seemed to 
have had an instinctive awareness that the world of nature was suffused with 
agency, potency, experientiality, and will. Non-human life forms clearly worked 
toward desired ends in a deliberate and quasi-conscious manner. They clearly 
experienced the world; they could flourish and be happy; they could suffer and 
perish. Indigenous people, seeing themselves as fully integrated into nature 
and not yet as a thing apart, would certainly have viewed other animals as fully 
enminded. Plants, as living and growing things, also would have undoubted-
ly been imbued with agency and spirit. And lacking any scientific notion of 
life, non-living things that exhibited power, motive force, or even patterned 
behavior would also have been assumed to possess something like a spirit or 
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soul, on a par with plants and animals. For our distant ancestors, all the world 
was alive.
As philosophy emerged, this ancient animistic intuition became subject to 
rational analysis—and thus transformed in the process. For the Greeks, the 
power to cause motion, or of self-motion, was a clear marker of an innate 
psyche. For Thales, even the humble magnetic rock was ensouled because it 
could move bits of iron. For others, the rational and orderly movement of ce-
lestial bodies was proof of ensoulment. Yet others saw elemental forces like fire 
and air as evidence of a universal psychic power. Even change itself, ubiquitous 
in nature, was seen as something god-like and divine—evidence of reason in 
nature.
Over time, arguments for panpsychism evolved in form and complexity, but 
never faded away. Some philosophers argued on a basis of ex nihilo, nihil fit: 
nothing in the effect that is not in the cause. If ensouled animals and plants 
could arise from mere matter, then mere matter must be ensouled. Some ar-
gued from a theological basis; if God made all and is, in some sense, extant in 
all things, then mind or spirit must be omnipresent. Other philosophers took 
cues from scientific reasoning. For example, the dynamic sensitivity of even 
the simplest forms of matter suggests an inherent experientiality. Yet others 
said that the physical manifestation of things is simply their exterior; they 
must also have an interior, and the best candidate for such an interior is some-
thing mind-like.
Present-day arguments are more sophisticated but draw on the same basic 
intuitions. We now have Russellian (in reality, Schopenhauerian) monism, 
analytical non-emergence arguments, process-based approaches, and a priori 
claims based on quasi-idealist views. Some current forms of panpsychism em-
phasize the mentality, consciousness, or experientiality of all (or at least some) 
elementary particles or ultimate entities. This is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition, however, because we are also compelled to accept our own enmind-
edness. Those who promote variations on such a micro-psychism paint for us 
a strange cosmos, one in which (say) atoms, humans, and perhaps ›higher ani-
mals‹ are experiential beings—and nothing else. An odd universe, to say the 
least. Far more likely, and more in line with historical thinking, is to argue that 
all physical objects, and perhaps all systems of objects, have an experiential 
unity or aspect. For present purposes, I will defend panpsychism in this latter 
sense: as a broadly conceived notion that all things have an experiential unity, 
a mind.
Regarding panentheism, we can date the origin of the term to the early 
1800s in the work of Karl Krause, a relatively minor German philosopher who 
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studied under Schelling and Hegel.1 Krause held an organismic view of the uni-
verse, one in which God was, in effect, the soul of the physical cosmos. An om-
nipresent God saturated all aspects of the physical world—just as water might 
saturate a sponge—but remained ontologically distinct. The water is not the 
sponge, and God is not the universe, as pantheism would have it. Panentheism 
attempts to retain something of a theological God while naturalizing him; he 
is no supernatural being, dwelling in some otherworldly heaven.2 Krause’s was 
an attempt to construct a modern, scientific, and naturalistic cosmos without 
abandoning God.
But from a present-day perspective we can see some immediate problems 
here. If a panentheistic God is ontologically distinct from the physical realm, 
we are dealing with a form of dualism. And if this God has any causal power in 
the world, or reacts in any way to our pleadings, we are directly faced with the 
severe problem of interactionism—of how a non-physical God can causally 
interact with physical beings or a physical universe. We are furthermore con-
fronted with the striking lack of evidence; if such a God exists, why is he not 
transparently obvious to all? On the contrary, he is defended by a vanishingly 
small portion of humanity.3 Additionally, we need to inquire whether a panen-
theistic God is anything like the Christian God: specifically, one who is good, 
just, merciful, and loving. Any such moral God immediately runs afoul of the 
Problem of Evil: why would any all-powerful and all-good deity allow rampant 
pain and suffering? This problem has long been recognized to have no cogent 
reply. Responses such as Plantinga’s—that for God to banish evil, he would 
also have to banish free will—are only marginally relevant. First, it addresses 
only logical, not metaphysical, necessity. Second, it’s irrelevant for natural evil 
(hurricanes, tsunamis, etc) and for evil suffered by sentient but non-human 
animals. Third, it holds a naïvely realist view of free will, one that is arguably 
unjustified. For these reasons, any conventional panentheism is untenable.
But there remains a valid intuition here, I think: that there exists some kind 
of higher-order consciousness or mind in the universe. This, in fact, may be the 
one valid belief behind virtually every religion known to man. It has seemed 
plausible, even obvious, to many people over the millennia that some sort 
of Mind (or Minds) are at work in the cosmos. Given a vague analogy to the 
1   For a good exploration of Krause’s views, see Göcke 2018.
2   For sake of convenience, I will refer to God in terms of male pronouns; but this is not in-
tended literally, of course. (To be politically correct, perhaps I should use a gender-neutral 
pronoun like ›zie.‹ But I won’t.)
3   There are no panentheistic religions, to my knowledge.
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human mind, it’s natural to project anthropomorphic qualities onto this Mind. 
And even this has some rational basis, as I will argue. But to turn the Big Mind 
into an all-good, all-powerful God who loves each and every one of us, answers 
prayers, sends sinners to hell, etc—this won’t do at all. What we need, then, is 
a naturalistic theology without the religion: a logos of theos (rationality about 
God) without the ›binding‹ (re-ligio, lit. to bind). I hope to make some progress 
along this path in the present essay.
1. The Greek Context
Having sketched some cursory thoughts on panpsychism, panentheism, God, 
and mind, I’d like to start to synthesize these concepts into a viable and natu-
ralistic theology. Unsurprisingly, many important ideas on this front were first 
articulated by the Greeks. Let’s remind ourselves what they said on these topics.
The pre-Socratics seemed quite convinced that the cosmos as a whole was 
ensouled in some way. Aristotle (411a7) tells us that Thales’ view was of a psyche 
that was »mixed with the whole [cosmos].« Anaximenes is recorded as saying 
this: »Just as our psyche, being air, holds us together and controls us, so do 
breath and air surround the whole cosmos« (frag. 17). For Xenophanes, »God is 
one«; he »remains in the same place, moving not at all.« Yet this God somehow 
controls all: »Without effort he shakes all things by the thought of his mind«.4 
Heraclitus’ God is Logos, a kind of cosmic rationality. Logos is ›the Wise One,‹ 
›the Eternal One,‹ and ›the Thunderbolt‹; indeed, »The Thunderbolt steers the 
Universe.« The Logos acts not from without, but from within: »The Wise One 
knows the plan by which everything is directed through everything« (frag. 41). 
Finally we have Anaxagoras, who posited Mind (nous) as his cosmic overseer: 
»Whatever things were to be, and whatever things were, as many as are now, 
and whatever things shall be, all these Mind arranged in order« (frag. 12). His 
view, according to Aristotle (984b15) was that »just as in animals, so in nature, 
Mind is present and responsible for the world.« Hence there seems to be a kind 
of pre-Socratic consensus that a divine intelligence pervades the universe, a 
cosmic Mind or cosmic Reason, which in some way moves things and brings 
order and coherence to all.
Such ideas were clearly seminal for Plato and Aristotle. Among many other 
things, Plato is famous for the first clear articulation of a world-soul. Two initial 
points here: First, as with his predecessors, ›world‹ and ›soul‹ are kosmou (cos-
mos) and psyche. So the purported world-soul is best conceived of as a cosmic 
4   Fragments 8, 10, 11.
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psyche or cosmic mind—a kind of rational intelligence. Aristotle confirms this 
for us: »it is evident that Plato means the soul of the whole to be like the sort of 
soul which is called mind« (De anima, 407a5).
Secondly, Plato explicitly differentiates the cosmic mind from the creator 
god or Demiurge. The latter brought the universe into being along with all 
its elements and then, in a separate act, it created the cosmic mind. But then 
the Demiurge vanishes from the scene, leaving the cosmic mind on its own. 
Notably, this mind is apparently unconcerned with the detailed operations of 
things, and especially unconcerned with human matters. Its main function 
seems to be to drive the regular motion of the heavenly bodies, and thus to 
»manage« the cosmos.5 It operates on the level of the whole, not the parts. In 
a very real sense, the cosmos is constructed on the same model as the human 
being; both have physical bodies and both possess higher-order rational minds. 
As above, so below.
Thus stated, it’s a fairly clear conception of panentheism. The cosmos is a 
god because it is intelligent, divine, and ensouled. But this god creates noth-
ing, is not moral, and certainly has nothing to do with individual humans. 
He doesn’t answer prayers, condemn people to hell, or send his son down to 
Earth to save humanity—not even close. Plato’s is a rational, philosophical 
panentheism.
Importantly, Plato seems to add a subtle form of panpsychism to his panen-
theistic ontology. Scattered throughout his late works are references to many 
kinds of ensouled things—and the list is impressively long. In addition to hu-
mans, animals, and the cosmos, he attributes psyche to plants (Tim 77b), indi-
vidual bones (Tim 74e), the Earth (Tim 40c), stars (Tim 41e), the sun and moon 
(Laws 898d), the four elements »alone« (Laws 895c), and even to the sum total 
of reality (Soph 249a). What consistent metaphysics could allow such ensouled 
entities and yet not include everything? Plato’s case for panpsychism is im-
plicit but strong. And if we are still unconvinced, he seems to resolve the issue 
for us with a striking passage near the end of Laws:
Now consider all the stars and the moon and the years and the months and all 
the seasons … A soul or souls … have been shown to be the cause of all these 
phenomena, and whether it is by their living presence in matter … or by some 
other means, we shall insist that these souls are gods. Can anybody admit all this 
and still put up with people who deny that »everything is full of gods«? (899b)
The last phrase recalls Thales’ panpsychist proclamation.6
5   Laws (899a).
6   Nearly all the pre-Socratics were panpsychists; see Skrbina 2017.
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For his part, Aristotle follows many of these attributions of psyche, though 
with a different interpretation. Psyche, for him, was the form or structure of bi-
ologically living things. Thus only humans, animals, and plants are ensouled, in 
a technical sense. Even so, other things in nature possess remarkably soul-like 
or life-like qualities, he says. For one, all of matter exhibits a kind of upward 
striving, a yearning for completion, fulfillment, life, and psyche. As John Rist 
(1989: 123) explains, for Aristotle, »the whole of the cosmos is permeated by 
some kind of upward desire and aspiration.« We see this described explicitly in 
Physics (250b12), where Aristotle writes of »an immortal never-failing property 
of things,« namely, »a sort of life, as it were, to all naturally constituted things.« 
Elsewhere he explains that the four elements, individually, »possess a prin-
ciple of movement in their own nature«.7 As well the cosmic sphere, because 
it displays constant and rational self-motion, is ensouled: »the heaven is ani-
mate and possesses a principle of movement«.8 Stars, too, embody a psyche: 
»We think of the stars as mere bodies … but we should rather conceive them 
as enjoying life and action;«9 after all, their movement »[is] similar to that of 
animals and plants.«
In his late writings Aristotle developed a notion of God as an Unmoved or 
Prime Mover, one who drives the motion of the cosmos via his thoughts. The 
Mover is thus a Mind; he thinks, and the universe revolves. »Life also belongs to 
God; for the actuality (energeia) of thought is life, and God is that actuality,« he 
writes.10 Somewhat later in Metaphysics, he reiterates that »these substances 
[i.e. stars] are gods, and that the divine encloses the whole of nature.« God, the 
cosmic Mind, thinks. Of what? Of itself : »Therefore it must be of itself that the 
divine thought thinks (since it is the most excellent of things), and its thinking 
is a thinking on thinking«.11 As with Plato, we have here no moral God, no re-
deemer, no dealer in prayer and sacrifice. This God is utterly unconcerned with 
human affairs. He merely thinks, and his divine rationality maintains order in 
the cosmos.
Of this view of God as world-mind, Whitehead (1967: 173) was notably im-
pressed. On this basis he grants Aristotle the title of »greatest metaphysician« 
in Western philosophy. Being largely free from mythological and theological 
baggage (of the Christian type), Aristotle could envision a purely rational 
7    De caelo (268b28).
8    Ibid. (285a28).
9    Ibid. (292a20).
10   Met (1072b27).
11   Ibid. (1074b34). The final phrase in original is: kai estin he noesis noeseos noesis.
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conception of God. For Whitehead, it’s a kind of peak in conceptual thought, 
something perhaps unsurpassable: »It may be doubted whether any properly 
general metaphysics can ever get much further than Aristotle.«
But there is more to be said. Even a cosmic Mind cannot move things with-
out some means—a carrier or conveyor of the mental force. In the heavens, 
according to Aristotle, this was accomplished via the so-called fifth element, 
ether.12 Ether conveys a circular motion from the Mind to the heavenly bodies. 
This suffices for the heavens, but ether does not exist (or at least is not 
efficacious) here on Earth. And none of the four traditional elements—fire, air, 
water, or earth—will do the job. Thus Aristotle was compelled to (re)introduce 
a new, Earthly element, the pneuma, that functioned like the ether.13 It had 
to be the carrier of mind, and to pervade all aspects of the earthly realm. He 
describes this strange entity variously as »the faculty of all kinds of psyche,« 
a »vital heat« (thermoteta psychiken), and »the principle of psyche«.14 It is, 
he says, »analogous to the element of the stars« [i.e. the ether]. Permeating 
everything, pneuma thus effectively animates everything, at least indirectly. 
In one of the most stunning passages in the Aristotelian corpus, he writes the 
following:
Animals and plants come into being in earth and in liquid, because there is 
water in earth, and pneuma in water, and in all pneuma is vital heat, so that, in a 
sense, all things are full of psyche.15
So it’s not that all things are ensouled—this applies only to biological life—but 
rather that a principle of psyche or vital heat pervades everything, filling them 
»in a sense« with soul. This is fully consistent with his earlier remark on the 
»sort of life« in all things. Via the pneuma, all of matter is thus quasi-animated. 
Hence we arrive at a tentative panpsychism in Aristotle, of the sort few would 
have expected.
As insightful as these two men were, both have shortcomings from our 
modern perspective. Plato comes across either as a double-dualist (body and 
soul, and matter and Form) or more likely as some kind of radical pluralist. 
He thus invites a range of interaction problems and a host of other difficult 
12   Aristotle seems to be uncomfortable with the term ›ether,‹ given that he rarely calls it by 
name. More commonly he refers to it as the »primary body,« »first element,« or »element 
of the stars.«
13   ›Pneuma‹ was already an old concept by Aristotle’s time.
14   GA (736b29-737a8).
15   GA (762a18).
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metaphysical questions that go unanswered. Aristotle’s cosmic Mind is more 
coherent and rational but we have a hard time fitting it into a larger concep-
tion of mind, especially given the strange and late introduction of the pneuma 
as a quasi-panpsychist entity.
Perhaps, then, we are best served by taking these ideas as inspiration and 
as aspects of truth in some broader metaphysical sense. Let me now try to 
construct a contemporary vision of God as a world-mind, vaguely along Greek 
lines, but with an eye to more recent ideas in philosophy of mind.
2. First Philosophy of the Mind
Pressing ahead: All philosophizing about the mind starts with one elemental 
fact, namely, that we ourselves are enminded and experiential beings. This 
is an old truth, dating back at least to Descartes, and it holds with full force 
today. There is no more indisputable truth than that we experience the world. 
Experiential reality exists, precisely because we are such reality. All serious 
philosophy must begin from this central metaphysical fact—perhaps the only 
indubitable fact that we possess.
Every move from here involves speculation, but we must try to keep it well-
grounded speculation. My experiences seem to be of two broad categories. On 
the one hand, I have the various qualitative feelings of sensory impressions 
and other internal mental states. Vibrant orange color, a piercing scream, and 
the smell of fresh bread all evoke qualitative feelings. These qualia are then at-
tached to certain things in my surroundings, in an apparently causal way. But 
the feelings themselves reside in me.
On the other hand, my experiences seem to have a sense of directedness, 
of focus, and of deliberation. They are about things. This so-called intentional 
aspect of the mind manifests itself in different ways: as desire, as will, as cogni-
tion, as belief. These mental states are oriented at, or directed toward, certain 
conditions or states of being. I see something, I want something, I think about 
or believe in something.
These two categories are distinct but not independent. Many of my mental 
states—perhaps all—are a mixture of qualia and intentionality. Sensory im-
pressions almost necessarily correlate with certain beliefs, for example, such as 
that a certain object is real and caused so-and-so sensory impression. My see-
ing and smelling a fresh loaf of bread is virtually simultaneous with my want-
ing a piece. A pleasing piece of music is connected to beliefs and thoughts 
about the composer. Feeling cold is connected to a belief about the need to 
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close an open window, and so on.16 All this, then, arises from fundamental in-
trospection. I am an experiential being, and my mental states seem to be com-
posed of two distinct aspects: qualitative and intentional.
My next step is to direct my attention outward, to the world at large. Here I 
embrace ontological monism. Dualism and pluralism have a certain intuitive 
force, but the problems of interaction, and general principles of parsimony, 
argue against them. After all, we do seem to inhabit one world. There is one 
reality, as best we can tell. Its nature may be complex, but it nonetheless is 
still one kind of thing, with likely one essential nature. The same physical—
and metaphysical—laws must hold throughout. Any other conception is 
highly problematic. Dualism, for example, not only introduces interaction-
ist problems but is also, objectively speaking, arbitrary. Why two substances? 
And which two? Does ›mind‹ and ›matter‹ really make sense as an ontological 
scheme, in this broad universe that we inhabit? Triple-ism (›triplism‹? ›trial-
ism‹?), quadruple-ism (›quadrism‹?), etc are no less arbitrary. It seems that the 
only remotely viable alternative to monism is a radical pluralism—an infinity 
of substances; this at least has the virtue of being non-arbitrary. Perhaps we are 
back to Anaxagoras once again.17 But for now, at least, I set this option aside.
I take it, then, that the two primordial metaphysical facts are (1) that I am an 
experiential being with a dual-aspect mind, and (2) that reality is a monistic 
entity. Everything about that monistic reality is experiential—some aspects 
are sensory, some are cognitive, some are volitional, but all are experiential. 
The sum total of my encounter with the one reality is an assortment of expe-
riential qualities.18
My next general observation about the world is that there seems to be a 
distinction between ›me‹ and ›not-me‹. Me—my mind, my self—seems to 
be spatially located in my head, thanks primarily to my sense organs (four of 
them, anyway) being located there. But I won’t worry here about the problem 
of location. Me is indubitably real, the locus of my experiences. Not-me, the 
outside world, seems equally real, as the source of various stimuli. Not-me 
seems concrete, tangible, dynamic, interactive. As a result, I tend to assign all 
not-me a categorical label: physical. In fact, ›physical‹ may be defined as that 
16   I hasten to note that this two-part categorization is not new. Leibniz seems to have estab-
lished the basic idea in the »perceptions« and »appetites« of his monads—perception 
representing a qualitative perspective, and appetite (or desire) an intentional one.
17   Or maybe Spinoza, with his infinitely-many attributes of the one God/Nature.
18   Henryk Skolimowski developed a related view in his conception of ›noetic monism.‹ See 
Skolimowski 1994/2019. But he elected not to articulate the panpsychist implications of 
this view.
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portion of experiential reality that I experience as not-me. In more common 
terms, ›the physical‹ seems to have a surface or exterior that I sense, and then 
perhaps something more, an interior, that I do not sense. In any case, ›the 
physical‹ is a wholly experiential reality, just as myself is a wholly experiential 
reality.
Both seem equally real, and yet both seem different, distinct; but they can-
not be ontologically distinct because reality is a monistic entity. The me/not-
me distinction must be one of appearance only, not reality. Or at least, not of 
fundamental reality. But the appearance itself, however, may well be a funda-
mental fact of existence.
The not-me is furthermore apparently distinguishable into two vague cat-
egories: like-me and unlike-me. Like-me includes other normally-functioning 
adult humans (and perhaps teens and children); unlike-me is everything else. 
The like-me’s seem to operate in the world basically the same as I do, and seem 
to be constructed, as it were, on the same metaphysical plan. But of course, 
given a monistic reality, this must be true. Everything, even the unlike-me’s, 
must be constructed on the same metaphysical plan.
Like me, the like-me’s seem to have qualitative experiences, i.e. qualia. Like 
me, the like-me’s seem to exhibit will, desire, cognition, and (generally speak-
ing) intentionality. I thus have reason to believe that my experiential unity, 
and my dual-aspect mind, are universal qualities, at least among the like-me’s. 
Again, this is to be expected on any monistic scheme.
But the apparent differences between me, like-me, and unlike-me must be 
explained as well. All are one, and all must share all essential characteristics. 
But because they are (apparently) distinct, they also differ in what we may call 
secondary characteristics. How can I tell the difference between essential and 
secondary characteristics? This is the major question at hand. If anything is to 
be considered essential, it must be the most fundamental facts of existence: 
namely, that each thing is an experiential being with a dual-aspect mind, and 
that each experiences the world as a monistic reality. Each thing must compre-
hend the world as a locus of experiences that it has.
If things have a further characteristic, it must be the ability to distinguish be-
tween ›me‹ and ›not-me‹; in other words, a sense of self. Assuredly all animals 
possess this, and likely all plants. Whether this distinction moves beyond bio-
logical life is difficult to say. But the sheer fact that things function in the world 
as distinct units, as integrated wholes, suggests that they do—in proportion to 
the intensity of their integration. Rocks are relatively strongly integrated, as are 
atoms and molecules. These things likely realize the me/not-me distinction, if 
only in very rudimentary form. Less integrated things—clouds, societies, solar 
systems—likely have only a correspondingly vague (and rudimentary) sense 
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of self. Again, this is not a problem because the me/not-me distinction is not 
ontologically fundamental. It’s a question of degree. But as I said, the appear-
ance of a distinction may well be fundamental.
This raises an important issue because objecthood is vague; it too is a ques-
tion of degree. If we allow, for example, that there are ultimate particles, then 
we are inclined to agree with Democritus: only atoms and the void. All so-
called objects are mere appearances. But the atoms collect into quasi-stable 
patterns, and then into patterns of patterns, and then patterns of patterns of 
patterns, and so on. These patterns come to be called objects. And we ourselves 
are precisely one such pattern. Yet we are not mere appearance; we are real, 
efficacious beings. Other objects are the same. Here we part company with 
Democritus; objects have a concrete status in the world.
Degree of objecthood must correlate with degree of unity, in some sense, 
which in turn correlates with degree of subjecthood. On this view, each object, 
no matter how conceived, is a subject—to a greater or lesser degree. If each 
object is a subject, we then arrive at a strong form of panpsychism, as I sug-
gested at the outset.
3. Mind, Both Lesser and Greater
The only mind that we know directly is our own. Being relatively intensely-
constructed objects, we have a relatively intense form of subjecthood. Intensity 
is a function of several factors: stability, coherence, dynamism, and complexity. 
Mental intensity, correspondingly, has its factors: focus or coherence, energy, 
subtlety, and sensitivity. If physical and mental states are the two counterparts 
of one reality, then each must correlate with the other, on a one-to-one basis. 
Each object is a subject, and thus each physical change is at once a mental 
change. Physical state and mental state are two sides of the same (monistic) 
coin.
Our bodies, and in particular our brains, are quasi-stable patterns of (say) 
particles or quanta of energy that maintain consistent, multi-layered patterns 
of dynamic interaction over several decades. This is reflected in our semi-
stable memories and personality. Therefore we possess correspondingly co-
herent, sensitive, and subtle minds that persist over time. An equally-massive 
rock is more stable but less dynamic, and hence is expected to have a less in-
tense, if more durable, mental unity. A star like the sun is more massive, more 
energetic, and more stable of a pattern, and yet its structural complexity is 
far below that of a human being. The experiential unity of the sun will be at 
once more energetic and yet simpler and less intense than the human mind.
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By contrast, consider human artifacts such as computers. Modern inte-
grated circuits are much more complex than our brains. The brain contains 
something like 500,000 neurons per square millimeter, but new computer 
technology is producing up to 100 million transistors per square millimeter.19 
Single chip processors now hold up to 19 billion transistors. The experiential 
unity of a CPU chip is thus likely more intense, if less energetic, than that of a 
human. Such technologies will serve as the basis of advanced artificial general 
intelligences that will soon exceed our own capacities.
An object, then, is simply a more or less well-integrated pattern of energy. 
The more integrated patterns have a more coherent mental unity; the less in-
tegrated, a less coherent one. But the central point, once again, is this: Every 
object is a subject. Or more compactly: each is an ob/sub.
Every object can also be thought of an aggregate—there being no ontologi-
cal distinction between the two. A rock is an aggregate, a plant is an aggregate, 
a human is an aggregate, a star is an aggregate. The more obvious aggregates, 
like a solar system, a football team, or a heap of sand, are also objects, though 
less well-integrated. They are also, correspondingly, less well-integrated sub-
jects; but they are subjects nonetheless.
This being the case, it implies that every aggregate—that is, every combi-
nation of elements or individual objects—is also an object in its own right, 
and thus also a subject in its own right. Or: every aggregate is an ob/sub. Even 
the most bizarre aggregates, like the one composed of my chair, the moon, 
and an atom in some faraway galaxy, is an object, and thus also a subject. But 
such ob/subs are of such low intensity that they are utterly indistinguishable 
from the background patterns of energy in the universe. They have conceptual 
importance but no practical relevance. The functionally relevant ob/subs are 
those ›ordinary‹ things that we distinguish in the world around us—rocks and 
trees, stars and planets, tables and chairs. They have persistent coherence and 
relatively strong degrees of integration, and thus play a dominantly causal role 
in the world.
Under this conception, the world is a vast entanglement of enminded 
ob/subs. Every apparently discrete thing is an ob/sub in itself, and is at the 
same time a participant in countless diversified ob/subs. Again, nearly all of 
the diverse objects, including the more bizarre combinations, fade into insig-
nificance, both as physical objects and as enminded subjects. The ones that 
really ›count‹ are those things that we naturally pick out as discrete entities—
people, animals, plants, rocks, artifacts, planets, stars. They are the most 
19   A neuron is a biological ›decision element‹ which functions, loosely, like a single transis-
tor. The analogy is rough but will suffice for present purposes.
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articulated objects, and hence the most articulated subjects. In fact, this is pre-
cisely why we pick them out—our minds are recognizing and relating to other, 
comparably-distinct minds (albeit in the form of objects).
Thus understood, ob/subs extend down to the smallest quanta of energy 
and up to the large cosmic structures—including, importantly, the cosmos as 
a whole. It would not be far from the mark to declare the vast interconnected 
web of ob/subs as the effective fabric of reality. In this web, the complexity and 
intensity of minds vary accordingly, but they all share the essential character-
istics. Each is an experiential being, an experiential unity, with a dual-aspect 
mind; each experiences the world as a monistic reality; and each has a sense 
of selfhood. »All mind is alike, both the lesser and the greater« (Anaxagoras).
4. God as World-Mind
If all objects are subjects, and all subjects share certain core qualities (an expe-
riential, dual-aspect mind; a sense of monism; a me/not-me distinction), then, 
at the highest level, the level of the cosmos as a whole, we may infer the exis-
tence and nature of a cosmic Subject, a cosmic Mind—God. The Mind of God 
must be constructed on the same metaphysical plan as the human mind, and 
as the mind of an atom. »As above, so below.« »All mind is alike.« Macrocosm 
and microcosm. Perhaps there is some wisdom in these old hermetic ideas 
after all—ideas that appear to date back to Pythagoras, at least.
If »all mind is alike,« then the Mind of God must function essentially in 
the same manner as our minds. That is, it must (a) be an experiential being, 
possessing a dual-aspect mind; (b) experience reality as a unified whole; and 
(c) possess a sense of self. Of this last point, God’s sense of self would seem to 
be utterly unique because, for him alone, all is ›me,‹ and there is no ›not-me.‹ 
What must it be like, for all to be oneself? For all to be me? We can scarcely 
imagine.
Furthermore, the relation of God to the universe must be analogous to 
that of our minds to our bodies. And what is that? Do we have panenthestic 
minds? Decidedly not. Minds are not souls—not in any modern sense. Our 
minds are not ›in‹ our bodies. Without pretending to solve all mind-body prob-
lems, I think we can plausibly claim that the mind and body are fundamentally 
interconnected—two aspects of the one monistic substance, which is none 
other than reality itself. There is no causal link between mind and body, in 
either direction; this is impossible in any truly monistic universe.
Our minds do not cause our bodies to do things. Assuming that there is 
causal interaction in an experiential cosmos, then it is between the various 
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ob/subs. As a given ob/sub changes its internal configuration through interac-
tion with other ob/subs, its physico-mental state changes as well. I step bare-
footed on a sharp rock; my foot suffers a momentary deformation; and my 
bodily mental state (and eventually my conscious state) changes accordingly. 
The small time delay for any conscious effect is not relevant in this ontological 
scheme; it’s a function of the spatial distance of my foot from my brain, and 
of the processing and signal transfer time in the cortex. In reality, so-called 
physical change and mental change are simultaneous. Every change in physi-
cal state is a change in a mental state. All things are ob/subs, and the universe 
is a monistic reality.
Correspondingly, God does not ›do‹ anything in the cosmos. He cannot do 
anything because, as the Mind of the cosmos, he has no causal relation to it. 
Nor can it affect him in any way. God’s only function and purpose is to instan-
tiate the ever-changing experiential state of the universe. Rather as Aristotle 
said, he simply thinks. Unlike Aristotle, he doesn’t drive the rotation of the 
heavens, not even by not moving. Rather, God’s mental state is the ›rotation of 
the heavens,‹ manifest as an experiential unity. Every physical change in the 
universe has a corresponding change in God’s mental state. Every small action 
I take—picking up my tea cup—and every small movement in nature—the 
rustling of leaves in the slightest breeze—are reflected in God’s mind. In this 
sense, God knows all. We can legitimately say that God is omniscient.
But he cannot do anything with this knowledge. Not only is he not omnipo-
tent, he has, as I said, no power at all. God is utterly power-less. He cannot 
interfere with human affairs; cannot answer prayers; cannot invoke miracles; 
cannot condemn people to hell—nothing. He is powerless to stop evil, to cause 
evil, or anything else. God simply thinks; he experiences.
Is God all-good? Compare to this question: Is our own mind ›good‹? These 
are normative questions that do not pertain to metaphysics. God, like our own 
minds, is neither good nor bad, simply because such terms are not predicable 
of minds. Minds simply are. They exist. They are the fabric of reality.
As the mind of the whole, God encompasses all layers of sub-mind within 
the cosmos. Just as all lesser objects are parts of the cosmic Object, so all lesser 
minds are parts of the cosmic Mind. In an experiential cosmos, God is the great 
Experiencer. God’s Mind is the sum total of all mind. In this sense, my meta-
physical view may qualify as a form of pantheism: all is mind, and all mind is a 
portion of God’s Mind. All is God.
Such a God is, again, but a faint image of any traditionally religious God. 
God thinks, he experiences; nothing more. Then why call him God at all? What 
do we mean, in fact, by the term ›God‹? Etymology is not much help. ›God‹ 
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seems to derive from the proto-Indo-European ghut (›that which is invoked‹) 
or perhaps from ghu-to (›poured,‹ as in a libation or ceremonial drink). But 
these origins are hopelessly vague. Standard religious interpretations are not 
much better, given the vast diversity of meanings and characteristics attrib-
uted to God, amongst the 4,000 or so world religions.
And yet there seems to be a core conception of God that we can distill from 
the many interpretations. There appear to be two qualities that are shared by 
virtually all traditional conceptions of God. These are, first, that God is a kind 
of supreme being or ultimate reality. As the cosmic Mind, the God I have ar-
ticulated here would indeed qualify as supreme and ultimate. The second core 
quality is that God is that thing which is most revered. Ought we to revere God, 
the cosmic Mind? Certainly we need not pray to him, which would be both 
pointless and inconsequential. But we might do well to develop a sense of awe 
and wonder at the cosmic Mind, and at our own small participation in it. Such 
an outlook certainly casts humanity in a new light, vis a vis the broader cosmos 
from which we evolved, and of which we belong.
And how, in fact, are we even to know such a God at all? How can we hold 
him in awe and wonder if we cannot truly know him? Here we might do well to 
recall Plato and his discussion of the soul of the sun. Plato, too, was concerned 
that we grasp the sun’s soul even though it is utterly invisible to us, in any con-
ventional sense. In his final work Laws, he wrote:
Everyone can see [the sun’s] body, but no one can see its soul—not that you 
could see the soul of any other creature, living or dying. Nevertheless, there are 
good grounds for believing that we are in fact held in the embrace of some such 
thing, though it is totally below the level of our bodily senses, and is perceptible 
by reason alone. (898d)
When the sun shines down upon us, bathing us in his glory, we are, says 
Plato, »held in his embrace.« His soul is there, it is real, it exists; though, like 
everyone’s soul, we cannot perceive it but by rational thought. In this sense, we 
perceive the mind only with the mind. Of course—how could it be otherwise?
In the same way, then, we may think about the Mind of the whole, God. We 
cannot see it, cannot hear it, cannot sense it in any way. And yet, by careful 
rational thought and well-ground speculation, we can understand that it may 
be there, that it must be there—that the Mind of God is as extant and real as 
our own mind. A rational God, a philosophical God, an omniscient God, a God 
that demands no subservience and that smites no sinners. Indeed—a God for 
whom no one need suffer and die at all. Imagine: a God for all humanity and 
for all time, yes, a God for all the universe. Imagine.
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Universal Consciousness as the Ground of Logic
Philip Goff
1. Introduction
Shortly after the Second World War, Aldous Huxley published a book defend-
ing what he called ›the perennial philosophy,‹ a metaphysical theory he argued 
had arisen 2,500 years earlier and had subsequently cropped up in many and 
varied cultures across the globe.1 According to Huxley, the view did not emerge 
from abstract philosophical speculation but because its truth came to be 
directly known to various individuals whilst in altered states of consciousness, 
in many cases the result of intense meditative training.
What was the content of this view? In standard analytic philosophy of mind, 
we distinguish between the subject of a given experience and the phenomenal 
qualities which characterise what it’s like to have that experience. In an expe-
rience of pain, for example, there is the thing which feels the pain (e.g. me) 
and there is the qualitative character of how the pain feels; the former is the 
subject of the experience, the latter is its phenomenal quality. In the altered 
states of consciousness discussed by Huxley, however, this division apparently 
collapses resulting in a state of pure or ›universal‹ consciousness: conscious-
ness unencumbered by phenomenal qualities. More dramatically, people who 
achieve these states of consciousness claim that it becomes apparent to them, 
from the perspective of the altered state of consciousness, that universal con-
sciousness is the backdrop to all individual conscious experiences, and hence 
that in a significant sense universal consciousness is the ultimate nature of 
each and every conscious mind. This realization allegedly undermines ordi-
nary understanding of the distinctions between different people and leads to a 
conviction that in some deep sense »we are all one«.
This is not a view that has been explored a great deal in the context of 
analytic philosophy, which tends to proceed by building coldblooded ratio-
nal arguments for a given position, rather than by intuiting its truth via al-
tered states of consciousness. However, Miri Albahari has recently presented 
just such a coldblooded defence of the perennial philosophy, arguing that it 
offers a better solution to the problem of consciousness than rival theories.2 I 
am fascinated, but ultimately unconvinced, by her argument. I would like here 
1   Huxley 1945.
2   Albahari 2020.
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to consider another coldblooded argument for the perennial philosophy, or 
something like it, rooted in its potential to account in a satisfying way for the 
metaphysics and epistemology of logical truth.
2. Logic and its Place in Nature
I take it for granted that empirical data, by which I mean the data of normal 
sensory observation and experience, should inform our best guess at what re-
ality is like. But are there any other sources of data that must be taken into 
account when doing metaphysics? Methodological naturalists say no: once 
you’ve accounted for all of the data of observation and experiment, in the most 
theoretically satisfying way possible, your job as a metaphysician is done. I dis-
agree. I have previously argued that there is at least one other datum that must 
be accounted for in addition to the data of third-person observation and ex-
periment, namely, the reality of consciousness.3 Nothing is more evident than 
the existence of one’s feelings and experiences. If a supposedly complete the-
ory of reality can account for all of the data observation and experiment but 
cannot account for the reality of consciousness, that theory is thereby falsified.
Are there any other non-empirical data, in addition to the reality of con-
sciousness? I think there is at least one more, one which arises from the need 
to account for the truth of the laws of logic and for our epistemological rela-
tionship with them. For the sake of simplicity I will mainly focus on the law of 
non-contradiction (LNC), which I will take to be the law that there aren’t, and 
cannot be, any contradictory states of affairs. This law is known with a kind of 
certainty roughly similar to the certainty with which I know that my own feel-
ings exist. One can perhaps debate whether our knowledge of LNC is more or 
less certain than our knowledge of the reality of consciousness, but it is clear 
that both are known with much greater justification than anything known on 
the basis of the senses. The sceptical doubts that terrorise our empirical knowl-
edge of reality threaten to a much lesser degree, if at all, our knowledge of 
basic logical laws.4
What implications does this have for the task of metaphysics? In my earlier 
work, I expressed the datum of consciousness as a constraint on metaphysical 
3   Goff 2017, Goff 2020.
4   This is of course not entirely uncontentious, and there are some philosophers happy to deny 
the law of non-contradiction (Priest 2000), just as there are philosophers happy to deny the 
reality of consciousness (Frankish 2016). I don’t have an argument either for the truth of LNC 
or for the reality of consciousness. Metaphysical enquiry has to start somewhere, and the real-
ity of consciousness and the truth of LNC seem to me the most solid starting points we have.
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enquiry, something I called ›the consciousness constraint.‹ Roughly this is the 
constraint on the metaphysician to account for consciousness in her overall 
theory of reality. The metaphysical implications of logic can similarly be ex-
pressed as a kind of constraint, which we can call ›the logic constraint‹. The 
logic constraint has two aspects, one metaphysical and one epistemological:
The Logic Constraint
1.  The Metaphysical Aspect—The metaphysician is obliged to postulate 
entities sufficient to ground the truth of the laws of logic.
2.  The Epistemological Aspect—The metaphysician is obliged to account 
for our knowledge of the laws of logic.
I call the second aspect ›epistemological‹ because it arises from the fact that 
we know about logical laws (and perhaps also, as I will presently discuss, from 
more specific facts about the kind of knowledge we have of logical laws). But 
this aspect of the constraint is also metaphysical in the sense that it imposes 
demands on one’s overall theory of reality. In the epistemological aspect of the 
logic constraint, facts about our knowledge of logic are taken as data that must 
be accounted for.
This source of metaphysical data has been much neglected in recent philos-
ophy, and is pretty much entirely unknown by the scientific community more 
broadly. To be a fair, there is much focus, at least in philosophy, on the need to 
account for the metaphysics and epistemology of mathematical truth, which 
raises very similar issues. However, it is an open question whether, in principle, 
mathematical discourse could be dispensed with, which renders plausible a 
variety of anti-realist theories of mathematical truth.5 It is much less plausible 
that logical discourse can be dispensed with, making it all the more pressing to 
account for the place of logic in reality.
I suspect that the neglect of this topic is due to a fairly widespread intuition 
in modern times that the truths of logic, such as LNC, are somehow ›trivial‹ 
or not really about the world. We find this in Hume’s claim that a priori truths 
are mere ›relations between ideas‹ and the logical positivists’ view that a priori 
truths are grounded in linguistic conventions or are ›true in virtue of meaning‹. 
However, these days, this kind of view is largely rejected by metaphysicians.6 
Linguistic conventions determine the meaning of a sentence, but whether or 
5   Hartry Field (1980), for example, tries to construe Newtonian mechanics without reference to 
abstract entities.
6   Sider 2012; Hale 2013: Ch. 5.
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not that sentence is true is determined by the nature of reality. When I say, 
›There are no square circles anywhere in the universe‹, this is no less a claim 
about reality than when I say, ›There are no unicorns.‹
I’m inclined to think that the neglect of both the logic constraint and the 
consciousness constraint arise from a common source, namely the scientistic 
intellectual culture that has emerged in the last two hundred of so years, in-
spired by the great successes of the physical sciences. There is an irony here 
in that the physical sciences have been so successful precisely because they 
have always been aimed at a limited task: roughly, modelling the behaviour 
of matter. But the incredible technology that such knowledge has produced 
has a visceral effect on one’s metaphysical yearnings, and it’s hard not to get 
carried away and to surrender all of one’s ontological faith to the thing that 
has produced such wonders. Nonetheless, the realities of consciousness and 
logical truth are so evident that I feel confident that at some point society will 
emerge from this scientistic phase of history and return to the task of formulat-
ing a theory able to account not only for what we can see with our eyes but also 
for what we know through intuition (logic) and introspection (consciousness).
3. The Hard Problem of Logic
There are extremely deep philosophical difficulties raised by the logic con-
straint, perhaps even harder than those raised by the consciousness constraint. 
One core difficulty is that there are considerations pushing in opposite direc-
tions: on the one hand there is pressure to put the ground of LNC outside of 
the contingent universe, and on the other hand pressure to put the ground of 
LNC inside of the contingent universe. Let me explain.
With regards to the metaphysical aspect of the logic constraint, there is strong 
pressure to hold that the ground of LNC is outside of the contingent universe. 
For suppose we grounded LNC in some contingent entity or collection of enti-
ties E. Given that E is contingent, there will be at least one possible world, call 
it W, in which E fails to exist. But if the ground of LNC does not exist in W, then 
presumably LNC will not be true in W. This is not a welcome result, as LNC is, 
I will assume, true in all possible worlds. We can put this argument as follows:
Argument for the Non-Contingency of the Ground of LNC
1.  If the ground of LNC is contingent, then there will be some possible 
world in which it fails to exist.
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2.  If there is a possible world in which the ground of LNC fails to exist, 
then there will be a possible world in which LNC is not true.
3. There is no possible world in which LNC is not true.
4. Therefore, the ground of LNC is not contingent.
This argument might naturally lead one to a Platonic view according to which 
the ground of LNC is an abstract object which necessarily co-exists with any 
possible universe.
However, there are also pressures in the other direction. Whether or not the 
laws of logic have implications for a Platonic realm, they certainly have impli-
cations for the physical world of space and time. Our universe is constrained 
not only by the laws of physics but also by the laws of logic. Suppose I know 
that two objects are a light year apart from each other. Assuming the truth of 
special relativity, I can infer that a signal cannot possibly get from one object 
to another in less than year. This is a way in which the laws of physics constrain 
what can possibly happen in this universe: things cannot travel faster than 
light. Similarly, if I know that Peter is in pain, I can infer that it’s not the case 
that he is not in pain. This is a way in which the laws of logic constrain what 
can happen in our universe: there cannot be contradictory states of affairs. Of 
course, there is a crucial difference between the two cases. The laws of physics 
hold only in this universe whilst the laws of logic hold in every possible universe. 
But the fact that the laws of logic have greater modal scope than the laws of 
physics does not imply a dissimilarity between physical and logical laws in so 
far as they apply to this universe.
Putting the ground of LNC in the Platonic realm makes it hard to account 
for the constraining influence of logic on the physical universe. How exactly 
does the ›hand of logic‹ reach out from beyond space and time in order to en-
sure that there are no contradictory states of affairs? One possibility is to build 
the ground of LNC into the essential nature of universals, and then to account 
for the impact on the physical world in terms of the fact that universals are 
instantiated in the physical world. Thus, the Platonist could hold that it’s in 
the essential nature of universals to resist being instantiated in a contradictory 
manner, e.g. it’s in the nature of pain to resist being instantiated and also not 
instantiated by the same individual. However, this is a somewhat disunified 
view, and we would be left wanting to know why all universals share this es-
sential feature. One possible way around this is to hold that LNC is grounded 
in the essential nature of the instantiation relation itself, i.e. the instantiation 
relation R is essentially such that, for any property P and any given individual 
I, R cannot both relate and not relate P to I.
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Whether or not Platonism can account for the metaphysical aspect of the 
logic constraint, the real problems with the view arise from the epistemologi-
cal aspect. There is a related and much discussed difficulty for the mathemati-
cal Platonist. If numbers are abstract objects outside of space and time, how 
on earth do we physical creatures get to know about them? The epistemologi-
cal challenge raised by the logic constraint is a little bit less straightforward: my 
starting point is not that there are logical entities, analogous to mathematical 
entities like numbers and sets, such that we need to account for how we know 
about those entities. Still, there’s clearly still a very deep difficulty accounting 
for our knowledge of logical truths, especially if the ground of those truths ex-
ists outside of space and time and hence is not something we have empirical 
access to. We could of course observe that LNC holds in our universe, in some-
thing like the way we observe that the laws of physics hold in our universe. 
But it’s hard to see how we could know that LNC holds in all possible worlds 
without having some kind of access to nature of the entity that explains why 
LNC is necessarily true. And how could we know the nature of that entity if it 
exists outside of space and time? Thus, by a slightly more scenic route, we have 
arrived back at essentially the same epistemological difficulty we find in the 
mathematical case.
This is a familiar challenge, at least in its mathematical guise, and I will 
not here trawl through all of the solutions which Platonists have offered in 
response. However, I would like to emphasise a particular aspect of the epis-
temological challenge, one that I think holds in both the mathematical and 
the logical case and which has not been focused on a great deal in recent phi-
losophy. It seems to me incumbent on metaphysicians not only to account for 
the bare fact that we know that LNC is true, but also for the specific form of 
this knowledge. As already remarked, my knowledge of logical laws, or at least 
basic ones like LNC, comes with a much greater degree of certainty than my 
knowledge of empirical facts. It’s very easy to entertain the skeptical hypothe-
sis that I am in the Matrix being deceived by the evil computers to think there’s 
a table in front of me when in fact the world I seem to experience does not 
exist. It is much harder to entertain the hypothesis that the evil computers 
are making me think that LNC holds when in fact it doesn’t. And this psycho-
logical difficulty seems to reflect the different kinds of justification that hold 
in these cases. It is just obvious to me, upon reflection—I can, as it were, just 
see—that there couldn’t possibly be a contradictory state of affairs, in such a 
way that the truth of LNC cannot rationally be doubted. As Descartes put it, I 
have a clear and distinct perception of the truth of LNC.
To satisfy the epistemological aspect of the logic constraint we must ac-
count not only for the fact that we know LNC but the fact that we know it 
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through a clear and distinct perception of its truth. Acknowledging this casts 
doubts on the adequacy of a fairly popular way of accounting for our knowl-
edge of logic (and mathematics) in terms of its indispensability for scientific 
theorising.7 We can perhaps imagine a race of alien creatures, call them ›the 
Quineans‹, who are able to represent the truths of logic and mathematics but 
do not have clear and distinct perceptions of their truth. The Quineans may 
find out that scientific enquiry is possible only on the assumption that certain 
logical and mathematical propositions are true, and, in virtue of their knowl-
edge of this fact, they may come to have justification for believing those logical 
and mathematical propositions.
If those logical and mathematical propositions are indeed true, then the 
Quineans may count as knowing them. But the Quineans’ knowledge of logic 
and maths is very different from our own. They would find it very easy to 
entertain skeptical doubts concerning LNC and basic mathematical truths 
like 2+2=4.8 To be sure, such skeptical doubts would be sweeping and radi-
cal, threatening the foundations of their empirical picture of reality. But, for 
Quineans, it would be as easy to entertain logical doubts as it is for us to en-
tertain empirical doubts. The reason we find it much harder to doubt LNC, for 
example by entertaining the possibility that there are square circles, is that it 
is directly apparent to us that LNC must be true and hence that a square circle 
could never be. The explanation of logical knowledge outlined above may be 
adequate to account for the epistemological situation of the Quineans but it 
cannot fully account for our situation.
The ground of LNC, by definition, explains the truth of LNC. It follows that 
if one understood the essential nature of the ground of LNC, and one had suf-
ficient powers of rational reflection, one could thereby come to know the truth 
of LNC. Compare: the chemical properties of H2O molecules explain the fact 
that water boils at 100 degrees, and by understanding the chemistry one can 
come to see that water, given its essential nature, must have this boiling point.9 
This all suggests a natural way of accounting for our knowledge of LNC. On 
the view I have in mind, we are somehow acquainted with the essential nature 
of the ground of LNC, in something like the way we are acquainted with the 
7   Quine 1980; Putnam 2012.
8   Presumably, like us, the Quineans wouldn’t be able to imagine scenarios in which there are 
square circles or in which 2+2=5. But we cannot imagine four-dimensional objects and this 
does not convince us that such things are impossible. Merely being unable to imagine that P 
is true is not sufficient for a clear and distinct perception that P is false.
9   I am here assuming that the causal powers of H2O molecules are part of their essential na-
ture. On a contingentist view of laws, we would also have to know the laws in order to make 
such a deduction.
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essential nature of our own conscious states, and in virtue of this acquaintance 
the truth of LNC is rendered apparent to us. In other words, I am directly in 
contact with the thing that grounds the truth of LNC, and I am thereby directly 
aware that LNC must be true.
The problem is that it is difficult to square this explanation with Platonism. 
I am acquainted with my conscious states in virtue of the fact that my mind is 
constituted of those states. How could I possibly bear this same relationship 
to something outside of space and time? How can we account for the fact that, 
at some point in evolutionary history, creatures of flesh and blood somehow 
became hooked up in an acquaintance relationship with something outside of 
the physical universe?
What we need is something in between the Platonic heaven that Plato 
pointed towards and the physical world that was Aristotle’s focus. We need an 
entity that transcends the physical universe and yet is intimately involved with 
it. Universal consciousness, I will suggest, fits the bill.
4. Universal Consciousness
Albahari explains the relationship between ordinary consciousness and univer-
sal consciousness by means of a thought experiment involving a ›cognisensory 
deprivation tank.‹ Upon immersion, one is to imagine, all of the phenomenal 
qualities of one’s consciousness are snuffed out one by one: not only the phe-
nomenal qualities involved in sensory experiences, but also those involved in 
conscious thoughts and emotions. Consciousness ceases not only to represent, 
but to instantiate any phenomenal character whatsoever. It might be assumed 
that the determinable of consciousness could not exist without having some 
determinate phenomenal character, just as the determinable shape could not 
be instantiated without the instantiation of some specific determinate of that 
determinable, such as sphericity. Albahari acknowledges that this possibility 
cannot be ruled out a priori. However, it is also possible that with the removal 
of all of its qualities, consciousness itself—pure awareness—remains. This is 
what is meant by ›universal consciousness‹: consciousness stripped of phe-
nomenal qualities.
Thus, whilst the relationship between universal consciousness and specific 
conscious minds is something like the relationship between a lump of clay 
and individual figures formed from that lump, this is a peculiar kind of clay 
that can exist without forming any shape at all. And there is another respect in 
which the clay analogy fails: whilst a hunk of clay that forms a specific cube at 
a given time must be distinct from the hunk of clay that forms a specific sphere 
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at the same time, the universal consciousness from which my mind formed is 
numerically identical to the universal consciousness from which your mind—
and every other mind—is formed.
One might worry that this commits us to contradiction. Suppose we have 
two individuals, one of which feels pleasure but not pain, the other of which 
feels pain but no pleasure. The view currently under consideration seems to 
entail that: (A) universal consciousness feels pleasure but no pain, and (B) uni-
versal consciousness feels pain but no pleasure. This would clearly be incoher-
ent. But, as I understand it, the view is not that universal consciousness is itself 
a subject that instantiates phenomenal properties. The view is rather that dis-
tinct subjects arise from universal consciousness (more on this in a moment).
We have not so far discussed another aspect of the perennial philosophy, 
one that might seem to put in the shade the theses so far discussed. Proponents 
of the perennial philosophy claim that not only each mind, but all of reality, is 
formed of universal consciousness. In a physicalist or dualist worldview, this 
is a radical claim. But in a panpsychist world view, according to which all fun-
damental entities are conscious subjects, this final thesis of the perennial phi-
losophy follows trivially from the others. If each conscious subject is formed 
of universal consciousness, and each fundamental entity is a conscious sub-
ject, it of course follows that each fundamental entity is formed of universal 
consciousness. All aspects of the perennial philosophy will be essential to my 
account of logic, and hence I will present the resulting view as a form of pan-
psychism. I don’t take this to be a disadvantage of the view. Panpsychism is a 
view that has considerable independent support as one of the most promising 
solutions to the problem of consciousness; and, as I have argued elsewhere, it 
is no less parsimonious than any other theory of fundamental reality.10
I will not here get into the details of Albahari’s argument, but the conclu-
sion of that argument is more radical still. Ultimately, Albahari defends the 
thesis that fundamental reality is exhausted by universal consciousness: that 
everything that exists is somehow grounded in universal consciousness. This 
commitment brings considerable challenges. It is, as Albahari acknowledges, 
hard to understand how many distinct subjects with their many and varied 
phenomenal properties might emerge from the single and undifferentiated 
universal consciousness. This is the ›Problem of the One and the Many‹ that 
Albahari wrestles with in her work, as did Parmenides, Plotinus, Spinoza and 
Schelling before her.
One easy way to avoid the Problem of the One and the Many altogether is 
to think of the relationship between universal consciousness and a specific 
10   Goff 2017, Goff 2019.
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conscious mind as partial grounding, rather than complete grounding. In com-
plete grounding relationships, at least as I think of them, the grounded entity 
is nothing over and above its ground; a party, for example is nothing over and 
above the fact that people are partying. The problem is that it’s hard to see how 
the totality of experiential facts, concerning a vast number of subjects instan-
tiating an unfathomable variety of rich and complex phenomenal characters, 
could be nothing over and above the fact there is a single, undifferentiated 
form of consciousness. Albahari does a fantastic job of trying to square this 
circle, but at the end of the day it seems to me plainly unintelligible.
On an alternative model, my conscious mind is partly grounded in univer-
sal consciousness—universal consciousness is an essential constituent of my 
conscious mind—but the fact that universal consciousness is formed into this 
specific conscious mind with this specific phenomenal character is something 
over and above the reality of universal consciousness per se. Subject arise, we 
might suppose, from the interaction of universal consciousness with discrete 
bundles of phenomenal properties. Thus, my mind is not wholly identical with 
universal consciousness, but rather contains it is as a metaphysical constituent.
This position aims to respect both the claims of mystics and the Cartesian 
certainty each of us has of the reality of one’s own mind. Perhaps some, prob-
ably including Albahari herself, will take this to be inconsistent with careful 
analysis of the claims of those who have directly experienced universal con-
sciousness. But such people were not aiming to do analytic metaphysics in 
writing about the truths they directly experienced, and this gives us some flex-
ibility in interpreting these claims. At any rate, I will aim to justify the view I 
am articulating not on the basis of the testimony of mystics, although such 
support would be welcome too, but on the basis of its potential to account for 
the truths of logic.
What is the causal basis for a specific conscious mind coming to be formed 
out of universal consciousness? This question cannot be answered indepen-
dently of the ongoing empirical and theoretical task of working out an ade-
quate panpsychist theory. On a constitutive panpsychist theory, my mind is 
nothing over and above micro-level conscious subjects. On an emergentist ver-
sion, there may be specific laws that result in new macro-level subject being 
formed of universal consciousness. Perhaps micro-level subjects flit in and 
out of being or perhaps there are a number of basic subjects that have existed 
since the beginning of time. Whatever the standard panpsychist says about the 
conditions sufficient for the creation of a new subject, the proponent of uni-
versal consciousness simply adds that in such conditions a subject is formed 
from universal consciousness. The account of logic I will defend below will be 
independent of these details.
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5. The Ground of Logic
How can the metaphysical theory outlined in the previous section account for 
the truths of logic? Crucially, we need to interpret it as a claim about all of 
modal space. On this view, universal consciousness is a necessarily existent 
entity, and all possible contingent entities are conscious subjects formed of, 
and thereby partially constituted by, universal consciousness. With this stipu-
lated, we now have an entity—universal consciousness—well-placed to be the 
ground of logical laws. On the one hand, universal consciousness exists neces-
sarily, and hence can ground the necessary truth of logical laws. On the other 
hand, it is intimately related to contingent entities, and hence is in a good po-
sition to account for the intimate relationship the truths of logic bear to the 
physical universe, both by constraining it and by becoming known to certain 
creatures.
To account for the metaphysical aspect of the logic constraint, we need sim-
ply to posit that universal consciousness has an essentially logical nature, e.g. 
is essentially such as to not tolerate being formed into contradictory states of 
affairs. This is just the nature of the clay out of which concrete entities are 
formed. This postulation entails, given that all possible states of affairs are 
formed from universal consciousness, that LNC holds in all possible worlds.
What about the epistemological aspect of the logic constraint? I want to 
propose that a plausible model of the epistemology of consciousness can be 
applied in this context. Before introducing this model, we need to bring in 
some technical terms. Many robust realists about consciousness hold that a 
subject necessarily stands in a relation of direct, pre-conceptual awareness to 
the phenomenal qualities of its experiences, a relation we can call ›acquain-
tance.‹ David Chalmers has outlined in great detail how we can account for our 
special epistemological relationship with phenomenal qualities in terms of the 
acquaintance relationship.11 Whilst all creatures are acquainted with their phe-
nomenal qualities, not all creatures are able to use that acquaintance relation-
ship to attend to them and think about them. A mature human is able to form 
what Chalmers calls a ›direct phenomenal thought‹, a thought in which one 
attends to a phenomenal quality and thinks the thought ›I am feeling like that‹, 
where the reference of ›like that‹ is determined wholly by the act of attend-
ing to the phenomenal quality itself. In direct phenomenal thought, according 
to Chalmers, the acquaintance relation the subject bears to the phenomenal 
quality being thought about plays a special justificatory role, enabling direct 
and certain knowledge of the truth of what is thought.
11   Chalmers 2003. I argue for the acquaintance relation in Goff 2015 and Goff 2017: Ch. 5.
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How can this model account for our knowledge of logic? This requires hold-
ing that universal consciousness is necessarily acquainted with its own logical 
nature, and that each conscious mind, being partly constituted of universal 
consciousness, inherits the acquaintance universal consciousness has with its 
logical nature. Of course, not all conscious creatures will be able to make use 
of this acquaintance, just as not all creatures can make use of their acquain-
tance with phenomenal qualities. But for creatures who have evolved cognitive 
resources that enable them to entertain a logical truth, such as ~(P&~P), their 
acquaintance with the logical nature of universal consciousness facilitates, we 
can suppose, a clear and distinct grasp of its necessary truth. Just as our ac-
quaintance with our phenomenal qualities grounds and justifies direct phe-
nomenal thought, so our acquaintance with universal consciousness grounds 
and justifies clear and distinct perception.
Leibniz argued that whilst we are not born with knowledge of necessary 
truths ›[w]hat is innate is what might be called the potential knowledge of 
them, as the veins of the marble outline a shape that is in the marble before 
they are uncovered by the sculptor.‹12 What the above model provides is a 
way of explaining this potential rather than leaving it as brute fact or divinely 
endowed. Moreover, this explanation fits well with a plausible theory of our 
knowledge of consciousness, providing a unified account of the justification of 
those aspects of human knowledge which involve rational certainty.
In summary, the postulation of universal consciousness allows for a simple 
and elegant theory of the metaphysics and epistemology of logical truth, one 
that is internally unified and fits well with a plausible theory of knowledge in 
another domain.
6. Is this Pan(en)theism?
Does the view I have just defended count as a form of pantheism or panenthe-
ism? We can split this question into two:
1. Is universal consciousness God?
2.  Is the relationship that obtains between universal consciousness and 
the universe a form of the relationship the pan(en)theist takes to hold 
between God and the universe?
Question 1 calls out for a definition of God, or at least an account of the mean-
ing of the term ›God‹. Most philosophers assume that the meaning of ›God‹ is 
12   Leibniz 1765/1996, Bk 1, Ch. 1-2.
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fixed descriptively. Benedikt Paul Göcke defines God as the entity which has 
the following characteristics: (A) it is the most fundamental entity, and (B) it 
is worthy of worship.13 Mark Johnston defines God as ›the highest one.‹14 An 
alternative to descriptivism is the view that the meaning of ›God‹ is fixed by 
ostension, i.e. via an act, or acts, of pointing to (in a broad sense of that term) a 
particular entity. This would put ›God‹ in the same broad semantic category as 
proper names, at least according to the account of proper names made popu-
lar by Saul Kripke.15 On this view, we fix the meaning of a proper name like 
›William Shakespeare‹ not by description by an initial act of ostension: parents 
declare that this child is to be named ›William Shakespeare‹. The name is then 
passed on through the linguistic community, thereafter continuing to refer to 
Shakespeare in virtue of its causal relationship with this initial act of ostension.
Johnston rejects this view of the meaning of ›God‹ as follows:
In the scriptures, no one actually turns up and says, ›I am to be called by the 
name »God«. No one says anything like, ›I hereby use introduce the name ›God‹ 
as the name of THIS impressive being.‹ There is no original dubbing of someone 
or something as »God,« a dubbing that we can now fall back on.16
This is, however, a possibility that both Gauke and Johnston overlook: the 
meaning of ›God‹ might be fixed with reference to religious experience. Mystics 
report of a wondrous reality that is made manifest to them in certain altered 
states of consciousness. Although mystical experiences are relatively rare, 
intimations of the divine are a common motivation for many, perhaps most, 
religious believers. Let us refer to both mystical experiences and divine intima-
tions collectively as ›religious experiences.‹ I propose defining ›God‹ as that 
which is known in veridical religious experiences, if indeed there are any. The 
advantage of this view is that it ties the meaning of ›God‹ to the fundamental 
motivations of real-world religious practice. Prophets, mystics and ordinary 
believers believe not because of abstract philosophical arguments, but be-
cause of their sense of the divine.
If we understand the term ›God‹ in this way, then whether or not universal 
consciousness is God will depend on whether or not universal consciousness 
is the object of mystical experiences. Whether or not this is the case cannot 
be settled, at least not straightforwardly, by examining the beliefs about God 
that are held by various religions. The fact that, say, Christians believe in a per-
sonal God is not inconsistent with universal consciousness being the object 
13   Göcke 2017.
14   Johnston 2009.
15   Kripke 1980.
16   Johnston 2009: 6.
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of Christian religious experiences. We must distinguish the accuracy condi-
tions of the religious experiences themselves, from the truth-conditions of be-
liefs concerning the object of those experiences. Ancient Greeks had veridical 
experiences of water whilst mistakenly believing that water is a fundamental 
element. Similarly, it could be that Christians have veridical experiences of 
universal consciousness whilst mistakenly believing that universal conscious-
ness is a kind of person.
Those who accept the reality of universal consciousness, at least in part, 
on the testimony of mystics will no doubt endorse an identity between the 
object of religious experience and universal consciousness. However, the cold-
blooded motivations for universal consciousness I have outlined in this paper 
do not depend on the testimony of mystics, and hence it is in principle pos-
sible to accept my conclusion whilst taking all religious experiences to be delu-
sions. In this case, it will simply be a coincidence that some of these delusions 
lead people to a correct view of reality, analogous to my dreaming my auntie is 
visiting when in fact, unbeknownst to me, she is.
Let us turn now to question (2). Suppose we do identify universal conscious-
ness with God. What then is the relationship between God and the physical uni-
verse? Pantheists believe that the universe is identical with God. Panentheists 
believe that the universe is in God, in the sense that the universe is an aspect of 
God but God’s nature is not exhausted by the physical universe. In fact, neither 
of these proposals captures the relationship universal consciousness bears to 
the physical universe on the view I outlined above. My proposal is that uni-
versal consciousness partly constitutes matter: that each individual entity is 
grounded in a relationship between universal consciousness and a bundle of 
phenomenal properties. Indeed, it is no part of the view I have defended that 
the physical universe was brought into being by universal consciousness. The 
view is compatible with the origins of the physical universe being a brute fact.
On this view, God/universal consciousness is an aspect of the physical uni-
verse, but the nature of the physical universe is not exhausted by God/uni-
versal consciousness: the physical universe is also constituted of phenomenal 
properties, which are not aspects of God. This is the converse of the panenthe-
istic position: God is in the universe but the universe is not in God. We might 
call this view ›theosenpanism‹, if that word were not too cumbersome.
7. Conclusion
The view I outlined above may sound peculiar and extravagant. This is not 
surprising, as the relationship between logic and physical reality is peculiar. 
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How on earth do these laws manage to enforce their governance in all possible 
worlds? How on earth does a physical human being get to know the laws that 
govern all of modal space just by sitting in an armchair and thinking? From 
the perspective of a methodological naturalist, these facts seem impossible to 
explain.
But methodological naturalism is a historical idiosyncrasy, which arises from 
an over-enthusiasm for physical science. The realities of logical truth and logi-
cal knowledge are hard data, and we should be prepared to spend ontological 
dollars accounting for them. Our scientistic culture renders us happy to spend 
to account for empirical data but miserly when it comes to non-empirical data 
(in so far as these are acknowledged at all). No doubt the cultural associations 
of ›new age‹ talk of universal consciousness, in contrast to the academic pres-
tige associated with Platonism, also plays a role here in discouraging the peren-
nial philosophy from being taken seriously.
In fact, the postulation of universal consciousness provides an explanation 
of logical phenomena which is surprisingly simple and elegant. We should take 
this possibility very seriously indeed.17
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What is panentheism? The term »Panentheismus« was coined by Karl Krause 
in 1828,1 reflecting the Greek expression πᾶν ἐν Θεός (pân en Theós), which lit-
erally means »all in God«. It is often said that panentheism stands midway 
between theism and pantheism, melding the transcendence of God from the-
ism with the immanence of God from pantheism. Whereas theism regards God 
as standing independent of the world, pantheism regards God and the world 
as coextensive or identical, and panentheism regards God as containing the 
world; the world is in God, hence God is more than the world (transcendence), 
but God is also present in the world (immanence).
The word »in« is central here and needs to be clarified. It has been claimed 
that various panentheist positions entail different meanings of »in« and Tom 
Oord has been credited with putting together an illustrative list.2 Supposedly, 
the world is »in« God because:
1. that is its literal location
2. God energizes the world
3. God experiences or »prehends« the world (process theology)
4. God ensouls the world
5. God plays with the world (Indic Vedantic traditions)
6. God »enfields« the world (J. Bracken)
7. God gives space to the world (J. Moltmann … zimzum tradition …)
8. God encompasses or contains the world (substantive or locative notion)
9. God binds up the world by giving the divine self to the world
1   Krause 1828: 256. Although Clayton 2010: 183 alleges that Friedrich Schelling prefig-
ured Krause’s 1829 [sic] coinage of the term »Panentheismus« with his use of the phrase 
»Pan+en+theismus« in his Essay on Freedom in 1809, that phrase (with or without the pluses) 
does not appear in the original German text, nor does »Pan+en+theism« (with or without 
the pluses) appear in any of the English translations; cf. Göcke 2013a: n. 5. A possible even 
earlier use by Krause awaits verification: in his foreword to Vorlesungen über das System der 
Philosophie, Krause tells us (pp. v-vi) that his System der Wissenschaft is unaltered (»unverän-
dert dasselbe«) from his teaching lectures of 1803-04 in Jena and that his Entwurf des Systemes 
der Philosophie of 1804 bears witness thereto. For the first study of Krause’s panentheism in 
English, see Göcke 2018.
2   Clayton 2004: 253.
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10. God provides the ground of emergences in, or the emergence of, the world 
[…]
11. God befriends the world […]
12. All things are contained »in Christ« (from the Pauline en Christo)
13. God graces the world […]
I am not convinced. Except for 1 and 8, the »becausal« relata per se seem to 
have nothing to do with the meaning of »in« at issue, and it is not obvious 
that in most of these cases a plausible connection to in-ness cannot be given 
in terms of a longer explanation involving a locative use. Here is how I would 
rate the list:
– Satisfactory becausal relations (i.e. ones that actually involve a recognizably 
straightforward meaning of »in«): 1, 8
– Unsatisfactory becausal relations: 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13
– Maybes: 4, 6, 12
Let us first consider the Unsatisfactories:
2. God energizes the world. By itself, this does not require the world to be in 
God; an analogy: an electronic device may be energized by an external power 
source (e.g. electrical outlet) or an internal power source (e.g. battery); only 
rarely would an electronic device be contained within its power source, if 
at all.
3. God experiences or »prehends« the world. Experiences and prehensions 
are not confined to internals (cf. proprioception) but may be of externals (cf. 
perception).
5. God plays with the world. Prima facie this suggests that God and the world 
are ontologically distinct, inasmuch as playthings are typically external to play-
ers. In the Heliopolitan creation myth, Atum does »play with himself« but that 
does not support a world-in-God interpretation or outcome.
7. God gives space to the world. »Giving space to« or »making space for« 
can be construed as forming an internal space or an external space. However, 
since the central concept of the tzimtzum tradition is contraction (»tzimtzum« 
means »contraction«) for the purpose of making the space in which creation 
of the world can take place, prima facie giving space to the world does not 
seem to put the world into God.
9. God binds up the world by giving the divine self to the world. One can 
bind up something that is either internal or external to oneself, but giving one-
self to the world suggests the world is external.
10. God provides the ground of emergences in, or the emergence of, the 
world […]. God could presumably provide this whether the world is in him 
or not.
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11. God befriends the world; 13. God graces the world. Again these do not 
preclude the world’s being external rather than internal to God.
Now for the Maybes:
4. God ensouls the world. If the »en« of »ensoul« works like the »en« of 
»envelop«, then there is a semantic linkage to »in« that implies the world’s 
being in God. However, if we go with the Oxford English Dictionary’s secondary 
definition of »ensoul« as »to infuse a soul into« then ensouling could be either 
internal or external.
6. God »enfields« the world. Because this claim is associated with Joseph 
Bracken, the notion of enfielding here is one that derives from psychological 
field theory,3 an offshoot of Gestalt psychology. In psychological field theory 
interactions between individuals and environments are central, and the total-
ity of a person’s experiences and needs and all the environmental factors that 
influence the person’s behavior at any time is called a »life space« or »psy-
chological field«. Psychological field theory also uses topological notions in 
describing the various interconnections within the totality. Hence, psychologi-
cal field theory deploys spatial metaphors that might provide an appropriate 
sense of in-ness. However, it is not clear whether Bracken’s take on fields con-
siders God to be coextensive with a field that is all-enfielding or whether the 
field is confined to the world.4
12. All things are contained »in Christ« (from the Pauline en Christo). This 
one strikes me as an outlier, not so much wrong as irrelevant, perhaps using 
»in« in a doxastic sense of participating-in-a-community-of-ideas or of having-
faith-in; or a social sense of being-together-in-fellowship (cf. the salutation 
»Yours in Christ«). To momentarily change gears, rather than implying any-
thing spatial or locative, 12 seems more on the order of what a party faithful 
might tell a comrade: »Everything is contained in Marx.« To be sure, there are 
some biblical passages that are more amenable to a spatial or locative con-
strual than this, although it is noteworthy that the »things« typically referred 
to are the believers in Christ and not the inventory of the world at large. (But 
that may be enough for a clever spin doctor to get started.)
Benedikt Göcke has instructively generalized the problems he sees with 
what I have listed as Unsatisfactories and Maybes with his observation that 
»almost any interpretation of ›in‹ that understands the relation between God 
3   Britannica 2016.
4   Bracken 2000: 7f. says, for example, »in line with this proposal one can postulate that the 
universe or cosmic process is at any given moment an all-encompassing ›structured society‹ 
or structured field of activity for all the actual entities emergent within it.« […] »God shares, 
in other words, a common field of activity with finite actual entities.«
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and everything else as an internal and intimate relation between God and ev-
erything else can also be thought of as an external and intimate relation, and 
vice versa.«5 As is evident from my own assessments, I don’t disagree with that. 
My problem, however, is with regarding a number of Oord’s so-called mean-
ings of »in« as being meanings of »in« in the first place, rather than simply 
being not relevantly qualified tenets of some variant of panentheism. »God 
graces the world« for example says absolutely nothing about in-ness or lack 
thereof, absolutely nothing about characterizing an internal or external rela-
tion. As a tenet of a variant of panentheism, it does not explain the in-ness of 
that variant; rather, what needs to be explained is how that tenet can be under-
stood in terms of the in-ness of that variant of panentheism.
I don’t believe a demarcation of panentheism that abandons the central loc-
ative or spatial characterization suggested by the etymology and the familiar 
diagrams (more on which below) or makes proprietary claims about any other 
properties of God not articulated in such terms is feasible. A clever theist could 
always appropriate such properties in some manner or other, and panentheists 
of different denominations could always find ways to disagree amongst them-
selves about such properties.
A constant across many popular contemporary portrayals of panentheism 
just is a spatial-locative characterization with accompanying diagrams. One 
may be naïve in holding that this constant directly provides us with a view of 
panentheism comme il faut, but that is where I will start and, after some scru-
tiny, grooming, and fattening thereof, abide.6
2. Figuring »In« Out
Let us then consider some diagrams commonly used7 to illustrative the differ-
ences between theism, panentheism, and pantheism:
5   Göcke 2013b: 63.
6   This is somewhat like the naïveté of naïve realism. Or it could be regarded as akin to the 
naïveté of Friedrich Schiller’s naïve poets, who in a childlike way accept what’s given, as 
opposed to the sentimental poets, who place themselves reflectively and self-consciously 
apart, but may also strive for a synthesis (see his 1795-96 Über naive und sentimentalische 
Dichtung). Moreover, Sharpe 1991: 60 discerns a youthful vision of »optimistic panentheism« 
in Schiller’s 1786 Theosophie des Julius. So I might with modest justification be said to be pur-
suing a Naïve and Sentimental Panentheism. 
7   Although the diagrams, being diagrams, are perforce two-dimensional, it is easy enough to 
imagine analogous three-dimensional representations, and there is no reason that the basic 
distinctions being made couldn’t be made in higher dimensional frameworks if need be, 
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Figure 1 represents the fact that in theism, God and the world are different 
substances. The »world« is typically regarded as being the universe, but we 
can expand that conception by allowing other possibilities such as a multi-
verse or the »many-worlds« of that eponymous interpretation of quantum 
mechanics.
Some diagrams for theism also have an arrow connecting God and the 
world to indicate that God interacts with and intervenes in the world. Without 
an appropriate caption or emendation, Figure 1 could just as well be a dia-
gram for the omni-absent God of deism. Let us represent God’s interactive 
interface with the world with a point of contact between the circles, i.e. a 
common »pineal point« on their circumferences, as in Figure 1a:
although visualizations would be more difficult. Moreover, the regions the lines enclose don’t 
have to be regarded as literally being bounded, although they could be, e.g. for the case of a 




Typical diagrams for panentheism and pantheism are:
The two-dimensional doughnut of Figure 2 shows that the world is contained 
within God and we can consider God’s interface with the world to be repre-
sented by a shared locus of points along the circumference of the inner circle. 
Alternatively, we might just represent the interface by single point of contact 
between the circumferences of the two circles, as in Figure 2a: 
But now an interesting question arises. Aren’t Figures 2 and 2a ambiguous? 
Although the world is represented as being »in« God, there are two possibilities:
Case (i). The world is in God but the world is not a part of God.
Case (ii). The world is in God and the world is a part of God.
To make an analogy: My vermiform appendix is in me and is a part of me. 
However, the cherry pit I accidently swallowed is in me but is not a part of me. 
Based on these considerations, I submit that Figure 2a, Case (i) is tantamount 
to Figure 1a. If the world is not a part of God and we imagine the contact point 
Figure 2 Figure 3 
Figure 2a 
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as a hinge and swing the contained circle outward like a door, we in effect end 
up with Figure 1a. Opening the »door« wouldn’t leave a circular hole in the big 
God circle, because after all if you take something out of God that isn’t a part of 
God, all of God will still be there. Cf: if my appendix is surgically removed, less 
of my body will remain, but if I cough up and spit out the cherry pit, my body 
is still all there. The upshot is that »in« cannot be conceived as mere contain-
ment; panentheism requires parthood, otherwise it collapses into theism.8
So Figure 2a, Case (ii) is the more suitable option. Panentheism requires 
that the in-God-ness of the world be construed not only in a locative or spatial 
but also in a substantive sense.
R.T. Mullins has recently proposed a model of panentheism that embraces 
a spatial-locative reading of »in«.9 Postulating a distinction between absolute 
(or metaphysical10) space and time and physical space and time, Mullins sug-
gests that absolute space and time, but not physical space and time, be con-
strued as attributes of God. »Absolute space and time exist regardless of the 
physical and temporal things that are contained within them« (p. 342). So in 
creating a universe, God creates physical space and time, but physical space 
and time exist in absolute (or metaphysical) space and time, and since abso-
lute (or metaphysical) space and time are attributes of God, the universe is 
»literally in God« (p. 343). Mullins alleges that »Classical theists typically claim 
that God creates space and time and as such space and time are not attributes 
of God. Some neo-classical and open theists affirm that absolute time is a nec-
essary concomitant of God’s being (e.g. Clarke and Swinburne), but they do 
not insist that absolute space and time are divine attributes« (ibid.). If so, he 
alleges, we have a unique claim about panentheism that differentiates it from 
theism.
Mullins adds that his model also demarcates panentheism from panthe-
ism, inasmuch as the panentheist »can maintain that God and the universe 
are distinct substances. God and the universe are not identical. The universe is 
not identical to absolute space and time; rather, the universe exists in absolute 
space and time. In identifying God and the universe, the pantheist is collapsing 
the distinction between absolute/metaphysical and physical space and time« 
(ibid.).
8    Some panentheists are prone to talk of the world as »God’s body«. I would suggest that 
such a conception of the world actually makes more sense for theism. That’s why I re-
ferred earlier to the interface between God and the world in Figure 1a as a »pineal« point.
9    Mullins 2016.
10   Mullins 2016: 343 mentions a distinction sometimes made between metaphysical space 
and time and physical space and time; he suggests that, given this distinction, absolute 
space and time are to be construed as metaphysical space and time.
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His proposal, as Mullins himself admits, does leave unanswered questions. 
One concern might be a seeming equivocation between substance and attri-
bute: God is a substance; the universe is a substance; absolute space and time 
are attributes; physical space and time (equated with the universe or contain-
ing the universe?) and the universe exist in absolute space and time.11 One 
might think absolute space and time are being treated both as substances and 
as attributes. Can a substance be attributed? (Aristotle and Frege say »no«.) 
Can an attribute contain a substance? (Perhaps when it’s really a relation… .) 
Purists will not be happy with such loose talk. And of course, one might also 
wonder, what’s to stop a contrarian theist from defying Mullins and appropri-
ating some of the claims he assigns to panentheists?12
Such concerns notwithstanding, I am sympathetic to Mullins’s proposal, in 
spirit if not entirely in letter, because it could straightforwardly serve as a cap-
tion for Figures 2 and 2a. However, the discussion for those figures also indi-
cates that Mullins’s proposal does not go far enough. It could only serve as a 
necessary condition for differentiating panentheism from theism, since it does 
not distinguish between Cases (i) and (ii). For that, we also need to construe 
the in-ness of panentheism as substantive parthood; God and the universe 
cannot be completely distinct substances.
3. The Dough in the Doughnut13
Having plumped for a spatial-locative characterization of panentheism à la 
Mullins, albeit supplemented with substantive parthood, I will hereinbelow 
flesh it out with some analogies.
11   If the universe necessarily exists, then physical space and time, in addition to absolute 
space and time, could be considered to be attributes of God. Cf: When I have the attribute 
of having an alimentary canal, and the alimentary canal includes an esophageal passage, 
then ipso facto I have the attribute of having an esophageal passage. Similarly, if God has 
the attributes of absolute space and time, and absolute space and time (necessarily) con-
tain physical space and time, then God could also be said to have the attributes of physi-
cal space and time. Moreover, if God can have contingent properties, then the universe 
doesn’t even have to necessarily exist. Theological conceptual frameworks have a lot of 
wiggle room.
12   But I don’t think it would be particularly contrarian for a theist to claim that absolute 
space and time are divine attributes. That no theists apparently have done so seems more 
like inadvertence.
13   A doughnut chart is a variant of the pie chart. Figure 2 isn’t a doughnut chart, not even 
a bad disproportional one (cf. notes 21, 22); like the cartoon character Jessica Rabbit, it’s 
»just drawn that way.«
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We have determined that Case (ii) is the viable option for panentheism. 
Although I made the comparison of panentheism and theism using Figures 1a 
and 2a because the visual analogy was more direct, it should be clear that a 
Case (i) for the Figure 2 doughnut is equally tantamount to theism, despite 
the greater dissimilarity of Figures 1a and 2. To use a baseball metaphor, there 
is a distinction between the infield (the world) and the outfield (God), and 
although they are interrelated in the game of baseball, the infield is not part of 
the outfield.
Speaking of fields, the metaphor of a force field is also apt, and we can take 
some inspiration from Bracken’s notion of »enfielding« (Maybes #6, above) 
without adopting the baggage attached. What sort of force field, then? Let’s 
first consider an ordinary magnet’s magnetic field. Objects can be placed in 
a magnet’s magnetic field, but with many kinds of substance, the field just 
passes through the object without having an effect on it. Witness the primary 
school science demonstration with a magnet under a sheet of paper and some 
iron filings on top. This demonstration could be an analogy for theism: the 
magnet (with attribute of magnetic force) = God, the paper plus iron filings = 
the world; God and the world are discrete substances; God acts upon the world 
and produces some effects in it (the paper is not affected but the iron filings 
are). Although the world is in the magnetic field, it is not a part of it, so the 
magnetic-field analogy is captured by Figure 2 Case (i).
Consider, too, the fields as postulated by general field theories in physics, 
where the physical universe, with its physical attributes of space and time, is it-
self seen as one enormous, possibly infinite physical field, and where ordinary 
physical objects and phenomena are constituted by curvatures, distortions, 
perturbations, or whatnot, of the field. God, on a panentheist conception, is 
naturally not a physical field with physical attributes. But instead, we might 
conceive of him, in parallel fashion, as a spiritual field with Mullins’s suggested 
divine attributes of absolute space and time. Indeed, regarding God as a spiri-
tual field is one way of understanding the biblical assertion that »God is spirit« 
(John 4:24).14 In physics, forces are typically essentially allied to fields (hence 
»fields of force« or »force fields«), so the notion of a spiritual field can also be 
regarded as essentially allied to a notion of a spiritual force.
Let us then entertain a notion of God as an endless spiritual field that con-
tains the world and of which the world is a part. Much like physicists’ talk of 
matter consisting of perturbations in the physical field that constitutes or 
pervades the physical universe, we can think of the physical universe itself 
as a perturbation in the spiritual field that is God. Nor need we think of the 
14   In some versions of the Bible, John 4:24 has »spirit« as a count noun: »God is a spirit«.
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spiritual field as passive; it might be regarded as an intelligent force15 that wills 
its own perturbations, and such willings of perturbations would ipso facto be 
acts of creation. A »point« in the spiritual field might be expanded into a uni-
verse; in other words, God could will a Big Bang within himself. This would be 
akin to the power of materialization sometimes attributed to yogis, with God 
being like unto a super-yogi who can initiate and foster a benign tumor within 
himself.
Inasmuch as these universe-constituting perturbations are within and part 
and parcel of the spiritual field of force, we may also say that the world is ipso 
facto »enfielded« (Maybes #6) by the spiritual field of force, viz. God. (If, al-
ternatively, we were to think of the divine spirit as being more like the local 
magnetic field in a schoolroom science demonstration, i.e. like, insofar as the 
divine spirit merely permeates or passes through the world in the way that a 
magnetic field passes through an object that is within but not a part of the 
magnetic field, then we would default to some form of theism.)
Presumably if the all-pervading spiritual field is a mentating divine person, 
then it can also be regarded as a soul, in which case we might have a soul that 
»ensouls« the world (Maybes #4). However, we might again ask about the role 
of the prefix »en«. Is it like the »en« of »enmired« (»stuck in or covered by 
mire [i.e. mud]«)? That would seem to suggest that what is ensouled is in the 
soul but is not a part of the soul, and that won’t do here since it amounts to the 
situation represented in Figure 1a or Case (i) of Figure 2a. Moreover, it is odd to 
speak of anything that is nonmental as a part of the soul.
Some panentheists (as well as some pantheists) like to think of the world 
as God’s body. But let’s consider souls à la Cartesian dualism for a moment. 
A person with a soul is not at all ensouled in the sense of a soul containing a 
body or even of a body containing a soul. The situation is more like that of a 
person wearing a hat: during life the Cartesian soul accompanies but is not a 
part of the body (and vice versa). Clearly the relationship between the world 
and divine soul or spirit cannot be Cartesian if we are to stick with the spatial-
locative construal of panentheism. If the relationship were Cartesian, it would 
be what is represented by Figure 1a or Case (i) of Figure 2a again.
However, if we think of a soul in its secondary sense of simply being a par-
ticular person, and think of a person as per Strawson’s person theory,16 then 
a human person is something that has both a body and a mind, i.e. an en-
15   The all-pervading and conceivably intelligent force of the new religion of Jediism is often 
described in panentheistic terms. However, Jediism appears to have no tenets about cre-
ation or the modal status of the universe.
16   Strawson 1959: chap. 3.
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tity to which both physical and mental attributes can be ascribed but which is 
itself neither a physical body nor a mind—Strawsonian tripleism,17 as it were. 
Pursuing that analogy, we might think of God as a divine person/soul who has 
both spiritual attributes and physical attributes, the latter by virtue of being 
suitably related to the physical world. However, if that relation, to repeat our 
previously used metaphor, is pineal, then we are again no further ahead. An 
alternative might be to consider »ensouled« to be akin to »enabled«. But that 
merely suggests providing an additional quality rather than consisting in a loc-
ative or spatial relationship. The conclusion I draw at this point is that ensoul-
ing is not helpfully comparable to enfielding after all, and I therefore demote 
ensouling from the Maybes to the Unsatisfactories.
4. Panning for Panpsychism
Returning to the notion of enfielding, we may ask how panpsychism might fig-
ure in an enfielding scheme of things. Presumably if the all-pervading spiritual 
field is a mentating divine person, it would be a tautology that panpsychism 
is true: mentality is everywhere that that divinity is, namely everywhere—
including, by implication, the physical universe. Put another way, this constru-
al of panpsychism would be true of the physical universe, and more besides.
Contemporary panpsychists and their fellow travellers will not likely be 
happy with such supernaturalization of panpsychism. Those folks regard pan-
psychism as a thesis about the physical universe, to wit that fundamental phys-
ical entities have genuine mental states. I myself am not drawn to the idea that 
»there is something that it is like to be a proton« (or whatnot) and therefore 
have no truck with the various panpsychisms that postulate or argue that the 
basic microphysical entities have primitive experiential/phenomenal proper-
ties or consciousness. However, I do think a significant analogy can be drawn 
between microphysical entities and the so-called unconscious mental states 
and processes that underpin or give rise to our conscious mental states and 
processes. There’s a lot going on in the brain and even if unconscious, the fact 
that we often resort to a homuncular intentional stance to make sense of much 
of it is highly suggestive. Moreover, since physical causal-dispositional states 
satisfy various common criteria for intentionality, and dispositional properties 
attend everything physical, we can argue for panintentionalism, considered as 
17   Cf. Martin 1969.
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a diluted variant of panpsychism.18 Physical intentional-dispositional states 
are everywhere and when arranged in complex arrays result in full-fledged in-
tentional states. How do conscious phenomenal states arise? I lean towards 
the view that they consist of or in neurophysiological properties, states, or pro-
cesses of the brain. These can be called emergent, but we need not decide here 
and now whether the emergence is like the weak emergence of water from its 
constituent elements or like the stronger emergence of property dualism.
Again we may ask how the God of panentheism figures in this scenario. 
There are two but not necessarily mutually exclusive possibilities. Given that 
the physical universe is a realm of cause and effect, we can regard the divine 
spirit as sustaining all worldly causal relationships, making the physical causal 
chains and intentional-dispositional configurations that result in mentality 
possible.19 Alternatively, we can opt for some form of occasionalism, whereby 
God intervenes to produce mental states whenever the underlying arrays of 
intentional causal-dispositional states are ripe for it. Moreover, God would ac-
complish either of these by enfielding, in the relevant sense, the world and 
willing the results. So just as causation in the world might be dependent on 
supernatural intentionality and willful causation, mentality in the world might 
likewise be dependent on supernatural intentionality and willful causation.
Thus we have two versions of panpsychism that are compatible with panen-
theism. The first is merely a consequence of God’s all encompassing presence 
as a divine person who consists in a mentating spiritual field; as such, it is 
simply a restatement of an essential attribute of God. The other is a modest 
worldly panintentionalism, which by the grace of God yields conscious men-
tal states at certain levels of complex organization of physical intentional 
causal-dispositional states. However, panintentionalism, as well as the various 
panpsychisms claiming primitive experiential/phenomenal properties or con-
sciousness for the basic microphysical entities, would be an optional add-on as 
regards panentheism. Unlike the situation with pantheism, God is not identi-
cal to the world and therefore panentheism per se does not stand in need of a 
panpsychism that derives mentality from the physical.
18   I have presented these ideas in more detail in Pfeifer 2016. Is my panintentionalism the 
same as David Chalmers’s panprotopsychism? According to Chalmers 2016: 31, »protophe-
nomenal properties are special properties that are not phenomenal… . Panprotopsychism 
is then the view that some fundamental physical entities have protophenomenal proper-
ties.« Since he does not regard mere dispositional properties as appropriately special, the 
answer is »no«.
19   Cf. Copleston 1961: 118-120.
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5. Another Inning
So far we have focused on how the world might be in God. But God himself 
is everywhere, we are told in our catechisms. God is omnipresent and ever-
present. So God is in the world and therefore presumably in each of us as 
well. I have previously suggested that in order to make some talk about God 
intelligible we need to recognize that the word »God« is equivocal between a 
mass-noun sense and a count-noun sense.20 When used with a mass sense, it is 
similar to the term »gold«: parts of gold are themselves gold; in contrast, parts 
of chairs are not themselves chairs. The noun »gold« does not take a plural 
form or an indefinite article (»a«) and so gold per se is not countable, whereas 
»chair« does take a plural form and an indefinite article. So if gold is in a cer-
tain space, then gold itself is also in a part of that space.21
Some English nouns can be employed in both a mass and a count sense. I 
can say »there’s chicken in the fridge«, and since parts of chicken can still be 
chicken we can each have chicken. However, if I say »there’s a chicken in the 
fridge« it doesn’t follow that we can each have »a chicken«. All this is admit-
tedly oversimplification, but the main idea is clear. Mass terms afford a means 
of talking about substances that treats wholes and parts as on a par.
Let us now return to Mullins’s idea of absolute space and time as attributes 
of God. Accordingly, physical space and time (which conjointly is identical 
to and/or contains the universe) is in absolute space and time; moreover, as 
I argued in the discussion of Figure 2a above, in order to distinguish panen-
theism from theism we need to construe this in-ness as substantive parthood. 
But if God is considered in his masslike aspect, we can say as we did for gold, 
that God himself, qua his attribute of absolute space, is in whatever the abso-
lute space encompasses, viz. the physical space and all its contents, parts, and 
constituents.
I used the term »masslike« in the preceding paragraph because I want to 
acknowledge that there would have to be an important difference between 
the use of »God« as a mass noun and ordinary physical mass nouns such as 
»gold«. When we talk of a mass of the substance gold, it occupies space and 
ipso facto subspaces (or parts) of that space. The problem with this picture is 
that although we can say that what a subspace contains is itself gold, we would 
20   Pfeifer 2016: n. 5. Also cf. n. 14 above.
21   Although not in every part of the space; real gold is not infinitely divisible, so at the atomic 
level we will have parts of gold that are not gold. In our physical realm, there may not actu-
ally be anything that is infinitely divisible while retaining its substancehood or identity, 
not even physical space.
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be committed to the consequence that some subspaces will contain more gold 
or less gold than others.22 Clearly this is not the sort of thing we want to say 
about God. When God is omnipresent, he is completely present everywhere, 
not present in varying quantities. So the analogy with mass terms for some 
uses of »God« needs further qualification.
Here are two additional manoeuvres we might make to explain why »God« 
doesn’t entirely behave like »gold«. The first is that we might say that the sub-
stance that is God, whatever it comes to, is a constant throughout both abso-
lute and physical space and time. Even as the speed of light is a constant such 
that two photons moving in opposite directions from a common light source 
would nevertheless move away from each other with a relative velocity of just 
the speed of light and not twice the speed of light, similarly when God is in a 
space (whether absolute or physical), he is fully present in all the subspaces. 
God’s total »there-ness« is a constant that cannot be exceeded or diminished 
by the different spaces in which he is present. The second manoeuvre might be 
simply to say that, unlike gold, God is not subject to the metrics of the spaces 
he is in at all; familiar notions of distance, area, or volume just don’t apply 
to him.
6. Quo Vadimus?
I have attempted herein to present a coherent view of panentheism that es-
chews Pickwickian senses of »in« and aligns itself with, and builds upon, pop-
ular diagrammed portrayals of panentheism. So we began this disquisition by 
going along with the common spatial-locative characterization of panenthe-
ism and paying heed to some typical accompanying diagrams. But apart from 
their role as visual aids, we might also consider what kinds of diagrams these 
are. The two-dimensional circles of planar Euclidean geometry have finite 
and measurable circumferences; such geometric properties are not properties 
of God, nor do they make for the best metaphors or similes for properties of 
God.23 So these visual aids, if taken too literally, inadvertently reflect the op-
posite of what we might wish for in a characterization of God.
22   Methanks Graham Oppy for this reminder.
23   It is not my intention here to belabor the obvious. I merely want to highlight the idea 
that the geometric properties of the diagrams stand metaphorically for certain features 
of God that might be better captured by a more abstract but nevertheless still spatial 
representation.
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Although we may be naturally inclined towards spatial metaphors that are 
inherently geometrical and typically Euclidean, I would like to recommend 
that we prescind from such metaphors and the particular realizations of sub-
stances that they implicate. Rather than the geometrical spatial metaphors, I 
think we should focus on spatiality at the more abstract level of topological 
spaces,24 of which Euclidean and other geometrical spaces are merely special 
cases. From a topological point of view, for example, God could be conceived 
of as (having the attribute of) a non-metrizable space that contains a metric 
or metrizable space, viz. the universe. Or else, God might be associated with a 
so-called pseudometric space, i.e. a space in which the distance between non-
identical points can be zero. Moreover, topological concepts can be combined 
with mereological concepts (ergo »mereotopology«). Some philosophers have 
disparaged the idea that mereology might be used to say anything distinctive 
or interesting about panentheism, but it seems to me that mereology is amena-
ble to many clever axiomatizations and shouldn’t be written off prematurely. 
Indeed, recent mereological work on conceptions of location may be fruitful, 
inasmuch as it addresses such issues germane to the nature of God as whether 
substances can interpenetrate, whether substances can be multilocated, and 
whether an entity can be an extended simple.25 Such topological or mereo-
logical possibilities are not obviously at variance with Mullins’s proposal and 
the additional views I have advanced. They merely represent a turn towards a 
more abstract and exact idiom that could be to our behoof.
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What a Feeling? In Search of a Metaphysical 




What has been said about the relation between panpsychism and pantheism1 
seems to hold also for panpsychism and panentheism: They are logically inde-
pendent from one another. At least, a panpsychist universe without panenthe-
ist background can be conceived of without any contradiction. This paper is 
going to pursue the following question: Could it nevertheless be the case that 
there is a metaphysical connection between panpsychism and panentheism?
This question brings to mind what might be a parallel case, famously ar-
gued for by Saul Kripke2: Before the advent of modern chemistry, the question 
about the essence of water could be, and has been, answered in several ways. 
In the meantime, the microstructure of water, described by the formula ›H2O‹, 
turned out to be a promising candidate for a metaphysical truth about what 
water essentially is, insofar our natural kind term ›water‹ rigidly designates 
the stuff with that microstructure throughout all possible worlds. Logic alone 
could not provide this connection; it was forged by experience—in this case 
scientific experience within a certain theoretical framework.
Can a metaphysical connection between panpsychism and panentheism be 
established in a similar way? This question encounters the problem that pan-
psychism seems to be a position which it is at least not directly corroborated by 
experience3. But maybe the according experience has just not yet been identi-
fied as such. In this paper the following will be argued: Panpsychism can refer 
to such an experience, the experience of what it is like to be a natural subject. 
As in the case of water, there is a framework within which this experience can 
be elucidated, namely a phenomenological approach suggesting that subjects 
are open to (mental) atmospheres which can connect them. To pursue this line 
of thought, it is apt to begin with a look at panpsychism.
1   Cf. Leidenhag 2018: Introduction.
2   Cf. Kripke 1980.
3   Cf. e.g. Brüntrup/Jaskolla 2017b: 4; Goff 2017a: 283f.
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2. A Look at Panpsychism
For the newly gained prominence of panpsychism in contemporary philoso-
phy, especially in analytic philosophy of mind, the following reasons can be 
given:
(R1)  Subjects are entities which can be in specific, namely mental, phenom-
enal or conscious4, states, i.e., in the following sense5: Subjects have per-
spectives on the world (intentionality), and it is like something for them 
to have these perspectives (qualitative consciousness).
(R2)  There are subjects which have been brought about in the course of natu-
ral evolution. Such subjects are to be called macrosubjects.
(R3)  The entities grasped by physics are just dispositional structures lacking 
intentionality and qualitative consciousness6.
(R4)  Only something which has intentionality and qualitative consciousness, 
namely some kind of subject or at least something which is subjective, is 
sufficient to bring about something which has these very properties7.
(R5)  Therefore macrosubjects have to be been brought about by something 
like a subject or by other subjects. Such subjects are called microsubjects.
(R6)  Microsubjects (at least at the fundamental level of reality given by phys-
ics) are the qualitative inside of the dispositional structures grasped by 
physics8.
These reasons are well-founded:
(R1) sums up a concept issued during the last decades in defense against 
physicalist attacks on subjectivity. This concept has been developed, among 
others, by Thomas Nagel and David Chalmers and stresses that intentionality 
and phenomenal consciousness as essential properties of subjectivity are not 
within the object realm of physics and therefore cannot be denied in the name 
of a physical worldview by physicalism9. Being thus theoretically motivated, 
this thesis can refer to each and every one’s personal experience at the same 
time and therefore is hard to shake.
(R2) is based on the wide-spread and well-founded conviction that there are 
at least human subjects and that these subjects have been brought about in 
4   In this paper, like in the panpsychist literature referred to below, these terms will be handled 
as synonymous.
5   Cf. Voigt 2019: 41-43.
6   Cf. Brüntrup/Jaskolla 2017c: 926-928, Chalmers 2017a: 26f.
7   Cf. Brüntrup/Jaskolla 2017b: 3.
8   Cf. ibid.
9   Cf. Brüntrup/Jaskolla 2017c: 923-928.
141What a Feeling?
the course of natural evolution. The growing acceptance of subjectivity in the 
animal kingdom10 gives further support to this thesis.
(R3) seems to describe quite aptly what contemporary physics is doing and 
moreover what it should be doing according to its theoretical and empirical 
foundations11.
(R4) is a version of the principle of sufficient reason12: If there is such a 
generic difference between subjects as conceived of in (R1) and the objects of 
physics as given by (R3), the bringing about of subjects by objects of physics 
would be a case of super-strong emergence in which something completely 
new appears in a way that cannot be accounted for, that remains unintelligi-
ble. Panpsychists claim that there is one promising alternative to this, namely 
that some subjects (macrosubjects) are brought about by other subjects—
according to (R5). Generally: Subjectivity can arise only from subjectivity. This 
is what makes subjectivity another basic feature of reality, besides or more 
precisely, as the look on (R5) will show, inside the physical features. How intel-
ligible this suggestion really is remains contested, as a look at the combination 
problem will show below.
(R5), the claim that there are microsubjects or something like them, fol-
lows logically from these presuppositions. »Microsubjects or something like 
them« here hints to the demarcation lines between different kinds of panpsy-
chism and related positions: panpsychism proper which will be pursued here 
and which presupposes that it is subjects all the way down, and other brands 
which assume that the chain of subjects in some place breaks off in favor of 
somehow subjective entities which nevertheless are not subjects themselves, 
but rather experiences or qualities13. Panpsychism proper is preferred here for 
two reasons: In the first place, it is hard to conceive of something subjective 
without any subject experiencing it; in the second place, the progress towards 
›real‹ subjects would have to be a case of super-strong emergence, a ›brute‹ 
occurrence which to avoid is prudent whenever possible.
(R6) is an attempt to find a place in nature for these microsubjects. One such 
place, also in a non-metaphorical sense, is supposed to be found inside the 
fundamental objects of physics, whatever these may be. This move guarantees 
that panpsychist theses do not get into conflict with physics, which, according 
to (3) does not have anything to say about these insides and rather is occupied 
only with the structural dispositions obtaining between them.
10   Cf. Soentgen 2018: 36-42.
11   Cf. Goff 2017b: 23-39.
12   On this and the follwing cf. Brüntrup 2017.
13   Cf. Chalmers 2017a, Goff 2017c: 165-171.
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As these points show, panpsychism tries to overcome physicalism and at 
the same time to access to its inheritance, physicalism being the thesis that the 
entities grasped by physics are sufficient to bring about subjects. Panpsychism 
tries to overcome physicalism by denying this thesis (which has come under 
great pressure anyway), and tries to access to the inheritance of physicalism 
by keeping up the notion that there are levels of reality given by physics, and 
that these levels—at least one of them—play a crucial role for the rise of mac-
rosubjects. As these levels are levels of nature, panpsychism, like physicalism, 
still is a naturalism, but a more liberal14, one could also say a more inclusive 
one, as it includes subjectivity already as a fundamental factor of reality.
So panpsychism looks like an attractive solution to the mind-body-problem: 
According to panpsychism, the relation between mind and body is not myste-
rious but rather intimate; and situating subjectivity at least on a lowest level 
of physical reality does not contradict the accepted assumption that science 
shows us a physical world, for, in a panpsychist view, this world is only the 
outside of that reality, which also has a mental inside. At the same time, pan-
psychism makes it plausible how, within such a physical world, ›ordinary‹ 
subjects15 like ours can arise: with a little help of the microsubjects hidden 
intimately on the inside of that physical world.
3. The Combination Problem
This solution, however, comes with a price: If microsubjects do the job to bring 
about macrosubjects, how do they do it? This question has been posed in the 
form of the famous combination problem16. In its original version by William 
James this problem starts with the assumption that microsubjects would have 
to constitute macrosubjects, in the sense of weak emergence, so that micro-
subjects somehow blend or fuse together in order to form a larger whole, and 
the contents of the mental states of this whole are accordingly formed by the 
contents of the mental states which belonged to the smaller units. Subjects 
and the contents of their mental states, however, just do not seem to do this. 
Even when put very close to one another, they do not fuse but rather remain 
enclosed within themselves.
One problem with the combination problem is the weak emergentist view 
that microsubjects constitute macrosubjects. A promising way out is to give 
14   Brüntrup/Jaskolla 2017c: 928.
15   Cf. Goff 2017a: 295.
16   On this and the following cf. the contributions to »Part III. Panpsychism and the 
Combination Problem« in Brüntrup/Jaskolla 2017a.
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up that view. Super-strong emergence also is out of the question, for it would 
mean that what is brought about belongs to another category than what is 
bringing it about, while here we deal with subjects on both sides. Moreover, to 
avoid super-strong emergence is what makes panpsychism excel in its compe-
tition with physicalism. What remains is non-constitutive strong emergence17. 
According to it, the microsubjects combine while staying what they are, and 
through their combination the macrosubjects comes to be as yet another sub-
ject. The Whiteheadian formula for this runs: »The many become one and are 
increased by one«18, with ›becoming one‹ here meaning ›getting related to one 
another‹ and ›are increased by one‹ standing for ›the additional subject, the 
macrosubject, being synchronically generated by that getting related to one 
another of the microsubjects‹.
This way out, however, encounters a generalized version of the combina-
tion problem, »The No Summing of Subjects Argument«19: Even if, or precisely 
if, microsubjects do not constitute macrosubjects, how can they bring them 
about after all, since subjects do not seem to be able to ›sum‹ in any way? 
Philip Goff rightly calls this »the heart of the combination problem«20, and 
articulates its presuppositions as follows21:
(CP1)  »Conceptual Isolation of Subjects«: It is possible to conceive that 
a certain number of subjects exist with certain mental states and 
this does not necessitate the existence of another subject.
(CP2)  »Transparency Conceivability Principle«: If a proposition con-
tains only transparent elements, i.e. elements which reveal what 
they are about just by inspection, and if, reflected in an ideal way, 
that proposition can be conceived of to be true, it »is metaphysi-
cally possibly true«.
(CP3)  »Phenomenal transparency«: »phenomenal concepts are 
transparent«.
(CP4)  »Metaphysical Isolation of Subjects« (MIS): It follows from the 
above premises that any number of subjects may exist without 
necessitating the existence of another subject.
(CP5)  CP4 has the consequence that subjects cannot bring about other 
subjects, at least not as panpsychism would have it.
(CP6)  »Therefore, panpsychism is false.«
17   Cf. Brüntrup 2017.
18   Cf. ibid.: 66.
19   Goff 2017a: 291.
20   Ibid.
21   Ibid.: 291f.
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In a convincing way, Goff argues for the first four premises and stresses that 
especially panpsychists should endorse phenomenal transparency, because 
to him what would make phenomenal concepts intransparent could only be 
their physical nature which is denied by panpsychism. Nevertheless, Goff still 
sees a chance for panpsychism to survive this assault: (MIS) only claims that 
the existence of a certain number of subjects does not necessitate the existence 
of another subject. It might still be the case that the existence of a certain 
number of subjects with certain mental states, which in turn have certain phe-
nomenal properties, together with some relation between these mental states 
necessitates the existence of another subject22. A relation of this kind Goff 
calls ›phenomenal bonding‹. Goff assumes that, while we can experience the 
phenomenal properties, we cannot experience the relations between them, 
which means: we cannot experience phenomenal bonding. Goff traces this 
back to what he passingly assumes as obvious: that »consciousness is a mo-
nadic property«23. From the immediate context, it becomes clear what this 
›monadic‹ thesis means to him:
(MON)   Each and every mental state is a categorial (i.e. also: non-relational) 
state of only one subject and therefore can be experienced only by 
that subject.
According to (MON), phenomenal bonding as a relation between mental 
states of several subjects cannot be experienced by any subject. Hence phe-
nomenal bonding is not directly observable, yet, as Goff argues, the sciences 
offer plausible parallel examples that sometimes it makes sense to assume the 
existence of non-observables24.
The concept of phenomenal bonding can be applied both in constitutive 
and in strongly emergentist panpsychism25. Since the latter already has proved 
to be more promising, it has to be considered what, in its context, phenom-
enal bonding can mean. In principle, it seems to mean that there are and 
there remain several microsubjects with their respective mental states and 
that these mental states are related by their phenomenal properties to one 
another—are ›phenomenally bonded‹—so that this relation brings about 
another subject, the macrosubject of these microsubjects. The macrosubject 
is added to its microsubjects and, so to speak, exists grounded on the web of 
22   Ibid.: 292.
23   Ibid.: 293.
24   Cf. ibid.: 292f.
25   Cf. ibid.: 295.
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their phenomenal interrelations. This view, however, again raises questions 
highlighted by David J. Chalmers:
What is the phenomenal bonding relation? And how could any phenomenal re-
lation holding between distinct subjects (or between phenomenal states of dis-
tinct subjects) suffice for the constitution of a wholly new subject?26
Chalmers proceeds to answer these questions:
A natural candidate here is the co-consciousness relation: a relation such that 
whenever it relates two phenomenal states, they are experienced jointly. When 
this relation holds among the states of distinct microsubjects, those states will 
be experienced jointly by a new subject.27
But he does so only to come up with a new problem arising from this an-
swer: Being a mental phenomenon, on a panpsychist background the 
›co-consciousness relation‹ has to be the inside of a physical relation. For mi-
crosubjects on the fundamental level of reality, such relations should be fun-
damental physical relations like spatio-temporal and causal relations. These 
relations in turn are connected with one another so that, in the final analysis, 
their network encompasses the whole universe. The problem posed by this can 
be called limitation problem: Is the co-consciousness relation—principally or 
within certain ranges—transitive or intransitive. I.e.: Are there, within this cos-
mic network of mutually linked co-consciousness relations, any lower or upper 
limits for bringing about new subjects? What makes the limitation problem a 
problem are the consequences of various ways to answer that question: If the 
whole network itself is the lower limit, that would mean that the universe is 
either the only subject (which Chalmers seems to fear28) or the primary sub-
ject (which Goff has come to endorse29), which would make the existence of 
›ordinary‹ subjects like us either epiphenomenal or hard to explain. If every 
link in that network brings about a new subject, that would mean that there 
are very many (macro)subjects and it would leave us with only fragmented 
subjects, which would make it »hard to see how we will get macrosubjects«30. 
And if only certain structures in that network bring about new subjects, 
we would need a reason why this is so, i.e. why certain groups of links are 
26   Chalmers 2017b: 200. It should be noted that ›constitution‹ here is to be understood in 
such a broad sense that it includes also strongly emergentist panpsychism.
27   Ibid.
28   Ibid.: 201.
29   Id. 2017b: 220-255.
30   Id. 2017a: 201.
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›transitive‹, i.e. jointly take part in bringing about a new subject, why others are 
›intransitive‹, i.e. do not take part in doing so.
Chalmers does not exclude »intermediate possibilities in which the relation 
is just nontransitive enough to yield nontrivial macrosubjects«, but in order to 
make those possibilities work, it would have to be shown how this structure be-
tween microsubjects and macrosubjects can arise so that »a limited multiplic-
ity of microsubjects associated with the human organism« can be assumed, 
saving the phenomenon of our subjectivity connected with such an organ-
ism31. An ›intermediate possibility‹ would have to avoid the »Scylla of a uni-
versal subject and the Charybdis of fragmentary subjects«32. Goff himself goes 
for the Scylla by »identify[ing] the phenomenal bonding relation with the spa-
tial relation«33. At first glance, this move is plausible: Also space is something 
known to science by its outer, dispositional properties; if such outer properties 
hint to subjectivity hidden inside of them, this should apply also to the case of 
space. If one takes the space of the universe to be a continuous whole, as Goff 
does, this leads to the thesis that there is a universal mind as the inside of the 
whole spatially extended universe34. Whoever is inclined to take the mind of 
the universe to be divine ends up with some kind of panentheism based on 
panpsychism right here. Rather, panpsychism understood this way collapses 
into panentheism. What still makes this horn of the dilemma a »Scylla« hard 
to embrace, however, is the circumstance that the phenomemon to be saved—
human consciousness—in the very process of its salvation threatens to get lost 
in space or at least to be turned into an epiphenomenon, something which 
exists only on a superficial plane of appearance. This contradicts the ›hard 
fact‹ of our existence as subjects; therefore the search for an »intermediate 
possibility« is justified.
4. Phenomenal Bonding and New Phenomenology
A way towards such an option can start from questioning one presupposition 
which Chalmers and Goff (together with most contemporary panpsychists) 
share, namely (MON). This presupposition, plausible as it seems to be at first 
sight, does not only pose an epistemic problem for phenomenal bonding by 
declaring it unobservable. (MON) challenges phenomenal bonding also on-
tologically: The relations in which phenomenal bonding itself consists are not 
31   Ibid.
32   Ibid.
33   Goff 2017a: 299.
34   This position has been expounded in Goff 2017b.
147What a Feeling?
physical relations but rather their non-physical inside. At the same time, ac-
cording to (MON) those relations are not mental states—not only because 
they are not states but relations, but also because there is no subject that could 
experience them, for subjects can only experience their own, non-relational 
states. Hence, if (MON) is true, phenomenal bonding gets stranded in an onto-
logical no man’s land as a type of relation which is neither physical nor mental; 
it seems to be a leftover from neutral monism35, only that the otherwise inde-
terminable ›neutral‹ now is situated within relations rather than within their 
relata. At best, this is where panpsychism proper would have to end and give 
way to protopanpsychism or some other position which works with ›some-
thing like a subject‹. If panpsychism proper has to end here, however, it does 
not even start, because then it would lose the microsubjects on the fundamen-
tal level of physical reality it presupposes.
But it does not have to end this way, because (MON) has been challenged in 
a way that can help out of that predicament. This challenge comes from a phil-
osophical movement which goes under the name of New Phenomenology36. 
Its core thesis has been formulated by its founder Hermann Schmitz37: The 
phenomenological description of feelings like anxiety, joy and despair shows 
that they are entities of a certain type which Schmitz calls atmospheres. 
Atmospheres in this sense are not in the subject but permeate and surround it 
so that also several subjects may participate in them. Atmospheres according 
to Schmitz may even be there without any subject feeling them. They qualify 
as mental states in the minimal sense endorsed also by panpsychism—see 
(R1)—, because it is like something to be in them, and they are distinct per-
spectives on the world, which is sensed differently when in anxiety, joy, despair 
and so on. Whoever adopts (CP3), according to which phenomenal concepts 
are transparent, and accepts Schmitz’s description, has to agree that atmo-
spheres are spatially extended mental states which do not belong to any one 
subject. This is enough to contradict (MON) by claiming that not all mental 
states are states of one and just one subject. At the same time, it fits nicely 
to the thesis that mental states might be spatial relations. Panpsychism and 
New Phenomenology seem to approach the same position in logical space 
from different directions. Of course, panpsychism tries to explain the rise of 
subjectivity in general term and thus is a metaphysical project, while New 
Phenomenology puts description in the first place, but this need not stop both 
from being complementary for each other.
35   On this position and its relation to panpsychism, cf. Coleman 2017.
36   For a presentation and critical discussion see Soentgen 1998.
37   Cf. Schmitz 21981: 91-360; id. 1990: 292-310.
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The way New Phenomenology originally was presented by Schmitz, how-
ever, threatens to disrupt this rapprochement. Two issues have to be mentioned 
here: Firstly, Schmitz claims that atmospheres just are there and received by 
subjects, denouncing any attempt to explain how atmospheres themselves 
arise as pointless38. If this were so, the concepts of atmospheres would be use-
less for the (also explanatory) project of panpsychism. Secondly, according to 
Schmitz the space in which feelings are extended is totally different from the 
space explored by science39. Space in the first sense is a ›feeling-space‹ filled 
by specific kinds of stuff which mediate what is felt in this space and how it is 
felt. This space lacks dimensions but has—only qualitative—intensities and in 
some cases directions. Space in the second sense is a neutral medium for inter-
subjective orientation and filled with the matter quantified by science. If this 
were so, adopting the concept of space in New Phenomenology to a problem 
of panpsychism could only rest on an equivocation.
Remarkably, during the further development of New Phenomenology, these 
two issues have been tackled: As Gernot Böhme has pointed out40, concern-
ing the first issue, aesthetic experience shows that there are indeed cases in 
which atmospheres are generated, for example in artistic efforts. As to the 
second issue, Jens Soentgen has argued critically that the thesis of the spati-
ality of feelings is informative only if space in this context is understood as 
the ›ordinary‹ space of intersubjective orientation and scientific exploration; 
otherwise it would be pointless or at best figurative to talk about a ›feeling-
space‹ at all41. Constructively, Soentgen has elaborated the thesis that ›ordi-
nary‹ space is also feeling-space by developing hermeneutic approaches in 
different fields of the life-sciences42. The point of these approaches is: Certain 
phenomena like the behavior of single organisms but also of complete eco-
systems can be explained and also predicted in a more comprehensive way if 
these phenomena are understood as reactions to atmospheres in the sense of 
New Phenomenology. For example, it is like something to be wildlife in a wood 
where regularly hunting takes place. And because the space in which the ac-
cording mental states are situated is no mysterious medium on its own, but the 
space also traversed by humans and explored by science, also the stuff mediat-
ing feelings throughout space is not just a mysterious non-physical something, 
but the ordinary stuff known to everyday experience and (in some extent) to 
38   Cf. id. 1999: 286.
39   Cf. id. 1990: 310-318.
40   Cf. Böhme 1995.
41   Cf. Soentgen 1998: 106.
42   Cf. id. 2018.
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science43. Against such an identity thesis, Schmitz has argued already early 
that the stuff feelings are made of displays other properties than the physical 
stuff44. But, as may be learned from panpsychism, categorial distinctness can 
go hand in hand with intimate ontological connectedness: The way panpsy-
chism sees the physical universe suggests that there is only one category of 
stuff, of course encompassing different stuffs, which have physical properties 
on the outside and have mental properties—the way it feels to be confronted 
with them—as their inside.
This approach in the context of the life-sciences can contribute to solve the 
limitation problem, centered round the question how we can arrive at macro-
subjects like ourselves. In that context, the obvious answer is: by natural evolu-
tion. In the course of this evolution, it may happen that many microsubjects 
become one in the sense that they get phenomenally bonded to one another. 
On the background of New Phenomenology, that means: They enter an at-
mosphere which makes them form a certain arrangement that gives rise to a 
macrosubject. If this macrosubject in turn manages to keep up this atmo-
sphere, it will endure as such. Being an enduring subject and therefore being 
capable of consciousness will provide enhanced abilities to react to the en-
vironment. By the ensuing increase of the fitness of their members, whole 
species of organisms with macrosubjects may arise—and obviously have aris-
en. All of this does not presuppose any intention to make this happen on the 
side of the microsubjects or the macrosubjects; it rather happens to them, and 
it could not be any other way, because having and carrying out such an inten-
tion would presuppose rationality; but the microsubjects, as may be assumed 
in this case, are not rational at all, and some macrosubjects may be rational, 
and are in the case of human subjects, but come to exist as such only through 
the act of phenomenal bonding which therefore must precede the exercise of 
their own rational capabilities45.
If phenomenal bonding is a spatial relation mediated by the qualities of 
certain kinds of stuff, and if being a subject and thus being capable of con-
sciousness offers an advantage in the struggle for survival46, those species have 
a great benefit whose exemplars are macrosubjects which manage it to bring 
about stable phenomenal bonding of their microsubjects. Neither on the side 
of the microsubjects nor on the side of the macrosubject this is an intended 
43   Cf. id. 2019.
44   Cf. Schmitz 21981: 208.
45   Cf. Voigt 2019: 54f.
46   Cf. Meixner 2004: 81; Swinburne 2007: 180-183. The point of consciousness as evolutionary 
advantage has been made by two dualists, but it can be used by panpsychists as well.
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process; rather it is something which happens and keeps itself happening 
while it is happening.
5. A Metaphysical Connection between Panpsychism  
and Panentheism
A further elaboration would have to show on which levels and under which 
physical, chemical and biological circumstances subjects can get phenome-
nally bonded in according atmospheres. That elaboration itself lies out of the 
scope of this paper. But within it lies the question asked at its beginning: Could 
there be a metaphysical connection between panpsychism and panenthe-
ism mediated by an experience? This question now can be reformulated: Can 
panentheism give an answer to a question which does not concern the circum-
stances under which, but the reason why subjects get phenomenally bonded 
in according atmospheres. The problem behind this question is: For subject to 
get bonded that way, the according atmospheres already have to exist, have to 
address them. Where, then, do that atmospheres come from? Seen from the 
outside, as modern science might do, it could seem that these atmospheres 
arise by mere chance. In the course of natural evolution, microsubjects under-
go many kinds of mutual arrangements; some of these arrangements, maybe 
highly improbable, but not impossible, bring about the right kinds of atmo-
spheres; the resulting macrosubjects somehow manage to sustain these atmo-
spheres; and the rest, like all of it before, is evolutionary history. But what it this 
process like viewed from the inside? The view from the outside cannot exclude 
that the microsubjects are somehow addressed and thereby motivated to enter 
those arrangements. As Brüntrup and Jaskolla have shown47, such a specula-
tive, but plausible consideration about the view from the inside demonstrates 
how panpsychism in general can underwrite a theist view of the world, with 
God not forcing, but nudging the microsubjects into a development towards 
increasing completion which includes the bringing about of macrosubjects. 
For this, there is again a fitting Whiteheadian catchphrase, depicting God as 
»the lure for feeling«48. Having panpsychism enriched with motives from New 
Phenomenology, this can be understood in the following way: God ›lures‹ the 
microsubjects to form the mentioned arrangements by offering them an an-
ticipation of the atmosphere they are going to enter in order to bring about a 
macrosubject.
47   Cf. Brüntrup/Jaskolla 2017c: 929-943.
48   Ibid.: 941.
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Brüntrup and Jaskolla explicitly leave it open to elaborate this general 
theist perspective on panpsychism in the direction of a panentheist perspec-
tive. The considerations above may contribute to ease this desideratum, and 
even show why it is promising to go this way: Panentheism consists in the 
thesis that »everything is in God«. Each of the concepts used in this thesis is 
in need of interpretation49. In the current, panpsychist context, ›everything‹ 
can be specified as ›every subject which exists and becomes in the course of 
natural evolution‹. This is going to be abbreviated as ›every natural subject‹. 
Hence, also what is meant by ›is in‹ becomes clearer: to be in something for 
a subject means to be in a mental state in the sense mentioned in (R1). Given 
this interpretation, panentheism seems to claim that every natural subject is in 
a mental state which is God, which in turn implies that God is a mental state, 
namely a mental state in which all natural subjects are. Does not this conse-
quence amount to a reduction ad absurdum, bereaving God of His ontological 
independence and of His personality, since mental states seem to depend on 
their subjects and seem to be something different from persons?
The answer to this question is not necessarily positive, if we take into ac-
count the reshaping of the concept of a mental state provided by New 
Phenomenology. According to it, not every mental state is just a state of mind, 
let alone a state of mind borne or possessed by exactly one subject; on the con-
trary it is possible for a mental state to exist on its own, as an atmosphere in the 
sense given above and used also below. Nothing precludes that such an atmo-
sphere is also a subject, or even a rational subject, i.e. a person. Therefore it is 
at least not absurd to understand God as the atmosphere of the universe and 
hence as the atmosphere of the different atmospheres encountering in it. This 
understanding, however, might run afoul of one horn of a well-known dilemma 
in the theological and philosophical discourse on God50: On the one hand, God 
is a concrete agent within the universe, and as such somehow known to us—in 
this case by the way we know what it is like to be in an atmosphere. On the 
other hand, however, God is consistently conceived of as the »totally other« 
which should be referred to only in a negative or at least very cautious way. 
Understanding God as an atmosphere, does this not negate His transcendence, 
i.e. also His otherness exceeding human knowledge, which is expressed in that 
second horn? Shouldn’t we all know the feeling what it is like to be in God?
However, what a feeling could that be? What is it like to be not (only) in 
some concrete atmosphere, but in any atmosphere at all? From the discussion 
on the limitation problem above, the answer to that is already known in an 
49   Cf. Göcke 2015.
50   Cf. Brüntrup/Jaskolla 2017c: 929.
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abstract manner: What it is like to be in an atmosphere is the same as what it is 
like to be in space. If phenomenal bonding is possible in a way conceivable to 
us, this also is the fundamental content of the according mental states of the 
involved microsubjects. It may be surprising to assume that it is like something 
to be in space, that being in space is a qualitative perspective on the world, but 
this very assumption has been endorsed and elaborated by Immanuel Kant 
in a way which is pertinent to the present discussion51. For Kant, space is the 
pure form of external intuition52, whereby ›external‹ characterizes the way the 
objects encountering in this way are intuitively apprehended: namely as dif-
ferent from the subject perceiving them. Accordingly, to be in space is to be 
confronted with something different from oneself. This intuition is not based 
on conceptual insight, which would be a privilege of rational subjects; on the 
contrary, it is the foundation of any sensual faculty and thereby can be pre-
supposed to be at work wherever qualities are sensed. So even microsubjects 
below the human level need not lack the intuitive knowledge (in a minimal 
sense) that there is something different from them, e.g. something they can be 
addressed by, they can combine and form arrangements with. What it is like 
to be in space, understood thus, is being open to atmospheres, as something 
not identical with oneself but at the same time mental, and what can happen 
within them. This is what it is like to be a natural subject; this is like what it is 
to be in the mental state which is God. What it is like to be in that mental state, 
however, is different and therefore to be distinguished from what it is like to be 
that mental state, in this case: to be God. We know that difference only from 
one of its side53, namely from our side as human and therefore natural sub-
jects: We know what it is like that we can encounter something (or someone) 
else, we know what it is like that there can be otherness. We can approach the 
other side of this difference at best in a negative way, like Nicolaus Cusanus 
did it by calling God, considered in Himself, non-aliud, the »Not-Other«, thus 
in the final analysis staying on our side of the difference (where else could we 
stay or go, at least under our natural conditions?) and acknowledging it as only 
one side of it.
These considerations allow to resume the initial question: Could it be 
the case that there is a metaphysical connection between panpsychism and 
panentheism? They even allow to give as a preliminary answer: Yes. This 
answer can be justified as follows: As suspected, the searched metaphysical 
51   For the following, cf. Voigt 2016.
52   Cf. Critique of Pure Reason: B42/A26.
53   On the conception of a difference with only one (available) relatum, see Zorn 2016: 
119-129.
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connection consists in an experience which could not just be logically de-
duced. This experience in turn is the experience what, for natural subjects, it 
is like to be in space. It might be logically possible to think of possible worlds 
with natural subjects which lack the external intuition of space and therefore 
any feeling for the other—which also would be possible worlds without atmo-
spheres. At the same time, it could turn out that these possible worlds widely 
differ from our actual world, since in them basic microsubjects might exist 
but, having no sense of something different from them, might never be able to 
combine and bring about macrosubjects. If every significant level of the physi-
cal world has its own mental inside, that would mean that such worlds without 
sense of otherness, without atmospheres would also lack significant physical 
structures above the level of the basic microsubjects. The way we experience 
our world tells us that it is very different from that. At the same time, since the 
inside of the microsubjects in our world are not directly accessible for us and 
since the concept of God as the atmosphere of atmospheres remains a border-
line concept like the Cusanian ›Non-Other‹, that difference does not force us 
to endorse the combination of panpsychism, New Phenomenology and panen-
theism offered here, let alone to assume the existence of such a God. The con-
nection which has been argued for in this paper does not come along with 
metaphysical necessity, but rather with metaphysical possibility54, as it tries to 
make plausible what could be the case in any possible world resembling ours. 
The task to further explore this possibility seems to be quite alluring.
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1. Introduction: »Strato’s Ghost has begun to walk of late«—
Cambridge Platonist Panentheism and Panpsychism
Cambridge Platonism used to be dismissed as a somewhat anachronistic and 
inevitably forlorn attempt at a humanist defence of a timeless ancient the-
ology in the era of early modern science and empiricism. However, modern 
research has increasingly revealed the chief representatives of the »school of 
Cambridge«1 or the »Cambridge Enlightenment«,2 notably Ralph Cudworth, 
Henry More, John Smith and George Rust, to be pioneering thinkers and pre-
cursors of key modern notions in theoretical and practical philosophy alike.3 
Their internalist epistemology constituted a powerfully-argued counterpoise 
to the nascent British empiricism of the likes of Thomas Hobbes and John 
Locke, emphasizing as it did the spontaneity and activity of the subject. 
Modelled upon Cartesian foundationalism, it views all truth claims as ground-
ed in a first fundamental intuitive insight into divine goodness of which a sub-
ject possesses an a priori idea exempt from any doubt whatsoever. Likewise, 
in anthropology, the Cambridge Platonists propounded seminal theories 
of consciousness in the Cartesian vein which, for all their debt to Descartes’ 
cogito, parted ways with the French rationalist in emphasizing account-
able practical agency, rather than theoretical reasoning as the chief mode of 
1   Cassirer 2002: 223-380, is the most influential proponent of the view of the Cambridge 
Platonists as backward-looking humanists. See also the rather negative assessment of 
Cambridge Platonism in Hall 1990: 40-81. On the Cambridge Platonists’ use of the ancient 
theology for the purpose of systematic philosophical enquiry, see Hedley 2017: 932-953. 
This special issue of the British Journal for the History of Philosophy provides a helpful sur-
vey of contemporary Cambridge Platonist scholarship. See the exposition of their Christian 
Platonism in my »Pre-existence and Universal Salvation—The Origenian Renaissance in 
Early Modern Cambridge« (Hengstermann 2017: 971-989), as well as the general overview of 
their thought in my »The Cambridge Platonists« (Hengstermann in print a)
2   This is the most recent group sobriquet suggested by Hutton 2015: 136-159.
3   Cf. Lovejoy 1908: 265-302. However, the claim that they anticipated the whole of Kant’s tran-
scendental idealism is certainly exaggerated.
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human subjectivity.4 In ethics, they espoused a theory of normativity which 
viewed autonomous human reason as the sole source of moral obligation,5 
thereby contributing decisively to the »invention of autonomy« culminating 
in Immanuel Kant.6 Cudworth’s theory in particular has been hailed as an-
ticipating Kantian ethical internalism in crucial regards.7 It is on the basis of 
their view of an »internal ought« inscribed into the human mind that they 
subjected contractualism, as put forward in classics of early modern politi-
cal philosophy such as Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan and Baruch de Spinoza’s 
Theological-Political Treatise, to in-depth criticism. Both their theoretical and 
their practical philosophy constitute what Cudworth, with one of numerous 
neologisms and technical concepts coined by himself, called the »philosophy 
of religion«. In his massive, albeit unfinished and fragmentary, True Intellectual 
System of the Universe of 1678, the philosophy of religion is shown to centre 
around the three doctrines of a theism of a providential benign Deity, a strict 
ethical realism and a libertarian theory of action.8
Cambridge Platonist philosophy of religion as a whole left a decisive mark 
on the history of panentheism and panpsychism as well. As to panentheism, 
they have been credited with seeking to precipitate a »pantheism controversy« 
more than a century before the outbreak of the historic debate of that name 
in Enlightenment Germany. Theirs is a religious philosophy that may well be 
qualified as a »Spinozism of freedom«,9 i.e. a system of thought that views God 
as informing and suffusing all of reality, while also emphasizing man’s capacity 
for libertarian choice. Like the more well-known dispute between Friedrich 
4   See the pioneering article by Thiel 1991: 79-99, and the perceptive chapter on the leading 
Cambridge Platonist’s theory of human subjectivity in his monograph The Early Modern 
Subject. Self-Consciousness and Personal Identity from Descartes to Hume (Theil 2011: 67-71).
5   Even though the author’s distinction between Cudworth’s early emotionalism and mature 
intellectualism is almost certainly misguided, the general approach to Cambridge Platonist 
ethics in Gill 2006: 7-74, in terms of its secularism is sound. Theirs is an Enlightenment ethics 
which stresses the moral autonomy of the subject.
6   See Schneewind 1998: 194-214.
7   This has been established in the compelling study of Cudworth’s ethics in Darwall 1995: 
109-148.
8   Cf. Taliaferro 2005: 11-56, who hails the Cambridge Platonists as the founding fathers of the 
philosophy of religion.
9   On this description, generally applied to the various metaphysical systems of the German 
Idealists, see the illuminating account of early English idealism in Hedley 2000: 21-39. 
Somewhat anachronistically, this concept is a very adequate description of Cambridge 
Platonism, even though Spinoza’s monism of substance is criticized only in the two major 
Cambridge Platonists’ later works. The significance of their ancient theology with its empha-
sis upon divine all-oneness was first stressed in Assmann 2007: 110, who was the first to credit 
the group with anticipating key aspects of the later Pantheism Debate.
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Heinrich Jacobi and Moses Mendelssohn about the late Lessing’s Spinozist 
creed, the controversies about Cudworth’s account of Platonist, Patristic and 
Egyptian ancient theology pivoted around God as hen kai pain. As to panpsy-
chism, it is thanks to their staunch resistance both to Cartesian dualism and 
Spinozist monism that the Cambridge Platonists are accorded a pivotal role in 
the history of this contentious doctrine.10 In his True Intellectual System of the 
Universe, Cudworth observed that the pre-Socratic »Strato’s ghost had begun 
to walk of late«,11 targeting two of the foremost western proponents of western 
panpsychism, namely the Dutch rationalist Spinoza, and one of his most gifted 
followers, i.e. the English physician turned metaphysician Francis Glisson. At 
the heart of panchchism or, as Cudworth chose to call it with another neolo-
gism of his own coinage, »hylozoism« is the notion of »living matter«, which 
is meant to render superfluous the belief in a transcendent creator God. In his 
magisterial outline of atheisms old and new, Cudworth sought to refute its hy-
lozoist variety with the very first formulation of the now classic »combination 
problem« of many allegedly conscious atoms coalescing so as to form a higher 
animal organism or conscious human mind:
And to say, that these innumerable Particles of Matter, Do all Confederate 
together; that is, to make every Man and Animal, to be a Multitude or 
Common-wealth of Percipients and Persons as it were clubbing together; is a thing 
so Absurd and Ridiculous, that one would wonder, the Hylozoists should not 
rather chuse, to recant that their Fundamental Errour, of the Life of Matter, than 
endeavour to seek Shelter and Sanctuary for the same, under such a Pretence.12
However, it was Henry More, Cudworth’s close friend and fellow Cambridge 
Platonist, who wrote the first major refutations of both Spinozist and Glissonian 
panpsychism. In his three works directed against Spinoza’s Theological-Political 
Treatise and Ethics as well as Glisson’s Treatise on the Energetic Nature of 
Substance, More built upon his earlier critique of Cartesian mechanism, which 
he had first put forward in his celebrated early correspondence with the French 
philosopher. In so doing, More developed a deeply original metaphysics of his 
10   See the very apposite description of their position in the foremost historical account of 
Panpsychism in the West by David Skrbina 2017: 102-105; 320-322.
11   Cudworth 1678: 145.
12   Ibid., 839. Cudworth’s originality in the formulation of this stock argument against pan-
psychism is emphasized by Skrbina 2017: 321: »Needless to say, such a situation poses, if 
not a problem, then at least a very large question for any panpsychist. Perhaps the first 
to recognize the question, and to criticize panpsychism on the basis of it, was Ralph 
Cudworth.« An excellent exposition of Cudworth’s critique of hylozoism is provided by 
Breteau 2006: 45-72.
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own which may broadly be characterized as panentheist and panpsychist in 
outlook. God, More argued both in his early rebuttal of Descartes and in his 
late critiques of Spinoza and Glisson, is an infinitely-extended creative mind 
endowing all of reality proceeding from its fullness with a first rudimentary life 
of its own. Only if we are prepared to grant extension to God and life to matter 
may we account for causality and the communication of motion by one body 
to the other.13
2. The Conundrum of Cartesian Causality—Vitalism in the 
Correspondence with Descartes
It is to remedy two perceived aporiai of Descartes’ philosophy of nature that 
More provides an early draft of a panentheist and panpsychist metaphysics 
in his correspondence with the French rationalist.14 The first is that of divine 
action. In order for God to communicate motion to inert matter in the begin-
ning, he needs to share with it its extension. He must, therefore, be viewed as 
an infinite incorporeal extension coextensive with finite corporeal extension. 
The second conundrum bears upon the concept of motion itself which, as a 
mode, cannot pass from one substance to another. Instead, all of reality must 
be endowed with a certain power of its own by which it can set itself in motion.
Throughout their correspondence, More bestows lavish praise upon the 
Frenchman whose natural philosophy surpasses all its rivals past and pres-
ent. However, despite the admiration in which he holds Descartes’ thought, 
there are a few »minor details« (paucula) on which More begs to differ from 
him.15 These »minor details« all bear on the core of Descartes’ rationalism, 
13   My appraisal of More’s early and mature metaphysics is throughout deeply indebted to 
the detailed expositions of his thought in Reid 2012, and Leech 2013.
14   More 1679: II/2, 227-271. The Correspondence has been recently translated into English 
by myself and published in the online sourcebook of Cambridge Platonism: http://www.
cambridge-platonism.divinity.cam.ac.uk/view/texts/diplomatic/Hengstermann1679C. 
There are several fine studies devoted to More’s early enthusiasm for and gradual dis-
enchantment with Descartes. The definitive overviews of the philosophical controversy 
and the text corpus of the correspondence are provided by Gabbey 1982: 171-249, and 
id. 1903 : 628-642. See also the lucid chapter on More’s critical reception of Descartes, in: 
Pacchi 1973: 3-48. Of the special issue of Les Études Philosopiques 2014/1 devoted to More’s 
Cartesian writings, the papers by Anfray (2014), and by Leech (2014) are particularly im-
portant for the following précis of the debate. The charge of atheism which More levelled 
at Descartes in the 1670s revolves around the latter’s denial of divine extension first dis-
cussed in the original correspondence of 1649/50.
15   Epistola prima H. Mori ad R. Cartesium (Op. omn. II/2, 234).
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notably his dualism of thought and extension and the question of how God, or 
any other incorporeal substance, can act upon matter and body without shar-
ing the latter’s defining attribute of extension and being present to it in some 
way.16 In response to what he views as a fundamental weakness of the admired 
Frenchman’s ontology and philosophy of nature, More, in the first exposition 
of his landmark doctrine, suggests that God must be viewed as »extended in 
his own way«:
Firstly, the definition which you give of matter or body is far broader than is 
warranted. For God also seems to be an extended substance, as do angels and 
indeed every thing subsisting through itself. Hence, extension is apparently co-
terminous with the absolute essence of things, although the latter may differ ac-
cording to the differences between the essences themselves. I view God as being 
extended in his own way on account of his omnipresence, occupying as he does 
the whole fabric of the world and each of its particles in an intimate fashion. 
How else could he impress motion upon matter, which, as you yourself concede, 
he did at some point and which he does to this day, unless he touches, or had at 
least at some point touched, the matter of the universe from close up? He could 
not have done so at any time had he not been present everywhere and occupied 
every single place. Hence, God is extended and expanded in his own way, and 
therefore is an extended substance.17
More’s argument is remarkable for its audacity. It calls for a new ontology 
whose first axiomatic tenet, as he states dogmatically, is the extension of all 
of being or substance as »coterminous with the absolute essence of things«.18 
Its theistic rationale is God’s creative agency in imparting motion to matter 
viewed as entirely immobile by itself in Cartesian physics. If and only if God is, 
or was at least once, present in all places, can he »touch«, or have touched at 
least once, the atoms constituting the reality of extension. More finds warrant 
16   As a consequence, Descartes, not surprisingly, was quite explicit in remarking in 
Responsum R. Cartesii ad Epistolam Primam H. Mori (Op. omn. II/2, 240) that, notwith-
standing More’s protestations to the contrary, his well-argued paucula were far from pe-
ripheral to his project of rationalist physics: »Moreover, I do not admit what you grant me 
in your extraordinary kindness, namely that my other opinions might well stand even if 
those about the extension of matter were refuted. For it is one of the principal and, in my 
view, most certain foundations of my physics, and I confess that no other reasoning could 
ever satisfy me in physics proper than one involving a so-called logical or contradictory 
necessity (excepting only those things which can be known from experience alone such 
as the fact that there are only one sun and moon around this earth and the like).«
17   Epistola prima H. Mori (Op. omn. II/2, 234-235).
18   This statement is particularly noteworthy as More in Epistola Secunda H. Mori (Op. 
omn. II/2, 243) states that »the root and essence of all things lies hidden deep in eternal 
darkness«.
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for his ontology of spiritual extension in the ancient theology represented by 
the Roman poet Virgil whose cosmological aperçu »The spirit within nourish-
es, and mind instilled throughout the living parts activates the whole mass, 
and mingles with this vast body«,19 interpreted by the author as a nod to the 
Platonism of the imperial age, contains in a nutshell his own key conviction of 
an extended God omnipresent in matter as the source of its motion. In contra-
distinction to corporeal extension which is defined by its inability to penetrate 
or be penetrated by other bodies, spiritual extension penetrates and is pen-
etrated by other spiritual and corporeal extensions alike. Spiritual extension, 
in turn, is either infinite or finite. Whereas finite spiritual extensions such as 
the human or the angelic mind may expand or contract, occupying larger or 
smaller bodies and places at will,20 God’s extension is, by definition, infinite, 
hence admitting of neither. Nor does divine extension entail the divisibility of 
his substance. Instead, God’s infinite extension is such that he occupies every 
single place »in his entirety«:
Besides, God, insofar as the human mind comprehends God, is everywhere in 
his entirety. He is present in all places and all spaces as well as in each point of 
space in his whole essence. However, it does not follow that he has parts external 
to each other or that, by implication, he is divisible, even though he occupies 
all places very closely and tightly without leaving any gaps in between. Hence, I 
19   Virgil, Aeneid, VI 726-727, quoted and discussed in Epistola prima H. Mori (Op. omn. II/2, 
235).
20   Cf. Epistola Secunda H. Mori (Op. omn. II/2, 243): »Notwithstanding, I hold that there is 
another equally real extension, which is not so well-known, let alone common knowledge 
in the schools. It possesses both different limits and shapes in angels and human minds 
which the latter, angels and minds, can change at will. While remaining one and the same 
substance, they can contract or re-expand to those bounds.« See also ibid., (II/2, 245): 
»For I deny that extension belongs to a body, insofar as it is a body, but rather insofar 
as it is a being or at least a substance.« More went on to call this variable extension the 
»essential spissitude« of finite spiritual extension. In his principal philosophical work 
The Immortality of the Soul I 2,11 (More 1987: 28), it is defined as a fourth dimension which 
distinguishes it from three-dimensional corporeal extension. The former spiritual dimen-
sion, he avers, is understood by the mind with the same ease and clarity as the latter three 
are perceived by the senses: »And as what was lost in Longitude was gotten in Latitude or 
Profundity before; so what is lost here in all or any two of the dimensions, is kept safe in 
Essential Spissitude: For so I will call this Mode or Property of a Substance, that is able to 
receive one part of it self into another. Which fourth Mode is as easy and familiar to my 
Understanding, as that of the Three dimensions to my Sense or Phansy. For I mean nothing 
else by Spissitude, but the redoubling or contracting of Substance into less space then it 
does sometimes occupy. And Analogous to this is the lying of two Substances of several 
kinds in the same place at once.«
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acknowledge the divine presence or amplitude, as you call it, to be measurable, 
but I deny that he is divisible in any way.21
However, infinite incorporeal extension may, by virtue of the »ubiquitous reit-
eration of its complete and total essence«22 or creative spatial omnipresence, 
act upon any finite spiritual or material extension occupying any place within 
its own infinity, »touching« it and thereby imparting motion to it. More pro-
vides a graphic example of possible divine action in his rebuttal of Descartes’ 
denial of a vacuum consequent upon the latter’s identification of body and ex-
tension. Whereas a vessel, on the principles of Cartesian physics, must collapse 
once the bodily extension between two opposing sides has been removed, 
Morean physics allows for a possible divine intervention preventing them from 
meeting: »For if God impresses motion upon matter, as you have shown earlier, 
can he not press against it, preventing the sides of the vessel from meeting? 
However, it is a contradiction to say, you argue, that the sides of a vessel are 
distant from one another without there being anything between them.«23
»Motion« of which God is the first source poses another major problem of 
which Cartesian physics, according to More’s early critique, is ill-equipped to 
provide a philosophically satisfactory account. More, for one thing, takes ex-
ception to Descartes’ very concept of motion as a merely relative change of 
place of two adjacent bodies. Firstly, its resultant reciprocity leads to several 
absurd consequences. Thus, on Descartes’ principles, a tower must be said to 
undergo motion whenever the west wind passes by it. Likewise, and even more 
implausibly, one person sitting still as another runs away from them, breaking 
out in sweat as a consequence, must be viewed as moving at the same speed.24 
Secondly, and arguably worse, Descartes’ definition fails to do justice to what 
More views as the defining characteristic of motion, namely the active power 
by which a spirit, whether divine, human or non-human, impels matter par-
ticles otherwise wholly inert and inactive. On closer inspection, this power of 
motion renders its very concept even more confusing. As the lowest of the cat-
egories, it should neither be able to act upon a substance nor pass from one to 
another without inevitably vanishing in the process: »Finally, I am completely 
baffled when I consider that a thing as tiny and as vile as motion, which is also 
capable of being separated from its subject and passing to another, and which 
is of so frail and so transient a nature that it would cease to be at once if it 
21   Epistola Secunda H. Mori (Op. omn. II/2, 245).
22   Ibid. (II/2, 246).
23   Epistola Prima H. Mori (Op. omn. II/2, 235).
24   Epistola Secunda H. Mori (Op. omn. II/2, 247-248).
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were not for a subject sustaining it, should nevertheless stir its subject up so po-
tently and impel it here and there so forcefully.«25 More’s far-reaching solution 
to the aporia of Cartesian causality consists in a sketch of panpsychist cosmol-
ogy that is closely linked to his panentheism of a spatially-extended infinite 
Deity. There is, in reality, he avers, no transfer of motion whatsoever. Instead, 
body and motion must be conceived of in analogy to mind and thought with 
one body exercising its own inherent power in setting itself in motion when 
occasioned to do so by another hitting it. The body’s inherent power or »life« 
is not yet sensation, but rather a rudimentary kind of self-presence or proto-
mentality which, as is required by its role in More’s theory of natural causality, 
enables it to engage in a certain degree of self-motion. Ontologically, material 
extension is the »last and lowest shadow and image of the divine essence« 
from whose infinite extension it derives its own motion in creation:
I, for one, am more inclined to assume that there is no transfer of motion what-
soever. Rather, on account of the impulse of one body, another body is, as it 
were, awakened into motion, just as the soul is awakened into thought on this 
or that occasion. Instead of receiving motion, a body stirs itself into motion on 
being alerted by another body. And, as I have said before, motion is to body what 
thought is to mind, that is to say, neither of them is received from without, but 
both proceed from within the subject in which they are to be found. And in fact 
every so-called body is also alive in a mindless and befuddled way, since in my 
view it is the last und lowest shadow and image of the divine essence which, I 
hold, is most perfect life. However, it is devoid of all sense and animadversion.26
All of reality is a »shadow and image« of God’s own archetypal »perfect life« 
with which it, therefore, cannot but share its defining characteristic. Inanimate 
being is, hence, ruled out as incompatible with the notion of creation viewed 
as the procession of reality from the supreme divine life. Instead, self-motion 
is intrinsic to reality.27 As a »kind of dark life«, matter per se is not primarily 
25   Epistola Tertia H. Mori (Op. omn. II/2, 256).
26   Ibid. As is observed by Reid 2012: 246, More’s theory of causality may be branded an id-
iosyncratic kind of occasionalism or »occasional causation« which the author defines as 
follows: »Whereas ordinary transeunt efficient causation means that one object A simply 
produces a certain effect on another object B by means of the exercise of its own intrinsic 
power, occasional causation will take place when one object A induces another object C 
to produce an effect on B by its own.« Thus, whereas in Malebranche’s more well-known 
variety, it is God who is the source of all motion, More’s attributes agency to every body 
qua body. His, therefore, is a cosmos of nearly infinitely many agents each of which, by its 
very nature, possesses the capacity for some rudimentary self-motion.
27   In response to Descartes’ scathing criticism of his notion of living matter, More, in his 
Responsio ad Fragmentum Cartesii (Op. omn. II/2, 271), provided an illuminating expla-
nation of the metaphor of nature as a »shadow« of the Deity. Its meaning is twofold. It 
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an »extension of its parts«, but rather a »constant motion« initially given 
to it and subsequently guided by God’s ubiquitous creative intellect which 
»instilled throughout the living parts activates the whole mass, and mingles 
with this vast body.«
Throughout his Correspondence, More closely links God’s spatial ubiquity 
and nature’s universal animation, viewing God’s creative agency, exercised in 
every single place of his infinite extension, as a benign communication of life 
and motion. While following the logic of his early trialism of extension in dis-
agreeing with Descartes and assuming the possibility of a vacuum, More is nev-
ertheless careful to deny its reality on theological grounds. Instead of leaving 
places devoid of its beneficent self-communication, »the divine fecundity«, 
More instead states as a theological first principle of his Christian Platonism, 
»is not idle anywhere. It has produced matter in all places without leaving even 
the minutest of gaps.«28 God’s spatial omnipresence is, hence, inextricably 
linked to his creative agency by which he everywhere produces the »dark life« 
of matter as his own »shadow and image«. His creative agency is conceived of 
in the univocal terms of More’s own hylemorphist theory of human action. For 
one thing, he avers, God’s life-giving omnipresence is the ontological sine qua 
non of the existence of libertarian agency in the first place. It cannot but seem 
all but inexplicable on the principles of rigid Cartesian mechanism: »How does 
the αὐτεξούσιον, of which we are conscious in ourselves, come to be?«29 For an-
other, man’s αὐτεξούσιον or freedom of choice by which he moves his own body 
by virtue of its animal spirits and shapes the corporeal reality within and with-
out furnishes the closest analogue to God’s own life-giving agency in the world:
I wonder, therefore, whether a philosopher should not acknowledge that there 
is in the whole fabric of things some incorporeal substance which can never-
theless, as bodies do on one another, impress on some body all or at least most 
expresses 1) the ontological dependence of the image upon the archetype and 2) a certain 
ontological kinship. In so doing, he also addresses the inevitable, yet possibly misleading, 
use of metaphorical language in all discussions of panpsychism: »Besides, there cannot 
be any deceit hidden in the use of metaphors and similitudes as long as we keep in mind 
that things are not designated by their proper names, but by figurative ones. Hence, in 
saying that matter or the universal body of the world was, as it were, the shadow of the di-
vine essence, I did not mean to say they were a shadow in reality. For the meaning of this 
metaphor is not that it is a shadow in actual fact, but that it depends upon God as does the 
shadow upon the body. Further, just as a shadow reflects some image of the body, albeit a 
very obscure and base one, there are in body or matter some blind and faint traces of the 
divine essence. However, since the latter, as I have said, is most perfect life, the analogy 
itself requires that matter is not wholly deprived of the image of life.«
28   Epistola Secunda H. Mori (Op. omn. II/2, 246).
29   Ibid. (II/2, 246). The concept used is the Stoic technical term for »free will«.
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corporeal properties such as motion, shape and the structure of its parts. Nay 
more, since this clearly holds true of motion and rest, may it not also add to it 
whatever is consequent upon motion? May it not divide and join, disperse and 
bind together, give shape to particles and arrange them after that, make them 
rotate or move in any other way and stop them again as well as all other such 
things as necessarily give rise to light, colour and other sense impressions of that 
kind, as your excellent philosophy has shown?30
Mores’s early doctrine of divine agency and causality by which he seeks to rem-
edy two key aporiai of Descartes’ metaphysics and physics posits an archetypal 
spirit of infinite extension and creative omnipotence which shapes the cosmos 
by »touching« it itself and by guiding and directing the infinitely many mate-
rial self-movers inhabiting it. In his mature critique of Descartes’ unorthodox 
follower Baruch de Spinoza, whom More, upon reading his Theological-Political 
Treatise in 1677, identified as the most astute of atheists, God’s infinite exten-
sion and ubiquitous life-giving agency are identified with absolute space and 
the spirit of nature respectively.
30   Ibid. Descartes’ comments on his critics’ reflections upon God’s substance and agency 
are highly revealing. On the one hand, he acknowledges in Fragmentum Resp. R. Cartesii 
ad Epist. Tertiam H. Mori (Op. omn. II/2, 268) that More’s doctrine of divine agency is 
based upon his own physical axiom of the preservation of the amount of motion origi-
nally imparted to the world in creation: »However, the moving power may well be that of 
God himself preserving the same amount of transfer in matter which he put into it at the 
first moment of creation.« Moreover, while not sharing More’s ontological conclusions, 
Descartes, in Responsum R. Cartesii ad Epistolam Secundam H. Mori (Op. omn. II/2, 252) 
also concurs with his view of the quasi-univocity of divine and human action expressed 
in hylemorphist terminology: »And while I think that there is no mode of action belong-
ing to God and his creatures univocally, I must confess that I cannot find in my mind any 
other idea representing a mode in which God or an angel can move matter than the one 
exhibiting to me the mode in which I am conscious of being able to move my body by my 
thought.« On the other hand, however, Descartes’ caveat that the resultant doctrine, as is 
clear from its very language, may be seen as close to Plato’s and Plotinus’s notion of the 
world soul is evidently far from ill-founded. It is, as he points out in Fragmentum Resp. 
R. Cartesii ad Epist. Tertiam H. Mori (Op. omn. II/2, 268), one of the reasons for his denial 
of spiritual extension: »I was afraid that I might seem to endorse the view of those who 
consider God the world soul united with matter.«
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3. Divine Space and Living Nature—The Panentheism and 
Panpsychism in the Critique of Spinoza
3.1 Spatial Panentheism: God as Infinitely-Extended Mind
At the heart of More’s critique of Spinoza are what he chooses to call »twin 
columns of« his adversary’s »atheism, namely that necessary existence per-
tains to substance as substance, and that there is but a single substance in the 
universe«.31 In his critique of Spinoza’s rationalist system, More vacillates be-
tween a strict first reading, viewing it as naturalism and reductive materialism, 
and a somewhat more charitable second one, branding it »hylozoism« or pan-
psychism. Either the single substance erroneously viewed as existing of neces-
sity is matter per se or it is matter endowed with a rudimentary life of its own. 
Spinoza’s misguided materialist ontology is throughout shown to spring from 
his inadequate epistemology which fails to do justice either to God’s goodness, 
as intuited by what More calls the soul’s »boniform faculty«, or the distinction 
between imperfect material and perfect divine extensions, as perceived by the 
senses and understood by the intellect respectively.32
31   Demonstrationis Duarum Propositionum … Confutatio, title (Op. Omn. II/2, 615). The 
Confutatio (ibid., 615-635) of Spinoza’s principal philosophical work, the Ethics, is inargu-
ably the most important of More’s three writings against Spinoza. However, his unduly-
neglected earlier refutation of the Theological-Political Treatise (ibid., 563-601) contains 
philosophical points crucial to More’s own anti-Spinozist panentheism and panpsychism. 
A third work is his Scholia In Epist. Ad V.C. (ibid., 602-614) in which More provides critical 
comments on the Opera Posthuma, which he had purchased in London shortly after his 
refutation of the Treatise. Most importantly, it contains his refutation of the Spinozist 
panpsychism of the Cambridge metaphysician Francis Glisson. See pp. 180-185 below. 
There is an English translation of the Confutatio by Alexander Jacob with a helpful in-
troduction and notes: Alexander Jacob, Henry More’s Refutation of Spinoza, Hildesheim/
Zurich/New York: Olms, 1991. My English translations of the Ad V.C. Epistola altera and 
the Scholia are accessible online in the Sourcebook: http://www.cambridge-platonism.
divinity.cam.ac.uk/view/texts/diplomatic/Hengstermann1679A. An exhausting account 
of the historical background of More’s critique of Spinozism, including the link between 
Cambridge Platonism and liberal Dutch theology, is provided by Colie 1964: 183-219, and 
1957: 66-93. See also Hutton 1984: 181-200, viewed by the author herself as »no more than 
a footnote to these studies« by Colie (ibid., 194 n. 1). However, Hutton’s essay contains 
an illuminating comparison between Spinoza’s and the Cambridge Platonists’ divergent 
concepts of divine revelation.
32   This two-fold approach to Spinoza’s metaphysics was first noted by Leech (forthcoming) 
on whose compelling reconstruction of the debate between the Dutch and the English 
rationalist the following exposition relies and builds throughout. See also the author’s 
earlier account in Leech 2013: 199-227. Cf., moreover, the excellent new article by Reid 
2013: 764-792. Apart from Leech’s and Reid’s important recent research work, More’s cri-
tique, despite its historical and systematic significance, has received only scant scholarly 
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In his critique of biblical prophecy in the Tractatus,33 Spinoza views revela-
tion as originating solely in the Hebrew prophets’ vivid imagination. Its sole 
object is ethical obedience, rather than metaphysical truth. The truth of the 
prophets’ imaginative visions is one of »moral certainty« alone and is borne 
out by their own probity and by God’s signs granted to them in confirmation of 
their mission. While More concurs with his adversary that the prophets were 
virtuous seers who were endowed with great imaginative power and granted 
extraordinary signs by God, he views prophets like Isaiah and Ezekiel as phi-
losophers of the highest calibre. The chief power by which they acquired the 
most sublime of truths about God, the soul and the world was their »boniform 
faculty«34 or, as More chooses to term it in his Ad V.C. Epistola altera, a »natural 
sagacity«35 or an »internal sense«.36 It is the power by which the soul, prior to 
any discursive reasoning, grasps or »touches« the infinity of God’s universal 
goodness in indisputable intuitive awareness. The soul’s boniform vision is one 
of a world proceeding from and suffused by God’s disinterested creative benef-
icence. At the moment of immediate insight, God himself acts upon the soul 
as its principle and form, allowing it to share in his own beneficent omnipres-
ence in existential union with it. In an early work, More provides a memorable 
description of his philosophical mysticism:
But I say that a free divine universalized spirit is worth all. How lovely, how 
magnificent a state is the soul of man in, when the life of God inactuating her, 
shoots her along with himself through Heaven and Earth, make her unite with, 
and after a sort feel herself animate the whole world, as if she had become God 
and all things? This the precious clothing and rich ornament of the mind, farre 
above reason or any other experiment. This is to become Deiform, to be thus 
suspended (not by imagination, but by union of life, Κέντρον κέντρῳ συνάψαντα, 
joyning centres with God) and by a sensible touch to be held up from the clotty 
dark Personality of this compacted body.37
As in More’s early hymn to the pinnacle of the soul’s experiential, yet ratio-
nal, vision of God, the prophets’ »sagacity« and »internal sense« of God is 
attention so far. Of the two earlier articles by Becco 1978: 103-119, and Schütt 1981: 19-50, 
the former provides an excellent interpretation in terms of More’s defence of divine and 
human agency, while the latter is largely an exercise in the logic of Spinozist monism.
33   Theological Political Treatise 1-2 (3, 15-44 Gebhardt).
34   Enchiridion Ethicum I 2,5 (Op. Om. II/1, 12). See my comprehensive exposition of 
Cambridge Platonist epistemology in Hengstermann in print b.
35   Epistola altera 20 (Op. omn. II/1, 574).
36   Ibid.
37   Second Lash of Alazonomastix, Cambridge: Printers to the University of Cambridge, 
1651, 43.
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described in terms of divine and human double-agency in his mature critique 
of Spinoza. Theirs is a knowledge of absolute certainty and indubitability in all 
matters of speculative divinity. Such, in fact, is the internal certainty attached 
to the prophets’ boniform vision that it even renders superfluous any exterior 
warrant, including divine signs, however impressive: »I reply that even though 
there usually tend to be external signs, prophets may nevertheless be equally 
certain without them because of a higher principle dwelling in their hearts, 
namely the most inward operation of the divine spirit that stirs a faith stronger 
than all imagination, reason or external sign.«38 The knowledge granted to the 
prophetic soul is that of God’s first attribute, his universal and disinterested 
goodness. By virtue of their »natural sagacity« which is superior to reason and 
sense, the prophets are given »indubitable knowledge of« a »God« who creates 
the world and intervenes in its history as a benign agent, as laid down in the 
Holy Writ: »For there is in all humankind a certain and infallible sagacity of 
mind by which they derive indubitable knowledge of God from such historical 
narratives and come to worship his justice, power and goodness.«39
It is on the basis of the soul’s boniform vision of the ens perfectissimum as 
a supremely good and benign agent that More subjects Spinoza’s definition 
of God as »absolutely infinite being, i.e. substance consisting of infinite attri-
butes, each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence«40 to detailed 
criticism. The bone of contention is the »absolute« by which the Dutch ratio-
nalist qualifies God’s infinity, expressly rejecting a Divine that is »only infinite 
in its kind« as unduly restricting it and denying to it any number of possible 
attributes expressing positive being and power.41 In a two-fold argument, More 
rehabilitates the Cartesian definition of God as the »supremely perfect being«42 
which, he avers, rules out »absolute« infinity as an adequate divine attribute. 
First, in an ad hominem argument, »absolute« infinity is shown to imply the in-
finity of all divine attributes, including the supreme moral ones which Spinoza 
is at pains to expose as merely imaginary and anthropomorphist in nature. 
Thus, Spinoza, despite himself, is compelled to acknowledge the absolute 
moral perfection of the one absolutely infinite substance: »For, an absolutely 
infinite being altogether implies infinite perfection, and infinite perfection 
absolute omnipotence, omniscience, and foresight of all things, which do 
not please Spinoza’s judgement.«43 Secondly, God’s moral perfections, on the 
38   Ibid. 10 (II/1, 568).
39   Ibid. 15 (II/1, 571).
40   Ethics 1D6 (2, 45 Gebhardt).
41   Ibid. 1D6exp. (2, 46).
42   Descartes, Meditations 3 (AT 7, 46).
43   Confutatio (Op. Omn. II/2, 623). Translation: Jacob 1991: 82.
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principles of More’s Christian Platonism, serve as the chief criterion of all of 
his characteristics. If and only if infinity expresses a moral perfection can, and 
must, it be predicated of the most perfect being. The sui generis of divine infin-
ity upon which More is careful to insist in opposition to Spinoza’s absolute is its 
goodness or the »essential sanctity and purity of the divine Majesty« by which 
it creates and saves all of reality. At the heart of the notion of the ens perfectis-
simum expounded in More’s critique of Spinoza, therefore, is its infinite moral 
perfection to which all of its other perfections must be viewed as subservient 
in its defining creative and salvific agency and by which it cannot but tran-
scend all of reality beneath it:
Hence, absolute infinity in God must not be understood in such a fashion as if it 
were not an infinity of his own kind (sui generis) and an infinity corresponding 
to his most absolute perfection. For there is a certain essential sanctity and pu-
rity of the divine majesty by which he is different and distant from all the rest of 
things by his very kind, as it were (toto quasi genere). It is this sanctity which this 
impure sophist tries to violate with such zeal and temerity when confusing the 
divine nature with the nature of created things. No infinity, therefore, is denied 
to God which expresses perfection, but that alone which involves imperfection. 
And whatever is perfect in the essence of creatures, as long as it pleases God, 
must be referred to him as the source and principle which. While not encom-
passing them formally, he encompasses the essences and perfections of all cre-
ated things eminently and causally.44
The God of More’s anti-Spinozist writings is both the Platonic idea of the good 
and the perfect mind expressed in Cartesian language. As the archetypal mind, 
he is not identical with the formal or actual reality of subsequent creation, 
but its eminent or causal archetype beyond it. As creative goodness, More’s 
Platonic God chooses to share his cosmic vision with man and the world at 
large. His supreme goodness by which he ungrudgingly communicates the 
riches of his being to all of reality constitutes the emphatic sui generis by which 
God transcends the latter both in ontological rank and supremely moral power.
Throughout his system, Spinoza fails to do justice to this transcendence of 
holiness by which God, as the soul intuits by virtue of the highest of its epis-
temic powers, is »distant and different« from the world. Instead, »confusing 
the divine nature with created nature«, he erroneously identifies God with 
matter viewed as mindless mechanism at worst and as generic life at best. 
On More’s materialistic first interpretation of his adversary’s substance mo-
nism, Spinoza, despite all his protestations to the contrary, is an atheist who 
denies the existence of God altogether. Instead, he posits matter as the sole 
44   Ibid. (II/2, 629). Translation: ibid., 99 (heavily modified).
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deity. Spinoza’s erroneous naturalist ontology of a divinized mindless matter 
is shown to originate in an egregious epistemological error. In an in-depth cri-
tique of proposition 15, More rejects Spinoza’s argument that it is one and the 
same extension perceived by sensation and imagination as finite, composed of 
parts and divisible and understood by intellect as infinite, without parts and 
indivisible: »As if, indeed that which is everywhere apprehended as divisible 
by the senses, can rightly and truly be conceived of by the intellect as indivis-
ible, all the particular things of the world, that is, the modes of the material 
world be divisible, and yet all the matter of the world everywhere, insofar as 
it is substance, be indivisible.«45 Spinoza erroneously conflates God with the 
material extension of sense perception and imagination, thereby attributing to 
him its many imperfections, including its divisibility. Not only is God, as mate-
rial extension, inevitably subject to the chaos of purely mechanistic motion 
and rest, but his thought likewise becomes divisible. Dispersed throughout 
all of animate matter, it is not the unified one of perfect indivisible intellec-
tion, but a disjoined many of a great number of consciousnesses of varying 
complexity. On More’s more charitable second reading of Spinoza’s substance 
monism as »hylozoism« or panpsychism, God is not mere matter, but thought 
as well. However, God’s thought is an inferior cogitation spread out throughout 
the infinitely many living beings brought about by the random motion and 
rest of his infinite extension. Since each of the modes of God’s extension, on 
the principles of Spinoza’s parallelism, is a mode of divine cogitation as well, 
divine cogitation must be literally »asinine« in asses and »leaden« in lead:
Since, therefore, stones, lead, dung, an ass, a toad, a louse and all things of that 
sort are individual things, it is necessary that they be modes of the attributes of 
God and their expressions in a certain and determinate manner. Moreover, since 
besides substance and modes there is nothing, and modes cannot be without 
substance, it is clear that the substance of God is the substance of stones, lead, 
dung, an ass, a toad, and a louse, and those extended things modes of divine ex-
tension and those thoughts modes of divine thought, so that the God of Spinoza 
thinks in an ass as an ass, in a toad as a toad, in a louse as a louse, and indeed in 
a stone, lead and dung as stone, lead and dung.46
45   Ibid. (II/1, 620). Translation: ibid., 73.
46   Ibid. (II/1, 619-620). Translation: ibid., 71 (modified). Cf. ibid. (II/1, 627), where More in-
cludes his adversary himself in a satirical climax of alleged subjects of divine thought, 
highlighting the incompatibility of hylozoism with an adequate definition of the ens 
perfectissimum: »Whence, if the substance which is God, or a Being supremely and ab-
solutely perfect, is nothing besides matter, which Spinoza, however, wishes, this God of 
Spinoza will think as a goose in geese, as an ass in asses, as a toad in toads, as louse in lice, 
as a tortoise in tortoises, as a man in men, as a fool in fools, as a maniac in maniacs, as 
Spinoza in Spinoza« (translation: ibid., 95).
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The many living beings and animate objects, each of which is viewed by 
Spinoza as a mode of divine extension and cogitation alike, are altogether ig-
norant of the mind processes of their fellow creatures. They, hence, fail to co-
alesce in one unified consciousness greater than themselves, let alone perfect 
in its range and scope. The multiplicity of consciousnesses in Spinozist hylozo-
ism cannot but fall short of the unity of supreme cogitation worthy of the ens 
perfectissimum.
Still, although he lambasts Spinoza’s erroneous reasoning, More is never-
theless prepared to credit his adversary with certain insights. In particular, 
Spinoza, for all his enthusiast fancy and materialist error springing from it, is 
shown to have had at least a faint inkling of the sui generis divine spatial ex-
tension of More’s own mature metaphysics47 which, astonishingly, the English 
rationalist expressly qualifies as prophetic in character.48
Spinoza therefore rages and raves, and does not philosophize acutely or soundly. 
However, in this philosophical rage there seems to me to have sprung up by itself, 
from the heat of this tumultuously agitated mind—just as it sometimes occurs 
to the delirious to divine in a certain manner and prophesy—the form of infi-
nite and indivisible extension. There is indeed a certain substance of this sort, 
infinite, indivisible and extended with unitary extension, which is absolutely in-
divisible and infinite, which, through what rage I do not know, has sprung up in 
Spinoza’s mind here. That this is indeed not matter is in fact certain—of which 
more later.49
Spinoza’s prophetic insight revolves around the two unorthodox Cartesians’ 
shared notion of a God who is not only perfect cogitation, but perfect extension 
as well. Crucial to Spinoza’s and More’s own line of reasoning is the Cartesian 
47   Besides the chapters devoted to it in Reid 2012: 103-139, and in Leech 2013: 123-143. More’s 
historic doctrine of absolute space, generally held to have influenced Isaac Newton’s, is 
the subject of several in-depth book chapters and articles. Cf., above all, the classical ex-
position by Koyré 2008: 78-94. Of the many essays devoted to Morean space, the one by 
Boylan 1980: 395-405, which is dedicated to the two principal mediatory entities in More’s 
panentheist metaphysics, is particularly relevant to the following account. Though build-
ing upon his more comprehensive exposition in his Enchiridium Metaphysicum of 1679, 
to which he repeatedly refers his reader, the epistemological argument for divine abso-
lute space in the Confutatio adds quite significantly to the most celebrated of Morean 
doctrines.
48   Not only is it extraordinary that More should credit his as formidable a philosophical a foe 
as Spinoza with the gift of prophecy, but it is also in keeping with the epistemology of his 
late critiques of enthusiasm and materialism. Every soul, however impure and corrupt, 
possesses a boniform faculty and is, hence, open to the vision of God’s spatial infinity suf-
fused by his omnipresent creative and salvific goodness.
49   Confutatio (Op. omn. II/1, 621). Translation: Jacob 1991: 74.
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axiom »that nothing is the modification of nothing«.50 This axiom by which 
Descartes himself had established the existence of the second substance of 
extension is the pivot of More’s argument for the necessary existence of an 
infinite divine spatial extension. Whereas Spinoza, implausibly, assumes that 
one and the same extension may at once be perceived as divisible and mobile 
and understood as indivisible and immobile, More instead insists that equal 
weight be placed upon the perception and the intellection of extension. The 
two extensions defined by contradictory predicates must, hence, be viewed 
as the attributes of two substances equally different in nature. Sensation and 
intellection reveal one extension that is mobile and »discerpible and impen-
etrable« and another that is immobile and »indiscerpible and penetrable« 
respectively.51 The former is the defining attribute of finite matter, the latter 
that of infinite spirit. Whereas Spinoza agrees with Descartes in identifying 
extension with matter tout court, More, from his early correspondence with 
the French rationalist in the late 1640s to his late critique of Spinoza in the 
1670s, distinguishes sharply between an imperfect extension that is the ob-
ject of sensation and imagination and a perfect extension that is the object of 
intellection: »I say, however, that there is an extended substance which it 
would be madness and delirium to consider as being composed of parts. That 
is, that immobile extension distinct from mobile matter which I have demon-
strated in the Enchiridion Metaphysicum.«52 In More’s principal metaphysical 
work, the demonstration or intellection in which the necessary existence of 
infinite space is established takes the form of a conceivability argument mod-
elled upon Descartes’ metaphysical doubt. Even when abstracting from all at-
tributes and modes of cogitation and extension, the I is shown to be unable 
not to grasp an infinite extension in which it cannot but imagine itself to be 
situated in the very act of meditative doubt and abstraction:
50   Descartes, Principles of Philosophy I 52 (AT 7, 25), quoted ibid. (II/1, 626). In his Scholia 
in Fragment. Respons. R.C. (Op. Omn. II/2, 269), a later comment on his own original 
correspondence with the French philosopher, More is careful to emphasize the axiom 
common to his and Spinoza’s metaphysics of the extended Divine, referring the read-
er to his late metaphysical chef-d’oeuvre: »Certainly, if the Cartesians hold on to these 
principles—and Spinoza himself is most adamant that there is no property or predicate 
of nothing—then it can clearly be demonstrated that there is an incorporeal substance 
distinct from matter which is extended in some way. I have provided detailed proof in my 
Enchiridium Metaphysicum, chs. 6-8.«
51   These are the defining attributes of body and spirit in More’s Immortality of the Soul I 3,2 
(p. 30 Jacob).
52   Confutatio (Op. Omn. II/1, 61). Translation: Jacob 1991, 61.
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I shall only observe, incidentally, that anyone who thinks his mind can be no-
where, may test his powers of thinking, and after he has abstracted himself from 
all thought or sense of his body, and fixed his mind on the idea of indefinite 
or infinite extension alone, and at the same time perceives himself to be some 
particular thinking thing, let him test, I say, whether he can in any way avoid 
perceiving himself at the same time to be or, at least, to be able to be somewhere 
within this very immense extension and to be surrounded everywhere by it.53
As well as establishing the reality and necessity of infinite spiritual extension 
which the I cannot conceive as non-existent, More’s anti-Cartesian and anti-
Spinozist conceivability argument also proves the contingency of indefinite or 
finite material extension. Infinite spatial extension can clearly be conceived by 
the I as entirely devoid of body and matter, i.e. as a vacuum, whose possibility 
More had established in his early critique of Cartesian physics. Bodily matter 
is thereby shown both to be distinct from extension and strictly contingent. 
Moreover, the necessity by which infinite extension and spirit is distinguished 
from contingent finite matter strongly points to its divine nature. It is further 
corroborated by some twenty attributes which absolute space shares with the 
God of classical theism. Once again invoking the Cartesian principle »that 
nothing is the modification of nothing«,54 More insists that, far from banning 
the Divine from the world, it proves its omnipresence in it: »And so, by that 
very door by which the Cartesian philosophy«, embraced and carried to the 
inevitably atheistic upshot of its mechanism by Spinoza, »is seen to wish to ex-
clude God from the world, I, on the contrary (which I am confident will attend 
me with the happiest success) strive and strain to bring him back.«55 More’s 
argument in his Enchiridium Metaphysicum ends in an enumeration of the 
characteristics common to God and space: »Of which kind are those which 
follow, which metaphysicians specifically attribute to First Being. Such as one, 
simple, immobile, eternal, complete, independent, existing from itself, subsist-
ing by itself, incorruptible, necessary, immense, uncreated, uncircumscribed, 
incomprehensible, omnipresent, incorporeal, permeating and encompassing 
everything, Being by essence, Being by act, pure Act.«56
Infinite immobile space, as distinct from finite mobile matter, is a key con-
cept in More’s Confutation. For one thing, it serves as a principle of individua-
tion that is meant to buttress his traditional doctrine of substance pluralism. 
Individuation, in More’s mature ontology, is not necessarily due either to 
53   Enchiridium Metaphysicum 27,10 (Op. Omn. II/1, 312). Translation: Jacob 1995: I, 107.
54   Ibid., 8,7 (II/1, 167). Translation: ibid. 57.
55   Ibid. Translation: ibid.
56   Ibid., 8,8 (II/1, 167). Translation: ibid.
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attribute or mode, as Spinoza holds in his argument for monism, but to place. 
»Real distinction«,57 conceived as the spatial separation of individual sub-
stances sharing one or both of their defining attributes, enables him to eschew 
monism and hold on to an ontological pluralism of self-movers. For another, 
More views immaterial extension as the mode of divine omnipresence. Thus, 
whereas mobile material extension cannot be predicated of God as the most 
perfect being, immobile immaterial extension is the mode of his creative and 
salvific ubiquity whereby God »touched«, and continues to »touch«, the ex-
tended minds inhabiting the infinite space of his archetypal intellect. Such is 
the God of the boniform vision that he gives life to responsible agents who pos-
sess the ability either to obey or disobey the »laws« of his universal goodness 
inscribed into their reason. Moreover, once they have forfeited his vision in sin, 
he comes to their aid »in new ways« meant to achieve his aim of universal soul-
making of their own autonomous moral volition. If, as has been established in 
More’s critique of Spinozist monism, God is not the extension of mindless mat-
ter, his supreme perfection may indeed be that of a supreme lawgiver benignly 
guiding his creatures towards moral and intellectual perfection: »Why should 
not God, if he exists and if he is a being distinct from worldly matter, be able 
to inscribe laws in the minds of men, doing it in such a way, however, that it is 
up to them whether to obey them or not. Why should he not after their disobe-
dience try in new ways to lead them to good fruits, as he is said to have done 
on Mount Sinai in giving the Laws to Moses?«58 The infinity of the archetypal 
creative mind’s extension is the absolute space of his purposeful agency in all 
of nature and history.
3.2 Panpsychism and Divine and Human Agency: The Spirit of Nature
Divine agency, conceived of as univocal love and goodness along the lines of 
the author’s Christian Platonism, is the key concern of More’s anti-Spinozist 
interpretation of the rationalist notion of the ens perfectissimum. In response 
to the spectre of Spinozist naturalism, More attributes two kinds of actions 
to the Deity, one that is mediated by and identical with the life of nature and 
one that is immediate and supernatural. For one thing, God acts upon the 
material world through the agency of the spirit of nature by which the intel-
ligible ideas of his supreme intellect gradually shape reality in law-governed 
organic processes. For another, the spirit of nature, viewed by More as a lesser 
57   Confutatio (Op. Omn. II/1, 617).
58   Epistola altera, 43 (Op. omn. II/1, 593).
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metaphysical entity devoid of intellection and volition, is such that God and 
other spiritual agents may act contrary to its laws whenever they see fit.59
More goes to great lengths to rebut Spinoza’s devastating critique of purpose-
ful divine agency in general and of miraculous supernatural intervention in 
particular, as put forward in the Appendix to the first book of the Ethics and 
the sixth chapter of the Theological-Political Treatise respectively. Spinoza’s 
rejection of divine design and goodness as ill-founded anthropomorphism is 
shown to flow from the proton pseudos of his metaphysics, namely his natu-
ralism. Once »God« is replaced by »matter«, Spinoza’s exposition of divine 
agency reveals its thinly-veiled naturalist meaning. God’s action, conceived of 
in terms of Cartesian mechanism, is solely that of the motion and rest of mind-
less material extension: »Nothing is determined by the free will of God [i.e. 
matter], or his absolute good pleasure, but all things have been determined by 
the absolute nature of the infinite power of God [i.e. matter].«60 In response 
to Spinoza’s critique of the classical theism of a divine moral agent, More, for 
one thing, levels the same objection at the Dutch rationalist in an ad hominem 
argument. Clearly, geometry, from which Spinoza’s notion of God as infinite 
extension is derived, is as much a product of the human mind as ethics. For 
another and more importantly, on the logic of the ens perfectissimum theology, 
it is inadmissible to deny to the divine archetype any of its human image’s per-
fections, let alone its greatest, which is deliberate moral agency:
To do justice to the human mind, since it apprehends excellently all particular 
things of which it is conscious, the fact that it judges God similar to itself and as 
a certain eternal and infinite and absolutely perfect omniscient mind, immedi-
ately and fully establishes providence. Is this not indeed infinitely preferable to 
that blind and tumultuous matter? I cannot fail to note how unworthily the fool 
accuses others here who posit God from their minds, which are free agents or 
proposing ends to themselves, since he posits matter from his mind, mathematic 
if your please.61
59   The development of More’s doctrine of the spirit of nature is traced in detailed analyses 
of his major writings in Reid 2012: 313-348. Most expositions centre around his contro-
versy with the chemist Robert Boyle, whose experiments More, much to the celebrated 
scientist’s chagrin, sought to interpret as providing empirical confirmation of his meta-
physical postulate of a mediating entity. Cf., above all, Henry 1990: 55-76. Again, More’s 
later debate with Spinoza, notably the link between final causality on the one hand and 
libertarian agency and contingency on the other, adds crucially to our knowledge about a 
landmark doctrine of Cambridge Platonism.
60   Confutatio (Op. omn. II/1, 622). Translation: Jacob 1991: 78.
61   Ibid. (II/1, 623); translation: ibid., 81.
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Instead, in Spinoza, the attributes of divine extension, notably the necessity 
by which mathematical proof proceeds, are once again shown to annul the 
superior ones of divine cogitation.62 They, thus, fall of short of God’s benign 
creative and salvific action.
As against the naturalist deity of Spinoza’s Treatise and Ethics, More insists 
upon the Platonic view of God as a supremely good moral agent. Contrary to 
the infinite power of thought and extension by which Spinoza’s substance acts 
without any purposeful deliberation, let alone moral intention, the omnipo-
tence of More’s God is that of his supreme creative and salvific goodness. It is 
for the sake of the autonomous moral soul-making of rational agents that God 
calls into being a world, intervening in its affairs either directly or through the 
agency of his angelic aides whenever he sees fit. More goes to great lengths to 
establish the distinctness of divine agency from nature. Whereas, for Spinoza, 
the laws of nature proceed from God and represent his understanding and will 
which are strictly identical, More views God and nature as two centres of dis-
tinct, albeit closely-related, creative agency. In contradistinction to Spinoza’s 
simple substance or nature which both understands and wills the infinity of 
all possible worlds flowing from its infinite power by necessity, More’s creator 
God is one of univocal goodness. As such, he understands evil when setting 
out to create a world with which to share his goodness and wisdom in creative 
power, but he does not will it. He is bound both by conceptual and ethical ne-
cessity to act in accordance with his infinite goodness and share with a finite 
reality the fullness of his own being. However, he is free to choose any single 
one of the many possible worlds envisaged in the beginning. The identity of 
divine and natural agency, which More identifies as the speculative core of 
Spinoza’s naturalist critique of miracles, must therefore be rejected on strictly 
conceptual grounds:
However, this last principle to which the whole proof boils down is utterly false, 
… Indeed, God understands the evil order of things, but he does not will it. He un-
derstands all the possible varieties of universes that he could create, even though 
only a single kind exists in actuality. According to this principle, however, all of 
them would exist as he would will all of them to exist assuming he understood 
nothing without also willing it, which is an obvious contradiction.63
62   Cf. ibid.
63   Epistola Altera, 19 (Op. Omn. II/1, 573). More’s reductio argument against Spinoza’s neces-
sitarian theological actualism is far from conclusive. While man’s epistemic access is re-
stricted to one world, this does not rule out that other or indeed all other possible worlds 
may have existed in the past, exist at present or come to exist in the future.
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Of the infinite number of possible worlds, God chooses to create only one, pre-
sumably the best of all possible ones, while not actualizing all the others. The 
world created is not one of dead atoms in motion and at rest in a lifeless void, 
but instead one animated by what More, as from his Immortality of the Soul of 
1659, calls the »spirit of nature«. Mediating between the supreme intellect and 
base matter at the top and at the bottom of his Platonic chain of being, the spir-
it of nature is defined by More as a »substance incorporeal, but without Sense 
and Animadversion, pervading the whole Matter of the Universe, and exercising 
a Plastical power therein according to the sundry predispositions and occasions 
in the parts it works upon, raising such Phaenomena in the World, by directing the 
parts of the Matter and their Motion, as cannot be resolved into mere mechanical 
powers.«64 While devoid of any active intellection and volition itself, it serves 
God as the natural means to his chief moral end of universal soul-making by 
preparing matter in such a fashion that it becomes capable of being informed 
by the creative ideas contained in his perfect archetypal intellect of which the 
spirit of nature itself is an imperfect mindless image. In More’s refutation of 
Spinoza, it is viewed as the living embodiment of the »universal laws of na-
ture«, which it »embraces … in a living fashion«.65 Originally proceeding from 
God not by the necessity of his essence, but by the benignity of his will alone, it 
gradually effects the »good of the universe« at large: »The universal laws of na-
ture do not arise from the divine intellect by the same necessity as a property, 
such as three angles equal to two right angles, from a triangle. Instead, they 
are inserted into the spirit of nature at the same time it is created by God and, 
therefore, geared towards the good of the universe«.66 It, thus, executes God’s 
beneficent creative intention of disinterested universal self-communication. 
As befits its role in God’s design, natural causality or the »spirit of nature« as 
the sum total of its laws is not one of mindless mechanism, but one of living 
organic growth and flourishing by which it produces and promotes the »good 
of the universe« at God’s behest. As such, the spirit of nature is nothing less 
than the »the external word of God« by which he bodies forth the intelligible 
principles and ideas contained in his wisdom: »I reply, however, that I find it 
quite reasonable that the work and order of nature itself should be called the 
order, decree or word of God since I view the spirit of nature in which the laws 
and order of worldly matter are contained, flowing from there into it, as the 
external word of God.«67 Its laws may therefore be equated with »God’s gen-
64   Immortality of the Soul III 12,1 (Jacob [1987]: 254).
65   Epistola altera, 18 (Op. Omn. II/1, 573).
66   Ibid., 20 (II/1, 574).
67   Ibid. 21, (II/1, 575).
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eral providence«: »Therefore, I do not mind admitting at all that God’s general 
providence is contained in the laws and order of this spirit of nature and can 
thus be rightly called a part of divine providence.«68
However, while More concurs with Spinoza in viewing nature as God’s own 
mediate providential action, nature or »general providence« needs to be com-
plemented by an immediate »special providence« which he is careful to ex-
press in terms of strictly libertarian agency unrestricted by the laws of nature: 
»However, what I insist upon most emphatically is that there is also God’s spe-
cial providence besides that, one that is administered by himself or through his 
ministers or angels, as they are generally called, and that it is entirely errone-
ous to conclude from the fact that the actions of the spirit of nature are called 
the orders or decrees of God that there are no other divine orders or decrees 
besides those.«69 God may choose to ignore the laws contained in the spirit 
of nature whenever the »good of the universe«, which is the latter’s original 
raison d’être, calls for a demonstration of the enduring benevolence and benef-
icence of his creative wisdom and power. Aided by his many angels and minis-
ters of grace, he is at liberty to intervene at will so as to reassure humankind of 
his benign providential care: »Nature has deliberately been created by God in 
such a way that it obeys its creator and his pleasure as well as the free minis-
ters of his providence in leaving its accustomed order, as they see fit, for the 
existence of God, the angels and divine providence to be made all the more 
evident by the fact that not everything depends upon nature alone.«70 Not 
only, therefore, does the spirit of nature account for the regularity of natural 
processes by which beings capable of participating in God’s fullness gradually 
come into existence, but also for the contingency of a world open to occasional 
interventions by supernatural agency, whether divine, angelic or demonic. To 
the spirit of nature’s lesser degree of reality, therefore, corresponds a higher 
degree of contingency which, in turn, is meant to allow different supernatural 
agents to exercise different kinds of moral agency, including libertarian choice. 
In his argument for theological interventionism, More, characteristically, in-
vokes the univocity of divine and human freedom. If man’s imperfect libertar-
ian action is not necessitated by natural causality, God’s own perfect freedom 
is clearly all the more exempt from it:
It is the divine intention that, even though they [i.e. the laws of nature] are to 
work in one and the same mode all the time unless some impediment turns 
up, their operation, once an impediment is caused by some free agent, is to be 
68   Ibid.
69   Ibid.
70   Ibid. 19 (II/1, 573).
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suspended or altered. However, God, that uncreated free agent (Agens illud libe-
rum increatum Deum), can with infinitely more ease do what even created free 
agents (libera Agentia) can do. When there is such a suspension or alteration, 
which has evidently not been caused by anyone nor by any other visible and 
perceptible natural cause, the effect may not unreasonably be ascribed to the 
work of angels or to God himself.
More’s a fortiori argument hinges upon the strict libertarianism shared by all 
the Cambridge Enlightenment thinkers. Not only is freedom a sui generis cau-
sality beyond the laws of nature, but it is tied closely to the categorical im-
perative of a purgation of all earthly passion and self-will. Besides possessing 
perfect intellection and volition, God, as a supreme moral agent, must be cred-
ited with the highest degree of libertarian freedom unhampered either by the 
laws of nature or man’s inferior motives. While his actions, determined by his 
goodness, are of necessity benign and beneficent, the course pursued to at-
tain his salvific ends is due to the contingent choice of his wisdom and power 
alone. Throughout his Ad V.C. Epistola altera, More emphasizes that God may 
intervene in nature »as the circumstances require it«.71 It is meant to bring 
home the notion of God’s moral agency guiding fallen humankind towards its 
eventual restitution. The interventions of God and his angels in salvation his-
tory serve as a soteriological amamnesis by which the fallen souls are reminded 
of the true intelligible reality which they are called upon to regain in a life of 
pious virtue and contemplation.
It was shortly after finishing his refutation of Spinoza’s Theological-Political 
Treatise that More came across a treatise by the celebrated physician and fel-
low Cambridge metaphysician Francis Glisson. Not only did More identify it as 
another Strato redivivus in Cudworth’s categorization of classical and contem-
porary atheism, but he also chose to wield his anti-Spinozist argumentative 
weaponry to combat materialist panpsychism in general.
4. Panentheist Panpsychism, Panpsychist Panentheism—More’s 
Critique of Glisson’s Energetic Nature
Shortly after the publication of the Treatise on Energetic Nature by biologist and 
physician turned metaphysician Francis Glisson in 1672, More subjected the tit-
ular concept to detailed philosophical critique, rejecting it as yet another form 
of hylozoism in the Spinozist vein. A major part of the »scholia« or comments 
71   It is not a figure of speech, but a leitmotif recurring throughout More’s first anti-Spinozist 
treatise Cf., e.g., ibid. 11 (II,1, 570), 19 (II/1, 573), 21 (II/1, 575).
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appended to his original refutation of Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise 
in the Ad V.C. Epistola altera consists in a sustained refutation of Spinoza’s kin-
dred spirit.72
In his refutation, More is quick to identify Glisson as a Spinozist. Just as the 
»impure sophist« views material substance as necessarily existent by itself, so 
does the celebrated physician view matter per se as being endowed with per-
ception, striving and self-motion: »Like Spinoza who holds that all substance, 
insofar as it is substance, exists from itself because it subsists through itself, 
he contends in that work that substance, insofar as it is substance, is neces-
sarily alive by the force of its nature, i.e., it perceives, strives and moves itself. 
He therefore assumes that the perceptive, appetitive and motive faculties are 
all intrinsic parts of matter itself.«73 Moreover, aligning Spinoza and Glisson 
in their commitment to necessary existence and necessary animation respec-
tively, More identifies the vitalism shared by his two opponents as a variety of 
constitutive panpsychism that is meant to render the belief in a creator dis-
tinct from the one living substance of nature superfluous to account for the 
emergence of life: »And certainly, bolstered by the Spinozist view of the neces-
sary existence of every substance as substance, the Glissonian way is such that 
it clearly supposes that there is no need of a creator God at all.«74 Several of the 
arguments against Glisson’s panpsychism advanced in the scholia may well be 
seen as »an exercise in question-begging of astonishing impudence«.75 Time 
and again, the English Platonist simply restates his cherished doctrine of the 
spirit of nature without offering any further philosophically substantial argu-
ment, simply placing the onus probandi upon his hylozoist opponent. Thus, 
he disagrees with Glisson’s hylozoist conclusions regarding Bacon’s typology 
of motions which, in contrast, he chooses to view as originating in a spiritual 
principle distinct from matter. Likewise, More shares Glisson’s admiration for 
the beautifully-wrought structures of apparently inanimate phenomena like 
»snow, rime, hail and the like in a microscope«, quoting with approval the 
Cambridge physician and metaphysician’s praise of their »exceeding elegance 
72   Deeply steeped both in Francisco Suarez’s late medieval metaphysics and Francis Bacon’s 
early modern science, the Cambridge physician and philosopher’s Glisson’s concept of 
energetic substance has only very recently been recognized as a deeply original pan-
psychist metaphysics. There is a fine thesis devoted to Francis Glisson: Hartbecke 2006, 
which examines the author’s thought in relation to his scholastic role model Suarez. A 
brief analysis of More’s refutation of Glisson’s principal work is provided in Henry 1987: 
15-40.
73   Scholia in Epist. ad V.C. (Op. Omn. II/1, 604).
74   Ibid. (II/1, 605).
75   Henry 1987: 32.
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and well-nigh inimitable art«.76 However, while Glisson takes nature’s artful 
design to be evidence of the life of energetic matter, More instead attributes it 
to the purposeful, albeit unconscious, work of the spirit of nature which per-
vades the whole of nature as a mediating principle inferior to God, but su-
perior to matter: »For I, too, acknowledge gladly that the shapes of so-called 
inanimate bodies are the effects not of mechanism, but the spirit of nature. 
And it is manifest that these phenomena do not by any means indicate a life of 
matter proceeding or unfolding from it, but only the life of the universe or the 
spirit of nature actuating the whole of worldly matter.«77 Finally, while More is 
right in pointing out that a projectile sustaining its motion hardly bears out a 
perceptive and appetitive power in lead, his own recourse to rising quicksilver 
in a thermometer is equally unlikely to be considered a compelling argument 
for the existence of his own »hylarchic principle« or »the hylostatic power of 
the spirit of the universe«,78 i.e. the spirit of nature.
Still, although many of his arguments against Glisson may be said to fall flat, 
More’s refutation is remarkable on two grounds. For one thing, More himself, 
for all his misgivings about panpsychism, comes close to restating his early 
panpsychist doctrine of his correspondence with Descartes and endorsing a 
variety of »hylozoism« on theological grounds. All of reality, proceeding as 
it does from the Deity’s supreme life, is seen as the latter’s »ultimate emana-
tion« and as such may possess some rudimentary living »self-motion« after all: 
»Hence, it is manifest that there may be a life without perception or appetite 
and without any original αὐτοκινησία. A life modifiable by an immaterial prin-
ciple in various ways is the one and only life that I am prepared to admit as 
being deeply rooted in matter. In fact, I am all the more willing to concede that 
lest the ultimate emanation from the first source of life seem entirely devoid 
of life«.79 For another, More holds that panpsychism, while being consonant 
with, and perhaps even implied by, the soul’s innate notion of a benign deity 
as all-diffusive life, cannot by itself account for the unity characteristic of the 
animate cosmos as an ordered whole and its living parts. The emergence of 
advanced animal and human life, let alone that of the living order of creation, 
is bound to remain as mysterious on the principles of Glisson’s panpsychism as 
it is on those of Hobbesian or Cartesian mechanism:
Indeed, if there were a kind of primordial life of matter, it would only be generic. 
As regards its specific modifications, it would be spread and disseminated across 
76   Scholia in Epist. ad V.C. (Op. Omn. II/1, 606).
77   Ibid.
78   Ibid.
79   Ibid. (II/1, 608).
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vast distances. It is no more helpful to assume such a kind life to account for the 
order and beauty of the world than none at all. If there is not something precon-
ceiving and foreseeing the whole fabric of the world and the mutual relation-
ships between its single parts at once, its creation will indeed occur as blindly 
and fortuitously as if it were created by mere mechanical motion. Of so little 
worth is the notion of that primordial life that is to split up into various physical 
forms afterwards.80
More’s counterargument hinges upon the combination problem which de-
prives panpsychism of its alleged explanatory power. The complexity of an 
animal organism militates strongly against the truth of modern Glissonian 
panpsychism. It is inherently unlikely that the single parts of the generic life 
of matter, »spread and disseminated across vast distances«, should conscious-
ly and purposely collude in producing the »specific modifications« required 
for a well-functioning living organism. Among the examples adduced are the 
aquatic bird whose wings have come to be such that it can easily cast off the 
water on re-emerging from the sea or that of a cock capable of taking part in a 
fight, which More describes with obvious gusto. Perhaps drawing upon his own 
eye-witness experience, he ridicules the conclusion inevitable on panpyschist 
principles that each single body part of a cock, quite implausibly, must have 
been aware of the finer details of a cock fight from its birth: »Oh, what express 
ideas and imaginings must they hence possess, notably of their bladelike spurs 
with which to gouge out or tear apart their rivals’ brains in a consciously-dealt 
out blow!«81 Moreover, even if such knowledge were to be granted to the single 
body parts, an emergence of complex organisms from simple atom lives would 
call for a degree of cooperation on their part that is clearly at odds with the 
egotism inherent to Glisson’s Spinozist concept of each body’s self-centred co-
natus. Assuming that all natural atoms were to possess the same knowledge 
about the future organism, whether it is an aquatic bird or a cock, they would 
be most unlikely to subordinate their own interests to the greater good of the 
one living whole. Instead, More imagines the atom lives to engage in a fierce 
struggle as they vie with one another for the privilege of constituting the high-
er faculties of the future organic whole of which they are supposed to be parts:
After all, all parts of earthly matter and the matter surrounding it are believed 
to be intent solely upon their own concrescence and substance. Thus, if these 
substances chance to act upon one another in their concrescence, they seek to 
realize their own form only. Yet, none of them is animate so that it would be ei-
ther impossible or completely fortuitous if any living form were to emerge from 
80   Ibid. (II/1, 608-609).
81   Ibid. (II/1, 609).
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that. However, living forms are the greatest mark of wisdom and providence that 
we find in the universe.82
The aporia of the combination problem is further exacerbated by the exis-
tence of self-conscious subjectivity. If the chaotic multiplicity of conscious or 
proto-conscious matter cannot account for the organic unity of animal life, 
Glisson’s Spinozist panpsychism is even less qualified to render intelligible the 
existence of the supreme oneness of a self-conscious human mind. Again, the 
many simple perceptions attributed to the atoms of living matter fail to add up 
to the unity of a human mind’s complex perception, nor does Glisson’s postu-
late of the energetic nature’s »perception of perception« remedy the aporia of 
a strong emergentism marring his panpsychism altogether. »Duplicate percep-
tion«, by which energetic matter is supposed to appropriate the many »simple 
perceptions« of all living forms and shapes allegedly caused und sustained by 
it, fails on numerous grounds. For one thing, perception, by its very nature, is 
simple. There is no such thing as a visual perception of the human eye which 
is consecutively perceived by the common sensorium and the intellect so as to 
yield a unified sense impression. Instead, perception, while involving the soul’s 
»plastic power« by which it interacts with the spirit of nature shaping its bodi-
ly sense organs, is grounded in the strict unity and simplicity of the conscious-
ness of sense perception which is the sine qua non of the epistemic process in 
question: »By the same act by which a sentient being perceives an object, it 
also perceives that it perceives the object. And this does not require a new act 
unless perhaps someone should raise a doubt whether it perceives«.83 The sin-
gle act of perception, hence, is not that of matter particles mutually perceiv-
ing each other’s perceptions which then somehow add up to acts of complex 
sensation. Instead, it is identical with a single soul’s consciousness of its sense 
impressions which is prior and superior to the inferior plasticity of its sense 
organs. For another, the postulate of atom lives endowed with perception can-
not but lead into the aporia of the emergent subject’s necessary awareness of, 
if not detailed knowledge about, all the many distinct centres of consciousness 
of which its own subjectivity is supposedly made up. In other words, as More is 
careful to point out in an ad hominem argument against the physician Glisson, 
if the hylozoism of the Spinozist variety were true, the subject or, in Glissonian 
parlance, the complex »suppositality« or »modal subsistence« that is the con-
scious rational self, would have to possess an anatomic expertise on a par with 
that of the author of the Treatise on the Energetic Nature of Substance himself:
82   Ibid.
83   Ibid. (II/1, 610).
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If the single natural atoms of matter which are joined together or coalesce into 
my ›suppositality‹ or my ›modal subsistence‹ understand the structure of the 
whole fabric of my body and its organisation in which their plastic power con-
sists and if, as is held by that famous Glisson, the plastic power or natural life per-
sists in the animals formed, overseeing their natural constitution and governing 
it by means of its perception, appetite and motion, then it seems clearly impos-
sible that I who am this ›suppositality‹ or ›supposite‹ should not understand the 
plastic perception of this supposite, i.e., of myself, and should not have the most 
accurate anatomical understanding of my body.84
This absurd inference is avoided on the principles of More’s own refined 
Platonist variety of panpsychism which denies consciousness to the soul’s 
lower powers, notably its plastic ones of organic self-formation. Since percep-
tion originates in the soul’s higher substance, its ignorance about the minu-
tiae of its physical functions does not pose a problem to Morean panpsychism 
with its complimentary axioms of the creative ens perfectissimum and the top-
down-causality exercised by it. The first cause must not be conceived as a dis-
tracted multitude, but as a supremely unitary intellect contemplating in itself 
the structured whole of the universe. Hence, if it were not for a consummate 
mind, a creation of spiritual substance conceived as a myriad of unconnected 
centres of consciousness would be every bit as random as a creation from ma-
terial substance:
How, for example, should matter which is the least unitary of all substances, con-
sisting of countless physical monads and natural atoms only, fulfil those tasks 
which require unity in the most absolute sense imaginable? For such must be 
that substance which foresaw and understood the most beautiful order and the 
mutual relationships of all the ideas of all these things at once, always contem-
plating in itself the ideas of all things with one single stabile and immutable 
glance. It is a kind of eternal perfect mind which preconceives in itself the ideas 
of all future created things and which pours them forth into its vicarious power, 
the spirit of nature, and all over matter in a vital, not in an intellectual fashion.85
Returning to his original position outlined in his early correspondence with 
Descartes, More, in response to Spinoza’s and Glisson’s »hylozoism«, sub-
scribes to a panpsychist ontology himself. However, it is supplemented by the 
boniform vision of God’s universal goodness and perfect mind which continu-
ously guides the many centres of consciousness and agency towards the par-
ticipation in the fullness of his own »perfect life«.
84   Ibid.
85   Ibid. (II/1, 608-609).
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5. God or Living Space—The Relevance of Morean Trialism  
of Extended Substance
More provides a first major response to the most influential early modern 
systems of panentheism and panpsychism. His own metaphysics which is 
meant to remedy the shortcomings of Cartesian mechanism and Spinozist 
hylozoism emerges as an original system of early modern rationalism in its 
own right.
On More’s principle of panentheism of space and panpsychism of life and 
nature, there are three closely-linked, yet distinct, strata of being each of which 
is endowed with its own kind of autonomous agency. At the apex of More’s hi-
erarchy of animate being is God who is defined as an infinitely-extended con-
summate mind of absolute creative goodness. Throughout, the unshakeable 
foundation of More’s Platonism is God’s universal and disinterested goodness 
intuited by the soul as an indubitable first truth in immediate vision. It calls for 
an ontology that does justice both to God’s transcendence to and immanence 
in all things. God, for one thing, must be transcendent since he cannot be the 
author of evil, whether natural or moral. Instead, God endows all of material 
reality with a spiritual agency of its own by which it may gradually come to 
participate in his universal self-communication. Of the possible finite worlds 
which God is at liberty to create, he chooses the one which allows all of reality 
to participate in him. The best possible world, in other words, is a panpsychist 
one in which all creatures have the capacity for participation in the fullness of 
the divine life. For another, God must be omnipresent as the formal and final 
cause of all reality. His infinite extension is such that it, quite literally, contains 
in itself all finite extensions upon which God acts both through the laws of na-
ture embodied by the universal spirit of nature and in occasional miraculous 
intervention.
More’s metaphysical system is clearly not without weaknesses. Surprisingly, 
he fails to address the relationship between space and the spirit of nature 
which should be seen as co-extensive spiritual extensions. As well as being im-
portant for reasons of the general coherence of his metaphysical system, it is 
crucial to More’s theory of divine agency, as it is difficult to see how space may 
act upon or »touch« the finite agents and atoms that inhabit its infinitely many 
places. It is particularly problematic considering More’s strict interventionism 
which poses formidable problems of its own in terms of theodicy. Throughout, 
More himself seems to vacillate between an identification of God and space 
and an interpretation of the latter as a mode of the former’s omnipresence. 
On the principles of his Christian Platonism, spatial infinity, suffused by the 
principle of organic life, should best be seen as a symbol and image of the 
ens perfectissimum’s supreme creative goodness whose vision is the first cause 
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and final purpose of all natural and moral agency, calling upon all creatures to 
share its riches.
More’s doctrine of God as the infinite space of the divine life in nature pro-
vides both a powerful response to Spinoza’s Deus sive natura and a remarkable 
system of early modern panentheism and panpsychism.
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Varieties of Panpsychism
Philip Clayton
Panpsychism is not like pregnancy. A woman either is or is not pregnant. In 
such cases more generally, either x or not-x. By contrast, you are not either 
warm or not warm, tall or not tall, smart or not smart. You can be more or less 
slow, more or less prompt, more or less witty. The discussion of panpsychism 
is changed in important and fruitful ways when we recognize that the topic is 
better understood in the latter way than in the former.
»Panpsychism is Not Like Pregnancy« would have been a strange title 
for a conference paper. Perhaps the paper would better have been titled 
»Panpsychism without the ›Pan.‹« At first glance, the panpsychism debate 
appears to be a question of all or nothing, just as the thief either takes all 
William’s money or he doesn’t. But I suggest that we need to think our way 
beyond this way of approaching panpsychism. Particularly in the context of 
panentheism, panpsychism should be more complex than, say, the thesis that 
all levels of evolution can be summarized under the heading of pan-psyche 
or, following David Ray Griffin, pan-experience. Instead, I will argue, the dis-
cussion of God, evolution, and psyche needs to be expanded to include the 
full variety of qualities, including awareness, intention, goal-directed behavior, 
mental representation, cognition, and consciousness. Clearly this shift has im-
plications for understanding the nature and scope of metaphysics and theol-
ogy, a topic to which I shall return at the end of the discussion.
Three things will happen when we return to the panpsychism question after 
this analysis. We need to have a better grasp of the issues that are raised by the 
evolution of consciousness. We should be able to specify the sense in which 
evolution produces qualities that were not actually already in the parts. Finally, 
we should reach a more complex understanding of the relevance of panenthe-
ism to questions of the evolution of consciousness, and hence a more complex 
understanding of the Divine itself. The upshot is a more limited affirmation of 
panpsychism, in contrast to the more »maximal« affirmation of the existence 
of psyche in all things, or all things as psyche.
The qualities that we call mental or proto-mental are extremely diverse. 
Because the differences are greater than is often acknowledged, I propose call-
ing the result minimal or »gradualist« panpsychism rather than traditional 
or »maximal« panpsychism. It will not have escaped you that minimal and 
maximal are terms on a quantitative scale rather than expressions of a forced 
either/or choice. Panpsychism in this more minimal form, I will argue, is the 
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more compelling view; and the quantitative nature of the discussion should 
help us to more fully nuance the discussion as the debate continues.
First, though, let’s get a full sense of the range of questions raised by the 
topic. If we are going to make progress in areas where stalemates have previ-
ously arisen, we will need to understand the questions that need to be raised … 
and the questions that are less productive.
1. Clarifying the Questions
(1) Mind and mental entities. Of course, many philosophers today doubt wheth-
er mentality as such even exists or, more accurately, whether mental states or 
qualia have a primary rather than derivative existence. Most readers will be 
well aware of this debate, and some engage in it professionally. For this rea-
son I will not repeat the well-known arguments against the major advocates of 
physicalism such as Wolf Singer, Francis Crick, and Dan Dennett. Whether 
anything mental exists may be a major debate, but I don’t think it’s the topic 
de jour.
I thus recommend that we begin instead with the assumption that some 
mental attributes or things exist and exercise causality qua mental. (I will 
problematize »the mental« in a moment.) Mentality is not merely an epiphe-
nomenon. It is not merely supervenient on physical states, nor is it merely a 
weakly emergent property of physical matter/energy, where all true causal 
forces reside.
As the old American metaphor puts it, we have more important fish to 
fry than reductionism. Leaving aside reductionism at the start will allow us 
to focus in on a different set of questions. For example: Does finite mentality 
arise at some point in cosmic evolution, such that it was not actually present 
at one point in time and then later was? If mentality is emergent, then must it 
always be linked to something physical, say a body? Do separate mental units, 
say souls, exist, or are they just multiple manifestations of one mental reality 
(call it God)? Skrbina puts it nicely:
The central issue here is whether we speak of such mind as »mind of single uni-
versal« (God, the Absolute, the World Soul, and so on) or of mind as attribut-
able to each thing in itself (of each object’s possessing its own unique, individual 
mind). The former view would be a monist concept of mind, the latter a pluralist 
concept. (Skrbina 2005: 21)
Whitehead’s famous notion of actual entities (Whitehead 1978) moves in the 
direction of radical pluralism. Assume for the moment that he is right and that 
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an extremely large number of actual entities (AEs) exist. This requires us to 
think of each such moment of creative becoming as a separate entity or occa-
sion, existing on its own. Of course, one can be a radical pluralist in this way 
and still hold that AEs are so interdependent that they are internally related. 
That would mean a radical pluralism of psyches.
The specter of panpsychism poses a further question: does the world con-
tain anything that is non-mental, such as purely physical objects? As suggest-
ed at the outset, I strongly resist this either/or frame; it leads too quickly to a 
simple syllogism:
Some mental things exist.
Nothing exists that is purely physical.
Hence, all things are mental things.
I will suggest that the more interesting discussion is of the varieties of men-
tality or »psychisms.« Interesting nuances of »psychism« surface when one 
explores options such as limited panpsychism, emergentist panpsychism, or 
the panpsychism of potentiality and actuality. They cause us to reflect on the 
differences, and thus on the status of the unifying concepts.
To proceed in this way is to hypothesize that das Mentale is not an either/
or quality, such that an entity either is mental (has the attribute of mentality) 
or isn’t. (For now I use »a mental entity« and »an entity that has mentality« 
interchangeably.) It is more fruitful to ask, »To what extent, and in what sense, 
is this entity mental?«
(2) Panentheism. A series of questions arise at the intersection of panpsy-
chism and panentheism. Some represent difficult challenges for classical 
panpsychism.
If there is a plurality of mental entities, how is God related to each one? 
For Whitehead, of course, actual entities are ultimate, not more dependent 
on God than God is on them. But actual entities could be dependent on God 
in a stronger way, existing only through the continuing will of God; or they 
could be real individual expressions of a single divine Spirit (this is the view of 
the Indian philosopher Ramanuja); or, following Spinoza, what we call indi-
viduals might merely be ways that the one divine substance is manifested in a 
particular time or place—modes of the One. How would one decide between 
these options?
Panentheism might also raise some critical questions for classical panpsy-
chism. What is God’s relationship to finite mental entities if they are really 
present »all the way down«? If God lures even an electron, what does God 
lure it to do? Or does theological panpsychism instead support monism? That 
would mean that the psyches that seem to be in all things are actually just one 
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psyche: the one mind of God, or Nous in Plotinus’s sense. For that matter, how 
would one distinguish finite »natural« mentality from infinite divine mental-
ity? Can the one be within the other without compromising the integrity of 
either? Do classical panpsychisms maintain that it’s the God question that 
supports the dichotomy either everything is mental or nothing is mental and, 
if so, why?
In contrast, a gradualist panpsychism begins with the question To what 
extent, and in what sense, is a given entity mental? Formulating this question, 
one immediately recognizes that the relationships between panpsychism and 
panentheism are rather more complex than one might have thought. There are 
no simple entailments: one can be a panpsychist without being a panentheist, 
for example if one is a pantheist. Conversely, one can be a panentheist without 
being a panpsychist, for example if one holds that the world is God’s (mate-
rial) body. Above all, gradualist panpsychism shifts the conversation in that 
one must now ask about the relationship between the panentheistic God and 
the whole history of emergent mentality.
2. Emergent Mentality
Gradualist panpsychism seeks a theory of consciousness that is consonant with 
the results and the methods of the sciences as well as with human phenom-
enal experience. Let’s call this a theory of emergent mentality. It’s the view that 
the particles and physical states of (say) macrophysics and physical chemistry 
do not manifest an actual mentality; they do not have intentions, for example. 
The first self-reproducing cell, by contrast, does have a primitive awareness 
of its environment. Increasing complexity across biological evolution brings 
more and more complex awareness, with human consciousness being the 
most advanced form of embodied awareness that we have yet discovered.
Emergent mentality as I use the term stands in contrast to a classical po-
sition such as Whitehead’s panpsychism or »panexperientialism.« Famously, 
Whitehead holds that all units of reality are occasions of creative becoming. 
Each actual (as opposed to merely potential) entity is thus its own center of 
experience. If given only a single argument to defend this view, Whiteheadian 
panpsychists will generally argue that mentality cannot come from something 
that is non-mental. But Whiteheadians are by no means the only philoso-
phers who object to gradualist theories of mentality. All dualists do, as well 
as many neuroscientists who are drawn toward exclusively material explana-
tions of thought and consciousness. So let’s call this particular critique the »no 
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mind from matter« (NMfM) Objection. Thomas Nagel sometimes expresses a 
similar intuition as fundamental or »schematic« for him: »In its schematic, 
pre-Socratic way, this sort of monism attempts to recognize the mental as a 
physically irreducible part of reality.« (Nagel 2012: 62) I will argue that this in-
tuition does not stand up to closer examination, at least not in this particular 
(non-theistic) form.
Finally, I do not think that theism as such falsifies one option and verifies 
the other. It is not inconsistent for advocates of most (but not all) forms of the-
ism to affirm either Whiteheadian panpsychism or emergent mentality. But I 
do think that setting panentheism in dialogue with contemporary philosophy 
and science supports gradual over maximal panpsychism.
The argument proceeds in four steps.
(1) Evolutionary Mentality and Emergentist Panpsychism
The evolutionary evidence suggests the emergence of the various phenomena 
that we call mentality, a position sometimes called emergentist panpsychism. 
Of the various forms of limited or gradualist panpsychism, this position is in 
my view the most convincing. Once again, it starts by challenging the assump-
tion that all existing things either are or are not centers of experience. Limiting 
or conditioning the »pan« in panpsychism is an important part of making 
this case.
Thomas Nagel is a famous anti-emergentist panpsychist. He argues, for 
example:
The implausibility of the reductive program that is needed to defend the com-
pleteness of … naturalism provides a reason for trying to think of alternatives—
alternatives that make mind, meaning, and value as fundamental as matter and 
space-time in an account of what it. The fundamental elements of physics and 
chemistry have been inferred to explain the behavior of the inanimate world. 
Something more is needed to explain how there can be conscious, thinking crea-
tures whose bodies and brains are composed of those elements… . Everything, 
living or not, is constituted from elements having a nature that is both physi-
cal and nonphysical—that is, capable of combining into mental wholes. So this 
reductive account can also be described as a form of panpsychism. (Nagel 2012: 
20, 57)
Nagel and I agree in opposing the reduction to physicalism but disagree con-
cerning when this »something more« is needed. He thinks that, in order to beat 
physicalism, mind must be fundamental to all things, whereas I argue that the 
first time it becomes fundamental is in the role it must play to explain self-
reproducing cells. From cells on we no longer disagree.
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For the emergentist panpsychist, »mind«—in the minimal form of aware-
ness and goal-directed behavior—is first discernible with the emergence of 
self-reproducing life; as a concept it only begins to play a role after that. From 
the birth of cellular agents, the two positions walk side by side. For example, 
both Godehard Brüntrup and I agree that unicellular organisms possess a ru-
dimentary form of awareness. This awareness is a matter of life and death to 
the cell. After all, cells can live and reproduce, or they can die. From an evo-
lutionary point of view, they have an interest in living. To move up a glucose 
gradient and receive more nutrition is in the interest of a unicellular organism; 
it is »good.« To move toward a toxin is »bad.« The cell’s (chemically mediated) 
awareness of its environment, which differentiates between the two, is of its 
very essence.
It’s fascinating to trace the evolutionary process from primitive awareness 
and goal-directed behavior at the birth of the biosphere to the most complex 
conscious cognition and subjective experiences. Note that, once a certain 
threshhold is passed, the anti-emergentist panpsychist appears to be as willing 
as the emergentist panpsychist to affirm the emergence of ever more complex 
mental phenomena.
(2) Mind in potentia
The more plausible the transition from potential to actual mentality becomes, 
the more the NMfM Objection is undercut. Although in the end my argument 
will require a theological dimension, the first step of the argument can be 
made without it.
Although each cell is aware, each can potentially become part of (say) a 
human being, a being with the attribute of consciousness. So the cell is poten-
tially conscious if the right circumstances occur; specifically, it is potentially 
conscious in the sense that it can become part of a whole to which we attribute 
consciousness (say a human person).
This topic raises some complex dilemmas concerning location and part/
whole relations. Not every property of a whole is a property of its parts (red-
ness), nor is every property of a part also a property of the whole (weighing less 
than one kilo). But some properties of parts are also properties of the whole 
(having some weight), just as some properties of a whole may also be prop-
erties of its parts (if the whole orchestra is in tune, then each instrument is 
in tune). Regarding location, it’s easier to say »Beth is conscious, though con-
sciousness is not the kind of property that has a location.« Surely conscious-
ness does not have a location in the same way that her hat does; still, if Beth is 
in California, we wouldn’t say that her consciousness resides in Tokyo. Is Beth’s 
consciousness located in each neuron of her brain, or in her brain as a whole, 
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in her body as a whole, or in her personhood (whatever that is)? It seems most 
adequate to say that Beth’s consciousness is present in Beth as a whole. Clearly, 
these philosophy of mind questions are relevant to panentheism as well.
Now consider an analogy. The cell as a whole is aware. And the actual chem-
ical components of a given cell had the potential to become part of that cell. 
Take for example one of the cytosine molecules (chemical formula C4H5N3O) 
that pairs with guanine to make up a rung in the DNA double helix. This par-
ticular molecule is potentially aware in the sense that, if the right circumstanc-
es occur, it becomes part of a whole cell to which we attribute awareness.
The analogy does two things. It treats both consciousness and awareness as 
whole-part relationships, which seems right. And it treats consciousness and 
awareness as existing in two forms: potential and actual. If the analogy holds, 
it allows us to say that consciousness already exists in potentia, in the parts 
that compose a conscious person, and that, analogously, awareness exists in 
potentia in the parts that compose a cell.
Now consider the NMfM Objection to emergent mentality, viz., that you 
can’t get consciousness from something that is not conscious. For a Cartesian, 
this is right; res cogitans and res extensa are dichotomous. For Descartes one 
can never emerge from the other because he presupposes from the start that 
no potential for this transition exists. By contrast, Western philosophy and sci-
ence offer a number of ways of understanding the transition from potential 
to actual. We could explore science-based analogies such as superposition, as 
in the »collapse« of the (probabilistic) Schrödinger wave equation to a par-
ticular macrophysical state.1 More broadly, Western metaphysics offers a rich 
legacy of ways to conceive the transition from potential to actual, for example 
in metaphysical systems inspired by Aristotle and in the dialectical philoso-
phies of the German Idealists. These achievements offer crucial resources for 
conceptualizing the transition from potentially aware to actually aware. To 
the extent that the transition becomes comprehensible, the NMfM Objection 
is answered.
1   Quantum physics offers an empirical basis for thinking about the concepts of the actual and 
the possible or potential. »Potentially aware« and »actually aware« can exist in a way that 
is analogous to a quantum superposition. We know that the Copenhagen interpretation of 
quantum physics allows for states that are superpositions of actual and possible. In the fa-
mous thought experiment known as Schrödinger’s cat, the cat exists in a state of superposi-
tion of dead::alive until a measurement causes the collapse of the wave function into either 
dead cat or alive cat. A so-called quantum computer (if one can be constructed) would be 
powerful because each bit (»qubit«) could manifest not two but three different states: on, off, 
or indeterminate. So far physicists have been able to prepare hundreds of individual atoms in 
individual »traps.« These matrices extend quantum potentials far beyond the scale at which 
they normally occur.
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(3) Gradualist Panentheistic Panpsychism
(1) God is a mental entity, the source of all mentality
(2) Everything is in God
(3) So all entities are mental entities.
At an academic conference in Munich in August 2017, Benedikt Göcke (among 
others) argued persuasively that the affirmation everything is in God is not suf-
ficient to demarcate panentheism from various forms of classical theism. In 
any event, a position would surely not count as panentheism if it does not af-
firm (2) in some sense. For its part, (1) is an affirmation about God that is held 
in one form or another across most of the history of theology. For example, 
even if God has a body, God is not simply a material being. Applied to God, 
»mental entity« could mean a variety of different things: has (or essentially 
has) mental attributes, or is solely mental in the sense of having no physical at-
tributes, or is the source of all mentality, or is mentality as such, etc. If (3) then 
follows, then from panentheism one can infer panpsychism.
Reflecting on the argument teaches us several things. First, its inference is 
not valid.2 Perhaps if (2) affirmed that »Everything is God,« the conclusion 
would follow. But that would be pantheism, not panentheism.
The argument also begs for a closer analysis of what is meant by mental 
entity. Given the imprecision of the term, it can only serve as a rough label 
for a set of different concepts. Thus Uwe Meixner writes in the Brüntrup and 
Jaskola collection, »The immediate consequence of this idea [panentheism] is 
that everything is in God (qua being in this total experience, which at the same 
time is the totality of all experiences), whether as an experience, as a subject 
of experience, or as an object of experience.« (Meixner 2017: 399) Process theo-
logians have explored these options in some detail. For example, Whitehead’s 
»objective immortality« affirms that only the outcome of creative activity (con-
crescence) is in God, whereas Marjorie Suchocki’s »subjective immortality« 
places the actual entity in its very becoming within God.
The ambiguity of »mental entity« and of the »in« in panentheism make 
it impossible to make a direct inference from panentheism to panpsychism 
in the full or »maximal« sense.3 Panpsychism does not follow if the panen-
theistic »in« is interpreted as the spatial »in,« nor if it is the finite »in« the 
2   To succeed, (2) would need to read »Everything is God.« (And even then there are problems, 
as we can learn from Shankara’s philosophy.) Panentheism is distinct from pantheism pre-
cisely because it does not make this assertion.
3   The question of whether panpsychism is helpful to the panentheist is an interesting one, 
although I will not have the chance to develop this argument fully here. Robert C. Whittmore 
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infinite. Unless and until it is shown that the »in« of panentheism requires 
each existing entity to be in itself a mental entity (to have mentality as one of 
its own properties), one is not compelled to affirm maximal panpsychism. Of 
course, one can attempt to defend maximal panpsychism on other grounds. 
But panentheism alone will not get one there.
Panentheism is helpful to the emergentist panpsychist, however. Even a 
minimal (panen)theism affirms divine creative intent and a continuing lure 
toward a telos that is consistent with the divine nature. Since the divine na-
ture is or includes mentality, one would expect that the telos is or includes 
mentality as well. That created mentality may not be instantiated at the time 
of the big bang; it may be the product of a universe continually lured toward 
the divine nature. This result is consistent with what we now know about cos-
mic evolution: the mathematical laws of astrophysics that seem to reflect the 
constancy of God; the self-organizing patterns of biochemistry; the emergence 
of awareness and goal-oriented behavior at the dawn of the biosphere; and 
the gradual development of the capacity to know and worship God. Gradualist 
panentheistic panpsychism becomes the affirmation that God lures creation 
from »potentially aware« to »actually aware« in ways that preserve both the 
transcendence and the immanence of God.
(4)  »God in All Things« and the Ground of Mentality
We have discussed all things in God; now we must turn to the second »in« of 
panentheism: God in all things.
(1) God is in all things.
(2) Wherever God present, mentality is present.
(3) Mentality is present in all things.
maintains that panpsychism can become panentheism or, even more strongly, that panpsy-
chism may imply or entail panentheism. He uses a passage from John Fisk:
    Panpsychism becomes panentheism in the realization that this »Life« manifest in all 
nature is »only a specialized form of the Universal Life,« which is that »eternal God in-
dwelling in the universe, in whom we live and move and have our being.« For if, as noted 
earlier, God cannot be conceived as something outside the universe (as maintained in 
anthropomorphic theism), and if, as has been shown, we cannot identify Him or It with 
the universe phenomenally manifest (since this would be pantheism), then it must be 
that the one (theistic) alternative remaining is the truth: the universe is (as panentheism 
teaches) inside God! (John Fisk, quoted in Whittemore 1964: 303.)
    Whittemore is right to note the inference from panpsychism to panentheism, adding 
only that the inference does not require maximal panpsychism; it works just as well from 
the standpoint of minimal panpsychism.
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Proposition (1) restates a major biblical theme, such as Acts 17:29, where Paul 
speaks of God as the one »in whom we live and move and have our being.« 
The same assertion is present in most forms of Western theism. Göcke and 
others have shown that (1) is not distinctive to panentheism. But »God in all 
things« does express one of the two »in’s« that even a more minimal panen-
theism must affirm. Again, (2) should be non-controversial for theists. If (3) fol-
lows, we have a second entailment from panentheism to panpsychism. Again, 
though, we must ask: panpsychism in what sense?
Skrbina put the point nicely:
There is a lingering and problematic sense in which Christian theology does 
allow for a weak form of panpsychism. If God is omnipresent, then he is obvi-
ously »in« all things; this points toward panentheism. If a portion of God is in 
a thing, and this portion assumes any sense of independent individuality, then 
this could qualify as a »monistic panpsychism.« (Skrbina 2005: 274 n. 24)
Skrbina recognizes that »panentheism can be confused with panpsychism.« 
As we saw in the previous section, the two cannot be identified, but the former 
does imply, at minimum, an evolutionary sense of the latter.
Finally, Skrbina notes, »On the traditional view, God is omnipresent. If God 
represents spirit or mind, then all things can be said to contain mind—the 
mind of God.« (Skrbina 2005: 21) One wonders, then: does the second »in« of 
panentheism (God in the world) entail panpsychism in a stronger sense than 
the first (the world in God)?
In order to respond to this final objection to a gradualist panpsychism, it’s 
helpful to take a short detour. Thomas Nagel is a non-theist who affirms a fun-
damental role for mind: »Mind, as a development of life, must be included as 
the most recent stage of this long cosmological history, and its appearance, I 
believe, casts its shadow back over the entire process and the constituents and 
principles on which the process depends.« (Nagel 2012: 8)4
Nagel holds that the gradual appearance of mind across cosmological his-
tory requires one to affirm that mind was present in the universe from the 
beginning as a fundamental principle, analogous to the way that physicists af-
firm that physical laws and mass/energy were present from the beginning. He 
argues:
So if mind is a product of biological evolution—if organisms with mental life are 
not miraculous anomalies but an integral part of nature—then biology cannot 
4   This is part of his non-emergence thesis, that is, his claim that there are no truly emergent 
properties of complex systems.
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be a purely physical science. The possibility opens up of a pervasive conception 
of the natural order very different from materialism—one that makes mind cen-
tral, rather than a side effect of physical law. (Nagel 2012: 15)
Examining this passage, however, one begins to discern the disanalogy be-
tween physics and biology. It’s true that physicists have to postulate that the 
fundamental physical particles and forces were present from the big bang, 
since they are essential for explaining even the first minutes of cosmic his-
tory. (See Weinberg 1977) We do not have to postulate the presence of mental 
entities, or properties such as awareness, in the same way. One might want to 
affirm that mind is »central« in the first million years of cosmic history, but 
there are no empirical reasons for doing so; it’s not a postulate that one actu-
ally needs at that point.
That brings us back to the NMfM Objection. Anti-emergentists such as Nagel 
respond that, if we don’t postulate the presence of mind from the beginning, 
it can’t play a role in biological or psychological explanations. That might be 
true if the only options philosophy had were x exists or x does not exist. In fact, 
though, our resources include powerful theories of becoming, the movement 
from the one to the other. The Aristotelian tradition(s) offer compelling analy-
ses of the status of potentiality and the transition from potential to actual. As 
a scientist, Stuart Kauffman ascribes to »the adjacent possible« a quasi-causal 
role in quantum physics and a role as formal or structural cause in biological 
evolution. (See Kauffman 2016) These contributions deflate the power of the 
NMfM Objection.
Once the NMfM Objection is set aside, an area of shared agreement becomes 
visible, namely, some ground for the gradual evolution of mentality must exist. 
Here we can affirm Nagel’s contention: »We ourselves are large-scale, complex 
instances of something both objectively physical from outside and subjectively 
mental from the inside. Perhaps the basis for this identity pervades the world.« 
(Nagel 2012: 42) Interestingly, when one attempts to speak of this »basis,« it is 
difficult to avoid theological language. As Philip Goff notes at one point:
Or maybe, as Colin McGinn (1989) famously argued, human beings are con-
stitutively incapable of grasping the nature of the properties underlying con-
sciousness; it could nonetheless be that the emergence of consciousness from 
non-consciousness is intelligible to God if not to us. (Goff 2017)
More precisely, Goff might have written, »the emergence of consciousness 
from non-consciousness is intelligible to God … and intelligible to us if we in-
clude, however hypothetically, the notion of God and divine creation.« Many 
panentheists hold that divine mind precedes the creation of the universe, so 
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that creation manifests divine intention and other features of God’s nature. 
The Westminster Shorter Catechism  boldly formulates the telos of God’s ongo-
ing creative act: »Man’s chief end is to glorify God, and to enjoy him forever.« 
This goal does not require that mentality have been actually present in cre-
ated beings from the first moment of cosmic history. But it does require that 
it have been present in potentia. That condition is met as long as the universe 
as a whole reflects the mind of its creator and the divine intent that mentality 
would eventually emerge and be manifested in the created world.
3. Conclusion
Thinking back over the argument, one realizes that this debate represents one 
particular instance of a much broader project: reflecting one’s way to sophisti-
cated responses that address core theological commitments on the one hand 
and the best of contemporary philosophy and science on the other. Success 
is impossible without participants who are willing to keep the doors open in 
both directions. The Richard Dawkinses and Dan Dennetts on the one side 
construe the natural world in such a way that mentality, and thus God, can-
not play a fundamental role. Strong advocates of the separateness of God, 
Cartesian dualism, or interventionist divine action close down the discussion 
from the other side.
We are familiar with theologians willing to do the hard work in philosophy 
and science to open up the discussion, but equally important are scientists 
such as Stuart Kauffman and secular philosophers such as Thomas Nagel. In 
the following passage, note how deeply the non-theist Nagel enters into the 
conceptual world of theism:
My preference for an immanent, natural explanation is congruent with my athe-
ism. But even a theist who believes God is ultimately responsible for the ap-
pearance of conscious life could maintain that this happens as part of a natural 
order that is created by God, but does not require further divine intervention. A 
theist not committed to dualism in the philosophy of mind could suppose the 
natural possibility of conscious organisms composed, perhaps supplemented by 
laws of psychophysical emergence. To make the possibility of conscious life a 
consequence of the natural order created by God while ascribing its actuality 
to subsequent divine intervention would then seem an arbitrary complication. 
Some form of teleological naturalism should for these reasons seem no less cred-
ible than an interventionist explanation, even to those who believe that God is 
ultimately responsible for everything. (Nagel 2017: 95)
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Nagel’s words here beautifully reflect the goal of this paper, and in some ways 
also its outcome. I have embraced teleological naturalism by eschewing mind/
body dualisms and affirming mentality only where it is observable and plays 
some explanatory role. At the same time, I have pursued the questions from 
my standpoint as a panentheist. These two commitments required me to find 
a version of emergent mentality compatible with the double »in« of panen-
theism: all things in God and God in all things. The requirements of theology, 
philosophy, and science are best met, I argued, by a gradualist panpsychism 
that affirms the actuality of divine mind, the potentiality of mentality from the 
moment of creation, and the actual emergence of mentality over the course of 
evolution.5
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Orthodox Panentheism: Sergius Bulgakov’s 
Sophiology
Uwe Meixner
1. Theism, Pantheism, Panentheism, Monotheism
Not only the use of language as a whole but also its philosophical use is chang-
ing all the time. For example, some philosophers start to use a certain philo-
sophical term in a sense which is not at all its original sense. In this sense, 
they misuse the term; but instead of censuring this, others imitate them; the 
misuse catches on, and soon the misuse becomes normal, and thus ceases to 
be a misuse—at least within certain philosophical circles. This is what hap-
pened to the term »phenomenology«: formerly, it was used by philosophers—
very properly, in view of its etymology—to designate a human science which is 
dedicated to the description of the phenomena (of some stripe or other); nowa-
days, many philosophers use it exclusively for designating something which, 
presumably, not only humans but also mice, bats, and even bugs have: phe-
nomenology (i.e., conscious experience, which is full of what-it-is-like).
And this—the replacement of the original use of a term by its misuse, 
which then becomes normal and ceases to be a misuse—is precisely what 
seems to be happening to the term »theism« these days. Formerly, it was 
used by philosophers—again, very properly—to designate a position which 
acknowledges the existence of at least one god. In fact, the present use of the 
term in such combinations as »polytheism,« »monotheism,« »henotheism,« 
or »tritheism« in no way contradicts this former use, and one would expect 
that the same is true of its use in the combinations »pantheism« and »panen-
theism.« But no: Quite a few philosophers nowadays believe that pantheism 
and panentheism are so far from entailing theism that these positions entail the 
negation of theism—also known (formerly at least) as atheism.
Contrary to this somewhat infelicitous replacement of an original mean-
ing by a new meaning (a replacement which can seem to turn pious Spinoza 
into an atheist), I will describe a version of pantheism/panentheism which 
is not only, in the old sense, theistic (as is Spinoza’s version of pantheism/
panentheism) but also prosopon-theistic (as Spinoza’s is not): a version which 
acknowledges a personal god, but no impersonal god. What I have in mind is 
the Christian panentheism of the Russian-Orthodox philosopher-theologian 
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Sergius Bulgakov (1871–1944). Bulgakov’s speculative theology, as will be seen, 
is thoroughly Christian and at the same time thoroughly panentheistic. In a 
sense which will become plain, it is a panentheism which is orthodox accord-
ing to the Abrahamic tradition (what Spinoza’s panentheism is not), and even 
orthodox according to the Christian tradition; it is another question whether 
Bulgakov’s panentheism is also Orthodox (it certainly is not quite Roman 
Catholic).
Note that it does not matter much whether one says »panentheism« or 
»pantheism«; for if these two terms are accorded their most reasonable in-
terpretations, then they—and, of course, also the corresponding adjectives 
»panentheistic« and »pantheistic«—are logically equivalent. It cannot be that 
there is a god with whom everything is identical; otherwise (by the logical laws 
of identity) this table would be identical with this shoe, which is plainly not 
the case. And it cannot be that everything is a god: plainly, neither this table 
nor this shoe is a god. Thus, two prima facie possible interpretations of the 
term »pantheism« are simply absurd. The most reasonable interpretation of it 
is this: »pantheism« designates the doctrine that the world is a god. Now, it is 
natural to understand the term »the world« in its most comprehensive sense, 
the sense according to which everything is in the world. Indeed, it is mandatory 
to understand it in this way if one wishes to interpret the term »pantheism« 
by making use of the term »the world«; if one used a less comprehensive sense 
of the term »the world,« then one would not do justice to the meaning of the 
word »pan« in »pantheism.« It follows that pantheism entails panentheism: 
If the world is a god, as pantheism holds, then—because everything is in the 
world (which is an analytic, broadly logical truth)—everything is in a god,1 just 
as panentheism holds. It also follows that panentheism entails pantheism: If 
everything is in a god, as panentheism holds, then—because everything is in the 
world—that god (in whom everything is) and the world (in which everything 
is) are in each other; which can be literally true—literalness being required at 
this level of abstract metaphysical discourse—only if they are (numerically) 
identical; hence the world is a god, just as pantheism holds.
Note also that panentheism (and therefore also its logical equivalent: pan-
theism) entails monotheism with respect to the concept of an all-including 
god (though not with respect to the concept of a god simpliciter). According 
to panentheism there is an all-including god: g; suppose there is another 
1   »Everything is in a god« is here to be taken in its logically strong interpretation: Some god is 
such that everything is in him (her, it), not in its weak interpretation: Everything is such that it 
is in some god. Only the logically strong interpretation of »Everything is in a god« is true to 
the normal sense of the word »panentheism.«
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all-including god besides g: g´. Since both gods are all-including, g´ is in g, 
and g is in g´. Therefore (according to the required metaphysically literal—
mereological—reading of »is in«), g and g´ are identical. Thus, the assump-
tion that there is another all-including god besides g is refuted and the final 
conclusion from the premise of panentheism is that there is one and only 
one all-including god. Monotheism with respect to an all-including god is not 
yet monotheism simpliciter, or (unre)strict(ed) monotheism: besides the one 
all-including god, there may be other gods, gods that are not all-including. 
However, for thinkers for whom the concept of an all-including god is the only 
legitimate concept of a god, it is indeed true that strict monotheism follows 
from panentheism. For them, monotheism simpliciter results from panenthe-
ism in virtue of the fact—just demonstrated—that monotheism with respect to 
an all-including god follows from panentheism; for, for such thinkers, the one 
all-including god must be the one god.
2. Spinoza and Bulgakov
Spinoza, the most famous pantheist in the history of philosophy (so far, at 
least), was also a panentheist and strict monotheist; in his metaphysics, the 
logical connections of the three »theisms« which were pointed out in the 
preceding section do certainly not fail to be manifest. Paradigmatically, in 
Proposition XV of the first part of his Ethica, he asserts of the One Substance: 
»Whatever is is in God, and nothing can be, nor can be conceived of, with-
out God.«2 There is a parallel of this in Bulgakov, who—presumably without 
having Spinoza in mind at all—asserts:
Nothing can exist outside God, as alien or exterior to him. […] There is only the 
one God in his divine Wisdom, and outside him nothing whatever. What is not 
God is nothing.3
Bulgakov does not mean to propose that what is not identical to the one God 
does not exist; for obviously there are many things which are not identical to 
the one God but exist nonetheless. He means to assert (with rhetorical empha-
sis) that everything (everything which is, everything which exists) is in God, 
and that what is not identical to God cannot exist, cannot be, without God. The 
2   My translation. For the Latin original, see (for example) Spinoza 1977: 34.
3   Bulgakov, Sophia. The Wisdom of God (Bulgakov 1993): 72 and 148; the italics and the 
capitalization—as all italics and capitalization (or lack of it) in quotations in this essay—are 
already in the edition quoted from (the reader may be sure of this).
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consonance in thought between Spinoza and Bulgakov is evident. In other re-
spects, however, the two panentheisms of these two thinkers are very different 
indeed. The difference is not that Spinoza is a pantheist, and Bulgakov is not:4 
qua panentheists, as we have seen, both thinkers are also pantheists (the two 
italicized words being accorded their most reasonable interpretations). The 
differences are the following: (1) Bulgakov employs more than one concept of 
a god, Spinoza only one (namely, only one of the god-concepts Bulgakov em-
ploys: the concept of an all-including god). (2) Bulgakov employs more than one 
concept of a world, Spinoza only one (namely, only one of the world-concepts 
Bulgakov employs: the concept of an all-including world). (3) Spinoza’s cos-
motheology is perfectly static; Bulgakov’s cosmotheology is dynamic and, as 
a consequence, has a historical dimension—which is completely absent in 
Spinoza’s. (4) For Bulgakov, a god must be a person; for Spinoza, a god must be 
a non-person; as a consequence, Bulgakov’s panentheism is prosopon-theistic, 
Spinoza’s is not. Obviously, this last difference between the two thinkers is the 
most important difference. In what follows, I will explore Bulgakov’s panen-
theism in some detail; keeping Spinoza’s panentheism in mind will certainly 
provide a useful point of comparison.
3. Two Christian Dogmas
Bulgakov developed his own panentheism—as a part of »sophiology«—
mainly in six theological publications: the so-called »minor« trilogy (The 
Burning Bush [1927/2009] on the Virgin Mary, The Friend of the Bridegroom 
[1927/2003] on John the Baptist, Jacob’s Ladder [1929/2010] on the angels), and 
the so-called »major« trilogy (The Lamb of God [1933/2008] on Christology, 
The Comforter [1936/2004] on Pneumatology, The Bride of the Lamb [posthu-
mously 1945/2002] on Ecclesiology).5 As a compendious source of Bulgakov’s 
views, I shall use his own outline of sophiology, Sophia. The Wisdom of God.6 In 
4   Due to thinking (locally) too small of the world, identifying it not with the all but with space-
time, Bulgakov does think that he is only a panentheist, not also a pantheist; see Sophia: 72.
5   The first number in the square brackets indicates the year of publication of the original 
work in Russian, the second number indicates the year of publication of its translation into 
English. The English titles are the titles of these published translations. (One of the English 
titles does not accord well with its Russian original: »The Burning Bush« should rather be 
»The Unburnt Burning Bush.«)
6   That book is the revised edition of a book published in 1937, The Wisdom of God: A Brief 
Summary of Sophiology, which itself is a translation from a (so far) unpublished manuscript 
in Russian.
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addition, I shall quote from The Lamb of God (and, finally, from a book called 
A Bulgakov Anthology).
Bulgakov’s panentheism seeks to be compatible with, and indeed to posi-
tively incorporate, two central dogmas of orthodox Christianity: the Dogma 
of the Trinity (the Nicene dogma), and the Dogma of the Two Natures in Christ 
(the Chalcedonian dogma). The Dogma of the Trinity (it can be found more or 
less explicitly expressed in the Nicene-Constantinopolitanian Creed) consists 
in the assertion that there are three divine hypostases—or persons: the Father, 
the Son, and the Holy Spirit—of one and the same divine ousia—substance, 
or essence, or nature.7 The Dogma of the Two Natures in Christ consists in the 
assertion that Christ is the incarnate second person of the Trinity (the Son) in 
two distinct natures (essences), one divine and one human, which natures are 
united in Christ »unconfusedly, immutably, indivisibly, inseparably.«8
Bulgakov rightly remarks:
We must here draw attention to the meager interest displayed in the doctrine of 
the one Ousia in trinitarian theology. […] It may even be said that the concep-
tion of Ousia has remained in the lifeless scholastic form in which it was taken 
over from Aristotle. It […] had been more of a theological symbol than a theo-
logical doctrine. Such a state of things could not last forever, and sophiology has 
come in our time to […] reveal the meaning of this symbol.9
Indeed, giving to the ousia of the Trinity—to the identical nature of the Father, 
the Son, and the Holy Spirit—the great measure of theological attention it de-
serves is a necessary (though certainly not a sufficient) condition for entering 
into sophiology and into Bulgakovian panentheism.
7   The consubstantiality of the Holy Spirit with the other two hypostases is left very much im-
plicit in the Nicene-Constantinopolitanian Creed (in contrast to the consubstantiality of the 
Father and the Son). But later the term »consubstantial [homoousios]« was extended to the 
whole Trinity (see Sophia: 24).
8   The quotation is from »The Definition of Faith of the Council of Chalcedon« (see Schaff 1900: 
262-265).
9   Sophia: 53 (fn). See also ibid., 24: »[T]he doctrine of the relationship between the tree 
hypostases […] has been to a certain extent elucidated in the process of the Church’s dog-
matic creativity. But […] the doctrine of the consubstantiality of the Holy Trinity, as well as 
the actual conception of substance or nature, has been far less developed and, apparently, 
almost overlooked.«
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4. The Divine Sophia
The fundamental sophiological definition is this: The Divine Sophia is the un-
folded Divine Ousia (Divinity, Godhead), the one nature of the three persons of 
the Trinity unfolded as to content (Divine Wisdom) and manifestation (Divine 
Glory).10 Bulgakov differentiates between Wisdom and Glory as distinct but 
inseparable aspects of the Godhead (the Divine Ousia) in its self-revelation—in 
its unfoldedness, as one should say in order to emphasize the purely ontologi-
cal, entirely non-epistemological character of the self-revelation that is meant 
here.11 It is important to keep in mind that the fundamental relation between 
the Divine Sophia and the Divine Ousia is (numerical) identity, since, of 
course, the unfolded Divine Ousia is identical (as is the enfolded Divine Ousia) 
with the Divine Ousia. The relationship between the Divine Sophia and the 
Divine Ousia is, therefore, the same relationship as the relationship between 
the standing Socrates and Socrates (and the sitting Socrates, to boot), except 
for the fact that the different »ways of givenness« (to use Fregean terminol-
ogy) of the Divine Sophia (the unfolded Divine Ousia) and the Divine Ousia 
(simpliciter, »Ousia as such« [Sophia: 54]) have nothing to do with the passage 
of time whereas they do have something to do with the passage of time in 
the case of the standing Socrates and Socrates. Saying it far less clearly but in 
Bulgakov’s own words: »[U]sing an abridged and simplified terminology, we 
can say: the divinity in God constitutes the divine Sophia (or glory), while at 
the same time we assume that it [the divine Sophia, the divinity in God] is also 
the ousia [as such]: Ousia=Sophia=Glory.«12
It is evident from this quotation that the Divine Sophia can also be defined 
as »the divinity in God,«13 that is, as the Divine Ousia (Godhead) in God, in 
other words, as the Divine Ousia as hypostatized (had, possessed) by God. This 
second definition does not only cast light on the first—the Divine Sophia as the 
unfolded Divine Ousia—(for the unfoldedness of the Divine Ousia, in Wisdom 
and Glory, is seen to be due to its being hypostatized by God), it also displays 
the fundamental relationship between God and the Divine Sophia: Since God 
hypostatizes (has, possesses) his ousia: Divinity, Godhead, the Divine Ousia, 
10   Sophia: 31-33.
11   In defining the Divine Sophia, Bulgakov himself prefers to speak of revelation (rather than 
unfoldedness): »Sophia is Ousia as revealed« (Sophia: 54); »the two persons [the Word and 
the Spirit] together disclosing the Father in one revelation—Sophia« (Sophia: 98).
12   Sophia: 33.
13   For this definition, see also The Lamb of God (Bulgakov 2008): 107.
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he hypostatizes the Divine Ousia inevitably just as it is hypostatized by him,14 
which is by definition (the second one) the Divine Sophia—alias, again by defi-
nition (now the first one), the unfolded Divine Ousia (unfolded in Wisdom and 
Glory). Or as Bulgakov himself says it: »[T]he one personal God possesses [hy-
postatizes] but one Godhead, which is expressed [unfolded, revealed] at once 
in Wisdom and Glory.«15
But what is God for Bulgakov? The last quotation implies that God is a 
person for Bulgakov. In fact, Bulgakov—whether he would be ready to admit 
it or not—believes that the three persons of the Trinity, each hypostatizing 
the Divine Ousia (see the Nicene dogma), collectively constitute yet another 
person, the one God: »The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, who are three 
distinct divine persons, together constitute one God.«16 Clearly God, thus con-
ceived of, is not identical with either the Father, the Son, or the Holy Spirit; he 
is the whole group, or »family,« of the three. And yet (see above) he is a person 
for Bulgakov and hypostatizes the Divine Ousia (and thereby, ipso facto, the 
Divine Sophia). The following quotation makes it explicit how the one personal 
God hypostatizes the Divine Ousia:
[T]he first thing one must say about the Divine Person is that, as trihypostatic, 
this Person is equally real in one hypostasis [of the Divine Ousia] and in three 
hypostases, that this Person is the pre-eternally realized reciprocity of love that 
totally vanquishes personal isolation and identifies three in one, while itself ex-
isting by the real being of these personal centers.17
Yet, the fundamental problem remains: If God is to be the entire Trinity and a 
person, then one is confronted (a) with the difficulty that it seems impossible 
that a group of distinct persons is a person (it would seem that three conscious-
nesses with three distinct subjects of consciousness cannot also be or form one 
consciousness with one subject, no matter how much high-quality love there 
is between the three subjects)18 and (b) with the difficulty that if the three per-
sons together were indeed another person (in spite of apparent impossibility), 
that then, undoubtedly, there would be a fourth hypostasis of the Divine Ousia, 
14   Consider for comparative illustration: Since I carry my load, I carry my load inevitably just 
as (i.e., precisely in the manner) it is carried by me.
15   Sophia: 32.
16   Sophia: 23.
17   The Lamb of God: 95.
18   But listen to Bulgakov, who is not touched by any such misgivings whatsoever: »These 
three centers in the Holy Trinity are equally real and equally subjects, so to speak. Each of 
them is a separate, equally divine I, but all three are one Divine I in its absoluteness—the 
consubstantial and indivisible Trinity.« (The Lamb of God: 190.)
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consubstantial with the other three—which is contrary at least to the spirit 
of the Nicene-Constantinopolitanian Creed. It seems that Bulgakov would 
have done better to let the Trinity be a non-person, just as every human family 
that consists of two, three, or more persons is (ontologically) a non-person. 
But then, if he had done so, who would have been the one personal god that 
not only Bulgakov but every prosopon-theistic monotheist—that is, in practice 
every believer in the Abrahamitic tradition—believes in?19
Be that as it may, Bulgakov is eager to rebut the objection (no doubt actually 
raised against his sophiology) that the Divine Sophia—the unfolded Divine 
Ousia—is a fourth hypostasis.20 He seems unaware of the fact that, according 
to his theological views, already the Trinity appears to be a fourth hypostasis. 
Yet Bulgakov does certainly not believe that God (for him, the Trinity) is a 
primary, non-derivative hypostasis of the Divine Ousia: God—the trihypostat-
ic, triune God: the Trinity—is a hypostasis (»a trihypostatic hypostasis«21) of 
the Divine Ousia only in virtue of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit being 
hypostases of the Divine Ousia. The Divine Sophia, in turn, is, by definition 
(the second one), the Divine Ousia as hypostatized by God—that is, as hypos-
tatized by each person of the Trinity; but it is, for all that, not a hypostasis at all. 
Being hypostatized does not turn the Divine Ousia into a hypostasis: by being 
hypostatized it does not become an individual which is bearer of an essence; it 
stays an essence. However, what hypostatization does do to the Divine Ousia 
is to make it be in a certain manner, namely, makes it be as hypostatized by the 
hypostatizer (i.e., unfolded in such and such a way):
The three persons of the Holy Trinity have one life in common, that is, one 
Ousia, one Sophia. Nevertheless this unity of divine life coexists with the fact 
that the life of each of the hypostases in the divine Ousia-Sophia is determined 
in accordance with its own personal character […]. One and the same Sophia 
is possessed in a different way by the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit […] 
19   This question is, of course, pressing only for Christians, not for Jews or Muslims. What 
a Christian prosopon-theist, qua prosopon-theist, cannot do is to assert godhood of the 
Trinity and deny personhood to it (since for a prosopon-theist, although there is a god, 
there is no impersonal god). I suggest that a Christian (trinitarian and monotheistic) 
prosopon-theist had best accept only the familiar three divine persons (in this sense, 
three gods), one of which, however, is the one personal god in the highest sense, since he is 
the origin of the other two (and of everything to boot): the Father Almighty. He, I believe, 
is what a Christian (trinitarian and monotheistic) prosopon-theistic panentheism must 
refer to as God, and not the Trinity, as Bulgakov believes.
20   See The Lamb of God: 105; Sophia: 35.
21   The Lamb of God: 189.
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The tri-unity of the hypostases is reflected in the threefold modality of the one 
Ousia-Sophia of the Godhead.22
In the unfolding of the Divine Ousia into the Divine Sophia—which is the 
unfolded Divine Ousia—the Son and the Holy Spirit are the disclosing (reveal-
ing) hypostases, the Father the disclosed.23 Thus the Son and the Holy Spirit 
are, so to speak, closer to the Divine Sophia than the Father.24 This makes it 
possible to say such things as that the Son (or Logos) is »Wisdom in person,«25 
and that »the Holy Spirit too is Wisdom,«26 »the personal Spirit of Wisdom.«27 
But Bulgakov urges that the »is« which is used here must not be literally under-
stood as the »is« of (numerical) identity; it is the »is« of predication and of rep-
resentation at once: of representative predication: exemplariness (with respect 
to the revelation of the Divine Ousia). Indeed, one can say that »the Father, 
the Son, the Holy Spirit, or the Holy Trinity ›is‹ […] Ousia or Sophia,« but one 
cannot (within orthodoxy) reverse these »is«-statements,28 which shows that 
they are not literally identificative; properly understood, they are predicative: 
»Each of these [each of the triune hypostases] in its specific way possesses 
Sophia and in this sense is Sophia.«29 Those »is«-statements cannot be literally 
identificative because »Sophia […], once more, is not a Hypostasis, but only a 
quality belonging to a Hypostasis, an attribute of hypostatic being.«30
This latter Bulgakovian assertion, however, must be a massive understate-
ment; for a few pages further on, Bulgakov speaks of »the common scholastic 
misunderstanding which makes Wisdom no more than a particular ›prop-
erty‹ or quality, comprised in the definition of God, and therefore devoid of 
proper subsistence.«31 One might even conclude that Bulgakov is contradict-
ing himself here. This is not really the case; but it is certainly difficult to find 
the proper ontological place for Bulgakov’s Divine Sophia. For Bulgakov, the 
Divine Sophia is, indeed, not a hypostasis (that is, not an individual which is 
bearer of an essence); a fortiori the Divine Sophia is not a »fourth hypostasis.« 
However, »she too loves. […] Sophia loves God without being a hypostasis.«32 
22   Sophia: 37 and 38.
23   Sophia: 46, 98, 105-106.
24   Sophia: 52.
25   Sophia: 98.
26   Sophia: 46.
27   Sophia: 98.
28   Sophia: 52
29   Sophia: 53.
30   Sophia: 52.
31   Sophia: 54.
32   The Lamb of God: 105.
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And God loves Ousia-Sophia: »It is loved by the Holy Trinity as life and revela-
tion. […] All life in God, in itself, is love. […] Apart from this the tri-hypostatic 
relation between God and his Ousia is inconceivable.«33 Is the Divine Sophia 
then a person (though not a hypostasis!) for Bulgakov? Certainly not: »Sophia 
is not a person,« he declares.34 But he also declares: »[W]e must insist on the 
full ontological reality of Ousia-Sophia.«35 Then, what is the Divine Sophia?—
ontologically, in addition to what its (two) definitions say about it? From the 
following five quotations it emerges that the Divine Sophia is for Bulgakov the 
subsistent (though non-hypostatic) life of God: »Ousia, and therefore Sophia, 
exists for God and in God, as his subsistent divinity« [or equivalently: »exists 
for the persons of the Trinity and in them, as their subsistent divinity«]; »the 
nature of God (which is in fact Sophia) is a living and, therefore, loving sub-
stance, ground, and ›principle‹«; »Ousia-Sophia is the life of a hypostatic spirit, 
though not itself hypostatic«; »Sophia is not [a?] hypostatic being, but she is a 
living entity. The divine world is alive, for nothing nonliving can be conceived 
in God«; »Sophia […] is his eternal divine life.«36
Two difficulties need to be pointed out here: (I) In what does the fine dis-
tinction between »subsistent« and »hypostatic« consist such that the Divine 
Sophia is subsistent (an individual substance in some legitimate sense) but not 
hypostatic (not a hypostasis)? (II) How can the Divine Sophia be at once a life 
(that is, something that is lived) and alive (that is, living)? For answering these 
questions it does not help to be told that »the nature of spirit is not a thing, 
but a living principle, even though it is not personal.«37 Nor does it help to 
remember the following lines from a poem by William Butler Yeats: »O body 
swayed to music, O brightening glance, / How can we know the dancer from 
the dance?«38 For, do we really not know in the case in question, in the divine 
case, Those Who Live (»the dancers«) from The Life (»the dance«)? It certainly 
seems that we do distinguish two ontological sides here and are quite right 
about this. Bulgakov himself writes: »Ousia-Sophia is distinct from the hypos-
tases, though it cannot exist apart from them and is eternally hypostatized in 
them.«39 If this is correct, Ousia-Sophia cannot be two things at once: be what 
is hypostatized and be one of its hypostatizers; Ousia-Sophia cannot both be 
33   Sophia: 35.
34   The Lamb of God: 107.
35   Sophia: 55.
36   In the order of quotation: Sophia: 55, 35, and 34; The Lamb of God: 105-106; Sophia: 54. See, 
moreover, the quotation footnote 22 refers to.
37   Sophia: 34.
38   »Among School Children,« Yeats 1980: 117.
39   Sophia: 34.
215Orthodox Panentheism: Sergius Bulgakov’s Sophiology
The Life and be among Those Who Live (those who live The Life). It would 
seem that Those Who Live are the three persons of the Trinity (and in a deriva-
tive, secondary sense also the Trinity itself) and that the Divine Sophia is The 
Life they live and love. This chimes well with Sophia being a non-person and 
a non-hypostasis, but it agrees ill with Sophia’s supposed ability to love God. If 
the Divine Sophia is not alive after all (since those who live in the divine region 
are, it would seem, only the three persons of the Trinity and, in a derivative 
sense, the Trinity itself), how can Sophia love, if only in a non-personal, non-
hypostatic way?40
The way out of this apparent impasse is to hold that the Divine Sophia is not 
only The Life, the divine life, but also has subsistence (hence individuality), but 
subsistence in a weak sense—subsistence in the strong sense would be hypo-
staticness, which Sophia has not. This non-hypostatic subsistence enables it to 
live and to love, to be a subjectum (hypokeimenon) of life and love—albeit in a 
modified, a non-hypostatic sense. Thus, the »fine distinction« between subsist-
ent and hypostatic that question (I) addresses is, in fact, a distinction within 
the concept of subsistence itself: it is the distinction between weakly subsistent 
and strongly subsistent (or hypostatic).
This, of course, is not yet a sufficient answer to question (I): one would still 
like to know what the fine distinction between weak and strong subsistence 
consists in. Well, perhaps this distinction is primitive, undefined—in fact, in-
definable. Then, in order to get used to it, it may help to consider that it is 
not an ad hoc invention; for the ontological situation of the Divine Sophia 
is by no means a singularity. An analogue of it is found in juxtaposing the 
humans with humanity as hypostatized by the humans. In contrast to the hu-
mans themselves, humanity as hypostatized by the humans is not a hypostasis 
(for otherwise it would be a human being, which it is not); yet one can say that 
it subsists (and is, therefore, an individual), that it subsists in a weak sense. This 
makes it possible to say, in a modified sense, that humanity as hypostatized by 
the humans lives and loves (though it loves not always what it should love). In 
the normal sense, however, it neither lives nor loves; in the normal sense, the 
humans, its hypostases, live and love (and not always what they should love). 
It is precisely this latter fact which makes it also true to say that humanity as 
hypostatized by the humans is the (loving) life of (all) the humans.
40   On Sophia’s non-personal, non-hypostatic love of God, see Sophia: 35.
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5. The Divine Sophia and the Creaturely Sophia
Even more than his identification of the Divine Sophia with the divine life, 
Bulgakov’s identification of »her«—the unfolded Divine Ousia—with the 
divine world brings out Sophia’s unfoldedness, Sophia’s richness. The two iden-
tifications may, in fact, go side by side, as in the following quotation: »The life 
of God in His Divinity, or the divine world as an objective and living principle, 
is precisely what Scripture calls Sophia, or the Wisdom of God.«41 But each of 
the identifications also occurs by itself, without the other, which fact has al-
ready been demonstrated for »Sophia = the divine life« and which, as follows, 
is also demonstrated for »Sophia = the divine world«: »Sophia as the Divine 
world, as the fullness of Divinity […], is not only the Wisdom but also the Glory 
of God.«42 For the purpose of discerning the panentheism in Bulgakov’s work 
and the character of that panentheism, Bulgakov’s identification of the Divine 
Sophia with the divine world is rather more telling than his identification of 
»her« with the divine life. The former identification becomes especially reveal-
ing of Bulgakov’s views if one takes into account what »the Divine world, as the 
fullness of Divinity«—the (in Wisdom and Glory) unfolded Divine Ousia, the 
Divine Sophia—comprises: »Sophia, as the ›world‹ of God, represents a ›pan-
organism‹ of the ideas of all in the all,« and »[t]he divine Sophia, as the revela-
tion of the Logos, is the all-embracing unity, which contains within itself all the 
fullness of the world of ideas.«43 A very momentous conclusion follows: If the 
Divine Sophia, the divine world, contains all ideas (that is, all types, all forms 
in the Platonic sense), really all of them, then the divine world (Sophia) must 
be—among other things44—the prototype of the created world, of creation, of 
»the world« (in the usual acceptation),45 which means »that the species of 
created beings do not represent some new type of forms, devised by God, so to 
41   The Lamb of God: 107. Consider here once more (because the instance is particularly strik-
ing, occurring in one and the same sentence) Bulgakov’s letting the Divine Sophia be 
at once a life and something living. There is a way to make (some) sense of this (see the 
previous section), but straightforwardly understood it is nonsense: a life does not live, and 
something living is not a life.
42   The Lamb of God: 108.
43   Sophia: 59 and 69.
44   This caveat is justified in view of what Bulgakov himself says: »That inner self-revelation 
of God which is described as fullness in reference to his Wisdom and Glory can also be 
defined as the ›world‹ of God in reference to the personal life of the Deity itself.« (Sophia: 
59.) The ideas in the divine world that concern the personal life of the Deity—of the three 
persons of the Trinity—are presumably not exhausted by the ideas in the divine world 
that concern the created world.
45   See Sophia: 65.
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speak, ad hoc, but that they are based upon eternal, divine prototypes.«46 Thus, 
the ground of the (created) world is the Wisdom of God (the Divine Sophia). 
»To admit this,« Bulgakov says, »is to affirm, in a sense, the fundamentally di-
vine character of the world, based upon this identity of the principle of divine 
Wisdom in God and in the creature.«47 Furthermore, he comes to the conclu-
sion: »The world exists in God: ›For of him, and through him, and to him, are 
all things‹ (Rom. 11.36).«48
However, understood literally, this conclusion does not yet follow. What, at 
this point, is in literal acceptation reached (that is, if one has followed Bulgakov 
so far and accepts his views) is this: The prototypes of the species of the created 
world are (not literally in God, not literally in the Trinity, but literally) in the 
divine world, that is, in the unfolded Divine Ousia, in the Divine Sophia, and 
»the [created] world bears within it the image and, as it were, the reflection 
of the divine prototype.«49 From this piece of prosopon-theistic Platonism it 
does not follow that, in particular, the world in time and space is (or exists) 
in God, in the (sufficiently) literal sense that literal panentheism requires. 
A fortiori it does not follow that everything, the world qua totality of being (and 
not only the space-time world and its parts), is literally in God. There is, thus, at 
this point still a considerable gap that separates Bulgakov from true panenthe-
ism.50 In order to close the gap, it will be necessary to make one considerable 
compromise: We will have to allow that any given x is already literally in God if it 
is literally in the unfolded Divine Ousia, the Divine Sophia (which is not God, as 
has become amply clear by now), or else if it perfectly exemplifies (in particular, 
perfectly hypostatizes) something which is literally in the Divine Sophia. Thus, it 
is true (let’s say it is true)—literally true—that »God contained within himself 
46   Sophia: 70.
47   Sophia: 71.
48   Sophia: 72.
49   Sophia: 64.
50   Bulgakov, to boot, locally—see Sophia: 72—confuses panentheism with space-time-
panentheism: the doctrine that the space-time world (everything in space-time, including 
space-time itself) is in God. Space-time-panentheism is certainly not logically equivalent 
to space-time-pantheism: the doctrine that the space-time world is God. In harmony with 
this non-equivalence, Bulgakov accepts—at Sophia: 72—space-time-panentheism—to 
his mind there: panentheism—and rejects space-time-pantheism—to his mind there: 
pantheism. There is nothing wrong about this from the orthodox Christian standpoint; 
but Bulgakov is wrong to believe that this is the correct general attitude of a panentheist 
vis-à-vis pantheism (compare footnote 4); it cannot be correct if panentheism and pan-
theism are taken in their maximal and most reasonable—their »true«—conception (as 
they are taken in this essay and, on the whole, also by Bulgakov); for then they are, as we 
have seen, logically equivalent.
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before the creation of the world the divine prototypes […] of all creatures.«51 
But it is true in virtue of these prototypes being contained in the Divine Sophia 
(which, too, is in God, but not in the same sense in which the prototypes are in 
the Divine Sophia; a transitivity of in-being is out of the question here).
Bulgakov asserts that the (created) world »exists outside God« on the same 
page (Sophia: 72) where he also asserts that »[t]he world exists in God.« He is 
not contradicting himself, since, at this point, the world’s »existence in God« 
is not meant literally by Bulgakov (not even meant by him in the extenuated 
literal sense just introduced): as we have seen, it only means for Bulgakov that 
the created world is an image and reflection of the divine world, rather in the 
sense of Plato and Plotinus. Bulgakov states this view also in the following way, 
and thereby gives a decidedly prosopon-theistic (therefore non-Plotinian) and 
sophiological turn to it:
[I]n creating the world […] from ›nothing‹ God […], in the divine Sophia, unites 
the world with his own divine life. Insofar as the creature is able to bear it, God 
communicates Sophia, the creaturely Sophia, to creation. […] Sophia unites God 
with the world as the one common principle, the divine ground of creaturely 
existence. Remaining one, Sophia exists in two modes, eternal and temporal, di-
vine and creaturely.52
If this—this prosopon-theistic Platonism—were all there is in the direction of 
panentheism in Bulgakov’s thought, then Bulgakov could, after all, not really 
be counted as a panentheist. But it is not all, of course.
6. Bringing the (Created) World Home
The last quotation in the previous section suggests that the creaturely Sophia, 
Sophia in the temporal mode, is identical to the Divine Sophia, Sophia in the 
eternal mode. That the Divine Sophia and the creaturely Sophia are identical 
is, in fact, Bulgakov’s view53—a somewhat rash view. For is it really true that 
the entire unfolded Divine Ousia—the entire Divine Sophia, the entire divine 
world—is reflected in creation? On consideration, the view that the creaturely 
51   Sophia: 64.
52   Sophia: 73 and 74.
53   See Sophia: 76. Bulgakow is unaware that there is no paradox in an identity with rather 
different modes of givenness (as Frege would say) of the identicals; for this reason, he 
thinks that the (alleged) »identity in distinction, and distinction in identity« between the 
Divine and the creaturely Sophia »is the primary and ultimate antinomy of sophiology« 
(ibid.).
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Sophia is a proper essential part of the Divine Sophia—namely, that entirety 
within it which is reflected in creation—seems closer to the truth than the 
simple assumption of their identity (see footnote 44).
Now, the divine world and the Divine Sophia are perfectly congruous with 
each other, are even (necessarily) identical, as we have seen. Numerical iden-
tity, however, is out of the question for the created world and the creaturely 
Sophia, as long as the created world is what it is and not, per impossibile, some-
thing else than it is—and it must be emphasized in this context that the crea-
turely Sophia is called »creaturely« qua being reflected in creation, but not 
qua being created, since it is an essential—and presumably proper—part of 
the uncreated Divine Sophia; whereas the created world is indeed something 
created—something created from »nothing.« Perfect congruence, in contrast, 
is certainly not out of the question for the two (which are necessarily two): the 
created world and the creaturely Sophia. Yet, so far, the created world and the 
creaturely Sophia are not perfectly congruous with each other—far from it; 
they are only on the way to perfect congruence; at present, their congruence is 
only rather partially realized:
The fundamental mark of the created world is becoming, emergence, develop-
ment, fulfillment. […] The world of becoming must travel by the long road of the 
history of the universe if it is ultimately to succeed in [perfectly] reflecting in 
itself the face of the divine Sophia, and be ›transfigured‹ into it. The creaturely 
Sophia, which is the foundation of the being of the [created] world, […] is at 
present in a state of potentiality, dynamis, while at the same time it is the prin-
ciple of its [the world’s] actualization and finality.54
Here we have the dynamical and teleological—and therefore temporal—
aspect of Bulgakov’s panentheism (which aspect is absent in Spinoza’s). 
History is metaphysically important to Bulgakov—who did take biblical escha-
tology seriously and was, moreover, a receptive reader of the German idealists 
(of Hegel in particular). In fact, there is according to Bulgakov a predetermined 
end to history: this end is the perfect congruence of the created world with 
the creaturely Sophia, which congruence ultimately—at the end of time—
matches the eternal identity of the divine world with the Divine Sophia. The 
end of history is, in other words, the perfect (that is, as perfect as possible) ex-
emplification of the creaturely Sophia by the created world—»pan-entheosis, 
or simply pantheosis, the complete penetration of the creature by Wisdom,« 
54   Sophia: 75.
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as Bulgakov puts it.55 This is God’s predetermined plan for the created world, 
which plan, nevertheless, is not deterministic:
God shall be all in all, and divine Wisdom fulfilled in the created [world]. This 
accomplishment has an inner inevitability and predeterminacy, which yet does 
not suppress created freedom. For that freedom is not substantive but rather 
modal; it determines not the ›what‹ but the ›how,‹ not the existence and final 
issue of the cosmic process, but only the manner of its accomplishment.56
The end—panentheosis/pantheosis—is already fixed from eternity, the way 
to it is not, but is a matter of creaturely—specifically, of human—free choice 
in the course of time, in history. For this reason the arrival of »the end of the 
world« may take a longer or a shorter time:57 its date is not predetermined but 
depends on human freedom. There are, indeed, »limits to the penetration of 
creation by Wisdom, involved in its [creation’s] freedom to develop«58—but 
only temporary limits; for »freedom unto evil has no substantive foundation, 
no resources to endure to eternity, and sooner or later must inevitably wither 
before the radiance of Wisdom.«59
Evidently, Bulgakov’s panentheism is an eschatological panentheism. But 
what is the point of this metaphysical »arrangement«? What is its deep mean-
ing, which may win heads and hearts and dispose Christians (first of all, 
Bulgakov himself) to believe in it? Bulgakov himself anticipates an acute criti-
cal question: »Is not the creation of the world, as it were, a sort of duplication 
of the divine Sophia?«60 The first thing that can be said in seeking to answer 
these three questions is this: »God created the world only that He might deify 
it and himself become all in all to it.«61 Thus, creating the world is not merely 
a matter of »the force of God’s love overflowing beyond the limits of its own 
being to found being other than his own«62 (although it is a matter of that, too). 
For the love of God for the created world is of a peculiar kind (as the second-
to-last quotation intimates); it is a love that ultimately raises up: a love »to the 
end that he [God, in the person of the Son] might […] raise the creaturely up 
55   Sophia: 147.
56   Sophia: 146.
57   See The Lamb of God: 436-437.
58   Sophia: 126.
59   Sophia: 147.
60   Sophia: 76.
61   Sophia: 136.
62   Sophia: 73.
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to the heavenly«63 (as Bulgakov puts it, speaking of the ultimate purpose of the 
kenosis of the Lord).
Now, for God there is no raising-up (of anything at any time) without first 
having thrown down (something at some time): if the former is to be accom-
plished by him, the latter must have been done by him first. Thus, what John 
Donne writes at the end of his »Hymne to God my God, in my sicknesse« is 
entirely appropriate metaphysically: »Therefore that he may raise the Lord 
throws down.«64 God’s creating from nothing is, metaphysically, a throwing-
down. This wording certainly has a negative ring to it. There are considerations 
that more than justify that wording. The questions at the beginning of the pre-
ceding paragraph become especially disquieting if one considers that there is 
a dark side to the proposed metaphysical »arrangement«: When Bulgakov says 
(as already quoted above) that »[t]he fundamental mark of the created world 
is becoming, emergence, development, fulfillment,« he could have added—
and he would have told the truth—that a very conspicuous mark of the cre-
ated world is also destruction, submergence, degeneration, frustration. Bulgakov 
is not blind to this; he is not blind to negativity, to evil: he imputes it to human 
(and angelic) freedom.65 Yet, in view of what we know about the world, this 
imputation is rather hard to believe to be true; for destruction, submergence, 
degeneration, frustration—and the staggering amount of pain and suffering 
they entail—and death seem natural features of the world. They were present 
long before the appearance of humankind, and they would have been present 
even if humankind had never existed. Angels do not seem to have anything to 
do with them, and what these features certainly seem not to be (except for very 
minor parts of them) is »wages of sin« (cf. Romans 6:23). But if they are indeed 
natural, how can the consequence be avoided that God, in creating, intended 
them? Are they not, in the main, consequences of the inexorable rule of the 
laws of nature, in other words, of the laws of God (enforced by God)? It seems, 
thus, that the Lamb of God who takes away the sin of the world ( John 1:29) is 
not only the lamb who takes away the sins the world—more precisely speak-
ing, its inmates—committed (countlessly many, doubtless), but that it is also 
the lamb who takes away the sin the world is66—committed by the world’s cre-
ator, by creating and upholding it: a necessary sin, necessary for the realization 
of raising-up love (without which God, who is Love, the paradigm of love, could 
63   Sophia: 89.
64   Gardner 1982: 90.
65   Sophia: 145-147.
66   Note in this context that the original Greek (of John 1:29) has the singular »the sin,« not 
the plural »the sins«: ἴδε ὁ ἀμνὸς τοῦ θεοῦ ὁ αἴρων τὴν ἁμαρτίαν τοῦ κόσμου.
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not be),67 indeed of deifying love, but nevertheless a sin against the good, a 
wrong that must be righted.
7. Anthropocentric Panentheism
Bulgakov, however, appears to be far from these unorthodox ideas (although 
they are adumbrated in Schelling’s so-called Freiheitsschrift,68 which Bulgakov 
may have read). It is in their consequence that, like the creation and progression 
of the world to its end, so also the kenosis of the Son of God is a throwing-down 
(indeed, to the bottom of hell), but a throwing-down for love, terminating in 
a glorious raising-up. It is in their consequence that the divine-human drama 
of Christ, with its terrible climax and astounding anti-climax, is last but not 
least a just self-punishment of God for the sin of creating (a sin it seems to be, 
even though the creating is love-enabling), a divine expiation and atonement, 
which, in the end, becomes God’s true and glorious self-justification: the perfect 
theodicy—perfect not least because a form of love, raising-up love, is extended 
in it, first of all, to a person of the Trinity itself (which fact, without the drama, 
would not have existed); and perfect not least because amnesty and glorifica-
tion is handed to the sinning creature for free: raising-up love again—if the 
sinning creature wants it and accepts it. Bulgakov, however, seems far from 
these thoughts; instead, he merely repeats the orthodox Christian view (which, 
it would seem to me, is not the entire truth):
Many texts [of the New Testament] express the general idea that Christ offered 
the redemptive sacrifice in His blood and took upon Himself the sins of the 
world. This is a fact irrefutably attested by Scripture and just as irrefutably obvi-
ous for our immediate religious consciousness. In Christ we become reconciled 
with God. Christ is the intermediary for us; by faith in Him we recognize that we 
are justified before God.69
67   Love, and especially raising-up love, cannot be without negativity it overcomes, and an 
arena—the (created) world—is needed for negativity and the love by which it is over-
come. Thus it is quite true what Bulgakov says: »There is no God without the world« 
(The Lamb of God: 399), although there is no »natural necessity« to this world-God rela-
tion, only a »free ›necessity‹« (Sophia: 73): the necessity of love. Note, incidentally, that 
Bulgakov immediately adds the following remarkable coda to the sentence just quoted 
(from The Lamb of God): »and there is no world outside of God: the world is in God.«
68   The full title in English: Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom.
69   The Lamb of God: 343.
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This—the voluntary-scapegoat-soteriology, as one might term it—is the 
ground Bulgakov declares we (we human beings), and he among us, are stand-
ing on (though, of course, this is can be obvious to us only if we are Christians). 
It is a part of the conspicuous anthropocentrism of Bulgakov’s panentheism. 
This anthropocentrism goes much further than the anthropocentrism of the 
Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed, where we read that because of us human 
beings and because of our salvation the Son—»true god of [from; out of] true 
god,« but certainly a god in a different sense than the sense in which the en-
tire Trinity is God for Bulgakov—descended from heaven and became himself 
a human being and was crucified for us. Already in the Creed it is all for us 
and because of us. In fact, Bulgakov’s anthropocentrism not only exceeds the 
Creed’s, it exceeds also the Bible’s:
[H]umanity [i.e.: humankind, the entirety of the humans] was really made to 
be lord of creation. […] Through humanity, created Wisdom can inform the 
formless elements, the tohu-bohu of matter, until it becomes an extension of the 
human body [!]. […] [A]ll in history can and must be wrought out by human-
kind in human fashion. For in Divine-humanity is included the whole fullness of 
humanity [i.e., the ideal human form], with its freedom and creativity.70
The created world belongs to humanity [i.e., humankind]. […] Humanity […] is 
the representative of all creation […] In this sense we may say the world is hu-
manity, which includes in itself the formality of all the rest. […] God’s image in 
creation is the human form. […] This ›image‹ is the ens realissimum in humanity, 
it establishes a true identity [a perfect relation of representation?] between the 
image and its prototype, which involves not only the ›divinity‹ of humanity on 
account of the image of God in it, but also a certain ›humanity‹ of God.71
Bulgakov makes the proud statement (no doubt in humility): »There is some-
thing in human beings which is directly related to the essence of God [i.e., 
the Divine Ousia].«72 What is it? »It is no one natural quality, but our whole 
humanity, which is the image of God. […] It lies within us, something as yet 
unrevealed, yet surely to be revealed, if only when ›God shall be all in all‹ 
70   Sophia: 140 and 141. Note that Bulgakov is of course not advocating humanistic triumpha-
lism (be it capitalist or socialist): »The Satanic principle in humanity is only strengthened 
by its unspiritual technical conquest of nature ›in its own name.‹« (Sophia: 140.) What he 
really has in mind (ibid.) is »a good and true humanization of nature, accomplished in the 
name of Christ.«
71   Sophia: 77 and 78. There are two deviations from this truth: »The secularist divorce of 
the human from the divine principle in humanity, with its sequel in the idolatry of the 
human, is an error; but equally false is the denial of the human principle in the name of 
the divine.« (Sophia: 141.)
72   Sophia: 79.
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(1. Cor. 15.28).«73 Now, according to »the doctrine of Divine-humanity or of 
Sophia«74 (which, no doubt, is the same doctrine as »the doctrine of Sophia, 
the divine Wisdom in creation«75), »the fullness of Divine-humanity shall be 
attained, when God shall be all in all.«76 From these quotations (which under-
score the dynamic character of Bulgakov’s panentheism) and previous exposi-
tions in this essay it can be gathered (a) that Divine-humanity is identical with 
the Divine Sophia (which is thus provided with yet another identification,77 in 
addition to its identification with the unfolded Divine Ousia, with the Divine 
Ousia as hypostatized by God, with the divine life, and with the divine world) 
and (b) that, therefore, the ideal form of creaturely humanity is contained in 
Divine-humanity (since every ideal form is contained in the Divine Sophia: 
in Divine-humanity), but is not yet fully realized, though it will be. Moreover, 
in the perspective of Bulgakov’s anthropocentrism (see »the world is humanity 
[that is, is epitomized by humankind],« quoted above), this creaturely human-
ity is a perfect representation of the creaturely Sophia: »[Creaturely] humanity 
is78 the created form of divine Wisdom,79 which [i.e., divine Wisdom] is simply 
God’s nature revealing itself [i.e., the unfolded Divine Ousia].«80 In its pres-
ent appearance, creaturely humanity—and thereby the creaturely Sophia—
is seriously impaired by the defects of its exemplifiers (bearers, hypostases): 
»Obviously, in humans, created Wisdom is obscured by sin.«81 As has become 
amply clear, this will not remain so forever.
73   Sophia: 79.
74   Sophia: 102.
75   Sophia: 114.
76   Sophia: 112.
77   Further evidence for this identification: »[T]he Son and the Spirit […] are two, yet the 
bond which unites them appears in the one self-revelation they share in Sophia, alike in 
eternal Divine-humanity in God and in the appearing in time among human beings of the 
God-human.« (Sophia: 102.) Moreover, Bulgakov speaks of »heavenly humanity, Sophia« 
(ibid., 99). No doubt, he is using the shorter name »Sophia« in abbreviation of the longer 
»Divine Sophia« (as he often does).
78   This cannot well be the »is« of numerical identity, it must be the »is« of (perfect pars- 
pro-toto) representation; it can therefore be replaced by »represents.«
79   Bulgakov should have said »the creaturely part of divine Wisdom« instead of »the cre-
ated form of divine Wisdom.« For the creaturely Sophia, which he is here referring to, is, 
properly speaking, not created, though it is creaturely by being exemplified by creatures; 
and it is not a form but a part of the Divine Sophia (Bulgakov even proposes its identity 
with the Divine Sophia, as we have seen in section 6).
80   Sophia: 88. It is not accurate to say that God’s nature »reveals itself.« Properly speaking, it 
is revealed by its hypostases.
81   Sophia: 88.
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8. The Work of Salvation
Bulgakov anthropocentric sophiology—»Divine Sophia as humanity«82—is a 
panentheism which is Christian; being Christian, it has not only eschatological 
but also Christological, Pneumatological and Mariological aspects. What will 
be fully achieved in the end—that is: the pan(en)theosis, the perfect congru-
ence of the created world with the creaturely Sophia (via perfect creaturely ex-
emplification of the forms in the creaturely Sophia), the greatest ontologically 
possible union of the created world with the Divine Sophia,83 with the divine 
world—is begun in the middle of time. It is physically begun in a strictly local, 
merely exemplary fashion; but spiritually, already some all-embracing work, 
too, is begun at that time: the work of salvation (and theodicy, I would add), 
resulting (among other things) in the freeing of humankind, and thereby of all 
creatures, to the real possibility of being ultimately raised up, of being deified. 
It is the work of Christ in Sophia, with Mary and the Holy Spirit as necessary 
helpers:
According to the sophiological interpretation of the definition of Chalcedon, the 
two natures in Christ correspond to the two forms of Sophia, the divine and the 
created. The created humanity of Christ[,] the God-human[,] came to him from 
the Mother of God. It belongs to her. In a true sense it is possible to say that 
she herself personally is this created humanity of Christ, that she is the created 
Sophia. […] [I]t is in this sense, as sharing the human nature of the God-human, 
that his holy Mother is the created Sophia.84
She is created Wisdom, for she is creation glorified. In her is realized the purpose 
of creation, the complete penetration of the creature by Wisdom, the full ac-
cord of the created type [better: token] with its prototype, its entire accomplish-
ment. In her[,] creation is completely irradiated by its prototype. In her[,] God is 
already all in all.85
Here, as so often in Bulgakov’s texts, there is reason to deplore Bulgakov’s indis-
criminate use of the word »is,« with which he is prone to connect non-literal 
senses, to the considerable detriment of clarity of meaning. To put it straight: 
Mary is, literally, neither identical to created Wisdom, the created Sophia, nor 
82   Sophia: 79.
83   By perfectly exemplifying a form in—literally in—the creaturely Sophia, x is perfectly 
exemplifying a form literally in the Divine Sophia (the creaturely Sophia being literally a 
part of the Divine Sophia), and hence x is in God, literally in God, as we have stipulated (in 
section 5).
84   Sophia: 126-127.
85   Sophia: 126.
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to creation glorified, nor to Christ’s created humanity.86 All that can be said 
literally (and truly) is that she, first among all humans, perfectly exemplifies 
(namely, is a perfect hypostasis of) creaturely humanity, creaturely human 
nature (»Christ’s created humanity«), and that she thereby, due to the onto-
theological centrality of humanness (implicitly confirmed by the Chalcedonian 
dogma), is a perfect representation (a living symbol, an epitome) not only of 
creaturely humanity but also of the creaturely Sophia (because creaturely 
humanity—perfectly exemplified by Mary—is a representative part of the 
creaturely Sophia) and of creation glorified (because Mary—perfectly exem-
plifying creaturely humanity—is a representative part of creation glorified). 
Only in a non-literal, in a representational sense, can it be said that in Mary cre-
ation is »completely irradiated by its prototype«—that is, made perfect vis-à-
vis its ideal, the creaturely Sophia—and that in Mary »God is already all in all.«
Still non-literally, still merely representationally, but certainly in a more tell-
ing, more »encompassing« way than in Mary alone, God—for Bulgakov: the 
Trinity—is already all in all in the risen Christ; who risen (and raised up) is no 
longer kenotic and, anyhow (kenosis or not), has all the time (according to 
orthodoxy) been both a perfect hypostasis of the unfolded Divine Ousia (of the 
Divine Sophia, of Divine-humanity), just like the Father and the Holy Spirit, 
and a perfect hypostasis of creaturely humanity, just like Mary (»[h]er human-
ity became his [the Son’s] humanity«87). The Holy Spirit in this local and ex-
emplary beginning of pan(en)theosis, in this singularity in the middle of time, 
cannot be separated from Mary or from Christ; for the Annunciation and the 
Incarnation, in which the Holy Spirit essentially participates, are the beginning 
of that beginning:
In the Annunciation both the Word and the Spirit are sent from the Father to 
reveal Sophia to the world, and thus to reveal, in the earthly, the heavenly hu-
manity. The next point to note in this mystery is that the Spirit must come on 
the Virgin, and be accepted by her, before she can conceive and give flesh to the 
Word. […] In the Incarnation, the Son and the Spirit come down from heaven 
together, for the Spirit, who rests on the Son inseparably and unconfusedly, in 
his descent on the Virgin brings down the Word too in person, in virtue of which 
she, conceiving the Son, becomes the birthgiver of God.88
86   To repeat (see footnote 79): the use of the word »creaturely« instead of the word 
»created« would have been more adequate to the truth.
87   Sophia: 116.
88   Sophia: 101.
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In all of this, »[t]he originating Hypostasis throughout remains, as before in 
all missions ad extra, the Father.«89 Presumably, therefore, the Father knows 
what is the ground of the necessity of What is not assumed [by God] is not 
healed [redeemed by God]—the principle of Gregory of Nazianzus, which has 
almost universally (among Christians) been supposed to govern the mission 
of all missions. To a Christian (but not to a Jew or Muslim), the necessity of 
Gregory’s principle may at first seem obvious; on thinking about it, it may 
become more and more enigmatic. Why couldn’t God save (heal, redeem) us 
without assuming—in the second Divine Person—our nature? In contrast, the 
necessity of the following principle can only be, and remain, immediately evi-
dent: What is not thrown down [initially by God] is not raised up [ultimately by 
God]. Far as this latter principle may be from the Orthodox mind of Bulgakov 
(though apparently not from the Anglican mind of John Donne), it neverthe-
less seems worthwhile to rethink the mission of all missions in its light.90
9. Panpsychism?
Prima facie panpsychism is the thesis that everything has mental states. Since 
neither non-objects, nor abstract entities, nor merely possible entities, nor im-
possible entities seem at all capable of having mental states, and since it is not 
absolutely certain that there are no entities which are non-objects, no entities 
which are abstract, no entities which are merely possible, and no entities which 
are impossible, it is recommendable to formulate the thesis of panpsychism in 
a less general way than seems right prima facie, as follows: Every actual con-
crete object has mental states. Yet even this restricted version of panpsychism 
may still assert too much: Does an actually existing table or stone have mental 
states? That they have mental states seems somewhat doubtful. Perhaps the 
thesis of panpsychism should, therefore, be put in the following way: Every 
actual concrete object which is a fundamental entity has mental states.
No matter which of the three formulations of panpsychism is chosen, it is 
obvious that panentheism—the thesis that everything is in a god (this thesis 
being taken in its logically strong interpretation: see footnote 1)—does not 
logically entail panpsychism, nor is logically entailed by it. Nevertheless, it 
turns out that Bulgakovian panentheism is not without Bulgakovian panpsy-
chism. What Bulgakovian panentheism amounts to has been amply described 
in the previous sections. But what, now, is Bulgakovian panpsychism? The key 
89   Sophia: 102.
90   More on this matter can be found in Meixner 2017.
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to answering this question is the fact that the Divine Sophia—the unfolded 
divine essence—is alive and conscious for Bulgakov91 (because, according to 
him, it is alive and loving God: see section 4). We may take it that the creaturely 
Sophia, too—which Bulgakov identifies with the Divine Sophia (see section 6) 
and which, in any case, is certainly not something that could exist apart from 
the Divine Sophia—is alive and conscious for Bulgakov. Therefore, in the 
pan(en)theosis, when the created world will be brought into perfect congru-
ence with the creaturely Sophia (that is, will enter into its maximal ontologi-
cal nearness to the creaturely Sophia, and thereby also to the Divine Sophia), 
the created world—»nature,« »the cosmos«—will certainly be as alive and 
conscious as it can possibly be, in all its parts. However, the created world is 
alive—certainly in a consciousness-implying sense—even now, although this 
fact is presently obscured by sin, obscured to the point that the created world 
appears to be dead (and, doubtless, is dead in some measure). Bulgakov had a 
vision—or rather, a strong intimation—of the resilient aliveness of the creat-
ed world (and it proved to be the first step of his long way back to the Christian 
faith):
This was my first sight of the mountains. I looked with ecstatic delight at their 
rising slopes. I drank in the light and the air of the steppes. I listened to the rev-
elation of nature. My soul was accustomed to the dull pain of seeing nature 
as a lifeless desert and of treating its surface beauty as a deceptive mask. […] 
Suddenly, in that evening hour, my soul was joyfully stirred. I started to wonder 
what would happen if the cosmos were not a desert and its beauty not a mask 
of deception—if nature were not death, but life. If he existed, the merciful and 
loving Father, if nature was the vesture of his love and glory …92
This, if anything, is Bulgakovian panpsychism, and no doubt, it is orthodox 
panpsychism.
91   The Neo-platonic origin of this idea is obvious if one considers what Plotinus has to say 
about the νοῦς: »Admiring the world of sense as we look out upon its vastness and beauty 
and the order of its eternal march, thinking of the gods within it, seen and hidden, and 
the celestial spirits and all the life of animal and plant, let us mount to its archetype, to 
the yet more authentic sphere: there we are to contemplate all things as members of the 
Intellectual—eternal in their own right, vested with a self-springing consciousness and 
life—and, presiding over all these, the unsoiled Intelligence and the unapproachable wis-
dom.« (Plotinus 1991 [Ennead V.1, 4]: 351.) The Divine Sophia (with the creaturely Sophia 
as part of it) is—among other things it is—the Christian form of the pagan Neo-platonic 
νοῦς.
92   Bulgakov 1976: 10.
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Panentheism and Panexperientialism for Open  
and Relational Theology
Thomas Jay Oord and Wm. Andrew Schwartz
Open and relational theologies have a particular affinity for panentheism and 
panexperientialism (panpsychism). These theologies come in various forms, 
however. And scholars propose various forms of panentheism and panexperi-
entialism. Diversity reigns.
We begin this essay by describing open and relational theology. We also 
describe panentheism and panexperientialism, broadly understood. We note 
reasons why open and relational theists would be attracted to each. And we 
argue that panentheism and panexperientialism complement one another, al-
though a person could be attracted only to one.
Much of the essay argues for one form of open and relational theology we 
think makes the best sense overall. This form includes belief in a personal/
relational God, makes distinctions between God and creatures, affirms God ev-
erlastingly creates (thereby denying creatio ex nihilo), and offers a solution to 
the theoretical aspect of the problem of evil. Adopting panexperientialism and 
panentheism offers ways to overcome theoretical problems in contemporary 
thought, while arguably motivating adherents of the view to love (promote 
overall well-being).
1. Open and Relational Theology
The label »open and relational theology« serves as an umbrella designation 
for a family of theologies.1 This family shares at least two core convictions. The 
»open« aspect refers to the idea that both creatures and God experience the 
ongoingness of time. Consequently, both God and creatures face an open, 
yet to be determined future. Because the future is not actual, it is inherently 
1   These include theologies using labels such as open theism, process theism, various relational 
theologies, some Wesleyan theologies, some feminist theologies, some ecological theologies, 
some Arminian theologies, some postcolonial theologies, and more. Thomas Jay Oord coined 
the »open and relational theologies« label in 2001 when forming a group that meets annually 
at American Academy of Religion (AAR) meetings. Andrew Schwartz currently serves as the 
group’s chair.
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unknowable as actual. Open and relational theists believe God is time-full 
rather than timeless.2 Theistic presentists often adopt this view of divine 
time-fullness.
The open view is perhaps best known for rejecting the traditional view of 
exhaustive divine foreknowledge. That traditional view says God knows with 
certainty what happened in the past and present, and God foreknows the fu-
ture with certainty. Open theism rejects the portion of that view that says God 
foreknows the actual future with certainty. Most open theists maintain God is 
omniscient, however, because God knows all actual and potential events and 
beings. God knows everything knowable.
The »relational« aspect of these theologies refers to the give-and-receive 
interactions that characterize all existence. Creatures and other elements of 
creation relate with one another, in this sense of being causally influencing. 
God also engages in give-and-receive relations with others. Open and relation-
al theists reject classic theistic views of divine impassibility and immutability, 
which say God in all respects remains unaffected by creation and unchanging. 
Relational theists believe God relates experientially with creatures.
Open and relational theists typically embrace a set of other ideas. Most em-
phasize love as God’s primary attribute and the moral imperative for at least 
complex creatures.3 Most affirm some form of libertarian freedom, at least for 
God and complex creatures.4 This freedom is genuine but limited by the ca-
pacities of the agents and the influences in their environments. Most open 
and relational theists affirm some version of epistemological realism, whereby 
reality actually exists prior to one’s perception of it. This realism means, among 
other things, we can know something but not everything about God and the 
world.5 Open and relational theologians affirm differences and similarities be-
tween God and creation. Most believe creation matters, and what we do makes 
an ultimate difference. And so on.
Self-identified open and relational theists disagree among themselves 
on issues other than the ideas we have noted. Some reject creatio ex nihilo, 
for instance, while others affirm it.6 Some affirm the salvation of nonhuman 
2   For arguments on God as »time-full,« see Oord 2010a.
3   See Wynkoop 1972.
4   See Pinnock 2005.
5   When we speak of the »world« as that which God relates, we mean the cosmos most broadly 
(i.e. reality) and do not intend to restrict this relation to planet Earth and its residents—
although Earth and its inhabitants are certainly part of this broader cosmos. The same is true 
when we refer to »creation.«
6   See Thomas Jay Oord, ed. Theologies of Creation: Creatio Ex Nihilo and its New Rivals (New 
York: Routledge, 2019).
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creatures, but others do not. Some stress the importance of traditional views 
of Trinity; others seek novel Trinitarian formulations; still others eschew 
Trinitarian ideas. Some place special emphasis upon the Bible as their primary 
source for knowledge of God, others emphasize the Bible less.
We see this diversity as a strength. Open and relational theologies avoid 
rigidity. Most in this tradition try to be humble in their claims about what 
we can know, even the core views of open and relational theology. But being 
humble is compatible with working boldly to make better sense of reality by 
speculating about God, creation, values, causation, relations, ethics, beauty, 
and more.
Given these general characteristics of open and relational theologies, we 
turn to two topics on which open and relational theologians differ among 
themselves: panentheism and panexperientialism.
2. God and the World: Panentheism
Many open and relational theists are attracted to panentheism. In fact, promi-
nent supporters of panentheism in the past and present fit comfortably under 
the open and relational label.7
Panentheism’s defining insight is that »all is in God.« This brief phrase has 
been interpreted in various ways.8 Thomas Jay Oord identifies more than a 
dozen interpretations of what »in« means to self-identifying panentheists. 
Some versions of panentheism are spatial, for instance, others comparative, 
some metaphorical, and still others causal. This diversity indicates a lack of 
clarity, but a measure of imprecision and disagreement are understandable 
given the subjects in question: God and everything else!9
7   Among the many examples that could be listed, we note especially Ian Barbour, Bradley 
Artson, Joseph Bracken, Philip Clayton, John Cobb, Carol Christ, John Culp, Roland Faber, 
Matthew Fox, Benedikt Göcke, Neils Gregersen, David Ray Griffin, Charles Hartshorne, Nancy 
Howell, Catherine Keller, Michael Lodahl, Jay McDaniel, Sallie McFague, Jürgen Moltmann, 
Thomas Jay Oord, Arthur Peacocke, Wm. Andrew Schwartz, Marjorie Suchocki, Donald 
Wayne Viney, Keith Ward, Michel Weber, Kirk Wegter-McNelly, Alfred North Whitehead, and 
Anna Case Winters.
8   For an example of this variety of panentheism meanings, see Clayton and Peacocke 2004. See 
also Barbour 1990, Cooper 2006, Gocke 2013, Jantzen 1984, Peacocke 1979 and 2004, Peterson 
2001, and Ward 2007.
9   See Oord’s comments in In Whom We Live and Move and Have our Being: Panentheistic 
Reflections on God’s Presence in a Scientific World (Oord 2004). R.T. Mullins also addresses the 
problem of various definitions in »The Difficulty with Demarcating Panentheism« (Mullins 
2016).
234 Thomas Jay Oord and Wm. Andrew Schwartz
We think panentheism, at a minimum, says creation is in God’s all-embracing, 
moment-by-moment experience. Being in God’s experience implies that God is 
experiential and affected by creaturely others. God is passible. Panentheism 
differs from theologies of passibility that claim only humans or complex crea-
tures affect God’s experience. It says all actual entities affect God’s passible 
experience. Although saying creatures affect God does not require believing 
deity is personal, most open and relational theists think of God this way.10
Saying creation affects God directly opposes the classic views of divine im-
passibility and immutability. Theologians like Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, 
and John Calvin thought God was unaffected and unchanging in all respects. 
To them, this is the essence of divine perfection. Augustine explains it this way, 
»There is no modification in God, because there is nothing in him that can 
be changed or lost … he remains absolutely unchangeable.«11 Carl F.H. Henry 
states the view succinctly: »God is perfect and, if imperfect, can only change 
for the worse.«12
The 20th century’s leading proponent of panentheism, Charles Hartshorne, 
believed classical theism was partly right. God’s essence is perfectly unchang-
ing and unaffected. But a fuller sense of divine perfection adds that God’s expe-
rience perfectly changes because God is affected by creation.13 Nearly all open 
and relational theists agree with Hartshorne. Some use the label »dipolar« 
theism to describe this. Thomas Jay Oord calls it God’s »essence-experience 
binate.«14
Open and relational thinkers point to God’s steadfast but relational love to 
illustrate this double perfection. God’s love is steadfast in the divine essence, 
because God consistently loves creation. This never changes. But insofar as 
love involves giving and receiving, God’s loving experience changes in dynamic 
relationship with creation. God is the »most moved mover,« to use Abraham 
Heschel and Clark Pinnock’s description of divine passibility.15
The Psalmist points to both forms of perfection: God »repents according to 
the abundance of his steadfast love« (Ps. 106:45). To »repent« means to change; 
10   As will be explored more fully below, consciousness and personhood is not a prerequisite 
for »experience« as outlined by Griffin and other panexperientialists.
11   Augustine 2012.
12   Henry 1982: 304. For another who endorses the argument that God cannot change in any 
sense, see Charnock 2015.
13   Hartshorne 1984: 2.
14   Many process-oriented theists prefer the »dipolar theism« label. Charles Hartshorne 
raised the label to prominence. For instance, see his essay »The Dipolar Conception of 
Deity« (Hartshorne 1967) and Viney 2007.
15   Pinnock: 2001.
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»steadfast« means to change not. God’s love involves both forms of perfection: 
perfect flexibility and perfect stability.16
3. Immanence and Transcendence
Advocates and opponents of panentheism use the labels »immanence« and 
»transcendence« to portray God and creation. Diversity reigns in the use and 
meanings of these words, however, so confusions abound.
Most open and relational theologians stress God’s nearness. God is with us. 
When immanence and transcendence are understood spatially, panentheism 
affirms divine immanence: God is present to all creation. But the spatial mean-
ing of panentheism is controversial. Opponents of panentheism also believe 
an omnipresent God is near to all. Despite the ambiguity, many advocates of 
panentheism emphasize this view of immanence as motivating their prefer-
ence for this view of the God-world relationships.17
The spatial distinction sometimes relies upon the mode of God’s knowing 
creation. Theologians who affirm God’s impassibility in all respects often say 
God knows creation by »seeing« it. »The eyes of the Lord are on all creation« 
(Prov. 15:3). This metaphor implies a distance between the seer and the objects 
seen. By contrast, open and relational theologies often stress God’s »feeling« 
or »relating with« all creation. God »is not far from each one of us; for in [God] 
we live and move and have our being« (Acts 17:27-28). Experiential knowledge 
implies God’s near and direct presence.
Theologians sometimes use immanence and transcendence language to 
describe God’s relation to time. If immanence points to God »in« time (pan-
temporal) and transcendence to God »outside« time (nontemporal), open and 
relational thinkers opt for God’s experience as immanent. God experiences 
the unfolding of reality in sequential moments, analogous to how creatures 
experience it. Open and relational theologians affirm, however, that God tran-
scends creatures by existing everlastingly.
The version of panentheism we embrace also says that God is aware, pur-
posive, responsive, and partly free. These elements support the view God is a 
person or personal, although many open and relational theologians prefer to 
say God is »relational.« Unfortunately, »personal« connotes the notion of a 
localized body (»see that person over there?«) or preferential treatment (»why 
16   See especially Oord 2010: chs. 3-5.
17   For instance, see Davis and Clayton 2018.
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does she get a personal trainer?«). We think God is an incorporeal, omnipres-
ent Spirit who loves all creation without playing favorites.18
Open and relational thinkers differ among themselves on whether God nec-
essarily or contingently experiences creation. Those who say God’s relations 
with the world are metaphysically contingent typically believe God once ex-
isted alone and decided to create the universe out of nothing (ex nihilo). God’s 
relationality with creation is contingent on God choosing to create and be in 
relation with creaturely others. In this view, primacy is given to God’s freedom 
from creation. Insofar as an act of love is free, some argue, God must be free to 
love or not love. Many in this group think God essentially relates within Trinity 
and contingently relates to creation.19
Open and relational thinkers who say God necessarily relates with creatures 
typically believe God has always been creating and relating with creaturely 
others. They deny God once existed alone and decided to create from absolute 
nothingness. On this second view, God essentially loves and relates to creation. 
A few in this group believe God essentially relates both with creation and in 
Trinity, making God doubly essentially related and loving.20 God is not free 
whether to love creaturely others, because God’s nature requires such love. But 
God is free to decide how to love creaturely others.
Despite these variations, open and relational theists typically agree with 
Charles Hartshorne when he says, »The primacy of love means that there is 
no possible value that any being could have simply in and by itself, or simply 
by its own decision.«21 In other words, love is necessarily relational, whether 
between creatures, between God and creatures, and/or within the Triune self.
4. Theocosmocentrism
We find most plausible the form of panentheism that says God necessarily or 
essentially relates to creation. To distinguish our view from other forms, we call 
it »theocosmocentrism.« As we define it, this view affirms an epistemological 
18   Open and relational theologians in the Latter-day Saints (Mormon) tradition believe God 
has a localized body. We do not follow this tradition, opting for the more widely embraced 
view that God is an incorporeal spirit (pneuma or ruach).
19   For example, see Bracken 2004, and Clayton 2005.
20   Thomas Jay Oord explores doubly necessary divine relations in The Nature of Love. (Oord 
2010a) For an argument focused on Jesus as the key insight for such double necessity, see 
Moltmann 1993.
21   Hartshorne, 1984.
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commitment that both God (theo) and creation (cosmos) are central to under-
standing reality.
Most theists deny that anyone can offer an overall adequate explanation 
of creation without reference to God. Theocosmocentrism agrees. But it adds 
that one also cannot offer an overall adequate explanation of God without ref-
erence to creation. We cannot know God well without God’s revelation in the 
world. While God comes logically first and is not co-equal with creation, both 
the Creator and creatures play necessary roles in understanding existence. This 
view plays an important role in how one thinks about issues in the science-
and-theology dialogue.
The epistemological commitment of theocosmocentrism entails ontologi-
cal commitments as well. This view of panentheism says God necessarily loves 
and relates to creation. Unlike forms of panentheism that say God’s love for 
creation is contingent or arbitrary, theocosmocentrism says God’s love for cre-
ation is an essential aspect of God’s eternal nature. »God is love,« from this 
perspective, means God essentially loves ad extra and not merely ad intra. And 
this is necessarily so everlastingly.
From the perspective of theocosmocentrism, the view that God once ex-
isted alone and then created from nothing (creatio ex nihilo) has numerous li-
abilities. We propose a doctrine of initial creation that says God always creates 
out of that which God previously created. God everlastingly creates. We might 
call the view creatio ex creatione sempiternaliter en amore (God creates out of 
creation everlastingly in love) if we want the Latin. God is ever Creator, not the 
at-one-time-started-to-create Creator.
Attributing necessarily divine properties is common (if not logically neces-
sary) for Christian theologians. The idea God everlastingly creates says creat-
ing is an essential attribute for God. We resist the label »infinite regress« to 
describe our view, however. »Infinite« says nothing positive; it simply says »not 
finite.« We prefer »everlastingly« to describe a beginningless and unending se-
quence of God’s creating activity.22 »Regress« suggests backward causation, 
which we reject. We argue time necessarily flows forward, so creating is always 
progressive.
Rejecting creatio ex nihilo allows one to reject the problematic view of divine 
power implied in it. The God who creates from nothing is ultimately responsi-
ble for setting up all cosmological laws of existence, deciding them by fiat. This 
God could break those laws on occasion to prevent evil. The ex nihilo Creator 
could make something new in the present from nothing instantaneously to 
stop evil. A God with that kind of power is culpable for failing to prevent the 
22   For further analysis of divine infinity see, Göcke and Tapp (eds.) 2018.
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genuine evil we see in our lives, and therefore that God does not consistently 
love. To put it differently, because genuine evils occur that a loving God with 
creatio ex nihilo power ought to prevent, we reject God has ever or even could 
create ex nihilo. We also have biblical, ecological, conceptual, revelational, and 
scientific reasons to reject creation from nothing.23
Theocosmocentrism rejects traditional views of divine power that say 
God does or could unilaterally determine creatures or situations. Instead of 
conceiving of God’s power in terms of singlehanded coercion, this form of 
panentheism conceives of God’s power as persuasive, relational, and inviting. 
C. Robert Mesle describes this nicely: »God’s power is the power that enables 
all of reality to continue its creative advance that makes creatures free, that 
shares the experience of every creature and is experienced by every creature.«24
Thomas Jay Oord argues for an »essential kenosis« view of divine power. 
This view says God’s love is kenotic, in the sense of self-giving and others-
empowering. Love so conceived comes logically first in God’s nature, prior to 
the divine will. This means God is essentially self-giving and others empower-
ing, and God could not choose to be otherwise. Out of love, God must therefore 
give freedom, agency, self-organization, or existence to creatures (depending 
on their complexity). God cannot withdraw, override, or fail to provide crea-
tures or creation these capacities. In sum, God’s love makes God incapable of 
controlling others. Among other advantages, essential kenosis solves the cen-
tral conceptual question in the problem of evil: God does not have the power 
to prevent evil singlehandedly.
Theocosmocentrism says God essentially relates to creation. This is meant 
in two distinct but complementary ways. First, insofar as God’s nature is love 
and love requires relations with others, God necessarily relates with others. 
These »others« at least include creation if not also relations within Trinity.
Second, theocosmocentrism says existence is constituted by relations. In so 
far as the structure of existence is relational, God—like all existing beings—is 
necessarily relational. While the Creator differs from creatures in many ways, 
the meaning of »relates with« applies to both. Just as there was no absolute 
beginning to God’s creative activity, God has also always been relating to all 
23   A brief explanation: the Bible doesn’t explicitly reveal creatio ex nihilo, it’s hard to be mo-
tivated to save ecosystems or the planet from collapse if God can create another universe 
ex nihilo, we know of no empirical examples of ex nihilo and the ancient phrase seems to 
ex nihilo nihil fit apply, the God with ex nihilo power is capable of providing and preserv-
ing inerrant revelation, and the amount of dark energy and dark matter in the universe is 
apparently inconsistent with big bang cosmologies tied to creatio ex nihilo.
24   Mesle 1993: 14.
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others: past creation, present creation, Godself, and future creation when it 
comes into being.
5. Ontological Distinctions between God and Creation
Critics sometimes accuse forms of panentheism of failing to distinguish God’s 
ontology from creation’s.25 Because of their emphasis upon divine immanence, 
panentheists are sometimes charged with anthropomorphism. Such criticisms 
apply to some forms of panentheism but not all. Theocosmocentrism makes 
careful ontological distinctions between the Creator and creation.
Theocosmocentrism describes a God who transcends creatures in many 
ways. For instance, it says God is everlasting: God had no beginning and 
will have no end. By contrast, all creatures, worlds, or universes have begin-
nings and ends. This form of panentheism says God is omnipresent, in the 
sense of being present to all creation. By contrast, creatures are localized.26 
Theocosmocentrism says God is transcendent by existing necessarily; crea-
tures exist contingently.27 It says God necessarily loves, although how God 
loves is freely contingent. Creatures capable of love must choose both whether 
and how to love. As noted above, theocosmocentrism affirms a form of tran-
scendence most theologies do not: it says God everlastingly creates. Creatures 
temporarily create as created co-creators in response to God.28 Like most the-
ologies, this form of panentheism affirms the transcendence of divine omni-
science: God knows all that can be known.29 Creatures are not omniscient.
Theocosmocentrism says God is distinct numerically from any creature and 
creation as a whole. The being of God is not the being of creation; the world 
is not literally God’s body. This numerical difference does not mean spatial 
25   For instance, see Cooper 2006.
26   While the spatially location of creatures is distinctive, it’s important to avoid thinking of 
this location in terms of atomicity, permanence, or individual independence. Doing so is 
to commit the fallacy of simple location, as Alfred North Whitehead called it.
27   To clarify, while particular creatures exist contingently, the notion of God as ever Creator 
implies that some non-particular creatures (abstractly) or another exist necessarily. Like a 
woman who exists everlastingly but is always married to temporarily existing men—each 
man being born and dying in succession—God exist everlastingly and creates and relates 
with contingent creatures—each being temporary.
28   Given that theocosmocentrism redefines God’s power as relational (not unilateral), all 
acts of divine creation can be understood as acts inviting cooperative co-creation.
29   Particular creatures always »know« as particular creatures, always in a particular context 
from a particular perspective. Therefore, the epistemic limits to creaturely knowledge are 
tied to the ontological limits of creatures as embodied and spatially-temporally located.
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distance, as if God were watching creation from somewhere else. God is dis-
tinct from and not the same as creation, but God relates directly with creation. 
God necessarily exists (a se) but necessarily relates to creation. This interde-
pendent and essential relationality of God and the world is a unique marker of 
theocosmocentric panentheism.
God and creation share some similarities. Without such sharing, abso-
lute apophatism would be true. Such similarities prompted Alfred North 
Whitehead to say God is »not an exception to the metaphysical principles« 
of reality.30 For instance, God and creatures are experiencing beings, and cre-
ation is comprised of experiencing entities. God and creatures perceive others, 
although as we will explain later, this perception is nonsensory. God and crea-
tures both exert causal influence. The formal definition of love applies both 
to God and creatures capable of love, but there exist differences in degrees, 
expressions, and modalities.31
In sum, theocosmocentrism offers a matrix of claims about God’s transcen-
dence and immanence in relation to creation.32 The content of this matrix dis-
tinguishes it from other forms of panentheism. A full explication of this matrix 
extends beyond the constraints of this essay.
6. The Experiencing Aspect of Panexperientialism
Open and relational thinkers believe that at least complex creatures experi-
ence God. The most complex sometimes experience God with a measure of 
cognitive awareness. But open and relational thinkers differ among themselves 
30   Whitehead 1978 (1929): 343.
31   Some of the most systematic and comprehensive work on formal definitions of love can 
be found in Thomas Jay Oord’s works, including Science of Love: The Wisdom of Well-Being 
(2004), The Nature of Love: A Theology (2010a) and Defining Love: A Philosophical, Scientific, 
and Theological Engagement (2010b). In Defining Love, Oord offers a formal definition of 
love, stating, »To love is to act intentionally, in sympathetic response to others (including 
God), to promote overall well-being« (15).
32   Roland Faber argues for an alternative view of panentheism worth particular note. To 
capture an often-overlooked nuance in Whitehead’s views of the God-word relationship, 
Faber speaks of the notion of mutual immanence as mutual transcendence. He proposes 
a new term »transpantheism.« As Faber notes, God and the world »exceed one another, 
and only for that reason, can be seen by Whitehead to be mutual instruments of novelty 
for one another« (The Divine Manifold [2014] and The Becoming of God [2017]). Because 
we think God and creation are ontologically distinct in the sense of their not being 
identical (pantheism), we affirm that creation exists in different ways than God exists. 
Consequently, Faber’s transpantheism is compatible with theocosmocentrism, and both 
are forms of panentheism.
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on the precise meaning of »experiencing.« They also differ on which creatures 
are capable of experiencing in general and experiencing God in particular. 
Some distinguish between humans and other creatures, others between ani-
mate and inanimate creation. Some believe experience is an emergent phe-
nomenon arising at some time in the evolutionary process.33 Others believe 
all creatures and created entities—from the most complex to the simplest—
experience others. We count ourselves in this last group.
The view that all existing entities experience is often called »panpsychism.« 
The label is problematic, however, for several reasons. The »psych« in the pan-
psychism label might suggest all things—from quarks to rocks to cells to amoe-
ba to elephants to galaxies—have conscious experiences. We reject that view.
The »panpsychism« label also highlights the mental dimensions of existing 
entities without reference to the physical dimension we think present in all 
existing entities. One might think panpsychism is a form of idealism saying 
ideas are the only real things in the universe or that physicality is ultimately an 
illusion. By contrast, we think actual things possess physical aspects.
We prefer the word David Ray Griffin coined: »panexperientialism.« All ex-
isting entities are experiencing entities.34 Panexperientialism, as we conceive 
it, says all creatures have both mental and physical dimensions.35 Thomas Jay 
Oord calls this duality, »dual-aspect monism.« One of panexperientialism’s 
great strengths is its ability to account for what’s true about both physicalism 
and idealism, while overcoming the shortcomings of the reductionist forms of 
these metaphysical views.
Key to understanding dual-aspect monism is distinguishing between 
how the creatures and things of the world are organized internally. Charles 
Hartshorne referred to some creatures as »compound individuals« and other 
things as »aggregates« (or aggregational societies).36 With some exceptions, 
we might say existing things are organized as animate and inanimate.37
Animate creatures have some central entity around which the individu-
als and groups comprising those creatures organize. In humans, we call this 
33   For example, see Clayton 2006.
34   Griffin first coined the term »panexperientialism,« in his article »Panexperientialist 
Physicalism and the Mind-Body Problem,« (1997).
35   We distinguish between »actual« entities and »real« entities. All actual entities are real, 
but not all real entities are actual. Real but not actual entities include the color blue, 
mathematical equations, and the (current) possibility that Andrew Schwartz will one day 
become president of the United States.
36   Hartshorne 1970: 90.
37   Some things in the world have both animate and inanimate dimensions. Plants are per-
haps the best examples of these things. Other entities are real but don’t actually exist. 
Possibilities are good examples of real but not actually existing entities.
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central member the mind. But in less complex creatures, the organizing entity 
might be far less complex. Examples of animate creatures include dolphins, 
dogs, mice, worms, and cells. But »even macromolecules, ordinary molecules, 
and atoms might be supposed to be compound individuals,« argues Griffin.38
Aggregates, by contrast, are inanimate. They have no central member and 
are therefore not organized as individuals. Consequently, inanimate objects 
cannot act or respond as a whole. Examples include buildings, chairs, rocks, 
plastic, and water. An inanimate object has no »overall experiential unity that 
allows it to feel and act as an individual,« explains Griffin. Because an inani-
mate object has no experiential unity, it has no power to respond to its envi-
ronment as a unity.39 To put it differently, an inanimate entity cannot act qua 
inanimate entity, but its individual constituents do act.
The distinction between animate individuals and inanimate aggregates 
proves important for talking appropriately about diverse creatures and enti-
ties in creation. We rightly say mice respond to stimuli, for instance, but rocks 
don’t. »Respond« implies a degree of unity, agency, and freedom, although it 
may be small. Mice have a central member around which much of their being 
organizes. The rock as a whole cannot respond. While the smallest entities that 
comprise a rock are themselves experiential, they are not organized around 
a central member. Consequently, humans, dolphins, dogs, mice, worms, cells, 
and molecules experience their environments and respond. But buildings, 
chairs, rocks, plastic, and water do not experience their environments and 
respond.
As implied in our reservations about the label »panpsychism,« we distin-
guish between mentality and conscious experiences. We use »mentality« in a 
very broad way, of which conscious mentality is a rare case. Only the most com-
plex creatures enjoy conscious experiences. Simple but animate creatures and 
inanimate objects do not experience consciousness.40 The capacity for con-
sciousness emerged in evolutionary history smoothly from less complex spe-
cies with mentality but not consciousness. We call this »smooth emergence.«41
Complex creatures capable of conscious experience represent a minis-
cule percentage of entities known to exist. Conscious experience represents 
a minuscule percentage of the experiences of conscious beings. For example, 
38   Griffin 1998: 186.
39   Griffin 1998: 186.
40   We prefer the term »non-conscious« to »sub-conscious,« because sub-conscious implies 
consciousness in a way that would either require assigning consciousness to entities like 
rocks, or denying that rocks have experiences. We believe the term non-conscious allows 
a way to speak of rock experiences without imply rock consciousness.
41   We are grateful to Joanna Leidenhag for suggesting this label in private conversations.
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humans are not conscious of the vast majority of their bodily experiences 
(from basic activities like breath to interactions on a cellular level). But they 
are conscious of some of their experiences.
7. Duality without Dualism
Understandably, many people want to avoid dualistic views that lead to insur-
mountable conceptual difficulties. To this point in the essay, we’ve explored 
ideas that speak of dual components. In this section, we explain that these 
ideas involve dualities. But they avoid insurmountable conceptual difficulties 
inherent in dualism. In fact, they overcome those dualisms.
One way to speak of dualities without dualism is to speak of distinctions 
without absolute separation. A coin, for instance, has both heads and tails. 
These are distinct but part of the same coin. If they weren’t distinct, the coin 
toss at the Super Bowl’s beginning would be useless.
Dualities as distinctions are present throughout reality. God and creation 
are distinct yet, according to theocosmocentrism, inseparable: duality without 
dualism. Panexperientialism says the physical and mental dimensions of all 
existing things are distinct but inseparable: dual-aspect monism.42
We addressed earlier problems that arise from an absolute God-world du-
alism that leads to apophatism. We believe that although God transcends 
creation in some respects, God and creatures share other respects. We also 
rejected the God-world dualism that says God’s relations with creation are in 
all senses metaphysically contingent. We said God necessarily or essentially 
relates with creation. Rejecting creatio ex nihilo leads to affirming a necessary 
God-world duality too. And so on.
Understanding how our minds and bodies relate has been a central con-
cern since at least the seventeenth century. The problem derives from com-
monsense experience. We naturally believe we have minds that experience the 
world. And we naturally believe our bodies influence our minds. But how can a 
purely mental and nonphysical thing—a mind—interact with purely physical 
and nonmental things—the constituents of our bodies?
Reductive physicalist views say existence is purely material/physical. If 
true, such physicalism allows no room for explaining our unity of experi-
ence, sense of freedom, values, and more. If humans are entirely comprised 
of physical entities with no mental dimensions, we have no way of explaining 
42   Alfred North Whitehead describes actual entities as »dipolar,« consisting of both a physi-
cal and mental pole (Whitehead 1978[1929]: 239).
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unified conscious experience.43 Sometimes referred to as the »hard problem 
of consciousness,«44 the challenge for physicalists is explaining the empirical 
data we know best: our conscious experiences.
Idealist views come in various forms, but some suggest reality consists en-
tirely of mentality and ideas. If true, such idealism allows no room to explain 
how the apparently physical world outside our minds exerts physical influ-
ence. The world explored by science seems comprised of physical things in-
dependent of our minds. The challenge for at least some forms of idealism 
is explaining the physical world as actually physical and not our mental con-
struct or simply ideas.
In response, many affirm a form of mind-body dualism we reject. This 
mind-body dualism says we have purely mental minds that interact with pure-
ly physical bodies and other entities in the world. How two entirely different 
things can be causally influential—what Jaegwon Kim calls »the combination 
problem«45—remains a mystery. Rene Descartes appealed to the pineal gland; 
others appeal to the unilateral action of God.
The dual-aspect monism of panexperientialism overcomes Cartesian mind-
body dualism. It rejects the view that our minds are purely mental and our 
bodies and other entities purely physical. Dual-aspect monism affirms the du-
ality of the physical and mental in each existing thing: our minds have both a 
mental and physical aspect, and every entity, cell, organ, and member of our 
bodies and other entities in the world have mental and physical aspects.46
In so far as dual-aspect monism attributes a physical dimension to the mind, 
it naturalizes it.47 In so far as dual-aspect monism attributes a mental dimen-
sion to all physical entities, it offers a robust form of non-reductive physicalism 
to account for mentality. In so far as dual-aspect monism is central to smooth 
emergence, it provides a conceptual account for the emergence of conscious-
ness from less complex entities with an iota of mentality but not consciousness.
Panexperientialists often call their view »organismic.«48 This word points 
to the relational, experiential, and vital aspects of the view. In biology, for 
43   We would extend this to include other (non-human) conscious entities as well, though for 
dualists like Descartes, only humans are thought to have a »mind/soul.«
44   See Chalmers 1995.
45   Kim 2005.
46   While non-dualism is much more common in Eastern philosophy (e.g. Śaṅkara’s Advaita 
Vedānta, Rāmānuja’s Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta), many Western philosophies have been non-
dual in orientation (e.g. most forms of Christian mysticism, Whitehead’s philosophy of 
organism).
47   Griffin 1998: 78.
48   In Process and Reality, Alfred North Whitehead refers to his work as a »philosophy of 
organism.«
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instance, organisms are alive and dynamic, always adapting to their surround-
ings. In social terms, organisms are interdependent parts that make up a 
whole. In these cases and more, the language of organism connotes a sense of 
relational becoming, which appeals to open and relational thinkers.
Organismic views stand in contrast to mechanistic ones. Mechanistic 
views connote substantival, nonrelational, and nonexperiential ontologies. 
Unfortunately, much contemporary philosophy of science adopts the mech-
anistic worldview. Despite acting with purpose, feeling, and consciousness, 
many scientists assume the world and its creatures have no purpose, feeling, 
or mentality. The dual-aspect monism of panexperientialism overcomes this 
self-contradiction.
We readily admit that we cannot prove in a deductive way the truth of dual-
aspect monism or panexperientialism. We cannot deduce from first principles 
that experience-based and organismic ontologies are truer explanations of ex-
istence than substance-based and mechanistic ontologies. There is no proof 
that every existing individual and entity is or is not comprised of mentality and 
physicality. We do find advantages to panexperientialism, however, that com-
bined with theocosmocentrism lead us to prefer it to alternatives.
8. Some Advantages to Our Views
Panexperientialism and theocosmocentrism account well for reality. We’ve 
already mentioned several advantages above. In this section, we list several 
more.
Ecological advantage: A growing number of people believe creatures great 
and small deserve respect and protection. This deserving is based not just on 
the value these creatures have for human flourishing. A growing number of 
people believe all creatures have value in and for themselves; they are intrin-
sically valuable. Recognizing the intrinsic value of creation initiates a funda-
mental shift from the commodification and exploitation of natural resources.
Panexperientialism provides a conceptual framework for affirming the sense 
that all creation and all creatures possess intrinsic value. Panexperientialism 
says not only that all creature’s experience, but it also says all experiences are 
valuative. In so far as an entity is a subject, it feels values. In so far as an entity 
is an object, it offers values that others feel. Values are thus understood as in-
trinsic qualities of reality. Those who care about animals and the environment 
have panexperientialism as a conceptual ally.
Evolutionary consistency advantage: The evolutionary picture of real-
ity says increasingly complex creatures emerged over long periods. This 
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emergence was gradual; it occurred as the result of mutations, environmental 
factors, self-causation, and (in the opinion of theists) divine action. A puzzle 
arises, however: How can experiencing creatures like ourselves (and apparent-
ly other complex organisms) gain the ability to experience from nonexperienc-
ing simpler entities? Some call this puzzle the »genetic problem« in evolution.
So-called »strong emergentists« claim that in some mysterious way, the con-
ditions in and among species became complex enough for simple creatures to 
attain the ability to experience. This claim feels like a wave of the hand, how-
ever, much like the compatibilist purporting God fully controls creatures and 
yet they are free.
Panexperientialism does not relay on such hand waving. It affirms smooth 
emergentism, because experience—with its dual-aspect monism—is present 
all the way down to the smallest entities of existence. What emerges, therefore, 
are increasingly complex expressions of experience, with conscious experienc-
es emerging only in the most complex creatures.
The mind-body advantage: It bears repeating that panexperientialism over-
comes the Cartesian mind-body problem. Instead of separating mind from 
body by saying one is entirely mental and the other entirely physical, panex-
perientialism unites mind and body. It recognizes mentality and physicality 
as two dimensions of all existing beings. For more details, see our discussion 
above.
The other minds advantage: Philosophers have long realized the impor-
tance linked to each person thinking that others have minds something like 
their own. This »analogy of other minds« is crucial for communication, deep 
relationship, and moral responsibility. We cannot know with certainty other 
minds exist, of course, but there are powerful reasons to infer their existence. 
Our writing this essay is an exercise in such inference!
Panexperientialism allows us to infer the possibility of minds in human 
and some nonhuman animals. It thereby provides a conceptual framework for 
overcoming solipsism. And it helps us make far better sense of the activities, 
habits, motives, and expressions we experience in other creatures. This pro-
vides a conceptual basis for believing others are morally responsible in some 
ways similar to how we consider ourselves. It provides a conceptual basis for 
political engagement, scientific programs, and so much of what we take for 
granted in our lives. Reductive physicalist views provide no such basis.
The freedom and agency advantage: For a number of reasons, many have 
come to believe complex creatures—at least humans—have genuine but lim-
ited free will. This sense of freedom arises in nearly every human, because they 
sense it of their own experience. It appears that less complex creatures exert 
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some measure of agency. Simple entities seem capable of self-organization. 
Even at the quantum level, a measure of indeterminacy seems present.
Panexperientialism makes sense of these degrees of freedom, agency, self-
organization, and indeterminacy. It says no entity, from the smallest to the 
largest, is entirely controlled by external forces. Because self-causation occurs 
from the smallest forms, what we typically call full-blown (but limited) free-
dom is possible through smooth emergence.49 Panexperientialism provides a 
conceptual framework to talk about degrees of self-causation among creatures 
of varying complexity.
The problem of evil advantage: The logical problem of evil (theodicy) is es-
sentially constituted of three propositions: 1. An all-loving God would want to 
prevent genuine evil; 2. An all-powerful God would be capable of preventing 
genuine evil; 3. Genuine evils occur. Given these, one could conclude (a) an all-
loving and all-powerful God does not exist, (b) God exists but is not all-loving, 
(c) God exists but is not all-powerful, or (d) God exists, but genuine evils do 
not occur.50
Among these possibilities, we prefer option »c.« We believe God’s power 
ought to be conceived in terms of uncontrolling love. This reconception re-
tains the view that God is the most powerful being (almighty) without claim-
ing God can singlehandedly control. A God incapable of such control is also 
not culpable for failing to prevent genuine evil.
The notion that God’s love is inherently uncontrolling fits nicely in the pan-
experiential framework. If degrees of experiential self-causation are present in 
the most complex creatures to the least and if God cannot control creaturely 
self-causation, evil can occur that God cannot prevent. Panexperientialism 
also provides a framework of essential relationality, in which God feels 
the pain of all creation upon its occurring. God is the fellow sufferer who 
understands.51 An open and relational theist of the theocosmocentrist variety 
49   We contend that freedom should always be understood as limited. At the very least, free-
dom is limited by space-time, history, and context. In so far as all agency is exerted by a 
particular physical entity in a particular place and time, in a particular historical, social, 
political context, the available possibilities that can be actualized at any given moment 
are limited. Hence, while freedom itself isn’t necessarily constrained, the possibilities that 
can be freely actualized at any given moment are limited.
50   One might include the claim of mystery in addition to these four, but that isn’t a solution 
to this problem.
51   Alfred North Whitehead famously called God the »fellow sufferer who understands« 
(Whitehead 1978 [1929]: 351).
248 Thomas Jay Oord and Wm. Andrew Schwartz
who adopts a panexperientialist perspective can affirm that all-loving God 
feels all pain but is not culpable for failing to prevent any of it.
The divine action advantage: Joining the dual-aspect monism of panexpe-
rientialism with the God-world relationship portrayed by theocosmocentrism 
offers a conceptual framework for identifying key features of divine action. 
Panexperientialism says God and all creatures are experiential. God and all 
creatures exhibit dual-aspect monism.
As a universal spirit, God has both a mental and physical aspect analogous 
to creaturely mental and physical aspects. The divine Spirit is similar to crea-
turely minds, in so far as both are not perceptible by our five senses but exert 
causal influence and receive causal influence. But Spirit differs from creaturely 
minds by being omnipresent, everlasting, and so on.
Just as our experiences are deeply shaped by the experiences of our bod-
ies (at various levels), so too God’s experiences are deeply shaped by creation. 
Just as the mind, with its physical and mental aspects, exerts influence on the 
body whose members also have physical and mental aspects, so the God with 
physical and spiritual aspects exerts influence on creation and creatures with 
physical and spiritual aspects.
Some call what we’re describing the »World-Soul« analogy, »the world 
as God’s body,« »God as the Mind of the Universe,« or »proprioception.«52 
Charles Hartshorne, for instance, says God as the world’s soul is analogous 
to the human mind’s relation to the body. »Mind-body relation is not a one-
to-one relation but a one-to-many relation,« says Hartshorne. »The body is a 
society of billions of cells, each a highly organized society of molecules and 
particles or wavicles. At a given moment, each of us, as a conscious individual, 
is a single reality; but our body is no such single realty.« Hartshorne then draws 
the analogy: »Similarly, God’s cosmic body is a society of individuals, not a sin-
gle individual.«53 Or as Dan Dombrowski puts it, »It makes sense to say both 
that the cosmos is ensouled and that God is embodied.«54
The »world is God’s body« has important disanalogies, however. It does not 
mean the world is identical to God, which is pantheism. Saying God is the soul 
or mind of the universe—from the dual-aspect monism perspective—does 
not embrace Cartesian dualism, which says God is a wholly mental substance 
and the world comprised of wholly physical substances. Nor does it mean God 
52   Among the many who think of the world as God’s body, see McFague 2001. On proprio-
ception, see Forrest 2016.
53   Hartshorne 1984: 59.
54   Dombrowski 1996: 86.
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as mind controls the world.55 And so on. Saying the world is God’s body or 
God is the soul of the universe works if one assumes the truth of dual-aspect 
monism, panexperientialism, and theocosmocentrism.
The love advantage: As the authors of this essay, we are especially con-
cerned with promoting overall well-being. In other words, we aim to love. We 
think adopting panexperientialism and theocosmocentrism helps us contrib-
ute to the common good. This relational worldview provides a metaphysical, 
epistemological, and ethical framework for living lives of love.
We are more likely to treat others and ourselves well, for instance, if we think 
we all have value and can experience value. We are more motivated to love God 
if we think our actions affect God’s well-being. We are more likely to think it 
possible to »imitate God, as beloved children, and live lives of love« if we think 
God’s being and our being have some similarities. We have no grounds for 
blaming God for evil, for instance, if a loving God cannot prevent evil single-
handedly. We can believe our lives and loves are ultimately significant if God 
always loves and cannot control us or creation. And so on.
9. Conclusion
One doesn’t have to adopt theocosmocentrism or panexperientialism to be an 
open and relational theologian. However, we believe these views are especially 
congenial to the open and relational perspective. Both provide a foundation 
for understanding God and the world in a deeply relational way. We offer these 
ideas in the hope that some would find them valuable.
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According to the guidance of the seven Ecumenical Councils as explications 
of the Christian Scriptures, Christianity teaches not only that there is a God, 
but that this God is triune and that one member of this Trinity has become 
incarnate in the person of Jesus Christ. Traditional explications of this teach-
ing show Christ as being both fully God and fully human, while remaining 
only one person. That is, whereas most everything else in the cosmos only has 
one nature, Christ is unique among entities in having two natures—divinity 
and humanity. Hence, Christ is properly named »Emmanuel,« »God with us.« 
When one turns to Christian practice to find those instances wherein human-
ity’s encounter with God is most profound, the Eucharist serves as the pinnacle 
of Christian worship and—or, perhaps, because of—a direct encounter with 
God. This is because the majority opinion teaching of the Christian tradition 
has it that in some fashion Christ—the God-human—becomes so related to 
the mundane elements of bread and wine, that the predications »This is the 
body of Christ« or »This is the blood of Christ« become warranted. Hence, the 
tradition teaches an increasing concretizing of God’s being with humanity: in 
the cosmos, in Christ, and in the Eucharist.
What is not laid out explicitly in the Christian Scriptures or the pronounce-
ments of the Councils, are specific statements regarding the ontology of the 
cosmos. The Christian theologian, then, is free to pursue fine-grained exposi-
tions of ontology that can be said to fall within the more thick-grained deter-
minations of these authoritative sources.1 Hence, well-intentioned Christians 
have pursued such radically distinct fundamental ontologies as idealism, dual-
ism, and materialism as possible ideologies within which to make sense of the 
Scriptural and Conciliar material. This essay proposes a route for explicating a 
model of the Eucharist—and its Christological infrastructure—within a pan-
psychist panentheistic ontological framework. Hence, the model offered here 
1   On the distinction and relation of fine-grained and thick-grained explanations in theology, 
see Arcadi 2018a.
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is a hypothesized conclusion of the conjunction of numerous conceptual data 
points (all of which will receive further elaboration anon), including:
1) The Christological determinations of the seven Ecumenical Councils.2
2) A Corporeal Mode model of Christ’s presence in the Eucharist.3
3) Panentheism.
4) Panpsychism.
In order to explicate this model of the Eucharist, each of the aforementioned 
data points must be laid out and explained. Since a description of the Eucharist 
is the telos of this essay, I will first set out some key distinctions and desiderata 
within the Eucharistic sphere of inquiry. Because the model of the Eucharist 
I favor utilizes the metaphysical infrastructure of Conciliar Christology, I will 
in the section following discuss these conceptual guidelines and show how 
they are brought to bear on the Eucharist. Subsequently, I will briefly discuss 
both panpsychism and panentheism. This will give rise to a discussion of how 
the Incarnation may be understood within a panpsychist and panentheistic 
framework. Finally, I bring all the data points to bear on the Eucharist in order 
to construct a panpsychist panentheistic incarnational model of the Eucharist.
2.  Preliminary Framework
2.1 The Eucharist
According to the accounts of Christ’s life from the Synoptic Gospels, Paul’s 
letter to the Corinthians, and in light of the liturgical traditions of broadly 
catholic Christianity, on the night before he was handed over to suffering and 
death, Jesus Christ took bread, blessed it, gave it to those with him, and said, 
»Take, eat, this is my body.« Likewise, Christ took some wine, similarly blessed 
it, similarly gave it, and similarly said, »Drink this all of you; this is my blood 
of the new covenant.«4 How properly to understand these locutions, however, 
has been the subject of no small amount of controversy over the course of the 
history of Christian theological reflection.
2   What has been called in the recent analytic theological literature, »Conciliar Christology.« 
See Pawl, 2016.
3   This terminology will be explicated further on and is derived from Arcadi 2016a: 402-412. For 
the record, my most thorough examination of the Eucharist comes in Arcadi 2018a. For a 
discussion of models of the Eucharist within an idealist ontological framework—and hence, 
support for the claim that one may realize at least one aspect of the traditional teaching of 
Christian theology within different ontological frameworks—see Arcadi 2016b.
4   The most relevant Scriptural pericopes are: Matthew 26:26-28, Mark 14:22-25, Luke 22:17-20, 
I Corinthians 11:23-26.
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As I see it, the traditional explanations of these words fall into three main 
families. First, we might designate those interpretations that join the bread 
and the wine in a metaphysically-robust sense to the body and blood of Christ. 
These are, as I call them Corporeal Mode explications of Christ’s presence in 
the Eucharist. This is the majority opinion family of views in the tradition and 
the genus under which my specific model will fall, hence further discussion 
of this family will come further on.5 Another family of views on the relation 
between Christ and the elements of bread and wine is the Pneumatic Mode.6 
This family emphasizes a spiritual connection between either Christ and the 
elements or Christ and the recipient by means of the elements. Finally, a third 
family of views I refer to as the No Non Normal Mode.7 This mode states that 
there is no more significant connection between Christ and the elements or 
Christ and the recipient of the elements by means of the elements than is 
found in any other locale in the cosmos. Perhaps one or more of these modes 
would fit more or less easily within a panpsychist panentheistic framework, 
but due to its popularity in the tradition, this essay pursues a species of a 
Corporeal Mode explication of Christ’s presence in the Eucharist.
The Corporeal Mode family of views can be further subdivided into three 
main descendants: transubstantiation, consubstantiation, and impanation. 
The former can be defined as holding to the twin beliefs that after the conse-
cration of the bread and the wine, the consecrated object is (a) no longer bread 
or wine, yet is (b) the body or blood of Christ, respectively. These metaphysical 
claims, however, obtain with no corollary empirical change in the consecrated 
objects. The objects remain empirically the same prior and subsequent to the 
consecration of these elements. What does change is the underlying reality of 
the objects. The proponent of consubstantiation—found, not by that name, 
in many Lutheran quarters—holds (b) with the transubstantiation theorist, 
but does not endorse (a). That is, the consubstantiation theorist holds that 
the body and blood of Christ comes to be located »in, with, and under«8 the 
bread and the wine. Yet in addition to retaining all their empirical qualities, the 
5   Specific communions that tend, either implicitly or explicitly, to endorse proposals in this 
family are the Eastern Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Lutheran, and some Anglican traditions.
6   Representative examples from the tradition of views falling in this family are the Reformed 
theological descendants of John Calvin, some Anglicans, and Methodist theological descen-
dants of John Wesley. It is a point of dispute in the history of interpretation, but I would place 
views inspired by the 20th century Roman Catholic theologian Edward Schillebeeckx in this 
latter category as well. For discussion, see Arcadi 2016a and Arcadi 2018b.
7   This view is largely found among the theological descendants of Ulrich Zwingli including—
but not limited to—some Reformed, Baptistic, Pentecostal, and Free Church traditions.
8   As the traditional Lutheran quip goes.
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consecrated objects remain bread and wine. Finally, like consubstantiation, 
the impanation theorist holds to (b) but not (a). However, what differentiates 
impanation from consubstantiation is the desire of the proponent of impa-
nation to offer an account of the union between the bread and the body of 
Christ—or the wine and the blood of Christ—in a manner patterned after the 
Incarnation. It is my contention here—as elsewhere—that impanation is to 
be preferred as most adequately satisfying the Scriptural, liturgical, linguistic, 
metaphysical, and theological desiderata pertaining to the presence of Christ 
in the Eucharist.9
Although transubstantiation, consubstantiation, and impanation are all 
Corporeal Mode cousins, there are subtle differences between them. What is 
desired by Scripture and the liturgy is a metaphysical state of affairs such that 
it is apt to say of the consecrated bread, »This is the body of Christ.«10 Each 
Corporeal Mode view attempts to offer such a metaphysical state of affairs. 
The transubstantiation theorist holds that the best way to secure the aptness of 
this predication is to hold that the post-consecration consecrated object is no 
longer bread. Oftentimes, in the Roman Catholic tradition this phenomenon is 
exposited with recourse to an Aristotelian substance ontology. However, this is 
not a necessary feature of the official Roman Catholic position. What is neces-
sary for the Roman Catholic is the denial of the continued presence and exis-
tence of the bread, post-consecration.
My purpose in this essay is not to show the necessary falsity of non-
impanation views of the Eucharist. Hence, I briefly just gesture in the direction 
of a response to the transubstantiation model. I do so by raising the question 
of: to what does »this« in the sentence »this is the body of Christ« refer? It is 
not the object empirically and phenomenally present to potential recipients, 
for that is merely the empirical features of bread, which the object no longer 
is. If the indexical refers to the body of Christ, we might reasonably ask about 
just where this body is? Aristotelian substance ontology has been deployed 
to argue that while the accidents of the bread remain where and what they 
always are, the substance of the bread changes to become the substance of 
the body of Christ. But then one is forced to accept the severing of the relation 
between substance and accident that is the bedrock of that ontology. Absent 
this modification to this ontology, we are left wondering just what »this« is.11
9    This is, of course, absent the constraints of the official teaching of the Roman Catholic 
magisterium.
10   I will here focus on the bread and the body of Christ; a similar analysis applies, mutatis 
mutandis, for the wine and the blood of Christ.
11   Of course, modifying Aristotelian substance ontology is just what the medieval school-
men did. See McCord Adams 2010. Again, my purpose is not to show the necessary falsity 
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A similar linguistic—and then by extension metaphysical—query can be 
raised in regard to the consubstantiation theory. The theorist in this camp typi-
cally holds that the body of Christ comes along with the consecrated bread to 
be consumed by the recipient. What is oftentimes lacking in this sphere of ex-
planation is a robust account of the union between the consecrated object and 
the body of Christ. »With-ness,« if it even meets the vagueness objection, does 
not seem to be any more intimate a relation than co-location. While this view 
can provide for the reality of the empirical features of bread in the consecrated 
object—because it is still indeed bread—it does not seem as though this view 
can countenance the predication that this object, »this,« is the body of Christ. 
Rather, on this construal, »this« refers to some imperceptible entity co-located 
with the bread. Yet, the bread is what draws the attention of the recipients and 
the bread is that which the minister holds and says, »this is the body of Christ.« 
More specifically speaking, if this metaphysical situation were apt, the minis-
ter should refer to the bread and say, »the body of Christ is around here.« But 
this, of course, is not what ministers following the catholic liturgies, following 
the words of Scripture, in fact say.
By contrast, impanation has the virtues of both countenancing a natural 
interpretation of the indexical and reusing a metaphysical infrastructure with 
the weight of Ecumenical Councils behind it. According to the traditional 
teaching regarding the Incarnation, the faithful are to say both that Jesus Christ 
»is God« and that he »is a human being,« while remaining one person. Hence, 
unity and duality are at the heart of the traditional teaching; Christ is unified in 
personhood, but dual in natures. In like manner, the impanation theorist holds 
that post-consecration the consecrated object is both bread and the body of 
Christ, yet remains unified by being only one object. In the Incarnation, the 
notion of the hypostatic union is deployed to describe the union between the 
divine nature and an instance of human nature. In a similar manner in impa-
nation, the notion of a sacramental union is deployed to describe the union 
relation between the bread and the body of Christ. Hence, the impanation the-
orist holds that the metaphysical state of affairs undergirding the predication 
of the bread that »this is the body of Christ,« is parallel to the metaphysical 
state of affairs undergirding the predication of Jesus Christ that »this is God.« 
As, however, should be clear by this paragraph, since impanation is based on a 
traditional explication of the Incarnation, we must first offer an examination 
of that doctrine.
of non-impanation views, but rather to show that there are more attractive features to 
this view in just those places where others are less attractive.
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2.2 The Incarnation
Anyone who reads the Christian Scriptures with the grain of the determina-
tions of the seven Ecumenical Councils will see that Christians think that Jesus 
Christ is both God and a human being. For instance, the, so-called, ›Definition‹ 
of Chalcedon states:
Jesus Christ is one and the same Son, the Same perfect in Godhead, the Same 
perfect in manhood, truly God and truly man, the Same [consisting] of a rational 
soul and a body; homoousious with the Father as to his Godhead, and the Same 
homoousious with us as to his manhood … made known in two natures [which 
exist] without confusion, without change, without division, without separa-
tion … concurring into one Person and one hypostasis—not parted or divided 
into two persons, but one and the same Son … the Lord Jesus Christ.12
This statement, among others in Scripture and the proceedings of the Councils, 
gives rise to the two-natures doctrine—that one member of the Trinity is in-
carnate as Jesus Christ, being one person with two natures. How to understand 
this doctrine, and defend the logical coherence of it, has been the focus of 
much recent work in analytic theology.
In tracing the conceptual frameworks in the analytic literature’s discussions 
of the two-natures doctrine, we can see a number of streams of explication. 
For instance, Jonathan Hill delineates a first branching of the Christological 
tree between those who hold to transformationalist models of the Incarnation 
from those who hold to relational models of the Incarnation. For the transfor-
mationalist, when the Christian tradition says that the second person of the 
Trinity became human, »to become human means being transformed into a 
human … just as a caterpillar becomes a butterfly by being transformed into 
one.«13 However, one worry that might be raised to this explanation is that, on 
the analogy of a butterfly, once the caterpillar is transformed into a butterfly it 
ceases to be a caterpillar. If the second person of the Trinity were transformed 
into a human and ceased to be divine, then we would no longer have a two-
natures doctrine of the Incarnation, as Conciliar Christology seems to require. 
Moreover, following the theo-logic of panentheism, we might see the trans-
formationalist view as not being apt. On panentheism, much of God remains 
beyond or outside the cosmos, but then by application to the Incarnation, in 
the Incarnation we would want some or much of God to remain beyond or 
12   Coakley 2002: 143.
13   Hill 2011: 8.
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outside the human nature in Christ.14 Hence, the two-natures proponent may 
go looking for other models to describe the Incarnation.
A second family of views on the Incarnation in the recent analytic literature 
are called relational views. These views typically hold that the second person of 
the Trinity—in the Incarnation—comes to be related in a particularly intimate 
way with a concrete particular that is an instance of human nature. Hence, 
on this view, Christ is composed of two concrete natures, the divine nature 
and an instance of human nature. Thus, this view is also termed »concrete-
compositionalism.« Given the panenthesistic framework to be sketched, we 
must specify that this view is relational by God in Christ being more intimately 
related to a segment of the cosmos than is God’s normal modus operandi. The 
panentheist is always going to think that God is related to the cosmos in a par-
ticularly intimate way (more on this anon). What occurs in the Incarnation, 
then, must be either of a different kind or different intensity of relation than 
is God’s relation to other parts of the cosmos. Yet, just what this relation is and 
how it might differ from God’s general relation to the cosmos remains a bit 
obscure.
There is a potential mediating position between transformationalist and re-
lationalist views, even as it might be characterized as one or other of the two. 
This view can be referred to as an »additionalist« perspective.15 The idea here 
being that the second person of the Trinity merely »adds on« whatever neces-
sary and sufficient features for being human are requisite. In this manner, the 
second person need not transform into a human and thus cease to be divine. 
Nor, however, does one need to hold that the second person becomes related 
to something somehow somewhat independent of the second person. Rather, 
whatever it is to be a human can be added on to the second person of the 
Trinity such that this person can properly said to be both divine and human. 
As will be seen further on, this is the most promising route of explication for 
Conciliar Christology within a panpsychist framework.
2.3 Panentheism
I turn now from Christology to panentheism. Panentheism is a theory about 
the nature of God and God’s relation to the cosmos. However, there does not 
seem to be a consensus in the tradition or the contemporary literature as to 
14   The notion of the second person of the Trinity extending beyond the human nature 
sometimes falls under the doctrinal heading of the (somewhat anachronistically termed) 
extra Calvinisticum. For a helpful historical theological examination of this doctrine, see 
McGinnis 2014.
15   See discussion in Arcadi 2018c.
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just how to characterize God or the God-cosmos relation.16 Hence, I want to 
here offer a brief apologia for a deflationary account of panentheism. A de-
flationary thesis about panentheism simply says that God exists, the cosmos 
exists, and the relation between God and the cosmos is sufficiently intimate to 
warrant the attribution of »in« of the cosmos to God. The panentheist can ac-
count for intimacy in this relation by a diversity of means: ontological, mereo-
logical, causal, axiological, teleological, or others. What I am keen to show, 
however, is that although how one characterizes the intimacy of this relation 
has bearing on how one conceives of the nature of God, this bearing need not 
be taken as necessity. And thus a number of very disparate views on the nature 
of God and God’s attributes can be held in conjunction with the deflationary 
panentheistic thesis.
For instance, deflationary panentheism can allow for such disparate con-
ceptualizations as either the strong divine immutability of classical theism or 
the strong divine mutability of process theism, and just about everything in 
between. The distinction turns not necessarily on the nature of God, but on the 
nature of the cosmos. If the deflationary panentheistic thesis is granted, and 
one has a corollary commitment to, say, four-dimensional eternalism, one can 
still seemingly preserve strong divine immutability. This picture would have it 
that there exists God and in God is a four-dimensional whole that presently—
from the divine present—contains all that there was, is, and will be, from our 
phenomenal experience. This can be as strongly a hard determinism, with a 
related strong divine immutability, as one likes. Likewise, on the contrary, one 
can lodge a presentist view of time within the deflationary panentheistic thesis 
and articulate a divine that is as changing, shifting, and mutable as the process 
theist likes. To determine one extreme or the other, or something in between, 
is not settled by accepting or demurring from panentheism.
A properly Christian appropriation of the panentheistic model of God’s 
relation to the cosmos must remain faithful to the creedal affirmations re-
garding the Trinity and the Incarnation, as well as the creaturely dependence 
relation the cosmos has on God as denoted in the first clause of the Creed. A 
project—such as this present study—that attempts to maintain fidelity to the 
Christological teachings of the Ecumenical Councils would be inconsistent if it 
did not maintain fidelity to the non-Christological teachings of those Councils 
as well. However, assenting to the creaturely status of the creation, does not 
necessarily rule panentheism out from the start. Rather one can maintain this 
notion with an understanding of panentheism as well. Göcke characterizes 
16   See especially the helpful discussion in Mullins 2016 and Göcke 2012.
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panentheism in this way: »Although there is a distinction between God, as 
the ultimate ground of reality and reality itself, a distinction that is epistemo-
logically needed for ultimate explanation, there cannot be a substantial onto-
logical distinction between them.«17 The conjunction of a thesis about God’s 
status as creator and the non-substantial ontological distinction between cre-
ation and creator do not need to be seen as entailing a contradiction. Rather, 
one can hold that the creation was brought into being out of God’s own being.
This conception might seem to push against the traditional Christian no-
tion of creatio ex nihilo. However, this need not be the case. This standard 
phrase can easily be interpreted to hold that God created out of nothing dis-
tinct from Godself, as if there were some entity or entities co-eternal with God 
from which God fashioned the creation.18 One does not need to hold that cre-
ation out of nothing entails that »nothing« is some space or area outside of 
God from whence God created the cosmos. Rather, the concern in this line 
of inquiry has to do more with God’s aseity than the process of creation. The 
Christian panentheist can maintain God’s aseity just as firmly as the classical 
theist, if she so wished. And hence she can similarly endorse the doctrine of 
creatio ex nihilo—which is ordered to this end—just as much as the classical 
theist; again, if she so wished.
One plausible mode for explicating the intimacy of the relation between 
God and the cosmos—an intimacy sufficient for holding the cosmos to be »in« 
God—is a causal mode. God is in the cosmos in that God is fundamentally and 
continually causing the cosmos whose existence is necessarily dependent on 
this divine causal activity. Drawing on my action model of God’s omnipresence, 
Georg Gasser makes the causal relation between God and the cosmos one of 
the central planks in his account of panentheism.19 According to Gasser, a tra-
ditional way of explicating God’s omnipresence has been to see God’s presence 
in a threefold manner: by God’s knowledge of all things, by God’s providential 
conservation of all things, and by God’s being the author of the nature and 
existence of all things.20 My account of omnipresence holds that the second 
manner, God’s causal activity, is all that is requisite to get an explanation of 
omnipresence off the ground. For Gasser, panentheism is such that, »All of cre-
ation is within the sphere of God’s creative, sustaining and caring agency or it 
17   Göcke 2017: 6.
18   Here the recent discussion around the relation between God and abstract objects is para-
mount. See, for instance, Craig 2016.
19   Gasser 2019: 43-62 and Arcadi 2017.
20   Gasser 2019: 57.
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is not at all.«21 Being »within the sphere of,« for Gasser, is sufficient to capture 
the »in« of panentheism. This causal account is but one among many ways of 
characterizing deflationary panentheism, but it will be particularly useful for 
my explication of the Incarnation and the Eucharist within a panentheistic 
framework. However, before we turn to the task of conjoining panentheism, 
the Incarnation, and the Eucharist, I have next to discuss the final data point of 
this hypothesis, panpsychism.
2.4 Panpsychism
Similar to panentheism, if one asks ten philosophers of mind about the nature 
of panpsychism, one will likely get a dozen different answers. Hence, all I can 
do here is to adopt a version of panpsychism that seems to have particular po-
tential for my Eucharistic aims. The fundamental tenet of this ideology is that 
each and every object in the cosmos is composed or constituted by mentality 
(or proto-mentality) and physicality. Call this a monism, call this dualism all 
the way down, call this something else, but the basic idea is that mentality 
is ubiquitous in the cosmos. The basic motive for panpsychism is that it cer-
tainly seems as though we humans have phenomenal consciousness that is 
not reducible to purely physical entities. However, a pure or simple dualism is 
fraught with many issues. Hence, if like comes from like, then this conscious-
ness or mentality or proto-mentality must be a part of the whole cosmos since 
it is part of at least one part of the cosmos, namely humans.
I take it that the microexperiences of less complex subjects can fuse togeth-
er into more complex objects with governing macroexperiences. In an analo-
gous manner as we think of the human body as a complex system of nerves, 
bones, blood, and flesh, the human mind (related to these bodily parts) arises 
as a macroexperiencer out of the microexperiences of its constitutive parts. 
This entails, however, that one can find consciousness or proto-consciousness 
at all manner of varying levels of complexity. Whether objects vastly less com-
plex than animals like rocks, bread, or wine actually have consciousness is up 
for interpretation and debate, but the determination of this discussion is not 
relevant for my purposes. All that is needed is that mundane objects have at 
least some level of mentality or proto-mentality that can be incorporated into 
larger complexes that do clearly have macroexeperiences.
21   Gasser 2019: 60.
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3. Conjunction of the Preceding
In what follows I draw together the various conceptual strands relating to pan-
psychism, panentheism, Christology, and the Eucharist.
3.1 Panpsychist Panentheism
This volume in its entirety is about just this topic of this section, the conjunc-
tion of panpsychism and panentheism. Accordingly, I will not offer an exhaus-
tive discussion of the implications of this conceptual marriage outside what 
is specifically required for the Eucharistic task at hand. As there are multiple 
ways to construe panpsychism and there are multiple ways to construe panen-
theism, so too are there multiple ways to construe a panpsychist panentheism. 
I suggest but one way here which, prima facie, fits the other conceptual data 
points of the current essay.
When we discuss panentheism, we are inquiring into how the cosmos is in 
God. When we fuse this view to panpsychism, we begin to inquire how God is 
in the cosmos. As indicated above, one plausible way to construe panenthe-
ism is through the continuous and fundamental causal activity of God at every 
location in the cosmos. This would entail that God is causally active on each 
and every object in the cosmos, no matter how simple or complex, small or 
large. I propose that at least one action God performs on the cosmos is to push 
simple objects into configurations of greater complexity. That is, God acts 
teleologically on the cosmos to push (or pull) a trajectory of ever-increasing 
complexity. One can easily overlay this story onto an evolutionary narrative 
whereby the history of the cosmos includes the emergence of ever increas-
ingly complex animals and systems, presently culminating in humans as the 
most systematically complex entities in the cosmos (so far as we know). On 
this view, everything is in God because God is in everything causally pushing 
(or, one might say, teleologically pulling) the fundamental mentality or proto-
mentality of all objects toward greater complexity.
However, given the theism of the Ecumenical Councils, since God is the fun-
damental entity, and God Godself is a mental entity, it might seem as though 
it would be God’s mentality that is at the core of every mental-physical object. 
How can a panpsychist panentheism avoid the entailment that there is only 
God’s mentality in the cosmos and the presence of non-divine mentality is 
merely an illusion?22 What blocks panpsychist panentheism from collapsing 
into pantheism? I propose that one way to block this entailment is to hold 
that in order for a system to be identified with an agent, that agent itself must 
22   For one response to this question, see, in this volume, Göcke 2020.
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identify with the system and take ownership of the system as its own. Systems 
of higher complexity—say, humans—are capable of incorporating systems of 
lesser complexity into their system. This routinely happens when humans use 
tools and also occurs in such mundane instances as wearing clothes, eating 
breakfast, and brushing one’s teeth. The incorporation of other objects into 
one’s own human system occurs by means of a causal connection between 
the agent and the object. When the object is in use by the agent, the object 
becomes part of the agent’s system and—even if for a time—is a constitutive 
component of a system more complex than itself.
A sycamore tree in my yard has, on the panpsychist proposal, mentality or 
proto-mentality. If, however, I were to take a branch from the tree, attach it 
to my body and utilize it as another leg, that branch would be incorporated 
into my body. As I had taken ownership of the branch, I could then identify 
it as part of me and it would indeed become part of my psycho-physical sys-
tem. In my causal connection to the branch, taking ownership of and identify-
ing with the branch, it would be proper to say of the branch that it is part of 
me, and that it is me. Conversely, with the cosmos and God, although God is 
continually acting on each and every object in the cosmos, supplying it with 
existence, mentality, and pushing it toward greater complexity, God does not 
identify with or take ownership of each and every object. But were God to do 
so, then that object would indeed become God. Since God is the source of each 
and every object in the cosmos, so I propose, God reserves the prerogative to 
intensify God’s causal union with each and every object, and take the requisite 
kind of ownership needed for God to identify Godself—at least in part—with 
the newly owned object. On this hypothesis, God is continually acting on the 
created realm. God does this (a) in order to sustain it in existence, (b) to pro-
vide the mental component that is paired with the physical as is necessary in 
the panpsychic worldview, and (c) to push the creation »upwards« into greater 
complexities of macroexperience, culminating in human beings. When fusing 
this view with traditional Christology, we arrive at one particular human being 
on whom this activity reached a unique height, the height of Incarnation.
3.2 Panpsychist Panentheistic Christology
Traditional Christology has it that the phenomenal experience had by Christ 
was and is had by God Godself. In fact, this statement is a tautology for the 
one who accepts Conciliar Christology. A panpsychist panentheism opens up 
the conceptual space to show how God could take on the consciousness of 
any component of the cosmos. There is no requirement that God take on the 
experiences—micro or macro—as God’s own of the cosmos. But there is no 
prohibition either. God is free to act as much or as little as God likes in any 
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given situation. Because of the radical dependence relation of the creation on 
the creator, God could simply cease acting on some segment or other of the 
cosmos and it would cease to exist. However, conversely, God is able to inten-
sify God’s actions as well. And this intensity could reach the point at which 
God even took on the phenomenal experiences of some complex segment of 
the cosmos as God’s own. This, we might say, would be a divine incarnation. 
And if it were to occur by way of a complex segment of the cosmos that meets 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for being human, this would be an 
divine-human incarnation. When we say that a divine-human incarnation has 
in fact occurred in the person of Jesus Christ, then we have finally arrived at the 
Incarnation of Christian teaching.
Within the contemporary analytic literature on Christology, this would be 
an additionalist model of the Incarnation. God could add on any segment of 
the cosmos as God likes in this incarnational manner. God does not need to 
transform into some segment of the cosmos, but nor does it need to be said 
that God merely becomes related to some segment of the cosmos. Rather, the 
additionalist conception of Christology has it that God adds on the phenom-
enal perspective of the human nature of Christ. Moreover, the additionalist 
Christological motif might in some way even parallel how the panentheist 
tends to think of the relation between God and the cosmos. We might say that 
God adds on the cosmos to Godself, within Godself. Like the second person 
of the Trinity additionally becomes human, so too at creation does God addi-
tionally include the cosmos. Consequently, we have a harmonious conceptual 
framework for thinking of both the divine-cosmos relationship and the rela-
tionship between the divine and human natures in Christ.
Here, then, is a panpsychist-panentheistic just-so story of the Incarnation: 
God, from Godself, creates the cosmos and continually exercises causal power 
on each and every object in the cosmos. Each and every object in the cosmos 
is a mental/physical hybrid, which is ontologically dependent on the causal 
power supplied to it by God. The microexperiences of the most simple ob-
jects can join together to form macroexperiences when the simple objects are 
joined up into a system of greater complexity. Such is, then, the emergence of 
human consciousness as a complex system. As the ontologically highest entity 
in which the cosmos is, God has the fundamental right to take ownership of 
each and every object and identify its phenomenal experiences as God’s own. 
God does this by intensifying God’s causal power exercised at the location of 
an object. God is present by causal power, and hence God can be more pres-
ent by causal power. If God were to intensify God’s causal power at a loca-
tion to the point of taking ownership of the object at that location, that object 
would become God. This could happen with as simple or as complex a system 
266 James M. Arcadi
as God likes. This has occurred in the person of Jesus Christ. God has added on 
the complex human system with its attendant macroexperiences that is the 
human nature born of the Virgin Mary. That object, the human nature born of 
the Virgin, remains a human nature despite its incorporation into the divine in 
a unique way. But the incorporation that is Incarnation also makes it such that 
it is proper to point to Jesus Christ and say, »This is God« in a manner inapt 
for other objects in the cosmos. Hence, it could be said, the panentheistic God 
has become incarnate in the panpsychist complex that is the human nature of 
Jesus Christ. God added on the human nature of Christ. God was always in us, 
as we are always in God, but in the Incarnation God became with us, as God 
became one of us, in Emmanuel.
3.3 A Panpsychist Panentheistic Incarnational Model of the Eucharist
With this brief account of the Incarnation within a panpsychist panentheism 
in place, we can finally apply all the preceding data points to the Eucharist. 
In the Eucharist, God is not just in us in a general causal sense; God is with us 
in a specific sense in the consecrated bread and wine. As indicated previously, 
I find the impanation view the most satisfying for a variety of reasons, not the 
least of which is the manner it comports with incarnational thinking. This is 
what will be expounded here. However, there are at least two routes by which 
one might apply the preceding to the issue of the presence of Christ in the 
Eucharist. Elsewhere I have called versions of these two routes »Hypostatic 
Impanation« or »Type-H Impanation« and »Sacramental Impanation« or 
»Type-S Impanation.«23 The distinction between these two views turns on 
which aspect of the incarnate Christ the bread and wine are related. That 
is, Eucharistic views like impanation attempt to characterize a relation that 
brings about the aptness of the statement, »This is the body of Christ.« One 
side of the relation is clearly the consecrated elements. The other relatum is 
different for Type-H or Type-S Impanation. For Type-H, the second relatum is 
the divine second person of the Trinity; hence, here the relation between the 
elements and the second person of the Trinity circumvents the human nature 
of Christ. For Type-S, the second relatum is the human body of Christ; hence, 
here there is a chain—of sorts—from the divine second person of the Trinity 
through the human nature of Christ to the consecrated elements. I will next 
describe each view in kind and then offer a brief assessment.
23   See Arcadi 2018a and 2015: 75-90.
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 Type H Impanation
Above I sketched the notion that God has the ultimate prerogative to take own-
ership of any segment of the cosmos and identify it as God’s own self. God does 
not do this, for this preserves the distinction of (most) of the cosmos (except 
Christ) from Godself and thus does not entail pantheism. Yet, this is just what 
the second person of the Trinity does in the Incarnation. God intensifies God’s 
causal activity at the location of the human nature of Jesus Christ, takes own-
ership of it, and identifies with it such that it warrants the predication, »This is 
God« when spoken of Christ.
The same situation could apply to the consecrated bread and wine and this 
is just what Type-H avers occurs in the Eucharist. God intensifies God’s causal 
activity at the location of the bread and wine, takes ownership of it, and iden-
tifies with these objects. God would then take ownership of the phenomenal 
perspective offered by these objects, and this perspective would become God’s 
perspective. This might be termed another incarnation of God in another loca-
tion in the cosmos. The structure and relative complexity (or relative simplic-
ity) of the bread and wine would dictate what God could do as the bread and 
wine. A human body, like what God adds on in the Incarnation, is a complex 
system that would allow God to walk, talk, eat, sleep, and do all manner of 
human activities as a human being. Bread and wine have no such complex-
ity, nor potential actions. Nevertheless, this model grounds the traditional 
Christian notion that God is specially present in the consecrated bread and 
wine of the Eucharist.
 Type-S Impanation
The Type-S theorist worries, however, that the Type-H view circumvents the 
human nature of Christ. On the Type-H view, God can intensify God’s presence 
at any and every consecration. But this happens only on an analogy with the 
Incarnation, not because of or in relation to the Incarnation. Type-H seems to 
result in predications of the consecrated objects like, »This is bread« or »This 
is God« or even »This is the body of God.« But it depends on what one means 
by »Christ« whether Type-H is able to deliver on the Scriptural and liturgi-
cal utterance, »This is the body of Christ.« If one took »Christ« to refer to the 
specific instance of Incarnation that is the adding on of the human nature of 
Christ’s phenomenal experiences to God, then Type-H would not supply the 
metaphysical story for the state of affairs expressed by »This is the body of 
Christ.« But, Type-S would.
Type-S wishes to draw a specific connection between the human nature of 
Christ and the consecrated bread and wine. How would this work? God would 
need to conjoin the micro-experiences had by the bread and the wine to the 
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system that is the human nature of Christ. Christ’s human nature, then, would 
be extended beyond the bounds of its organic human body to include objects 
non-organically connected to his human body.24 Despite these objects dis-
tance from the human body of Christ, they would nonetheless be joined by 
divine power to the human phenomenal experience of Christ. As the human 
body just is the locus of human phenomenal experience, then these objects 
would properly be considered parts of the human body of Christ. This would, 
of course, then sanction the liturgical utterance made of the consecrated 
bread, »This is the body of Christ.«
The symmetry of this model with my illustration of the sycamore tree 
branch above should be clear. The consecrated bread and the wine become 
instruments or tools of the human nature of Christ. In this manner, as in other 
instances of bodily extension or prosthesis use, the instruments become parts 
of the body of Christ and are aptly named as such. The distinction, however, 
between the Type-S explication of Eucharist and the sycamore branch illus-
tration is the lack of physical contiguity between the consecrated elements 
and the human nature of Christ. However, I do not see the lack of physical 
contiguity as an obstacle for the view. Given a panpsychist and panentheis-
tic framework, God merely needs to conjoin the phenomenality of the conse-
crated elements to the phenomenality of Christ’s human nature. This fusion of 
mentality or proto-mentality of seemingly discontinuous objects, then, fuses 
the objects themselves. When this conjunction is instantiated and a causal 
connection between Christ and the consecrated elements occurs by means of 
this conjunction, the liturgical utterance is warranted: this—this bread—is the 
body of Christ.
 Assessment of Both Views
Both of these impanation theories are able to deliver on a concentration of 
God’s presence at the location of the consecrated bread and wine. Both, in 
different senses, would be able to deliver on the conception of the bread and 
wine being the body of God. Type-S is to be preferred, however, if one held 
»Christ« to be a specialized term denoting only the incarnate activity of the 
Second Person of the Trinity in the human nature of Christ. If one is attempt-
ing to draw a tight connection between the historical body of Christ (born of 
the Virgin, suffered under Pontius Pilate, raised on the third day, etc.), then, 
for my money, Type-S is the preferred route. However, Type-H is not without 
24   This might seem a stretch, but the literature on the Extended Mind Thesis (EMT) is 
now vast and has obvious points of contact with the narrative adduced here. For further 
application of the EMT to the Eucharist, see Arcadi 2015.
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merit and is worthy of consideration. Here I simply raise two other brief 
considerations.
First, one might wonder whether having the phenomenal experiences of 
consecrated bread and wine would entail feeling great pain at being chewed 
and digested. However, there should be no worries about Christ feeling the 
pain of being manducated. The sensation of pain—so far as we understand 
it—requires a much more complex configuration of matter than we see in 
the combination of flour, water, yeast, oil, and salt.25 The human body that 
the second person of the Trinity assumed at the Incarnation provided an ap-
propriately complex configuration of matter such that in virtue of his human 
nature Christ did feel the pain of the Passion. But there is no requirement on 
the present Eucharistic model—or any model of impanation—that Christ feel 
pain by way of the faithful’s teeth. Bread and wine just cannot supply the kind 
of phenomenal experience as a human body can.
Second, given the incorporation of the bread and wine into the body of 
Christ, does the bread and wine cease to be bread and wine? That is, do the 
impanation models I have sketched collapse into transubstantiation? From 
one angle, I see no reason the transubstantiation theorists could not help 
themselves to much of what I have described as impanation within a panpsy-
chist panentheistic incarnational framework. They too could argue that the 
predication »this is the body of Christ« is apt due to the requisite concentra-
tion of divine activity that »elevates« the microexperiences of the elements 
to a sufficiently high level. However, at this point in the analysis it does not 
seem that the distinction between transubstantiation and impanation can 
be made on the basis of philosophical reasoning alone. Rather the transub-
stantiation theorist will assert the determinations of the Roman Catholic 
magisterium to say that we may no longer call the consecrated object »bread« 
post-consecration. On the contrary, the impanation theorist will aver that the 
theo-logic of the Incarnation that provides the metaphysical infrastructure for 
the aptness of the predication pushes the faithful to maintain the reality of the 
bread in the same way as Christ is both God and a human being. The dispute 
here, to me, seems intractable and one will simply have to decide whether they 
will choose the conception of their ancestors, or choose the view of those in 
whose land they dwell. But as for me and my house, we will choose a version 
of impanation.
25   These are the traditional ingredients in Eucharistic bread. For a fascinating theological 
study of the materiality of the Eucharist, see Grumett 2016.
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4.  Conclusion
Panentheism teaches that God is in us insofar as we and all things are in God. 
Christianity teaches Emmanuel, that God is with us in the person of Jesus 
Christ. The Eucharist has long been held to be a unique way that God is with 
humanity. Hence, as indicated from the outset, this progression from panen-
theism to Incarnation to Eucharist indicates an ever concretizing and ever 
localizing experience of God’s presence with humans. Although in some sense 
any view of the divine that includes the attribute of omnipresence entails the 
possibility of encounters with God anywhere, Christian teaching has it that 
the Eucharist is a direct encounter with God; the Eucharist is literally an in-
stance of Emmanuel, of God with us. This essay has sketched how this might 
be said to be so within a panpsychist panentheism. It should not be forgotten, 
however, that in addition to making it such that God is with us, the Eucharist 
is intended by Christ to be consumed by the faithful. Thus, the Eucharist be-
comes a unique way that—even as we are in God—God is in us.
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Panentheistic Cosmopsychism:  
Swami Vivekananda’s Sāṃkhya-Vedāntic Solution 
to the Hard Problem of Consciousness
Ayon Maharaj
This chapter provides the first detailed examination of the views on con-
sciousness of Swami Vivekananda (1863-1902), the famous nineteenth-century 
Indian monk who introduced Hinduism and Vedānta to the West. First, I 
present Vivekananda’s metaphysical framework of panentheistic cosmopsy-
chism, according to which the sole reality is Divine Consciousness, which 
manifests as everything in the universe. As we will see, his panentheistic cos-
mopsychism combines elements from the classical Indian philosophical tradi-
tions of Sāṃkhya and Advaita Vedānta as well as the teachings of his guru Sri 
Ramakrishna (1836-1886). Then I reconstruct his sophisticated arguments in 
favor of panentheistic cosmopsychism. I argue that Vivekananda’s panenthe-
istic cosmopsychism, in light of its distinctive features and its potential philo-
sophical advantages over rival theories of consciousness, deserves to be taken 
seriously by contemporary philosophers of mind and religion.
We now see that all the various forms of cosmic energy, such as matter, 
thought, force, intelligence and so forth, are simply the manifestations of 
that cosmic intelligence, or, as we shall call it henceforth, the Supreme Lord. 
Everything that you see, feel, or hear, the whole universe, is His creation, or 
to be a little more accurate, is His projection; or to be still more accurate, is 
the Lord Himself. It is He who is shining as the sun and the stars, He is the 
mother earth…. He is the speech that is uttered, He is the man who is talk-
ing. He is the audience that is here…. It is all He.
— Swami Vivekananda (1896)1
*   This essay presents, in a highly condensed form, the core argument of two chapters of my 
current book project, tentatively titled Swami Vivekananda’s Vedāntic Cosmopolitanism.
1   CW2:211. Throughout this chapter, citations to Vivekananda’s Complete Works (CW) follow 
this format: »CW,« volume number, page number.
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1. Introduction
Conscious experience is such a pervasive feature of our lives that we usually 
take it for granted. We experience, for instance, the delicious taste of tiramisu, 
the vivid colors of a rainbow, the sharp pain of a sprained ankle. What all these 
experiences have in common is an irreducibly subjective or qualitative charac-
ter. As Thomas Nagel (1974) puts it, there is something it is like to be in any such 
experiential state. Recent philosophers have used technical terms like »qualia« 
and »phenomenal consciousness« to capture this subjective dimension of the 
experiential lives of human beings and (presumably) many other animals.
In spite of its familiarity, consciousness is notoriously difficult to explain. 
Philosophers throughout the world have puzzled over this ubiquitous feature 
of our everyday lives. What exactly is consciousness? What makes us conscious 
creatures rather than mere non-conscious automata? Does consciousness 
arise from physical states of the brain, and if so, how and why? The contem-
porary philosopher David Chalmers (1995, 1996) has made an influential dis-
tinction between »easy« and »hard« problems of consciousness. According 
to Chalmers, neuroscientists may very well be able to solve in the next cen-
tury or two one of the »easy« problems of consciousness, such as the problem 
of pinpointing the neural correlates of particular conscious states. However, 
Chalmers argues that such a hypothetically complete and accurate science of 
physical correlations would still leave unanswered the one really hard prob-
lem of consciousness: namely, the problem of explaining why certain states of 
the brain are accompanied by, or give rise to, conscious experience. Similarly, 
Joseph Levine (1983) has argued that even if scientists are able to identify the 
physical correlates of conscious experiences, there still remains an »explana-
tory gap« between physical states and consciousness that needs to be bridged.
Philosophers have proposed a wide range of solutions to the hard problem 
of consciousness, including eliminativism, materialist reductionism, epiphe-
nomenalist dualism, interactionist dualism, and mysterianism. For various 
reasons, many philosophers have not been satisfied with any of these theo-
ries of consciousness. As a result, a number of recent analytic philosophers 
of mind have begun to take seriously panpsychism, the apparently counter-
intuitive view that consciousness is present everywhere.2 There are two basic 
forms of panpsychism, depending on how one characterizes this fundamental 
form of consciousness. Micropsychism is the form of panpsychism according 
to which macro-level human and animal consciousness derives from the more 
2   See, for instance, Nagel 1979, Brüntrup and Jaskolla 2017, Seager 2020, and Goff 2017a.
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fundamental consciousness of micro-level entities.3 The most formidable prob-
lem facing micropsychist views is the »subject combination problem«—the 
problem of explaining how micro-subjects can combine to form macro-level 
conscious subjects (Chalmers 2017).
In light of the subject combination problem, some contemporary philoso-
phers have rejected micropsychism in favor of cosmopsychism, the view that 
human and animal consciousness derives from »cosmic consciousness,« the 
more fundamental consciousness of the universe as a whole.4 Clearly, cosmo-
psychism avoids the subject combination problem, since it explains human 
and animal consciousness in terms of cosmic consciousness rather than the 
consciousness of micro-level entities. However, cosmopsychist views still have 
to address the obverse problem—sometimes called the »derivation problem« 
(Nagasawa & Wager 2017) or the »decombination problem« (Albahari 2020)—
of explaining how the conscious experiences of individual humans and ani-
mals derive from the singular consciousness of the cosmos as a whole.
While most contemporary philosophers have not considered non-western 
forms of panpsychism, some scholars have very recently begun to explore how 
ideas and arguments from Indian philosophical traditions—such as Vedānta,5 
Yogācāra Buddhism,6 and Śaiva Nondualism7—might be able to enrich con-
temporary debates about panpsychism. This chapter discusses the views of 
Swami Vivekananda (1863-1902), the famous nineteenth-century Indian monk 
who introduced Hinduism and Vedānta to the West. I argue that Vivekananda 
defends a distinctive form of cosmopsychism that has great contemporary 
relevance.
Section 2 presents Vivekananda’s metaphysical framework of panentheistic 
cosmopsychism, according to which the sole reality is Divine Consciousness, 
which manifests as everything in the universe. As we will see, his panentheis-
tic cosmopsychism combines elements from the classical Indian philosophical 
traditions of Sāṃkhya and Advaita Vedānta as well as the teachings of his guru 
Sri Ramakrishna (1836-1886). Section 3 reconstructs Vivekananda’s sophis-
ticated arguments in favor of panentheistic cosmopsychism. I argue that his 
panentheistic cosmopsychism, in light of its distinctive features and its poten-
tial philosophical advantages over rival theories of consciousness, deserves to 
be taken seriously by contemporary philosophers.
3   For this definition of micropsychism, see Goff 2017b.
4   See, for instance, Shani 2015, Shani 2018, and Nagasawa and Wager 2017.
5   Gasparri 2019, Albahari 2020, and Vaidya 2020.
6   Duckworth 2017.
7   Biernacki 2016a,b.
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2. Vivekananda’s Sāṃkhya-Vedāntic Framework of Panentheistic 
Cosmopsychism
In his approach to consciousness, Vivekananda takes his initial bearings from 
the classical Indian philosophical tradition of Sāṃkhya. Sāṃkhya upholds a 
metaphysical dualism between two fundamental entities, the eternal con-
scious Puruṣa (Spirit or Self) and the insentient Prakṛti (Primordial Nature). 
According to Sāṃkhya, insentient Prakṛti is the material cause of all creation, 
which first becomes intellect or will (mahat/buddhi), which itself becomes 
the ego-sense (ahaṃkāra), which in turn evolves into mind (manas), the five 
sense-capacities (buddhīndriyas), the five action-capacities (karmendriyas), 
and the five subtle elements (tanmātras), and these tanmātras themselves 
evolve into the five gross elements (mahābhūtas). Sāṃkhyans claim that all 
these twenty-four cosmic principles (tattvas) exist for the sake of the conscious 
Puruṣa, which is entirely separate from nature.
The English word »mind« corresponds to what Sāṃkhya philosophers call 
the »internal organ« (antaḥkaraṇa), which comprises the intellect/will (bud-
dhi), ego-sense (ahaṃkāra), and mind (manas) in the narrower sense of the 
thinking faculty. It is important to note that in Sāṃkhya philosophy, the inter-
nal organ is also the liṅgaśarīra or sūkṣmaśarīra (the fine or subtle body), the 
reincarnating entity which inhabits different physical bodies (sthūlaśarīras) 
from one life to the next. Vivekananda explains the Sāṃkhyan doctrine of re-
incarnation as follows:
Each one of the Purushas is omnipresent; each one of us is omnipresent, but 
we can act only through the Linga Sharira, the fine body. The mind, the self-
consciousness, the organs, and the vital forces compose the fine body or sheath, 
what in Christian philosophy is called the spiritual body of man. It is this body 
that gets salvation, or punishment, or heaven, that incarnates and reincarnates, 
because we see from the very beginning that the going and the coming of the 
Purusha or soul are impossible. (CW2:455-56)
Sāṃkhya, then, upholds a three-tiered ontology of the self: the insentient 
grossly physical body (sthūlaśarīra), the insentient subtly physical body which 
reincarnates (liṅgaśarīra), and the conscious non-physical Spirit (Puruṣa). 
Moreover, Sāṃkhya philosophers accept the existence of multiple Puruṣas, 
each corresponding to a different liṅgaśarīra.
Vivekananda explains the Sāṃkhyan approach to consciousness as follows: 
»Mind, intelligence, will, and everything else is insentient. But they are all re-
flecting the sentiency, the ›Chit‹ [Consciousness] of some being who is beyond 
all this, whom the Sankhya philosophers call ›Purusha‹« (CW2:450). Crucially, 
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then, even the mind (antaḥkaraṇa) is actually a subtle form of insentient mat-
ter, but it appears to be conscious because of the »light« of the Puruṣa behind 
it. As Vivekananda puts it, »By itself the mind has no light; but we see it rea-
sons. Therefore there must be some one behind it, whose light is percolating 
through Mahat [cosmic consciousness]… and subsequent modifications, and 
this is what Kapila [the founder of Sāṃkhya] calls the Purusha, the Self of the 
Vedantin …« (CW2:455-56). Obviously, Vivekananda intends the »light« of the 
Puruṣa illuminating the mind to be understood in metaphorical terms. For a 
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Figure 1 The Dualist System of Sāṃkhya
While Vivekananda accepts key elements from Sāṃkhyan philosophy, he also 
singles out for criticism three fundamental aspects of Sāṃkhyan metaphys-
ics: the doctrine of multiple Puruṣas, the doctrine that insentient Prakṛti is 
the source of all creation, and the metaphysical dualism between Puruṣa and 
Prakṛti. Since I do not have the space to discuss his criticisms in detail, I will 
only summarize them here. Vivekananda’s internal critique of the Sāṃkhyan 
doctrine of multiple Puruṣas takes off from the Sāṃkhyan premise that the 
Puruṣa is both omnipresent and infinite (CW2:460-61). He argues that the 
notion of multiple infinites is incoherent, since the infinites would limit one 
another, thereby becoming finite. Hence, if the Puruṣa is truly infinite, it can 
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only be one rather than multiple. For Vivekananda, then, the Sāṃkhyan doc-
trine of the infinitude of Puruṣa, when pushed to its logical conclusion, en-
tails that there is only one Puruṣa—namely, the impersonal (nirguṇa) nondual 
Brahman of Advaita Vedānta.
Vivekananda also criticizes Sāṃkhyan atheism by presenting two main 
arguments for positing God (īśvara) as the efficient and material cause of all 
creation (CW2:460). His first objection is based on the Sāṃkhyan view that 
the macrocosm is reflected in the microcosm, so that each of the cosmic prin-
ciples has its individual counterpart.8 For instance, according to Sāṃkhya, 
while mahat is the universal or cosmic intellect, buddhi is its counterpart at 
the individual level. Vivekananda now argues as follows. If Sāṃkhya holds that 
all the individual manifestations of Prakṛti exist for the sake of an individual 
Puruṣa, then it should also hold that all the cosmic manifestations of Prakṛti 
exist for the sake of a universal Puruṣa as their »ruler and governor.« This uni-
versal Puruṣa, he claims, is none other than God (īśvara).
Vivekananda’s second argument in favor of adding īśvara to the Sāṃkhyan 
system targets its doctrine of insentient Prakṛti (CW3:6-7). According to 
Vivekananda, Sāṃkhya posits both Puruṣa and Prakṛti as absolutes, so if the 
absolute Puruṣa is omnipresent and beyond time, space, and causation, then 
the absolute Prakṛti must also be omnipresent and beyond time, space, and 
causation. In that case, however, there would be no »change or manifestation,« 
since Prakṛti would be beyond nature altogether and unable to interact with it. 
He also makes an independent argument that it is impossible to have »two ab-
solutes.« He seems to have in mind here his argument—mentioned earlier—
that the notion of multiple infinite Puruṣas is incoherent, since they would 
limit each other. Similarly, two absolutes would limit each other and thereby 
lose their absolute status. To avoid this difficulty, we must posit a universal 
Puruṣa—God or īśvara—at the basis of Prakṛti.
Finally, Vivekananda argues that we should reject the spirit-matter dualism 
of Sāṃkhya in favor of a Vedāntic panentheism:
Beyond this Prakriti, and eternally separate from it, is the Purusha, the soul of 
the Sankhya which is without attributes and omnipresent. The Purusha is not 
the doer but the witness. The illustration of the crystal is used to explain the 
Purusha. The latter is said to be like a crystal without any colour, before which 
different colours are placed, and then it seems to be coloured by the colours be-
fore it, but in reality it is not. The Vedantists reject the Sankhya ideas of the soul 
and nature. They claim that between them there is a huge gulf to be bridged over. 
8   Hence, as Larson (1969: 176-200) notes, Sāṃkhyan cosmology doubles as a psychology of the 
individual soul.
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On the one hand the Sankhya system comes to nature, and then at once it has to 
jump over to the other side and come to the soul, which is entirely separate from 
nature. How can these different colours, as the Sankhya calls them, be able to act 
on that soul which by its nature is colourless? So the Vedantists, from the very 
first affirm that this soul and this nature are one…. The idea of the Advaitists is 
to generalise the whole universe into one—that something which is really the 
whole of this universe. And they claim that this whole universe is one, that it is 
one Being manifesting itself in all these various forms. They admit that what the 
Sankhya calls nature exists, but say that nature is God. It is this Being, the Sat, 
which has become converted into all this—the universe, man, soul, and every-
thing that exists. (CW1:361-62)
Vivekananda argues, rather swiftly, that the »huge gulf« Sāṃkhya posits be-
tween Puruṣa and Prakṛti makes it impossible for Prakṛti to interact in any way 
with Puruṣa. Hence, he claims that the Vedāntic view that Puruṣa and Prakṛti 
»are one« is more logically sound than Sāṃkhyan dualism. On this basis, he 
defends the panentheistic view that God, the sole Reality, has become every-
thing in the universe.
According to Vivekananda, then, these three fundamental problems internal 
to Sāṃkhyan metaphysics necessitate a transition from soul-matter dualism 
to spiritual monism. In particular, he defends a Vedāntic panentheism which 
incorporates key aspects of Sāṃkhyan metaphysics while also correcting for 
the latter’s deficiencies and lacunae. It is crucial to note that Vivekananda’s 
Vedāntic panentheism is based not on Śaṅkara’s world-denying philosophy of 
Advaita Vedānta but on the world-affirming Advaitic philosophy of his guru 
Sri Ramakrishna.
Sri Ramakrishna’s views on consciousness are grounded in his philoso-
phy of Vijñāna Vedānta, which I explain in detail in the first chapter of my 
book Infinite Paths to Infinite Reality (Maharaj 2018). Sri Ramakrishna makes 
a key distinction between two fundamental stages of spiritual realization 
which he calls »jñāna« and »vijñāna.« Jñāna, he claims, is the Advaitic real-
ization of one’s true essence as the impersonal nondual Brahman, which is 
»immovable, immutable, inactive, and of the nature of Pure Consciousness 
[bodha-svarūpa]« (Gupta 1992: 430).9 The jñānī feels that Brahman alone is 
real and that everything else is unreal. However, Sri Ramakrishna maintains 
that some rare souls, even after attaining brahmajñāna, can go on to attain the 
even greater state of vijñāna, a more intimate and expansive realization of God 
as the impersonal-personal Infinite Reality which has become everything in 
the universe. According to Sri Ramakrishna, »The vijñānī sees that the Reality 
which is impersonal [nirguṇa] is also personal [saguṇa]« (Gupta 1992: 104). 
9   For the original Bengali, see Gupta 2010 (1897-1932).
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Hence, while the Advaitic jñānī dismisses Śakti (the personal God) as unreal, 
the vijñānī realizes that »Brahman and Śakti are inseparable« (Gupta 1992: 
550; translation modified). Moreover, while the jñānī dismisses the world as 
unreal, the vijñānī looks upon the world as a real manifestation of God. As Sri 
Ramakrishna puts it, »God, as Consciousness [caitanya], has become the en-
tire universe of the living and non-living« (Gupta 1992: 300).
Sri Ramakrishna explicitly states that he himself attained this panentheistic 
realization of vijñāna:
Why should the universe be unreal? That is a speculation of the philosophers. 
After realizing God, one sees that it is God Herself who has become the uni-
verse and all living beings. The Divine Mother revealed to me in the Kālī temple 
that it was She who had become everything. She showed me that everything 
was Divine Consciousness [sab cinmaya]. The Image was Consciousness, the 
altar was Consciousness, the water vessels were Consciousness, the doorsill was 
Consciousness, the marble floor was Consciousness—all was Consciousness. 
I found everything inside the room soaked, as it were, in Bliss—the Bliss of 
Saccidānanda. I saw a wicked man in front of the Kālī temple; but in him also I 
saw the Śakti of the Divine Mother vibrating. That was why I fed a cat with the 
food that was to be offered to the Divine Mother. I clearly perceived that the 
Divine Mother Herself had become everything—even the cat… . After realizing 
God, one sees all this aright—that it is She who has become the universe, living 
beings, and the twenty-four cosmic principles. (Gupta 1992: 345)
In contemporary philosophical terms, we can say that Sri Ramakrishna’s mys-
tical experience of vijñāna led him to accept a panentheistic form of cosmo-
psychism, according to which everything in the universe is one and the same 
Divine Consciousness manifesting in various forms. He specifically empha-
sizes that this Divine Consciousness is present not only in sentient creatures 
like cats and human beings but also in insentient things like water vessels and 
marble floors. Sri Ramakrishna considered his panentheistic worldview to be 
a world-inclusive form of Advaita. As he puts it, »The bhakta also has a realiza-
tion of oneness [ekākār jñāna]; he sees that there is nothing but God. Instead 
of saying that the world is unreal like a dream, he says that God has become 
everything« (Gupta 1992: 700). Crucially, Sri Ramakrishna explicitly contrasted 
his world-inclusive Advaitic philosophy with the world-negating Advaitic phi-
losophy of Śaṅkara and his followers.
Vivekananda, I will argue, addressed the hard problem of consciousness 
largely by developing and defending the vijñāna-based panentheistic cos-
mopsychism taught to him by Sri Ramakrishna. As we will see, Vivekananda 
frequently appealed to Advaita Vedānta in his efforts to explain and justify 
his panentheistic cosmopsychism, but we should always keep in mind that 
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he followed Sri Ramakrishna in championing a world-inclusive Advaitic phi-
losophy that conceives the world as a real manifestation of the impersonal-
personal God.
Crucially, Vivekananda’s preferred nondual Vedāntic framework integrates 
within it all the elements of Sāṃkhya philosophy which he takes to be valid. 
In particular, he fully accepts the Sāṃkhyan doctrines that mind is a subtle 
form of matter and that conscious experience has a spiritual basis. He also ac-
cepts most of Sāṃkhyan cosmology, except that he equates Mahat with īśvara 
(and perhaps tacitly assimilates Sāṃkhyan Prakṛti to Mahat/īśvara as well). 
He makes this explicit in an 1896 letter to his disciple E.T. Sturdy in which he 
sketches a diagram illustrating his Vedāntic cosmology:
I am working a good deal now upon the cosmology and eschatology of the 
Vedanta…. I intend to write a book later on in the form of questions and an-
swers. The first chapter will be on cosmology, showing the harmony between 
Vedantic theories and modern science.
Brahman   =   The Absolute
Mahat or Ishvara = Primal Creative Energy (CW5:102)
Unfortunately, he never found the time to write the book he had planned, so 
we will have to reconstruct his Vedāntic cosmology by drawing together vari-
ous relevant passages in his work. For Vivekananda, Brahman is the impersonal 
(nirguṇa) nondual Absolute, and the vertical line indicates that it is insepara-
ble from Mahat/Īśvara, the »Primal Creative Energy« which he also frequently 
refers to as »Shakti.« For instance, in his 1894 lecture »The Women of India,« 
he explains the inseparability of the impersonal Brahman and Śakti as follows:
[T]he central conception of Hindu philosophy is of the Absolute; that is the 
background of the universe. This Absolute Being, of whom we can predicate 
nothing, has Its powers spoken of as She—that is, the real personal God in India 
is She. This Shakti of the Brahman is always in the feminine gender. (CW9:195)
Vivekananda echoes here his guru Sri Ramakrishna’s favorite teaching 
that »Brahman and Śakti are inseparable« (Gupta 1992: 550). Following Sri 
Ramakrishna, Vivekananda holds that while the impersonal nondual Brahman 
is utterly transcendent, Śakti—i.e. Mahat/Īśvara—is the same Absolute in its 
dynamic form as the personal God who creates, preserves, and destroys the 
universe.
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Vivekananda’s equation of Īśvara with Mahat is highly significant, since it 
indicates how he integrates key aspects of the Sāṃkhyan system into his own 
broader Vedāntic cosmology. In Vivekananda’s hands, the insentient Mahat 
of Sāṃkhya becomes the »cosmic consciousness«10 or »cosmic mind«11 from 
which everything in the universe derives:
What are you and I and all these souls? In our discussion of evolution and invo-
lution, we have seen that you and I must be part of the cosmic consciousness, 
cosmic life, cosmic mind, which got involved and we must complete the circle 
and go back to this cosmic intelligence which is God. This cosmic intelligence is 
what people call Lord, or God, or Christ, or Buddha, or Brahman, what the mate-
rialists perceive as force, and the agnostics as that infinite, inexpressible beyond; 
and we are all parts of that. (CW2:231)
In Vivekananda’s Vedāntic cosmology, Mahat/Īśvara manifests both as indi-
vidual conscious souls ( jīvas) and as insentient minds (antaḥkaraṇas). As he 
puts it, »According to the Sankhya philosophy, the reactive state of the mind 
called Buddhi or intellect is the outcome, the change, or a certain manifes-
tation of the Mahat or Cosmic Mind« (CW1:361).12 Vivekananda accepts 
unchanged the rest of the Sāṃkhyan cosmology from buddhi down to the 
5 mahābhutas (gross elements). He follows Sri Ramakrishna in championing a 
world-affirming Advaitic philosophy, according to which the sole reality is the 
impersonal-personal Infinite Divine Reality. We can now see that the personal 
aspect of the Infinite Reality is none other than Mahat/Īśvara/Śakti, the »cos-
mic consciousness« which not only grounds, but actually is, everything in the 
universe. Ultimately, then, Vivekananda solves the hard problem of conscious-
ness by appealing to a Sāṃkhya-Vedāntic framework of panentheistic cosmo-
psychism. While he accepts the Sāṃkhyan view that the mind (antaḥkaraṇa) 
is insentient, he claims that all our conscious experiences are grounded not in 
the individual Puruṣa but in the all-pervasive Divine Consciousness. Figure 2 
illustrates his panentheistic cosmopsychism in a nutshell.
10   Vivekananda equates Mahat with »cosmic consciousness« at least twice, in CW8:363 and 
CW2:231.
11   Vivekananda explicitly equates »Mahat« with the »Cosmic Mind« in several places, in-
cluding CW1:360-1 and CW2:267.
12   CW1:361. I do not think Vivekananda means to imply that buddhi is a separate cosmic 
principle from Mahat. Rather, he follows Sāṃkhya in taking buddhi to be the »individual 
Mahat« (CW1:250-51), the microcosmic counterpart to the macrocosmic Mahat.
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As I discussed earlier, the most serious problem for contemporary cosmopsy-
chists is the decombination problem: how does the single cosmic conscious-
ness ground the conscious experiences of multiple individual subjects, each 
of whom has his or her own first-person perspective? In order to answer this 
question, most contemporary cosmopsychists have drawn upon Jonathan 
Schaffer’s (2010) priority monism, the view that there exists only one basic en-
tity, which grounds all other entities. Combining cosmopsychism with priority 
monism yields priority cosmopsychism, the view that cosmic consciousness 
is the only basic entity, which grounds all individual conscious experiences. 
Proponents of priority cosmopsychism offer differing accounts of how cosmic 
consciousness grounds the conscious experiences of individual subjects.13
I would argue that Vivekananda’s panentheistic cosmopsychism is a distinc-
tive form of priority cosmopsychism, which provides a unique account of the 
13   See, for instance, Goff 2017a: 220-55, Shani 2015, Shani 2018, and Nagasawa & Wager 2017.
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Figure 2 Vivekananda’s Sāṃkhya-Vedāntic Framework of Panentheistic Cosmopsychism
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grounding relation. I would call Vivekananda’s account of grounding »ground-
ing by manifestation,« according to which X grounds by manifestation Y if 
and only if Y is a manifestation of X.14 According to his panentheistic cos-
mopsychism, then, the Divine Cosmic Consciousness grounds the conscious 
experiences of individual subjects in the sense of manifesting as all of these 
individual subjects with their respective conscious experiences. According to 
Vivekananda, Mahat/Īśvara manifests as all the individuals souls ( jīvas), each 
of which has its own unique conscious perspective. My conscious experiences, 
rooted in my own first-person perspective, result from the association of my 
particular jīva with my particular antaḥkaraṇa. Your conscious experiences, 
rooted in your different first-person perspective, result from the association 
of your jīva with your antaḥkaraṇa. Vivekananda’s account of grounding by 
manifestation satisfies what Philip Goff calls the »free lunch constraint«—the 
constraint that any adequate theory of grounding must account for the appar-
ent paradox that if X grounds Y, then (a) Y is nothing over and above X, and yet 
(b) Y is not identical to X (Goff 2020: 146). In Vivekananda’s account of ground-
ing by manifestation, ordinary conscious experience, as a manifestation of the 
Divine Cosmic Consciousness, is nothing over and above the Divine Cosmic 
Consciousness while not being identical to it.
How would Vivekananda respond to the decombination problem? Applied 
specifically to Vivekananda’s panentheistic cosmopsychism, the decombina-
tion problem can be formulated as follows: how is it logically possible for God, 
with His own divine perspective, to manifest as various human beings, who 
enjoy their own different conscious perspectives? Since I provide a detailed 
reconstruction of Vivekananda’s response to the decombination problem in 
the tenth chapter of my book in progress, I will only summarize his response 
here. According to Vivekananda’s panentheistic cosmopsychism, Divine 
Consciousness is the sole reality. Through the individuating principle of māyā, 
this nondual Divine Consciousness manifests as everything in the universe 
through a process of playful self-limitation or self-veiling (CW2:125-26). In ig-
norant people, the Divine Consciousness manifests as egoic consciousness. As 
a result, ignorant people remain unaware of their own divine nature, and their 
conscious perspectives are grounded in their identification with the body-mind 
complex and their consequent preoccupation with worldly thoughts and de-
sires (CW6:474-75). Those who engage in spiritual practice can ascend to high-
er planes of consciousness through the awakening of the Kuṇḍalinī (CW4:237). 
Vivekananda would often appeal to the analogy of »veils« to convey that our 
true nature is Divine Consciousness and that the aim of all spiritual practice is 
14   I borrow the structure of this formulation of grounding from Goff (2019).
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nothing but to remove the »veils« covering our divine nature. As he puts it in 
his lecture »The Real Nature of Man,« »Every good thought that you think or 
act upon is simply tearing the veil, as it were; and the purity, the Infinity, the 
God behind, manifests Itself more and more« (CW2:82). As we ascend to high-
er planes of consciousness, veil after veil covering the Divine Consciousness is 
removed, and our conscious perspective itself changes at each higher plane, 
until the Kuṇḍalinī finally rises to the sahasrāra, and we realize our true nature 
as the Divine Consciousness without any veils.
Hence, from Vivekananda’s perspective, the conscious perspectives of vari-
ous people are one and the same Divine Consciousness limited or »veiled« to 
varying degrees and in different ways, depending on their current plane of con-
sciousness. Since the various planes of consciousness are mutually exclusive 
(CW3:20-21), our ignorant conscious perspectives and God’s divine perspective 
are also mutually exclusive. So long as we enjoy our ignorant conscious perspec-
tives, we do not, and cannot, share the perspective of Divine Consciousness. 
Conversely, when we realize our true nature as Divine Consciousness, we no 
longer have our ego-centered conscious perspectives. Crucially, then, God’s di-
vine perspective never coexists with our own limited conscious perspectives 
as ignorant human beings. Hence, I would argue that Vivekananda’s account 
of grounding by manifestation provides a novel and elegant solution to the 
decombination problem that deserves to be taken seriously by contemporary 
philosophers.
If Vivekananda is right that we are nothing but different manifestations of 
God, why don’t we all think of ourselves as God? Why don’t we share God’s 
first-person cosmic perspective rather than having our own individual first-
person perspectives? Vivekananda’s Vedāntic answer is that we are deluded 
into thinking that we are autonomous individuals due to our preoccupation 
with our own ego and its selfish concerns and desires. As he puts it, »Man only 
remains hypnotised with the false idea of an ego. When this ghost is off from 
us, all dreams vanish, and then it is found that the one Self only exists from the 
highest Being to a blade of grass« (CW6:474-75). According to Vivekananda, by 
renouncing sense-pleasures and engaging in ethical and spiritual practices like 
meditation, unselfish service, and the worship of God, we can break our false 
identification with our ego and realize our true nature as God Himself:
There is only one Self in the universe, only One Existence, and that One Existence, 
when it passes through the forms of time, space, and causation, is called by dif-
ferent names, Buddhi, fine matter, gross matter, all mental and physical forms. 
Everything in the universe is that One, appearing in various forms…. You are the 
Infinite… . Therefore the idea that you are Mr. So-and-so can never be true; it is 
a day-dream. Know this and be free. This is the Advaita conclusion. (CW2:462)
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It is important to note here that Vivekananda’s »Advaita conclusion« is based 
on the world-affirming Advaita taught to him by Sri Ramakrishna rather than 
the world-negating Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara and his followers. According to 
Śaṅkara’s Advaita Vedānta, nondual Brahman alone is real and this entire uni-
verse is ultimately unreal. It may appear that Vivekananda endorses Śaṅkara’s 
Advaitic position when he says that our individuality is a »day-dream.« 
However, it is clear from the context that what he means is that our delusion 
consists in thinking that we are autonomous individuals; in reality, we are 
different manifestations of God Himself. Crucially, Vivekananda follows Sri 
Ramakrishna rather than Śaṅkara in holding that God actually manifests as 
both deluded and enlightened people. Sri Ramakrishna makes this point ex-
plicitly in the following passage:
This world is the lil̄ā [sportive play] of God… . God alone has become all this—
māyā, the universe, living beings [ jīvas], and the twenty-four cosmic princi-
ples…. It is God Himself who has become both vidyā [Knowledge] and avidyā 
[ignorance]. He remains deluded by the māyā of avidyā. Again, with the help of 
the guru, He is cured by the māyā of vidyā…. The vijñānī sees that it is God who 
has become all this. (Gupta 436; translation modified)
For Sri Ramakrishna and Vivekananda, the omnipotent God playfully mani-
fests as everything in the universe, including both deluded and enlightened 
people. Moreover, in contrast to Śaṅkara, they hold that God’s world-līlā is 
impermanent but perfectly real. Hence, Vivekananda maintains that our or-
dinary conscious experiences are real manifestations of the Divine Cosmic 
Consciousness.
It is also important to note that Vivekananda’s panentheistic cosmopsy-
chism, in spite of its nondualism, preserves the Sāṃkhyan distinction between 
sentient and insentient entities. While Vivekananda maintains that everything 
in the universe—including both sentient creatures and insentient entities—is 
a manifestation of the same Divine Consciousness, he does not hold that ev-
erything is conscious in the sense of being mental or sentient. Rather, he holds 
the Sāṃkhyan view that only entities with a mind (antaḥkaraṇa) are sentient. 
Surendranath Dasgupta (1922: 241) succinctly explains why an antaḥkaraṇa is 
necessary for conscious experience:
A question naturally arises, that if the knowledge forms [i.e. the antaḥkaraṇa] 
are made up of [the same]15 sort of stuff as the objective forms of matter are, why 
15   Dasgupta’s original phrasing is as follows: »… if the knowledge forms are made up of some 
sort of stuff as the objective forms of matter are….« Since this phrase is ungrammatical as 
it stands, I have supplied in brackets what I believe he meant.
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then should the puruṣa illuminate it [i.e. the antaḥkaraṇa] and not external ma-
terial objects. The answer that Sāṃkhya gives is that the knowledge-complexes 
are certainly different from external objects in this, that they are far subtler and 
have a preponderance of a special quality of plasticity and translucence (sattva), 
which resembles the light of puruṣa, and is thus fit for reflecting and absorbing 
the light of the puruṣa.
In other words, a physical structure must be sufficiently subtle and translu-
cent to reflect the light of the Puruṣa. Gross physical entities like stones are 
insentient because they lack the subtlety and translucency (sattva) necessary 
to reflect the light of the Puruṣa. Human beings, dogs, and bats, by contrast, are 
sentient because their minds (antaḥkaraṇas) are sufficiently subtle and trans-
lucent to reflect the light of their respective Puruṣas. Vivekananda fully accepts 
this Sāṃkhyan view but replaces the individual Puruṣas of Sāṃkhya with the 
single Divine Cosmic Consciousness. According to Vivekananda, only entities 
endowed with an antaḥkaraṇa can be sentient because an antaḥkaraṇa is nec-
essary to reflect the light of the all-pervasive Divine Consciousness.
3. Vivekananda’s Arguments for Panentheistic Cosmopsychism
Even if Vivekananda’s panentheistic cosmopsychism seems to be logically 
coherent and offers an arguably elegant account of ordinary conscious expe-
rience, why should we believe that it is a plausible metaphysical worldview? 
In numerous lectures, he presents arguments in support of the plausibility of 
panentheistic cosmopsychism. Unfortunately, since he never wrote the defini-
tive book on Vedāntic philosophy that he had planned, there is no single place 
in his corpus where he works out these arguments systematically and in detail. 
Accordingly, in the remainder of this section, I will try to reconstruct his justi-
fication of panentheistic cosmopsychism by drawing upon his various lectures 
and writings. A good starting-point for this reconstruction is his lecture »The 
Cosmos: The Macrocosm,« delivered in New York on 19 January 1896, which 
contains his most detailed argument for panentheistic cosmopsychism. The 
relevant passage from the lecture is long but needs to be quoted in full, since it 
is a continuous piece of reasoning:
Next comes a very important question especially for modern times. We see that 
the finer forms develop slowly and slowly, and gradually become grosser and 
grosser. We have seen that the cause is the same as the effect, and the effect is 
only the cause in another form. Therefore this whole universe cannot be pro-
duced out of nothing. Nothing comes without a cause, and the cause is the effect 
in another form.
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Out of what has this universe been produced then? From a preceding fine 
universe. Out of what has men been produced? The preceding fine form. Out 
of what has the tree been produced? Out of the seed; the whole of the tree was 
there in the seed. It comes out and becomes manifest. So, the whole of this uni-
verse has been created out of this very universe existing in a minute form…. This 
coming out of the fine and becoming gross, simply changing the arrangements 
of its parts, as it were, is what in modern times [is] called evolution. This is very 
true, perfectly true; we see it in our lives. No rational man can possibly quarrel 
with these evolutionists. But we have to learn one thing more. We have to go one 
step further, and what is that? That every evolution is preceded by an involu-
tion…. The whole of this universe was present in the cosmic fine universe. The 
little cell, which becomes afterwards the man, was simply the involved man and 
becomes evolved as a man. If this is clear, we have no quarrel with the evolution-
ists, for we see that if they admit this step, instead of their destroying religion, 
they will be the greatest supporters of it.
We see then, that nothing can be created out of nothing…. The whole series 
of evolution beginning with the lowest manifestation of life and reaching up to 
the highest, the most perfect man, must have been the involution of something 
else. The question is: The involution of what? What was involved? God. The evo-
lutionist will tell you that your idea that it was God is wrong. Why? Because you 
see God is intelligent, but we find that intelligence develops much later on in the 
course of evolution. It is in man and the higher animals that we find intelligence, 
but millions of years have passed in this world before this intelligence came. This 
objection of the evolutionists does not hold water, as we shall see by applying 
our theory. The tree comes out of the seed, goes back to the seed; the beginning 
and the end are the same. The earth comes out of its cause and returns to it. We 
know that if we can find the beginning we can find the end. E converso, if we 
find the end we can find the beginning. If that is so, take this whole evolutionary 
series, from the protoplasm at one end to the perfect man at the other, and this 
whole series is one life. In the end we find the perfect man, so in the beginning 
it must have been the same. Therefore, the protoplasm was the involution of the 
highest intelligence. You may not see it but that involved intelligence is what is 
uncoiling itself until it becomes manifested in the most perfect man. That can 
be mathematically demonstrated. If the law of conservation of energy is true, 
you cannot get anything out of a machine unless you put it in there first…. There 
cannot be added in the economy of this universe one particle of matter or one 
foot-pound of force, nor can one particle of matter or one foot-pound of force 
be taken out. If that be the case, what is this intelligence? If it was not present 
in the protoplasm, it must have come all of a sudden, something coming out of 
nothing, which is absurd. It, therefore, follows absolutely that the perfect man, 
the free man, the God-man, who has gone beyond the laws of nature, and tran-
scended everything, who has no more to go through this process of evolution, 
through birth and death, that man called the »Christ-man« by the Christians, 
and the »Buddha-man« by the Buddhists, and the »Free« by the Yogis—that per-
fect man who is at one end of the chain of evolution was involved in the cell of 
the protoplasm, which is at the other end of the same chain.
Applying the same reason to the whole of the universe, we see that intelli-
gence must be the Lord of creation, the cause. What is the most evolved notion 
289Panentheistic Cosmopsychism
that man has of this universe? It is intelligence, the adjustment of part to part, 
the display of intelligence, of which the ancient design theory was an attempt 
at expression. The beginning was, therefore, intelligence. At the beginning that 
intelligence becomes involved, and in the end that intelligence gets evolved. 
The sum total of the intelligence displayed in the universe must, therefore, be 
the involved universal intelligence unfolding itself. This universal intelligence is 
what we call God. Call it by any other name, it is absolutely certain that in the 
beginning there is that Infinite cosmic intelligence. This cosmic intelligence gets 
involved, and it manifests, evolves itself, until it becomes the perfect man, the 
»Christ-man,« the »Buddha-man.«… This cosmic intelligence is what the theo-
logians call God….
We now see that all the various forms of cosmic energy, such as matter, 
thought, force, intelligence and so forth, are simply the manifestations of that 
cosmic intelligence, or, as we shall call it henceforth, the Supreme Lord. 
Everything that you see, feel, or hear, the whole universe, is His creation, or to be 
a little more accurate, is His projection; or to be still more accurate, is the Lord 
Himself. It is He who is shining as the sun and the stars, He is the mother earth. 
He is the ocean Himself. He comes as gentle showers, He is the gentle air that we 
breathe in, and He it is who is working as force in the body. He is the speech that 
is uttered, He is the man who is talking. He is the audience that is here. He is the 
platform on which I stand, He is the light that enables me to see your faces. It is 
all He. He Himself is both the material and the efficient cause of this universe, 
and He it is that gets involved in the minute cell, and evolves at the other end and 
becomes God again. He it is that comes down and becomes the lowest atom, and 
slowly unfolding His nature, rejoins Himself. This is the mystery of the universe. 
»Thou art the man, Thou art the woman, Thou art the strong man walking in the 
pride of youth, Thou art the old man tottering on crutches, Thou art in every-
thing. Thou art everything, O Lord.« This is the only solution of the Cosmos that 
satisfies the human intellect. (CW2:207-11)16
This passage contains Vivekananda’s core argument for panentheistic cosmo-
psychism, though I believe there are key points in the argument where certain 
premises are implied or presupposed rather than explicitly stated. I will supply 
these missing premises by drawing on his statements and arguments in other 
lectures and writings. On my reconstruction, Vivekananda actually makes 
two independent but mutually supportive arguments, the first in support of 
panpsychism in general, and the second in support of panentheistic cosmo-
psychism in particular. I will now present and discuss each argument in turn. 
I take both his arguments to be abductive arguments (inferences to the best 
explanation), rather than deductive or inductive arguments.
16   Vivekananda makes a similar involution argument in numerous other places, including 
CW2:74, CW2:173, and CW8:362-63.
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Argument 1: Vivekananda’s Involution Argument for Panpsychism
1.  Doctrine of the Pre-existent Effect: If c is the material cause of e, then e 
must already be present in some form in c.
2.  Denial of Materialist Reductionism: Consciousness is not identical to 
anything material, such as a brain state.
3.  Denial of Emergentism: Consciousness could not have emerged from 
non-conscious matter at a certain point in the evolutionary process. 
( from 1 and 2)
4.  Plausibility of Panpsychism: Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that 
consciousness is involved—that is, present in some form—even in 
primordial matter. ( from 2 and 3)
Premises 1 and 3, as well as the conclusion 4, are explicitly stated in the long 
passage cited above. I would argue that premise 2, though not explicitly stated 
in this passage, is presupposed here and explicitly stated elsewhere.
In the first paragraph of the long passage, Vivekananda states premise 1, 
the Sāṃkhyan doctrine of the pre-existent effect (satkārya): »the effect is only 
the cause in another form.« According to Sāṃkhya, nothing new can ever be 
produced; rather, all effects are already present in another form in their re-
spective material causes. The Sāṃkhya scholar Gerald James Larson (1969: 
165) summarizes two of the main arguments Sāṃkhyans provide in support 
of satkāryavāda: »First of all, non-being obviously can produce or do nothing. 
Second, the effect is made up of the same material as the cause, there being a 
difference only with respect to the appearance or modification of the material.« 
Vivekananda reaffirms both of these Sāṃkhyan arguments for satkāryavāda. 
He echoes the first Sāṃkhyan argument when he states that »nothing can be 
created out of nothing.« Later in the same paragraph, he makes this same point 
in a slightly different way when he says that the notion of »something coming 
out of nothing« is »absurd.« The intuition here is a powerful one: it just seems 
obvious that there must be a sufficient material cause for any existing entity. 
He provides three examples to make this intuition more plausible: this entire 
universe must have been produced from »a preceding fine universe«; human 
beings are produced from the »preceding fine form«; and a tree is produced 
from »the seed.« Vivekananda also echoes the second Sāṃkhyan argument for 
satkāryavāda: It is a matter of empirical fact that »the cause is the effect in 
another form.« If we examine the nature of any given effect, we will find that 
it is made of the same material as its material cause, only in a modified form.
In cosmopolitan fashion, Vivekananda then goes on to provide further 
support for the Sāṃkhyan doctrine of satkārya by appealing to two modern 
Western scientific theories: namely, the doctrine of evolution and the law of 
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the conservation of energy. As he puts it, »This coming out of the fine and 
becoming gross, simply changing the arrangements of its parts, as it were, is 
what in modern times [is] called evolution. This is very true, perfectly true… .« 
Significantly, Vivekananda defines the doctrine of evolution in very general 
terms as a continuous process that molds pre-existing properties into other 
forms. He argues that a logical consequence of this modern doctrine of evolu-
tion is that »every evolution is preceded by an involution.« That is, the mod-
ern scientific understanding of the evolutionary process implies satkāryavāda: 
since nothing truly novel can emerge through the evolutionary process, the 
evolved entity or property had to have been »involved«—that is, pre-existent 
in a latent form—in that from which it evolved. As Vivekananda puts it, »The 
little cell, which becomes afterwards the man, was simply the involved man 
and becomes evolved as a man.«
Vivekananda was familiar with the views of Charles Darwin, T.H. Huxley, 
and Herbert Spencer—all of whom defended various forms of the doctrine 
of evolution—and he often referred to »Darwin« and »Darwinism« in his 
lectures and writings.17 However, it is crucial to note that Vivekananda says 
nothing here about the mechanism of evolution. Indeed, in other places, he 
explicitly criticizes Darwin’s preferred evolutionary mechanism of natural se-
lection, arguing that while natural selection certainly operates in the »animal 
kingdom,« it cannot account for the moral and spiritual qualities of human be-
ings (CW7:154).18 Hence, the modern doctrine of evolution which Vivekananda 
endorses as »perfectly true« is only the very general one which holds that pres-
ently existing entities did not emerge suddenly or out of nothing but evolved 
gradually from earlier entities in which the presently existing entities were 
already present in a latent form. For Vivekananda, then, modern scientific evi-
dence for the truth of evolution lends further support to the ancient Sāṃkhyan 
doctrine of satkārya. Vivekananda also supports premise 1 by appealing to the 
law of the conservation of energy, which holds that the total amount of energy 
in the universe remains constant and that this energy only changes forms and 
manifests in a variety of ways. If this law is true, he argues, then nothing new 
can come into existence; rather, what exists now is only a »change« or »mani-
festation« of what existed previously.
Vivekananda explicitly defends premise 2 (the denial of materialist reduc-
tionism) in his lecture »The Science of Yoga« delivered in California in 1900:
17   See, for instance, CW7:152-5 and CW6:40.
18   For discussion of Vivekananda’s criticisms of Darwinian evolution, see Killingley 1990 and 
Brown 2012: 131-54.
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The mind cannot be analysed by any external machine. Supposing you could 
look into my brain while I am thinking, you would only see certain molecules in-
terchanged. You could not see thought, consciousness, ideas, images. You would 
simply see the mass of vibrations—chemical and physical changes. From this 
example we see that this sort of analysis would not do….
External analysis will go to the brain and find physical and chemical changes. 
It would never succeed [in answering the questions]: What is the consciousness? 
What is your imagination? Where does this vast mass of ideas you have come 
from, and where do they go? We cannot deny them. They are facts. I never saw 
my own brain. I have to take for granted I have one. But man can never deny his 
own conscious imagination. (CW7:431-2)
Here, Vivekananda rejects two strategies for explaining consciousness that are 
still being actively discussed by contemporary philosophers of mind—namely, 
materialist reductionism and eliminativism. While materialist reductionism 
seeks to explain consciousness in terms of physical states of the brain, elimi-
nativism goes to the extreme of claiming that first-person consciousness does 
not even exist. Against eliminativism, Vivekananda argues that first-person 
conscious experiences are »facts« that cannot be denied. Against material-
ist reductionism, Vivekananda claims that through the methods of physical 
science, we might be able to demonstrate, at best, that certain »physical and 
chemical changes« in the brain correspond to certain states of conscious-
ness. However, he argues that »[t]he mind cannot be analysed by any external 
machine,« because any such objective scientific analysis of the brain would 
require abandoning the subjective point of view with which conscious experi-
ences are essentially connected (CW7:431). Therefore, he concludes that con-
sciousness cannot be identical to anything material, such as a particular brain 
state. He thereby anticipates Nagel’s argument against reductionism in his in-
fluential article »What Is It Like to Be a Bat?« (1974). As Nagel (1974: 437) puts 
it, »every subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a single point 
of view, and it seems inevitable that an objective, physical theory will abandon 
that point of view.« Vivekananda can also be seen as anticipating Chalmers’s 
distinction between »easy« and »hard« problems of consciousness, since 
Vivekananda distinguishes the easy problem of identifying the neural corre-
lates of consciousness from the hard problem of explaining the nature of con-
sciousness and how and why it is correlated with certain brain states.
Now we can come back to Vivekananda’s involution argument for pan-
psychism. The reason I include his denial of materialist reductionism as the 
second premise of his involution argument will be obvious once we go on to 
discuss premise 3. If materialist reductionism holds, then consciousness would 
be identical to a brain state, and there would be no difficulty in explaining 
how consciousness—taken to be wholly physical—could have evolved from 
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non-conscious matter at a certain point in the evolutionary process. Hence, al-
though Vivekananda does not explicitly state premise 2 in the context of his in-
volution argument for panpsychism, he nonetheless presupposes this premise.
Vivekananda defends premise 3 (the denial of emergentism) on the basis 
of the first two premises. As Vivekananda himself notes, many of his contem-
poraries subscribed to emergentism, the view that consciousness emerged 
at a late stage in evolutionary history. He defines the emergentist position as 
follows: »It is in man and the higher animals that we find intelligence, but 
millions of years have passed in this world before this intelligence came.« 
Vivekananda refutes emergentism by appealing to the doctrine of the pre-
existent effect (premise 1): »[W]hat is this intelligence? If it was not present 
in the protoplasm, it must have come all of a sudden, something coming out 
of nothing, which is absurd.« According to Vivekananda, the emergentist view 
that conscious intelligence arose from non-conscious matter at a certain point 
in our evolutionary history is »absurd« because it is tantamount to holding 
that something can come from nothing, a position that is ruled out by premise 
1. Since consciousness is distinct from matter (premise 2) and something can-
not come from nothing, consciousness could not possibly have emerged from 
non-conscious matter.
In the statement just cited in which Vivekananda refutes emergentism, he 
also introduces the conclusion 4: the only way to avoid the »absurd« doctrine 
of emergentism is to assume that conscious intelligence was already »pres-
ent in the protoplasm.« In other words, he believes that premise 3 makes it 
reasonable to accept panpsychism, the view that consciousness is present in 
everything. Just as the entire tree was »involved«—that is, present in a latent 
form—in the seed from which it grew, consciousness was involved, in the dis-
tant past, even in the most primitive forms of matter and life. As he puts it, the 
»perfect man … was involved in the cell of the protoplasm….«
Vivekananda was not alone among his contemporaries in defending pan-
psychism. In fact, both W.K. Clifford (1845-1879) and William James (1842-1910) 
presented similar arguments for panpsychism. Like Vivekananda, James ar-
gued in his Principles of Psychology (1950 [1890]: 149), »If evolution is to work 
smoothly, consciousness in some shape must have been present at the very origin 
of things.« Likewise, Clifford (1874: 60-1) argued that the »doctrine of evolu-
tion« rules out the possibility of emergentism—which would have amount-
ed to an »enormous … jump from one creature to another«—and claimed, 
therefore, that there is consciousness or protoconsciousness »even in the 
Amoeba.« Vivekananda may even have been aware of the pan(proto?)psychist 
views of Clifford or James. However, Vivekananda was unique among his con-
temporaries in arguing for panpsychism on the basis of the doctrine of the 
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pre-existent effect (premise 1). For Vivekananda, since evolution presupposes 
material causation, it is an instantiation of the more general Sāṃkhyan doc-
trine that every effect pre-exists in its material cause.
It is also worth noting that contemporary philosophers of mind like Thomas 
Nagel and Philip Goff have advanced so-called »genetic« arguments for pan-
psychism that are very similar to Vivekananda’s involution argument. Recently, 
Nagel (2012: 14-15) has argued for panpsychism on the grounds that »evolu-
tionary biology … cannot account for the appearance of consciousness and 
of other phenomena that are not physically reducible.« Similarly, Goff (2013) 
defends a »sorites-style argument for panpsychism« based on the assumption 
of the truth of evolutionary theory. According to Goff (2017b), if we assume 
that emergentism is true and that consciousness does not admit of border-
line cases, then »we will have to suppose that some utterly precise micro-
level change—down to an exact arrangement of particles—marked the first 
appearance of consciousness…, and it is going to seem arbitrary that it was 
that utterly precise change that was responsible for this significant change in 
nature.«19 Vivekananda’s involution argument for panpsychism has great con-
temporary relevance in this respect, since his unique appeal to the doctrine of 
the pre-existent effect arguably provides additional support for such genetic 
arguments.
Now that Vivekananda takes himself to have established the plausibility 
of panpsychism in general, he goes on to inquire into the precise nature of 
the all-pervasive consciousness that is »involved« even in primitive matter: 
»The question is: The involution of what? What was involved? God.« In order 
to justify his move from panpsychism in general to the specific view that the 
all-pervasive consciousness is Divine Consciousness (»God«), he presents the 
following argument:
Argument 2: Vivekananda’s Argument for Panentheistic Cosmopsychism
1.  Argument from Design: The traditional argument that this universe 
presents evidence of design makes it reasonable to believe that there 
exists a divine intelligence.
2.  Existence of Mystical Claims: There are credible mystics, such as Sri 
Ramakrishna, who claim to have directly perceived an all-pervasive 
Divine Consciousness.
3.  Argument for the Epistemic Value of Mystical Experience: Given certain 
uncontroversial epistemic principles of perceptual justification and 
19   This is Goff ’s own summary of his argument in Goff 2013.
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perceptual testimony and other relevant premises, it is reasonable for 
us to believe that the reported spiritual experiences of credible mys-
tics are veridical.
4.  Plausibility of Panentheistic Cosmopsychism: Therefore, it is reason-
able to believe that there exists an all-pervasive Divine Consciousness. 
( from 1-3)
In the long passage cited above, Vivekananda explicitly states premise 1 and 
the conclusion 4, and he hints at premise 2. I will argue that he also implicitly 
presupposes premise 3, which he explicitly articulates and defends in detail 
elsewhere. The fact that he explicitly appeals only to the design argument in 
this particular passage should not lead us to think that he arrives at the con-
clusion of panentheistic cosmopsychism on the basis of that argument alone. 
I will argue that the argument for the epistemic value of mystical experience, 
which he took to be even stronger than the design argument, is crucial to his 
argument for panentheistic cosmopsychism.
Vivekananda’s first step in establishing the nature of the all-pervasive con-
sciousness is to appeal to the »ancient design« argument (premise 1): the uni-
verse displays »intelligence« in its »adjustment of part to part.« He does not 
present the design argument in all its details, since he assumed that his British 
audience was familiar with it. Vivekananda’s language of »adjustment of part 
to part« suggests that he likely had in mind William Paley’s famous 1802 argu-
ment from design. Paley’s argument runs as follows. When we inspect a watch, 
we find that »its several parts are framed and put together for a purpose, e.g. 
that they are so formed and adjusted as to produce motion, and that motion so 
regulated as to point out the hour of the day« (Paley 1802: 2). This adjustment 
of part to part in the watch makes it reasonable to infer that »the watch must 
have had a maker« (Paley 1802: 3). The natural world as a whole resembles the 
watch in its adjustment of part to part, though on a much vaster scale and with 
much greater complexity. Therefore, it is reasonable to infer that the natural 
world was designed by a great and powerful divine intelligence.
Vivekananda’s apparently uncritical acceptance of the design argument 
here is somewhat misleading, since in numerous other lectures, his stance 
toward the design argument is much more ambivalent, if not critical. For in-
stance, in his lecture on »Vedic Religious Ideals,« he asserts that the design 
argument »is not a very logical argument, as we all know; there is something 
childish about it, yet it is the only little bit of anything we can know about 
God from the external world, that this world required a builder« (CW1:353). 
Vivekananda’s overall position, then, seems to be that while the design argu-
ment is not very strong, it does lend some support to the belief that this world 
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was designed by a divine intelligence. As I argued in chapter 4, his views on the 
design argument were likely influenced by John Stuart Mill’s ambivalent treat-
ment of the design argument in his Three Essays on Religion (1874). According 
to Mill (1874: 174), Darwin’s theory of evolution through the mechanism of the 
»survival of the fittest,« if true, »would greatly attenuate the evidence for« a 
Divine Creator, since it would account for the adjustment of part to part in the 
natural world in wholly naturalistic terms. However, Mill believed that no one 
had yet been able to prove that natural selection could explain all instances 
of apparent design in the natural world. Therefore, he concluded that »in the 
present state of our knowledge, the adaptations in Nature afford a large bal-
ance of probability in favour of creation by intelligence« (Mill 1874: 174). As I 
already mentioned, Vivekananda, like Mill, partially accepted Darwin’s theory 
of evolution through natural selection, arguing that natural selection can ac-
count for the traits of lower animals but cannot explain the moral and spiritual 
qualities of human beings (CW7:154). Hence, I believe that Vivekananda agreed 
with Mill in holding that the design argument, though significantly weakened 
by Darwin’s evolutionary theory, still gives us some reason to believe that this 
world was designed by a divine intelligence.
The next step in Vivekananda’s argument is to inquire into the precise 
nature of this divine intelligence, the existence of which has been made at 
least somewhat plausible by premise 1 (the argument from design). Premises 2 
and 3 comprise Vivekananda’s primary argument for believing that the divine 
intelligence is the all-pervasive Divine Consciousness. Premise 2 is the relative-
ly uncontroversial one that credible mystics like his own guru Sri Ramakrishna 
claim to have directly experienced the all-pervasive Divine Consciousness. He 
hints at this premise in the long passage cited earlier when he refers to »the 
perfect man,« »the God-man« who has realized the Divine Consciousness. At 
the end of the passage, he also cites Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 4.3 as scriptural 
support for his panentheistic cosmopsychism: »Thou art the man, Thou art the 
woman … Thou art everything, O Lord.« Vivekananda looked upon scriptures 
like the Upaniṣads as records of the statements of enlightened »Rishis« who 
directly »realised« certain »supersensuous« facts (CW2:60). For Vivekananda, 
it was the modern sage Sri Ramakrishna who reaffirmed the panentheistic 
spiritual vision of these Upaniṣadic sages. In particular, as we discussed ear-
lier, Sri Ramakrishna claimed to have attained the mystical state of »vijñāna,« 
which disclosed to him that »everything was Divine Consciousness« (Gupta 
1992: 345). Sri Ramakrishna specifically taught the young Vivekananda that 
»there is a state higher than« Advaitic nirvikalpa samādhi, and he described this 
higher state as the realization that the Lord is »all that exists« (Chetanananda 
1997: 36).
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Of course, even if people like Sri Ramakrishna claim to have experienced 
the all-pervasive Divine Consciousness, what reason do we have to believe 
them? Vivekananda answers this question in premise 3, the argument for the 
epistemic value of mystical experience, which he develops in detail in other 
lectures and writings. Since I discuss this argument in detail in the fifth chapter 
of my book manuscript in progress, I will only provide here the barest outline 
of his argument. Vivekananda’s key move is to derive a principle of epistemic 
justification from the traditional Indian doctrine of pratyakṣa-pramāṇa (the 
perceptual means of knowledge): »What is the proof of God? Direct percep-
tion, Pratyaksha. The proof of this wall is that I perceive it« (CW1:415). Here 
and elsewhere, Vivekananda advances a Principle of Perception as Epistemic 
Justification (hereafter PEJ), which I would reconstruct as follows:
When a subject S has a perceptual experience which she takes to be of x, S is 
thereby rationally justified in concluding that she really does experience x un-
less there are good reasons to think her experience is delusive.
Moreover, Vivekananda defends PEJ by arguing that its denial would leave us 
»no place to stand on this side of nihilism,« since we presuppose this prin-
ciple whenever we act on the basis of our sense-perceptual experiences in our 
day-to-day lives (CW1:199). On the basis of PEJ and other relevant premises, 
Vivekananda argues that just as we are rationally justified in accepting as real 
what we perceive through our senses, mystics are rationally justified in accept-
ing as real the transcendental entities such as God or the Ātman which they 
perceive through supersensuous perception.
But what about those of us who do not enjoy mystical experiences? Is it 
reasonable for us non-mystics to believe the testimony of mystics? In response 
to this question, Vivekananda reconceives the traditional Indian doctrine of 
śabda-pramāṇa (the testimonial means of knowledge) as a principle of per-
ceptual testimony rooted in PEJ. According to Vivekananda, a credible per-
son’s claims about her own »direct perception« count as »direct evidence« 
for the rest of us (CW1:204-5). I take him to be championing here a Principle 
of Perceptual Testimony as Epistemic Justification (hereafter PTEJ), which I 
would formulate as follows:
Others are rationally justified in believing that S’s perceptual experience is as 
S reports it to be, unless they have some reason to believe that S is deluded or 
deceiving them.
According to Vivekananda, if we are rationally justified in believing the sense-
perceptual testimony of ordinary people, then we are also rationally justified 
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in believing the testimony of credible mystics like Sri Ramakrishna who claim 
to have perceived that everything is Divine Consciousness. He concludes, 
therefore, that the »words« of »Yogis« who »have seen the truth« count as »di-
rect evidence« for the existence of the supersensuous realities they claim to 
have perceived (CW1:204).
Vivekananda’s defense of PEJ and PTEJ resonates strongly with contempo-
rary philosophical defenses of similar epistemic principles, including Richard 
Swinburne’s (2004: 293-326) principles of credulity and testimony, James 
Pryor’s (2000) perceptual dogmatism, and Michael Huemer’s (2001) phenom-
enal conservatism. Moreover, on the basis of these twin epistemic principles, 
Vivekananda advances an argument for the epistemic value of mystical expe-
rience that has remarkable affinities with the »arguments from religious ex-
perience« developed by recent philosophers of religion like Swinburne (2004: 
293-326), Jerome Gellman (1997), and Kai-Man Kwan (2006).
Premises 1-3, Vivekananda argues, make it reasonable for us to accept 
panentheistic cosmopsychism, the view that the sole reality is an all-pervasive 
Divine Consciousness. As he puts it, »Everything that you see, feel, or hear, the 
whole universe … is the Lord Himself…. He it is that comes down and becomes 
the lowest atom, and slowly unfolding His nature, rejoins Himself.«
Notice, then, that the conclusion of Argument 2 specifies the precise nature 
of the all-pervasive consciousness already established by Argument 1 (the in-
volution argument for panpsychism): namely, that the all-pervasive conscious-
ness is Divine Consciousness. Arguments 1 and 2 are also mutually supportive, 
since they provide independent grounds for believing that some form of pan-
psychism is true. Taken together, Arguments 1 and 2, if successful, make it 
reasonable to believe not only that panpsychism is true but that the most plau-
sible form of panpsychism is panentheistic cosmopsychism. However, from 
Vivekananda’s perspective, in order to achieve absolute certainty of the truth 
of panentheistic cosmopsychism, we would have to follow in the footsteps of 
mystics like the Upaniṣadic sages and Sri Ramakrishna, who attained the direct 
supersensuous perception of the all-pervading Divine Consciousness through 
intensive spiritual practice.
Of course, much more would need to be said to clarify and defend fully 
Vivekananda’s panentheistic cosmopsychism. However, I hope to have shown 
in this chapter that his cosmopsychist position is a sophisticated and origi-
nal one that deserves to be taken seriously by contemporary philosophers. To 
conclude, I will summarize four significant advantages of Vivekananda’s dis-
tinctive cosmopsychist position over rival theories of consciousness. First, by 
conceiving mind as a subtle form of matter, Vivekananda not only accounts for 
the causal efficacy of mental states but also welcomes naturalistic explanations 
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of a wide range of cognitive phenomena like learning, remembering, and in-
formation processing. Second, his cosmopsychist position avoids the subject 
combination problem, which is the major pitfall for micropsychist theories. 
Third, since his panentheistic cosmopsychism is based on grounding by mani-
festation, it is arguably better equipped than other cosmopsychist theories to 
address various forms of the decombination problem. Fourth, he makes the 
radical claim that his panentheistic cosmopsychism can be empirically veri-
fied through mystical experience. While a small handful of contemporary phi-
losophers have begun to consider the relevance of meditative techniques and 
mystical experience to debates about consciousness, Vivekananda has gone 
much further than any of them in defending the epistemic value of mystical 
experience on the basis of general epistemic principles. For too long, the phi-
losophy of mind has been almost entirely isolated from the philosophy of reli-
gion. By bringing these two fields into fruitful dialogue, Vivekananda remains 
very much our contemporary.
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